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
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HISTORICAL MEMOIR
OF
A MISSION
TO
THE COURT OF VIENNA
IN 1806.

BY
THE RT. HON. SIR ROBERT ADAIR, G.C.B.

WITH
A SELECTION FROM HIS DESPATCHES,

PUBLISHED BY PERMISSION OF THE PROPER AUTHORITIES.

in a question of definite liability ref.
to Adair as follows: "It was never, never
substantiated, and certain those characters were
all suspicion, has LONDON:

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LONDON:

Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-Street-Square.

TO
EARL GREY.

MY DEAR LORD,

I INSCRIBE to you this record of a period, full of danger to Europe, and of difficulty in our relations with the Continental Powers, in which you bore a distinguished part. Accept it, in remembrance of the great man whom, on his death, you succeeded in the direction of our Foreign Affairs. Accept it, also, in the name of our fifty years' friendship, increasing on my side in veneration as life and its businesses recede from me.

ROBERT ADAIR.

Chesterfield Street, Mayfair,
10th April, 1844.

ADVERTISEMENT.

It was originally intended by the author of this Memoir that it should not be published during his lifetime ; but the many and increasing errors of the Foreign Press in commenting on the matters of which it treats, induce him to alter his purpose. He lays it before the Public therefore now, in order that, if necessary, recourse may be had for the truth of his statements to the testimony of some eminent men still living, and who were employed in planning and executing the foreign policy of England in 1806.

He avails himself likewise of the official permission granted to him by Lord Palmerston, and not withdrawn by Lord Aberdeen, to print such parts of his despatches from the Court of Vienna, where he was employed at that period, as might not be prejudicial to the public service. Prince Metternich's consent, without which their publication would not have been proper, has been notified to him through her Majesty's ambassador at that Court.

CONTENTS.

	Pages
INTRODUCTION - - - - -	1—6
MEMOIR - - - - -	7—314
Causes of the Commencement and Rupture of the Negociation for Peace in 1806, between England and France - - - - -	21—82
Transactions, until the Cessation of Diplomatic Intercourse between England and Austria -	83—106
Despatches to Mr. Fox, Lord Howick, and Mr. Can- ning, until Lord Pembroke's Arrival at Vienna, July 3. 1807 - - - - -	107—256
Despatches continued from Lord Pembroke's De- parture, September, 1807, until February 21. 1808 - - - - -	257—314
APPENDIX: Correspondence - - - - -	315—441
LETTER to Count Stadion - - - - -	443—470
REMARKS on M. Gentz's Narrative of what passed at the Prussian Head-Quarters in October, 1806, previously to the Battle of Jena - - - - -	471—492
REMARKS on M. Gentz's Observations on the Nego- ciations of 1806, for Peace between England and France - - - - -	493—532

INTRODUCTION.

It is observed by Mr. Fox, in his historical work on the reign of James II., that "in reading the history of every country, there are certain periods at which the mind naturally pauses to meditate upon and consider them with reference, not only to their immediate effects, but to their remote consequences." Two such periods will occur to him who reads the history of the revolutionary war with France, and the part taken in it by Great Britain. His first pause will be at the peace of Amiens, in 1802; his second, at the general peace and settlement (as it was called) of Europe, in 1815. The period at which it shall be given him to fix his thoughts, and to take into his view the remote consequences of that war, social as well as political, is still at too great a distance to be more than a subject for speculation. At all events, if he pauses now it is all he can do. The "Two Principles" are still opposed to each other in adverse array.

The narrative which follows, and the documents by which it is accompanied, relate to the second of the above periods, namely, the war which broke out afresh after the peace of Amiens. In rendering them public the Author does not pretend to write a history of that war. It will be enough for his purpose if the materials which he presents shall assist others, better qualified than himself for that task, to establish some truths hitherto little regarded, but the knowledge of which is necessary to place in their proper light the

transactions to which he refers, and the character of the statesmen by whom they were directed.

It was shortly after the commencement of this second period, that Mr. Fox, after a long exclusion from power, became Foreign Minister. The new war, begun under Mr. Addington's administration, and continued by Mr. Pitt until his death, had been distinguished by events the most disastrous to Europe. Mr. Fox's accession to office was the epoch, not of any new system in our foreign relations, but of an honest experiment to reconcile our old system to the new state of things into which the affairs of the Continent appeared to have settled down. The experiment of peace with France, *as a state*, partially tried by Mr. Addington, in 1802, by a treaty which never was executed, was now again to be attempted by Mr. Fox, disincumbered indeed from all obstacles of form, but incalculably aggravated in point of difficulty by the increased power and resources of France, and by the recent discomfiture at Austerlitz of a confederacy, the last which it seemed possible to oppose to her. References to the negotiations at Paris, in 1806, will occupy consequently an important place in the following work.

But in order fully to understand this part of the subject, and in some measure likewise the cause, which, by encouraging Napoleon to ask too much, eventually occasioned the rupture of these negotiations, it will be proper to take a short view of Mr. Fox's political situation at the time at which he opened them.

On the breaking out of the first war in 1793, Mr. Fox declared his determined opposition to its principle and its policy. The debates on those topics involved every conceivable subject of English interests, foreign as well as domestic, and were carried on not only with the gravity proportioned to their import-

ance, but with all that personal earnestness and party zeal with which an honest conviction of their value had inspired the statesmen who took part in them. Exaggeration, of course, on both sides soon embittered our divisions; and such was the extent of alarm and horror excited among all ranks of our population, by the doctrines and actions of the French revolutionary chiefs, that every endeavour to find out some rational means of avoiding war was regarded as an approbation of their enormities, and the proposer of such a course as little better than their accomplice.

The war, consequently, had not continued long before there began to prevail among a great portion of what may be called the governing classes of this country, an opinion that Mr. Fox had become so enamoured of the French Revolution as to have lost sight of all his old English principles. How this opinion became prevalent it would be long, although not difficult, to explain. It originated, undoubtedly, in the separation which, from the opposite views entertained of that revolution as influencing the destinies of the world, and more especially with regard to the most prudent manner of dealing with it in reference to ourselves, had taken place among the leaders of the Whig party. With the classes above-mentioned the speeches and writings of Mr. Burke were decisive. Every where they had given the tone to the public feeling. When to these considerations are added the really mischievous designs of an extreme popular faction then beginning to form itself, Mr. Pitt's dexterity in connecting and confounding the old reformers with this faction, and in availing himself of the vantage ground thus given him, so as, in all discussions on our existing institutions, to throw his antagonists on the defensive, it will not be wondered at that such powerful causes, all operating together and aided by nearly the whole of the daily

press, should have produced the effect described, and that through them Mr. Fox should have been exhibited to the world as a dangerous man, who, if ever he obtained power, would use it to bring about such changes in our English system as he and his friends might think best calculated to fit and adapt it to that of France.

If, with all their absurdity, such notions as these obtained credit at home, they could not fail to be received generally abroad. In France especially,—and such was the necessary consequence of this unwise scheme of detraction—he was believed to be so much on their side in his views of foreign affairs, that his accession to office was looked forward to as the epoch, not only of a peace favourable to France in its direct stipulations, but of a strict incorporating alliance with her.

Such were the circumstances personal to Mr. Fox, under which he came into power, in February, 1806. It was not long afterwards that negotiations for peace were set on foot. Here, therefore, in the judgment of those who did not know him, was to be the test of his character as an English statesman. Here would speedily be brought to the proof the consistency of his opposition to the war-system of his predecessors, with his old opinions as a supporter and advocate of the European policy of King William. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, the negotiations were to be under his immediate conduct and control. How, and on what principles would he conduct them? Having condemned the war as unjust, would he incline towards France in the terms of the peace? Having reprobated the intervention of the continental powers in the settlement of her internal concerns as a violation of the law of nations, would he take for his guidance the new version of that law asserted and promulgated by France, or would he adhere to the

established usages of Europe, and his own early principles of resistance to her power and preponderance?

The reader of the following pages, after considering them, will answer these questions for himself. He will form his judgment from the transactions to which they relate; and perhaps in a small degree from the part borne by the Author, small as the then circumstances and condition of Europe necessarily rendered it, in executing Mr. Fox's instructions to him on his appointment as Minister to the Court of Vienna.

It is for this purpose that he now offers to the public, with permission from the proper authorities, some extracts from his despatches while at the Court of Vienna. They extend from June 1806 to February 1808, when his mission was brought to an end. They were carried on consequently beyond Mr. Fox's life, and the continuance in office of the administration of which he formed a part. During the whole of this latter period the Author continued in the same course of action with which he began his mission, without receiving from the Ministers who succeeded Lord Grenville's government any instructions in a different sense or spirit. He is entitled therefore to assume that on the main points of English European policy which, under Mr. Fox's directions, he had been pressing on the consideration of the Austrian government, they saw no reason to alter the line of conduct which had been prescribed to him by their predecessors.

These letters, it will be observed, relate to a point of history which may be said to stand alone, in some measure, in the picture of Mr. Fox's political life. Since his twenty years' exclusion from power, which began when he was but six and thirty years old, and during the whole of the war with France, this was the only opportunity he had had of proving by his actions

when he came into direct contact with the new system, how much better adapted he considered the old one to be for the administration of the foreign interests of such a country as Great Britain.

The Author has a further motive for dwelling somewhat particularly on the negociation for peace in 1806. On its failure some of Mr. Fox's warm friends so far mistook the character of that transaction, as to have persuaded themselves that it had been rendered ineffectual, not so much from any disinclination on his part to conclude a treaty on the terms offered by Napoleon, as from his having been over-ruled by what, in their total ignorance of facts, they called a war-party in the Cabinet. The same notion was taken up at the time by a great portion of the continental press, as well as by individuals of no small note, with whom the Author has had the benefit of conversing at various periods of his intercourse with foreign statesmen. It is his wish, and he thinks it his duty, to correct this error as far as he possesses the means; and he trusts that whoever may be disposed to study this period of English history with the special purpose of understanding the true character of Mr. Fox's policy, and not to rest satisfied with what he will find about it in the party records, and "*basse littérature*" of the day, may read with some advantage the documents which are here laid before him.

MEMOIR.

THE state of Europe in 1806—the new combination of interests which had arisen upon the breaking out afresh of the war between Great Britain and France, by the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens—the continued subjection of Prussia and Germany to the ascendancy of France, together with the line of policy which, after the disastrous peace of Presburg, an overwhelming necessity prescribed to Austria, until the great day of their common emancipation, have long become matter of history. They are divested of that obscurity which attends diplomatic transactions while in progress, and may now be understood by any one who will give himself the trouble to examine the public documents within his reach. Not so the efforts made by England and Russia, and, in her own prudent way, by Austria herself, although not then in alliance with either, to save the sinking vessel of European independence. These are but little known; and are besides so lost in the great results of succeeding years, that it will be a task of some difficulty to revive their remembrance, and to place them where they deserve to stand in the history of our eventful times. I will endeavour to perform this task.

Among the first and wisest of those efforts, was the attempt made by the administration recently formed by Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, to make peace with

France. The measured, and, at the same time, generous policy of Great Britain in that attempt, had for its basis not merely a settlement between us and France as to our mutual objects and individual interests, but the keeping together and preserving, at almost any cost to ourselves, the shattered remnants of Europe, and the elements of her federative system. With these purposes in view, Mr. Fox in February 1806, entered upon his administration of foreign affairs. To effect them by arms was no easy task. All the military strength of Europe that could be relied on in a contest with France had been dispersed by the recent defeat of the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. The finances of both those powers were exhausted. Great Britain was not in a condition to help them, either by subsidies or loans, and—worse than all—the principle of concert and union, so often abused by the several powers for the attainment of separate advantages, was by this time nearly worn out among them, and had lost that support of mutual confidence without which it never can be brought to act for a common cause. The connection of Prussia with France, founded on a scheme of partial neutrality incompatible with the existence of the old Germanic empire, more or less intimate, but in some form or other ever subsisting under all the different forms of government which France had given to herself since the peace of Basle, and the gradual fusion of the German States on the Rhine into the same system, had effectually broken the great chain of association through which alone the friends of continental independence could hope to erect any thing like a defensive barrier against her power.

It is not the purpose of this memoir to dwell on the many circumstances which contributed to produce this disunion. The fact of its existence is all that is now necessary to notice. For the causes, we may

consult the profound writings of Mr. Burke, who in deep bitterness of heart has thus laid them open to the common eye :—

“ As long as there was any appearance of success,” writes Mr. Burke in reasoning upon the failure of the first war against France, “ the spirit of aggrandisement, and consequently the spirit of mutual jealousy seized on the coalesced powers. Some sought accession of territory at the expense of France ; some at the expense of each other ; some at the expense of third parties ; and when the vicissitude of disaster took its turn, they found common distress a treacherous bond of faith and friendship.

“ It would answer no great purpose to enter into the particular errors of the war. The whole has been but one error. It was but nominally a war of alliance. As the combined powers pursued it, there was nothing to hold an alliance together. There could be no tie of honour in a society for pillage.”*

It will be seen but too often in the transactions which are here commemorated, how this incurable spirit of discord among the chief powers repelled every approach towards a scheme for common action among them, when fresh vicissitudes of disaster showing themselves in the worst of all shapes—that of impending foreign conquest—had thoroughly awakened them to a sense of their common danger.

Mr. Fox, on entering his office, found it full of despatches and other documents, verifying to the fullest extent this gloomy prospect of continental affairs. Something, however, was to be tried. The power of Russia, notwithstanding the disasters at Austerlitz, was still standing erect. Her last alliance with Austria, indeed, as to its specified objects, had been put an end to by the Treaty of Presburg, but for all the

* Letters on a Regicide Peace.

purposes of a common cause her alliance with England still subsisted. We had an alliance too with the king of the Two Sicilies ; and we were on friendly terms with Austria. Here were Mr. Fox's means, and his only means, for protecting the Continent from the arms of France, if unhappily the failure of the negotiation for peace should render the continuance of war inevitable.

The nature and extent of these means clearly pointed out the use of them. Powerless for aggression or for the recovery of lost ground, in any defensive scheme of resistance they might be made to go far and to last long. At the same time they excluded no active measures in advance which the fortune of war might give encouragement to. The whole system of the new ministry, therefore, might be comprised in the two words, "*voir venir*." Building on this rock, and without ostentatiously aiming at successes out of their reach, they patiently waited the sure result of a policy through which, in a few years afterwards, and in spite of all intervening obstacles and disasters, Europe, with resources preserved and with energy restored, was to work out its own way to peace, freedom, and security.

The embassy at St. Petersburg was then filled by Lord Granville Leveson, and in his absence its duties were discharged by Mr. Stuart ; men who were then laying the foundation for the high character and rank which they have now reached in their public life. They were succeeded by the Marquis of Douglas.

The situation of Sicily, menaced by the immediate neighbourhood of a French army, made it necessary to entrust the commander-in-chief of our forces in that kingdom with diplomatic authority, and General Fox accordingly was accredited as minister to the Court of Palermo.

We were on such terms with Sweden as to render it fit that we should stipulate for her interests as an

ally, if we did not admit her into the general negotiation for peace.

Our relations with Prussia at this period were doubtful, and in one respect hostile. The occupation of Hanover was an act of aggression which placed the King of England in a state of war with that power; and it remained for His Majesty, guided by considerations of prudence alone, to determine in the then situation of his continental interests, how far he would avail himself of his belligerent rights. The Prussian envoy, Baron Jacobi, however, remained still in London, and Mr. Jackson continued in the same capacity at Berlin.

Our envoy at Vienna was Sir Arthur Paget, and on his recal, or rather resignation, I was appointed to succeed him.* I had no regular instructions from Mr. Fox. There was nothing in his office on which to ground any. Long habits of indulgent regard (it could be nothing else) had led him probably to believe that I should not abuse the confidence expressed in the remarkable words with which, on my asking for instructions, he dismissed me:—"I have none to give you. Go to Vienna, and send me yours." These words were my guide in many transactions which occurred during my residence there, and chiefly so when the occupation of Germany by the French armies deprived me of all means of communi-

* Sir Arthur's resignation arose from his high sense of honour and delicacy. He thought himself bound to offer it, in consequence of the publication of one of his despatches, in which he had given an account, as it was his duty to do, of the causes which led to the capitulation of Ulm, and the failure of the last campaign. In this narrative, necessarily most confidential, it was not possible to avoid mentioning names and proceedings of distinguished persons, in a manner, that if divulged must obviously lessen his efficiency with them in treating of other concerns. Mr. Fox himself had no intention of removing Sir Arthur Paget. He had the highest opinion of his ability, and told me, when I took leave of him, that he had found no better despatches in his office than his. — R. A.

cating with England; but they were not sufficient to authorise me to act with decision in cases easily to be foreseen, when it would be out of my power to await orders from thence. On my pressing him therefore for some specification of the points he particularly wished me to attend to, he wrote them down as follows:—

“ To express on all occasions the most perfect goodwill to Austria, and to tranquillise her perfectly, with regard to any apprehensions she may entertain of our getting her into a scrape for the purposes of Russia and Great Britain, or even for that of the general advantage of Europe. She cannot wish to avoid war more than we wish she should.

“ To suggest to her the possibility of her not being able to avoid it by any concession whatever, and to advise her to make up her mind speedily, to what she will do in such a contingency.

“ To observe that it is very doubtful whether Russia will give up the mouths of the Cattaro. If she apprehends an approaching war in the south-west parts of the Ottoman Empire, such a concession from Russia is scarcely to be expected. But even if, in kindness to Austria, she should give up a place which she considers to be of such value, it is still to be feared that Bonaparte will take some other pretence for quarrelling with Austria. On this supposition also, it is necessary for the Cabinet of Vienna to make up her mind. At all events, let not a danger, which may go to her very existence, come upon her unawares.

“ If there is war, how is Vienna to be defended? or can it be defended at all?

“ To admonish them (without however taking any tone of superiority), that they can expect no safety unless the war be begun and managed with the perfect concurrence of the generals, and especially the

Arch-Duke Charles, and that there ought to be no difference of opinion among the members of the Cabinet. Those who do not concur with the leading power ought to quit. The generals ought all to act under the Arch-Duke, and to be such as he approves.

“If there should be any means of preserving peace, we will favour that design by keeping most perfectly secret any good understanding that may exist between us, and confine our intercourse (except when opportunity offers of secret and confidential communication) to that of mutual respect and civility.

“If Razamowski be still at Vienna, to cultivate his friendship, and show him every proof of entire confidence.”

On putting this paper into my hands, Mr. Fox further told me to observe to Count Stadion, in my first conference with him, that it appeared to our Cabinet that Austria was not sufficiently aware of her danger.

My first audience of the Emperor was on the 18th June 1806, for the delivery of my credentials, and my first confidential conference with his minister immediately followed. In this interview I laid open to him without reserve the whole course of policy intended to be pursued by the new Government. I told him explicitly that the system of forcing or persuading foreign powers, by means of subsidies, to enter into wars against their own conception of their interests, if ever it had been acted upon by England, was now effectually renounced; but that at the same time, and particularly with reference to the present situation of Austria, if she should feel herself in real danger from fresh exactions and injuries on the part of France, we were not the less determined to assist her in a defensive war; and I did not neglect to repeat to him Mr. Fox's last words to me, “that Austria did not appear sufficiently aware of her danger.”

After this nothing of importance occurred, until by

accounts received from Paris, it appeared that the negotiations for peace which had hitherto * been confined to unofficial communications, were about to be opened regularly between Great Britain and France, and that a Russian plenipotentiary was expected there to take part in them. This was an anxious moment for Austria. Hard as were the terms of the peace which she had just concluded at Presburg, it was her wish as well as her interest to maintain it; and she could not but be aware that her best hope of doing so and of escaping from fresh exactions under pretext of a renewal of hostilities between France and Russia, lay in the success of a negotiation which would render the peace general throughout Europe. On the other hand, she could not be indifferent as to the terms of such a pacification. She would naturally be anxious, first, that in principle the peace might be one in which all the belligerents should concur by a common act, and next—for she could hope for nothing better—that the territorial condition of Europe should remain as it was. Taking no part herself, however, that might enable her to influence the negotiations, she watched them with the most intense anxiety; and when the principle of negotiation on the basis of the *uti possidetis* announced in M. de Talleyrand's first confidential communication to Mr. Fox, was acceded to by England, Austria joined cordially in the common wish and hope that a treaty upon that basis, comprehending all the belligerents, might speedily be brought to a conclusion.

One of the chief advantages which presented itself to Austria of making a peace on this basis was the preservation of Sicily to the king of Naples. Ill informed by his correspondents at the Court of Palermo, that Court itself misled by the most erroneous accounts

* From March 5th, the date of Monsieur de Talleyrand's first letter to Mr. Fox, until June 16th, the date of Lord Yarmouth's return to Paris.

from its minister at London, whom the British Cabinet did not think fit to admit into their confidence, Count Stadion had entertained some doubts whether we might not give way on this essential point, and agree to propose to his Sicilian Majesty some compensation for that island; but on my repeated assurances that there was no intention on our part of listening to any proposal of that nature, I succeeded in removing his suspicions.*

This was the situation of affairs when Monsieur d'Oubril, the Russian Plenipotentiary appointed to co-operate with Lord Yarmouth, who had been invested with the same character on the part of England, arrived at Vienna on his way to Paris. He stayed there only to communicate his mission to Count Razamoffsky and myself, and on the 23d of June proceeded on his journey.

Of the extent of M. d'Oubril's confidential communications to Count Razamoffsky I am ignorant, but it is my firm belief that he did not inform the Count either of his intention to sign a separate treaty with France, or even that he had powers to do so. His communications to me were very scanty; scarcely more than the fact of his mission for the ostensible purpose of an exchange of prisoners, and of his orders to listen to any overtures which might be made for peace. But he did not fail anxiously to inquire of me what were Mr. Fox's real opinions on the subject of Hanover, and whether he was determined to make its restoration to His Majesty a *sine quâ non* of any treaty.

In a few days after his departure, we received the

* There had been some conversation on this point at Paris, which will be amply noticed in other parts of this Memoir. For the way in which the proposal was received by the English government, consult the diplomatic correspondence laid before parliament, on the rupture of the negotiations. — *Annual Register* for 1806.

astonishing news of his having signed a treaty with France for a separate peace.

In this place, as the serious business of my mission is about to commence, and in order to do full justice both to Count Razamoffsky and M. d'Oubril—to the one for not deceiving me, and to the other for not telling me what he might have thought it his duty to conceal from the ambassador of his own Court—I think it right to publish full extracts from my despatches relative to this subject. Monsieur d'Oubril shall have no reason to complain; for if on Count Razamoffsky's authority I represented him at the time as acting in opposition to his instructions, and as exceeding his powers, I will now repair that error by reprinting the text of those powers as they were published ten years afterwards by authority; and the translation of which will be found among the State Papers of 1806, printed in the Annual Register for that year. From the tenor of these it is clear that in signing a separate treaty, M. d'Oubril did not at least exceed his commission.*

* These instructions are given under the authority of a work, entitled, "*Les Ephémérides Russes, compilation publiée à St. Petersbourg, avec permission de la censure, et aux frais de la Couronne.*" They are as follow:—

"Nous Alexandre I. Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c. &c.

"Portant constamment notre sollicitude à la conservation en Europe du calme et de la tranquillité, et étant mû par un désir sincère de mettre fin à la mésintelligence et de rétablir la bonne harmonie avec la France sur des bases solides, nous avons jugé bon de commettre ce soin à une personne jouissant de notre confiance. A cet effet nous avons choisi, nommé, et autorisé notre aimé et féal Pierre D'Oubril, notre conseiller d'état, et Chevalier des ordres de Saint Wladimir de la troisième classe, de Sainte Anne de la seconde, et de Saint Jean de Jerusalem, comme nous le choisissons, nommons, et autorisons par les présentes, à l'effet d'atteindre ce but, d'entrer en pourparlers avec celui et ceux qui y seront suffisamment autorisés de la part du Gouvernement François, de conclure et signer avec eux un acte ou convention sur des bases propres à affermir la paix qui sera établie entre la Russie et la France, comme à la préparer entre les autres puissances belligérantes de l'Europe.

"Promettans sur notre parole Impériale d'avoir pour bon et d'ex-

The treaty was signed on the 20th July, by the Russian and French plenipotentiaries, and on the 21st Lord Yarmouth presented his full powers for entering into a negotiation on the part of England.

It were needless to describe the effect produced at Vienna when these two events came to be known there: — enough to say that the surprise and consternation were general. Russia deserting the common cause and England following her example! — these, and not without reason, were signs of danger serious enough to perplex the councils of Austria in the precarious state of her own relations with France, after the peace of Presburg. And here began my first and only difference with that excellent minister Count Stadion, of whom I never can speak without the highest respect for his honour and frankness, nor without lasting gratitude for his kindness towards myself. Except at Vienna, justice has rarely been done to him otherwise than for his personal qualities; but in European history he will be remembered as one of those statesmen to whose temper and sagacity Austria owes, in no small degree, her restoration to her present state of independence and stability. It happened that in a conversation on the course of foreign policy adopted by our new ministry, and particularly with reference to the principle on which they meant to conduct the negotiation with France, I had assured him that they never would depart from the old English rule which from the earliest times had governed the system of our continental alliances, and which had a balance

écouter fidèlement tout ce qui aura été arrêté et signé par notre dit Plénipotentiaire, de même de donner notre ratification Impériale dans le terme auquel elle aura été promise.

“ (Signé)

ALEXANDRE.

“ (Contre-signé)

PRINCE ADAM CZARTORYSKY.”

See “*Pièces Justificatives*,” in the *Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*. vol. ix. p. 481.

of power for its object ; and that although we had no prospect for the present of making that balance as even in the scale as might be wished, still we should never make a peace that did not provide a foundation for one, leaving it to time and events to bring it to something like an equipoise. In confirmation of this assurance, I referred him to the cause which had occasioned the suspension of the preliminary correspondence from the time of M. de Talleyrand's first overture in March until May. It had been interrupted, as he knew, because France had refused to admit Russia into it as our ally, on the old pretension of excluding us from continental connections ; nor had it been resumed until she had given way on that vital point, by acknowledging in express terms our unlimited right of intervention and guarantee ; and that it was then, and then only, that Mr. Fox, on consultation with Russia, had consented to a form which admitted of discussing, but only of discussing, separately such matters as pertained to our several interests, common as well as individual. With regard to specific conditions, I had it not in my power to particularise what they were likely to be ; but on one point, namely, the cession of Sicily to France, I could venture positively to assure him that, so far from consenting to its surrender, it was not intended to be made the subject even of negotiation ; that in fact there would be no negotiation at all unless France as a preliminary renounced her demand of Sicily, and returned to her first proposal of the *uti possidetis* ; for it was on the acceptance of that condition alone, that Lord Yarmouth would produce his powers.

After so distinct an assurance, I had no right to be surprised at perceiving some coldness on the part of the minister when he communicated the fact to me, which he did a few days after this conversation, of the presentation of his full powers by Lord Yarmouth

without his having obtained this previous renunciation. At first sight it seemed to be clear, that on this latter point, I had either deceived him, or had been deceived myself; and in either case my credit with him must necessarily be diminished. But this awkward state of our incipient diplomatic relations was sure to cease on the receipt of my next despatches from London. In the full certainty therefore of what they would contain on this head, I ventured to assure him that either some great mistake, or some pressing necessity, must have occurred at Paris to have occasioned such a step on the part of our negociator; and that, after all, France would gain nothing by it but the insignificant advantage of being enabled to perplex the conferences at her pleasure, by the introduction of fresh matter for dispute without the remotest prospect of attaining her end.

In all that I had anticipated on this subject the event fully bore me out. It was soon known that to produce his full powers on the instant, or to quit Paris in twenty-four hours, was the alternative offered to Lord Yarmouth, before M. d'Oubril could have well folded up his treaty. Placed in so new and difficult a situation, the French government having actually refused him the short delay necessary to get fresh instructions upon it from his own government, and unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of an absolute rupture, Lord Yarmouth had indeed given way, and by so doing had admitted that he was ready officially to discuss the pretension of France to place Sicily among the objects to be treated for; but on the other hand it will be no less clear on referring, as we shall shortly do, to the correspondence, that from the beginning to the end the French negociators never advanced a single step towards their object of acquiring Sicily, nor even so far as to obtain an estimation of its value from the British plenipotentiary

in considering what might constitute an equivalent for it.

It is needless to say that my very first despatches from London were of a nature fully to relieve the British government from all suspicion of a vacillating policy on this important occasion, and to reinstate me consequently in the confidence of the Austrian minister.

But in order to sift this whole matter to the bottom, to clear the way for rightly understanding the steadiness and the unity of our policy at this period until Napoleon, failing to separate us from the Continent by his diplomacy, effected it for a time by his arms, it will be necessary to go somewhat at length into the history of these Paris negotiations ; with respect to which, and to the true causes of their rupture, much mis-statement has been hazarded, and much error has prevailed.

CAUSES OF THE COMMENCEMENT AND RUPTURE OF THE
NEGOCIATIONS FOR PEACE IN 1806 BETWEEN
ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

IN order thoroughly to understand the circumstances which led to the negotiations for peace, in 1806, and the reason of their failure, we must look back to the first war with France, in 1793. Into the causes of that war, and by what gradations we got into it, it will not be necessary to enter. The facts are as follow:—A long series of vices and errors had existed in the government of France. The country called for a remedy to them. If the first movers in the revolution looked, for their part, no further than so to limit the monarchy as to obtain through new institutions security against the return of the public evils, other leaders with far different views, and other factions formed on far different principles, soon took the direction of it out of their hands, and, instead of reforming the monarchy, subverted it. These new leaders went further. They passed the celebrated decree of fraternity, holding out to the people of all other countries who might choose to imitate their example the promise of assistance and support. In doing this they had gone beyond the lawful means of defence which every country is justified in employing against its adversaries, and thus put themselves into a state of hostility towards every community, whether monarchical or republican, that was living under a settled government. Europe took the alarm. A revolution so made and so sustained could not be matter of indifference to the neighbours of France, especially to England. It could not be so, whether considered as an example in government, or as her

first step towards the conquest of the world. The question, therefore, for us, was—how to deal with it. The most distinguished leaders of the public opinion at that time were Mr. Pitt, Mr. Burke, and Mr. Fox. Now, in this case, and before any act of direct aggression had been committed on either side, there was a choice as to our mode of proceeding. First, we might make war upon France, and force her back on her old monarchy. Secondly, we might keep aloof, and wait for events, observing a wary and mistrustful neutrality towards her. Thirdly, we might leave her alone; be neutral, but friendly in our neutrality; and above all, throw no obstacles in the way of her internal reforms.

Of these three modes of proceeding, Mr. Burke was for the first; Mr. Fox for the last. The minister took the middle course. He would neither enter into war *for* the old monarchy, nor, if forced into one, continue it *until* its restoration; but he was willing enough to oppose the revolution by arms, if France should give just cause for hostility on other grounds.

The comparative prudence of these different courses it were useless now to discuss; all that is required is to point out clearly the opposition of sentiment which prevailed amongst the great leaders of the state. For the views of Mr. Burke, and his reasoning upon them, we may consult his writings; and Mr. Fox, in his letter to his constituents of December, 1793, has set forth his own in a manner sufficiently explicit to be left as they stand for the judgment of after times. The views of Mr. Pitt, together with his acts, must appear before the same tribunal, to be judged by those rules of historical justice to which all men are amenable whose hands have wielded the destinies of the world.

But the diversity of opinion amongst these eminent men led to other differences, which, as materially

affecting the public measures, must not be overlooked in this narrative; and the less so, as they afford a decisive, although in this instance a painful proof of the soundness of the distinction between a party acting together for national objects and ends, and a mere factious combination to drive a minister from his place.

Many friends of Mr. Fox, some of them connected with him by the strongest ties of affection and confidence from the earliest days of his life, differed from him as to the nature and character of the impending crisis. They dissented not only from the course he proposed, and the opinions by which he recommended it, but thought both of these dangerous to the country and the government; and in their minds it was no small aggravation of the danger that he was insensible to the view which they took of it themselves, and inaccessible to their remonstrances. Taking the obvious line under such circumstances, they withdrew from all participation with him in political counsels; for with them this was no case for compromise, nor even one in which private friendship could follow its impulses in the search of motives for mutual agreement. It may not be superfluous to add, that if ever there was virtue in politics, it was seen and proved on both sides in the separation which then took place among the Whigs. But that virtue was put to a severe, if not a difficult trial. The deep agony of Mr. Fox was witnessed by an assembled Parliament; and if the feeling was not, in its demonstration, reciprocal, allowance must be made for those sterner modes of thinking which made its repression appear a duty. To differences of such a nature there could be but one remedy; not time, but the extinction of their cause.

Such was the state of political sentiment among the leaders when the war broke out. After much

mutual manifestation of ill-feeling, an act of positive aggression was committed on the part of France by the infraction of a treaty to which England was a guaranteeing party. Whether this was the first aggression,—whether, on the other hand, the refusal to receive M. de Chauvelin's credentials from the new government did not constitute such an act of hostility as to justify France in considering herself to be placed in a state of war by us,—is a question of public law wholly beside the purpose of the present work. It is enough that this act of aggression, aggravated by the decree of fraternity already mentioned, brought on an immediate rupture.

For the military events, varying through every form of success and of defeat, and for the political changes in the conduct of foreign powers which occurred from this time until the peace of Amiens, we must consult the public annals. It will not be acting justly, however, towards either of the great parties under whose opposite banners the people of England had ranged themselves, wholly to disconnect the intervening transactions from the opinions and counsels adopted by them at the first breaking out of the revolution.

The war had not lasted long before ill-success began somewhat to sour many of its popular supporters. Under the impatience of disappointment they began to inquire into its object, which seemed to them not sufficiently clear, and to urge that it should be explicitly and intelligibly declared. Mr. Wilberforce, a virtuous and able man, at the head of the two most powerful sects of England in alliance with the church and the state, and partaking himself in all the horror excited by the proceedings of the dominant factions in France, saw the necessity of removing every obstacle in the way of peace which belonged to mere questions of government, and not to

practical security. The restoration of the French monarchy, whether as a cause or an object of war, having been disclaimed by the leaders of every section of opinion except Mr. Burke, he thought it might be practicable not only to open a door for peace, but to reconcile to it all dissentients who in the main agreed in the justice and necessity of the war itself. With this view he moved an amendment to the address to the Crown, on the opening of the session of December, 1794. His proposal (after the usual assurances of support against the enemy) was "to represent to His Majesty that *the time was come* when it would be advisable and expedient to endeavour to restore the blessings of peace."

Opposed to this amendment as to the exact time, but agreeing in the substance of it, Mr. Pitt, on the 28th of the ensuing month, on Mr. Grey's motion "*that the existence of the then government of France ought not to be considered as precluding at this time a negociation for peace,*" brought forward a declaration in the shape of an amendment to that motion, "that he was ready to treat for peace with *any* government, *under whatever form*, in France which should be capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity."

Thus Mr. Wilberforce carried two vital points in this question of the French war, both as to principle and practice. Mr. Pitt, disavowing all extreme doctrines, and admitting that a government, although itself emanating from insurrection, and, therefore, likely enough to encourage insurrection in other states, might yet be capable of maintaining such relations, soon cleared his way to a direct negociation with the Republic; while his high-principled supporters saw no inconsistency in consenting to one, so that the question remained open with regard to the

extent and nature of the security to be demanded, and that he himself was to be the judge of it.

In these advances towards peace Mr. Fox, of course, heartily concurred. He accepted them not only as wise and just in themselves, but as affirming his original proposition, that neither the peace so much desired by Mr. Wilberforce, nor the security required against a revolutionary government, could be obtained otherwise than through a regular negotiation with persons in actual possession of authority in France, no matter how they came by it.

Two negotiations were, therefore, entered into, the one in 1796, the other in 1797. For much of their character, making allowance for his particular view of this great subject, we may consult Mr. Burke's two celebrated "Letters on a Regicide Peace." But the world was not yet ready for peace; nor is it to be wondered at that these attempts failed, considering the temper which then prevailed on both sides.

Matters went on thus until the year 1800, when Mr. Pitt, who had failed also in an endeavour to obtain the consent of the Crown to a measure of home policy favourable to the Roman Catholics of Ireland, resigned his office. He was succeeded by Mr. Addington, who immediately set on foot a third negotiation. More successful than his predecessor, he got as far as a treaty, such as it was, but he never arrived at its execution. Not but that he was himself willing enough to execute it if France would have sat down quietly with what she had gained; but her never-ceasing exactions and usurpations in Piedmont, in Switzerland, and every where within her reach, alarmed him for the state in which Europe had been left under its stipulations, and taught him that his treaty was any thing but a security for peace.

The conditions of that treaty, concluded at Amiens in 1802, were such as to separate those supporters of

the war who thought them on the whole to be as favourable as could be obtained in the relative situation of the two countries, from those who required from a revolutionary government a greater degree of security than they would have demanded from a restored monarchy. In the Upper House, Lord Grenville, and in the Commons, Mr. Thomas Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Mr. William Elliot, declared their dissent from them, for reasons which, although ill supported by numbers, soon began to make a serious impression on the public mind, or rather to revive, it may be said, that opinion of insecurity, the sense of which had been suspended by the hopelessness of success, and the heavy pressure of taxation.

Against this revulsion of the public sentiment Mr. Addington could not make head, although supported in his measure both by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. This was very much owing to the inherent weakness of his government, which had not nerve enough to stand by their treaty after they had made it. With a real wish for peace, the minister was fairly bullied out of the one he had just concluded, by the charges of timidity and incapacity showering down upon him without mercy from almost every quarter. The consequences were natural enough in such a case. Attacked for his weakness, Mr. Addington seemed to think that the best defence for his ministry would be some demonstration of vigour, which should shame the world out of its accusation; but his vigour, instead of braving, was displayed in yielding to it. Stung to the quick by the never-ceasing imputations of incapacity, doubtfully supported by Mr. Pitt, well and honestly by Mr. Fox so far as his treaty required it, but opposed by him and by the chief leading powers of the House of Commons as a minister representing the mere will of the Crown, Mr. Addington retreated from a ground he could no longer hold, and fell back

upon the war-spirit of the country, which seemed to revive under his pacific experiment. Thus after a short feverish interval we relapsed into our old hostile habits, taking our chance as before for what might happen.

But the state of parties by this time had become such as to render a change of ministry inevitable. As a measure indeed, the non-execution of the treaty of Amiens was popular enough, and Mr. Addington recovered all that he had lost by having made it; but the great interests of England and of the world were not again to be hazarded under his guidance. Accordingly, after some close divisions in the House of Commons, he gave in his resignation in May, 1804, and Mr. Pitt resumed the administration.

Into the causes which at this time defeated the project of the formation of a ministry on an extensive basis, and which was to comprise Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and other distinguished men, it is not meant to enter at large. Enough to say, that the necessity of such a ministry was understood and felt by no man more than by Mr. Pitt himself, and he had recommended it accordingly to his sovereign. Unhappily, that monarch's personal prejudices against Mr. Fox disappointed both his and the public wishes, and he found himself compelled to form a government out of the scanty materials which lay ready to his hand; for of his former colleagues Lord Grenville declined to come into office with him, and thus to sanction an exclusion for which no wise or constitutional reason could be alleged, while Mr. Fox's old Whig friends, who had separated from him on account of their differences at the beginning of the first war, had in this crisis of public difficulty rejoined him. The new ministry therefore, thus got together by Mr. Pitt, lived and breathed on the credit of his name alone.

That name, however, was great enough to infuse spirit into the new war, and to encourage a fresh effort on the part of some of the Continental powers. Under his auspices explanations were sought; and although they made no progress at Berlin, treaties were entered into with Russia and Austria for no less an object than the entire liberation of Europe, and the reduction of the power of France to bounds which might render it possible to live at peace with her. The result of this confederacy was like that of the former ones. A short and disastrous campaign destroyed and dispersed almost all the remaining means of defence for the Continent, and hurried, it is supposed, to his grave the celebrated man who had called them once more into the field. Even the will of George the Third bent beneath this mighty loss — a loss carrying with it the overthrow of his own dearest plans of internal government; and finding for the moment all combination of factions in resistance to the national voice to be impossible, he consented to the formation of a ministry, including Mr. Fox, at the head of which was Lord Grenville.

Of this union an honest endeavour to make peace with France was one of the leading measures. The country called for it. Every English statesman of any note felt that the time was come for putting an end to the miseries of a protracted struggle, profitable to no party, and which from the hour that a treaty of peace had been signed at Amiens with the one and indivisible republic left no longer an object to those chivalrous spirits who had drawn their swords for the old monarchy of France. Alive, therefore, to the importance of peace, if it could be had on terms of safety to Europe, and strong in the public confidence, Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox from the day of their entering upon office held themselves ready to renew

the experiment which all preceding administrations had hitherto failed to bring to a successful issue.

It must not be supposed, however, that peace, desirable as it was, was the only object of that great union of parties which, with the exception of some names much to be regretted, led to the formation of the new government. A general sense of the public difficulties arising from the renewal of the war, and the necessity of meeting them with all the available resources of the country, had produced in the minds of our leading statesmen the effect which they ever will produce among men who deserve that name — the oblivion of all differences which are not of a nature to affect the fundamental principles of their public conduct. The treaty of Amiens, as already noticed, by which republican France was admitted into fraternity with the lawful sovereigns of Europe, had divested the new war of that peculiar character, which, in the old one, formed the chief ground of support with one of the parties, and of opposition with the other. The constitution, suspended during that war in many of its important articles, had been restored. The great questions which divide and distract us in the present day were but dimly visible in the distance. No difference, therefore, was likely to arise with regard to internal affairs; and at the epoch at which we are now arrived, there existed no impediment to the fullest and most complete fusion of all party interests as a foundation for the construction of a truly national and parliamentary government.

The opening, therefore, of a negotiation for peace with France was a necessary consequence of the establishment of such a ministry in England; not, as it has been pretended by uninformed foreign writers and orators, that an entire and fundamental change in our national policy had been brought about by Mr. Pitt's death — it was precisely the reverse; but

that many practical difficulties in the way of peace, most of them referable to considerations of a personal nature, were removed by that event. Unhappily, however, the question of difficulties had only changed hands; and while in appearance every thing both as to public opinion in England, and the construction of the new ministry, seemed as favourable to peace as even France herself could desire, — while in the warm professions both of Napoleon and of his minister M. de Talleyrand, and in the really altered tone of our mutual intercourse, every thing seemed to lean towards a pacific termination, — it soon became apparent that under all these flattering hopes there lurked an incurable cause of failure, through the prevalence of which they must inevitably be destroyed. That cause was Napoleon himself.

Before I proceed to develop this cause, it will be but just to discard from it all imputation of deliberate insincerity on the part of Napoleon. From what has been said in the introductory chapter to this work, it is clear that he might well have fallen into an error with regard to the minister with whom he was about to negotiate, from the impression he was then under as to his character and political views. To give him this impression, as we have already seen, the enemies of that statesman, and not a few of his friends, had alike contributed. Having detected, as they thought in their wisdom, an "*esoteric doctrine*" in his politics*, his enemies had for years been representing him as an ambitious and disappointed man, who not finding in his own country the place due to his pretensions and his powers, had identified himself with the French cause, and who sought for peace, not so much for its own sake, or for any good he might hope for ultimately to the world from the change which

* See Lord Dudley's Letters.

had been effected in its social condition, as for the means it would afford of securing and fixing the destinies of a revolution, through the influence of which he was to obtain elevation for himself. On the other hand, many eager friends who, on no better authority than the inspirations of their own zeal, had acquired the habit of considering themselves as speaking his sentiments, helped not a little to countenance that preposterous belief by a boundless admiration of the new theories, and by a vehemence of language in regard to foreign monarchies ill-suited, to say the least of it, to questions of political conduct involving such mighty interests as those we were then contending for.

It was too much, perhaps, to expect that, in the hurry of his tempestuous career, Napoleon should ever have stopped to weigh in his own mind, on the one hand, Mr. Fox's early admiration of the efforts made by France to give herself free institutions, and on the other, the conduct which it would become his duty as an Englishman to hold whenever in the course of events he might have to treat with a French government on the adverse interests of the two countries. If he had, he would have understood him better. He would have seen that, in the first and promising days of the mighty change which had just been effected, Mr. Fox looked to it as an event which by the formation of a government responsible to public opinion might operate such a fundamental alteration in the foreign policy of France, as to render her more just and pacific in her dealings with other states, and so far consequently to enable him to relax in some degree from his old system of mistrust and jealousy of her preponderance. But of all men Napoleon surely must have been the last to pretend that France, under any of her new governments, had performed the fair promise of her outset,

or to persuade himself that in 1806 it had been such as to inspire the hope of more moderation in his own. He might have been aware, therefore, that any negotiation with himself, of which Mr. Fox should have the conduct, would necessarily follow the old plan and habits of such transactions, and be carried on at arm's length between the parties; and he might have expected in the conferences of 1806 to meet the same man whom M. de Vergennes in those of 1782 deservedly characterised as "*un fagot d'épines*." But these reflections never appear to have occurred to him. Spoilt by his successes, and yielding possibly to that false way of estimating human actions and motives the habit of which is said to have been among his weaknesses, he gave in to the common error, and persuaded himself that he should get almost any treaty from Mr. Fox which would not be a positively disgraceful one to England.

It is but fair to say that Napoleon was not singular in this opinion. The pains taken in parliament, and by a very unscrupulous use of the public press, to fix a jacobin taint on Mr. Fox's public character, had, in many quarters where he was not known, been successful. They had been eminently so in foreign countries. In France, the belief that in all public questions Mr. Fox was *on their side*, prevailed almost universally. To this fact I can offer personal testimony. So far back as the year 1802, after the ratification of the treaty of Amiens, I accompanied Mr. Fox on his journey to Paris. I had then an opportunity of conversing with many of the leading men of the day, and amongst almost all of them I found the belief prevalent, that his accession to power, whenever it should happen, would be followed by a peace most favourable to France as to terms, and lead to a strict alliance and incorporating union with her, something

like the old "family compact" with Spain.* It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that when four years afterwards these notions were to be brought to the test, Napoleon should enter upon a negotiation with Mr. Fox, in the full belief that he should hear nothing from him about the balance of power, and such like "old saws;" nor of any claims founded on what it was the fashion to call the antiquated and exploded system of international confederacies. And here was the foundation of the grand error, which so shortly after their commencement was to prove fatal to the ensuing negotiations.

It has pleased a French author, who informs us that he was commissioned by Napoleon to write the diplomatic history of France, to tell the world a different story. In a very elaborate account of the above negotiations, which, on the presumption of its authenticity, I shall be obliged to notice at some length, he tells us, and fairly enough so far, that Napoleon considered them to bear, on the part of Mr. Fox, a character of frankness and sincerity, which gave them in the beginning every prospect of success, but that they assumed a different character on his death; that, by that event, the ascendancy in the British Cabinet passed into the hands of a party adverse to his pacific intentions, and that the treaty was broken off in consequence of it. In this version of the transaction, Napoleon is followed by his historian, who adds some remarks of his own on what

* That Napoleon had himself given into such fancies, may be presumed from his words to Mr. Fox, on his presentation at the Thuilleries, when in his loose and rambling way he talked to him of the division of Europe into two sects, and of the *great Western family* which was to give peace to the world. I did not hear the exact words, although standing near Mr. Fox at the time of their utterance; but he told me the purport of them on our return from the Thuilleries, adding, with regard to the great Western family—"and himself, I suppose, at the head of it."—*R. A.*

he calls Lord Lauderdale's uncourteous manner of pressing his demands, and assigns, for the failure of this attempt at peace any and every cause except the true one.

It may be well to give this author's statement in his own words : —

"Ces divergences," he tells us in referring to some disputed points, which we shall consider hereafter, — "ces divergences ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles qu'au moment où la maladie que suivit la mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direction de la politique Anglaise." *

In support of this statement, and to claim likewise for his government equal sincerity of purpose, and a most accommodating generosity in point of terms, the author, M. Bignon, has entered minutely and critically into the details of that negotiation, together with the nature of the proposals of each party for a reasonable adjustment; and he points out the fluctuations which from time to time they underwent, until the final rupture of it by the departure of Lord Lauderdale from Paris.

As these matters are closely connected with my proceedings at Vienna, and with the principles on which I acted in executing Mr. Fox's instructions to me, I shall enter more fully than it might otherwise be necessary into this gentleman's narrative; and I will begin mine by adopting his excellent advice. "Ce n'est point," he says, although for a different purpose, "ce n'est point sur des manifestes, mais sur les pièces seules des négociations, qu'il est aujourd'hui possible de connaître la vérité." To these documents which M. Bignon equally with myself, I understand, admits to be the official notes and correspondence laid before

* Histoire de France depuis le 18 Brumaire jusqu'à la paix de Tilsit, vol. v. p. 278. par M. Bignon.

the English Parliament at the beginning of the session of 1807, I shall adhere. Fortunately they are so full and so clear, as to make it easy to substantiate from them the direct reverse of M. Bignon's conclusions on all the material points on which he reasons ; and to prove, not only that it is not true that the death of Mr. Fox occasioned the rupture of the negotiation by its having fallen into other hands, but that long before that event, and even before the mission of Lord Lauderdale, he had attained the moral conviction that peace with Napoleon was at that time hopeless ; and that whether sincere or not in the first offer, it had been rendered hopeless by Napoleon himself.

A word or two first with regard to the character of this negotiation, as given to it by M. Bignon's narrative. On its gravity and its immense importance to the interests of mankind he dwells but little. He represents it rather as a diplomatic fencing match, than as a serious examination of difficulties with a determination on both sides to come, if possible, to an agreement. His whole relation is a self-complacent recital of the scientific movements on this chess board, by which Mr. Fox was driven, as he pretends, point by point, from the strong ground he had taken up at the commencement of the discussions, and compelled at length to negotiate on the principles and terms prescribed to him by his opponents. All this is meant to redound to the honour of the French diplomatist, by whose superior skill it is insinuated that Mr. Fox's firmness was overpowered, the great European settlement which he meditated was defeated, and the whole question reduced to one of individual interest, to be settled on a balance of profit and loss between England and France alone. Believe his statement, and it will appear that Mr. Fox was not only compelled to renounce his whole system of international union and confederacy, but that he was ready also to

discard the only remaining ally of his country, the king of Sicily, and to join Napoleon in despoiling that sovereign of the little that still remained to him of his dominions.

In thus stating his case, M. Bignon does not seem to be aware that he gives up in fact a most essential part of it. For admitting the above statement to be correct, what does it prove? simply that as to what is called diplomatic dexterity in the contest M. de Talleyrand had the superiority over Mr. Fox. Now this is an advantage which, even if the fact were so, Mr. Fox might easily grant him. He was great enough to be able to spare to an antagonist any credit to be derived from excellence in that branch of the art on which he never valued himself, and of which indeed he knew nothing; but on the other hand, what becomes of the assertion that his death was the cause of the rupture of the negociation? The object of M. Bignon's work, the proposition he has undertaken to prove with a view of casting the blame of the rupture upon the English ministry, is that Mr. Fox was so well disposed towards Napoleon, as to have been ready to come into his terms if he had lived. If so, what becomes of this superior skill of the French diplomatist in cajoling him? If he was so willing to yield, where was the triumph in forcing him to do so? The cleverness is not very apparent, by which we are made to consent to what we wish. Victory can only be gained over resistance; but if Mr. Fox resisted to the last, his warlike successor was not likely to resist less. If it be true, therefore, as this author pretends, that in the course of this negociation Mr. Fox was gradually beaten from his ground, and forced in his entrenchments, M. Bignon must find out some other cause for its unsuccessful termination than his death, and for the pre-

valence of a more warlike spirit infused, as he affirms, into the discussions by his successor.

But in the character thus impressed upon the transaction, M. Bignon, as well as his master, is mistaken from beginning to end. No warlike spirit either prevailed or existed at this time in the British cabinet. And here lies the great fault of the history-makers of the present times. Standing without-side (as one may say) of the great causes of political action, they never seem to recollect that in all important concerns there are two parties. What is partially communicated to them, or what they contrive to pick up by their own skill and industry, they consider to be the whole of the case. Thus they never arrive at a distinct knowledge of the events which they relate. This happens more particularly when they write about England and English statesmen. Foreigners, it is true, are not bound to enter into the disputes and quarrels of our factions, but they ought to understand the difference between what is merely personal in such quarrels, and the higher national objects embraced by them; and before they undertake to become historians of transactions over which the power of Great Britain has exercised a decisive influence, they ought to study the nature of that power and in what it consists. They would then learn that the divisions of our parties constitute one of its main ingredients, and that in an honourable struggle for the great offices of state, the success of one of them over the other never leads to a change in the direction of the public force prejudicial to the acknowledged interests of the state itself. Had M. Bignon taken the trouble to consider this, his acuteness would have enabled him to perceive that if the negotiation of 1806 began under more favourable auspices than any which had preceded it, it was precisely because that war-spirit which he has conjured

up anew on this occasion existed no longer ; and because Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Lord Spencer, were not less anxious than Mr. Fox himself to bring the war to an honourable end. Like the writers of this class, M. Bignon concludes, from the opposite view taken by the chiefs of our parties of the necessity of the war in 1793, that in any attempt at peace in which those statesmen might hereafter participate, the old difference would ever be ready to break forth according to the accidental prevalence in council of one or other of them on a particular point. This is to show equal ignorance of English politics in general, and of the composition of the new government. We have seen how that government was constructed. Like all Whig administrations, that of Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox was a union of national interests for national purposes, giving security to the country through their names and their character for the faithful execution of their public engagements. It was a government strong enough either to receive from France or to offer to her fair terms of peace, and honest enough to try for it in good earnest.

The proposal came from France. The formal origin of the negociation is fairly enough stated by M. Bignon. Yet he might have spared, without injury to the interests entrusted to his defence, his allusion to Mr. Fox's visit to Paris, in 1802. He cannot mean to affirm, and he ought not to have insinuated, that the visit in question, resolved upon by Mr. Fox for the purpose of consulting the despatches of Barillon and D' Avaux for the historical work on which he had for some time been engaged, or that the attentions paid to him by the First Consul, had had the effect of disposing him, four years afterwards, to favour France in the terms of peace. Neither was it necessary to refine upon the motives which might induce Mr. Fox to

enter upon a negotiation as soon as he had the power to do so. They were simple and ready to his hand. They were to be found in the whole tenor of his opposition to the war. So anxious had he been from the first to avert that calamity, that in 1792, in his place in Parliament, he declared himself ready even to become Mr. Pitt's envoy, and to go himself to Paris if that Minister would empower him to treat for a settlement of the existing differences, and of the declared matters of complaint. Holding these strong opinions, and too much of a statesman to stand upon the idle ceremony of who should speak first, Mr. Fox, when he became Minister in 1806, was ready, if necessary, to take the first step himself. Not to have met an advance towards peace, therefore, would have been a childless inconsistency, totally out of keeping with his character. It required no "*dispositions affectueuses*" (a word by the way not at all descriptive of his mode of estimating Napoleon) to induce him to make peace; and the "*adroites insinuations*" of M. de Talleyrand (if they were anything more than a friendly demonstration of the pleasure felt by that statesman at the renewal of an old acquaintance under circumstances which promised apparently to render it useful to the world) might have been reserved for an obstacle more difficult to surmount than reluctance or indifference on the part of Mr. Fox to enter upon a negotiation for it.

In these dispositions, both of himself and of his colleagues, Mr. Fox received with unfeigned satisfaction M. de Talleyrand's overture of the 2d of March, expressing a readiness on the part of France to treat for peace on the basis of that of Amiens.

To negotiate on that basis, however, could not suit Mr. Fox. The peace of Amiens was a transaction simply between England and France, in which no continental interests were provided for. It was

liable also to the apparent objection of positively excluding England from a participation in those interests, inasmuch as in that instrument the renewal of former treaties, according to the old practice of European diplomacy, had been omitted. In his reply, therefore, Mr. Fox required the admission of the allies as an indispensable preliminary.

To the admission of our allies—of Russia particularly as a negotiating party—France objected. For this she had two reasons: first, the obtaining from us the practical acknowledgment of our separation from the Continent; secondly, she was herself carrying on at this time a correspondence at St. Petersburg for a separate peace. In the sequel it will appear that she availed herself with some dexterity of her manœuvres at that court to disturb for a moment, although not essentially to interrupt, the harmony between Great Britain and that power.

In the mode, however, in which M. de Talleyrand brought forward this objection to joint negotiation, and the statement of it by M. Bignon, there is the widest possible difference, a difference the more necessary to be here remarked and understood, as within it we shall discover the first thread in the web of chicanery which so early began to show itself in the conduct of the negotiation on the part of France.

M. Bignon's statement would lead us to believe in a plain peremptory rejection of this principle by his government *ab initio*. "La France ne voulait pas souffrir," he tells us, "l'intervention d'une puissance étrangère." This is lofty, but nothing to the purpose. The "intervention d'une puissance étrangère" was never thought of by Mr. Fox, and except for the sake of assuming a tone in his work of which it would be in vain to search for an example, much less for a justification, in any of the French official documents, it is

singular that he should deliberately persist in confounding a joint negociation of two parties, each of whom is at war with a third for an object common to the two, with an "intervention étrangère," which from its very terms supposes the interference of a power indifferent to that object. But what says the official French answer to this demand for the admission of our allies? Is there a word in it rejecting the principle of joint negociation? Is there one phrase equivalent to the "la France ne voulait pas souffrir?" Nothing like it. M. de Talleyrand, indeed, who was most anxiously desirous of peace, knew full well that the introduction of any such language must put an end at once to all further discussion.

To understand thoroughly this important point, it will be necessary to read, and to read attentively, the official correspondence from the 26th of March to the 20th of April, and particularly the two letters of Mr. Fox and M. de Talleyrand, the first dated March 26th, and the second April 1st in answer to it. In the first (that of Mr. Fox) the demand of joint treaty is set forth with a precision and clearness characteristic of the man and of the occasion. "England cannot neglect the interests of any of her allies, and she is united to Russia by such close ties that she would not treat, much less conclude anything, but in concert with the Emperor Alexander; but *while awaiting the arrival of a Russian plenipotentiary*, some of the principal points might be discussed." And he concludes with the benevolent exhortation, justified as he had fully hoped by softened animosities on both sides, and by the many new circumstances in which the two countries then found themselves, "Let us then do all in our power to terminate them (the common misfortunes), and let us endeavour, if possible, to reconcile the respective interests and the glory of the two

countries with the tranquillity of Europe and the happiness of the human race."

M. de Talleyrand's reply to this demand of treating in concert with Russia contains not a syllable in refusal of it. For what are his words? "The Emperor wants nothing that England possesses. Peace with France is possible, and may be perpetual, provided—

"1st. There be no interference in her internal affairs; and that

"2dly. No attempt is made to restrain her in the regulation of her Custom House duties; or

"3dly. To cramp her commercial rights; or

"4thly. To offer any insult to her flag."

This is all: not a word in rejection of the principle of joint negotiation, according to the proposal contained in the letter he is answering, appears in this despatch, from first to last. It consists only of the four articles above stated, to be expanded of course hereafter into the details necessary to give them their effect, as the groundwork on which a peace honourable and "perpetual" might be made between France and England. Here, therefore, is the whole of what was *to be done*. Here is all that Mr. Fox was required to consent *to do*. Here was the alpha and omega of this vast transaction; a greater than which, or one more pregnant with happiness to mankind, could not come within the compass of a statesman's care.

It is true, indeed, that although the above enumeration contains the whole of the French conditions, it does not contain the whole of the Minister's despatch. After having stated them as fixed and indispensable articles, M. de Talleyrand goes on propounding a number of plausible generalities (on which he insists with still more importunity in a subsequent despatch) *pour battre la campagne* as it would appear, and prepare us, not for a frank and vigorous rejection of Mr. Fox's principle, but for an objection to its application

under the circumstances; an objection grounded, as we have already seen, on an evident and perhaps intended confusion between participation and mediation. Such an objection was no answer to Mr. Fox's demand; on the contrary, M. de Talleyrand took effectual care (and in this consists the whole of his dexterity) to avoid putting it in such a shape as to elicit a reply which must have broken off all further intercourse between them. With the exception of these four points, his despatch consists of observations more or less astute and ingenious, all of them tending no doubt to persuade Mr. Fox to fall in with the writer's views, but not one of them necessary to be agreed to, or requiring even to be discussed, before opening the regular conferences. Of all this M. de Talleyrand was himself so thoroughly aware, that without waiting to see the effect either of his objection or of his arguments, he accompanied his answer at once with a passport for a negociator.

The lure of a passport, however, did not take. Mr. Fox replies instantly and satisfactorily to the four conditions of France, but in the terms of his former letter insists again on treating only provisionally until Russia could take part in the negotiation. On this M. de Talleyrand returns to the charge with another set of arguments, of no greater cogency indeed than his former ones; but for the refinement of some of them amusing enough. It was represented that England totally misunderstood her real position; that Russia was no ally of hers, nor anything like it. Russia, we were told for our information, was at peace with France at the commencement of the war with England. During that war, indeed, she had entered into a coalition with Austria; but Austria having made her separate peace, Russia became by that act, if not at actual peace with France, yet in such a state of relationship towards

her as to preclude her from becoming the ally of England.

Sophistry such as this, we may well believe, could not overpower the reason, nor was it much likely to conciliate the confidence, of Mr. Fox. The whole despatch indeed of the French Minister bore a character of *finasserie* utterly repugnant to his own habits of transacting business; and from this moment he began to augur ill of the result. He replies therefore in two lines, "Will you negotiate conjointly with Russia? We answer, yes; but if you require us to negotiate separately, we say, no."

Such is the summary of the five important letters which passed between these Ministers during the first two months of their intercourse. From the many other topics of observation and of argument contained in them, the two fundamental points of *fact* above stated are easy to be selected: first, joint negotiation insisted upon by Mr. Fox; secondly, joint negotiation argued against but not rejected by M. de Talleyrand. And at this point, with a slight formal variation about to be noticed, the question remained between them from the 20th of April to the 20th of July, that is, until Russia cut the matter short by signing separately for herself, and before our negotiation with France was even opened.

Let us now return to the progress of the correspondence. The despatch of Mr. Fox bringing the question thus to an "ay" or a "no," was delivered on or about the 24th of April; and by its contents an end was put for five weeks to all intercourse between the two governments. By this time France began to perceive that she had not chosen her ground judiciously in her attempts to decoy us into a separate treaty. No use had been made of her passport; there it lay, and might continue to lie for what we cared about it. She began then to see that she was

losing her opportunity. Accordingly, after five weeks of reflection, M. de Talleyrand sets himself about seriously to clear away the main obstacle which lay at the bottom of his pertinacious resistance to a joint treaty. First, and most formally he disavows all pretension on the part of France to contest the right of England to form such alliances as she should think fit, or to interfere with her in any of her transactions with the Continent; and next he declares himself ready, first, to negotiate in the preliminary forms which were adopted during the administration of Lord Rockingham in 1782; or secondly, "to establish as a basis two fundamental principles," taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely, "That the two states should have for their object that the peace be honourable for themselves *and their allies*, and at the same time of a nature to secure, as far as in their power, *the future tranquillity of Europe.*"

France having thus lowered her tone, and reduced her demand of separate treaty to separate and provisional discussion, Mr. Fox acquiesced in the proposal. He had ascertained, during the interval between his last despatch of the 20th of April and this renewed offer of the 2d of June, that Russia had no objection to the proposed mode of negotiating, provided nothing were concluded but by common consent. He replies thus, therefore, on the 14th:—"After the open disavowal which you have made of the intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our continental connections, no doubt can exist upon that essential point; and it would be more distressing that difficulties in form, rather than in substance, should prolong a war which the two governments equally desire to terminate." Still, however, he was not satisfied without adding to his consent to treat *the proviso*, "That while we mutually acknowledge

our respective rights of intervention and guaranty with regard to the affairs of Europe, we also mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or the lesser states that compose it." This stipulation was not without a motive. He had an eye to that modern invention of carrying on war during peace which had begun under the directory, and to the scheme then on foot, and admirably contrived for that purpose, of setting up a protectorate of the Rhine against the old German empire.

On the principles, and under the explanations therefore, contained in the above letter and *proviso*, Mr. Fox consented to open the conferences in a regular form: and now let us look back for a moment to M. Bignon's account of the way in which matters had reached this point. "La difficulté," says this writer, "qui arrêtaient les négociations au premier pas, ne pouvant être vaincue, il fallait l'esquiver." He then recites M. de Talleyrand's proposal as above stated, and adds, "cet expédient sauva tous les amours propres."

How this "expédient" which admits to the utmost extent to which England ever claimed it, the right and the practice of allying herself with what continental power she pleased—a right for giving effect to which confederacies for wars and joint negotiations to end them are but the means—a right also strenuously and invariably resisted by France ever since her attempt to introduce her own version of the law of nations into the European system—how this proceeding can be said to "esquiver la difficulté," is not very intelligible. The difficulty, as it regarded France, was neither avoided nor compromised. It was submitted to. The French government had created it; and the solution came from themselves. Their object was to get us to make a separate peace, and they tell us so at the first word. Nothing is

easier, they say, than to make a peace that shall last for ever if we will but be reasonable. “Nos intérêts sont conciliables par cela seul qu’ils sont distincts.”* What says England in reply? She denies flatly this principle. She denies that her interests are, or can be, distinct from those of the Continent.† The French despatch proceeds: “Si, maîtres de la mer par votre puissance propre, vous voulez l’être aussi de la terre par votre puissance combinée, la paix est impossible.” In this, therefore, consisted the “difficulté” on the 1st of April; and how was it gotten over? By the disclaimer of France on the 2d of June of all pretension to interfere with us in the management of our continental interests or alliances — interests which she had just told us were distinct from those of the Continent, and alliances which, through the action of a “puissance combinée,” were to make us masters of the Continent as we already were of the seas, and which consequently was to render “*la paix impossible!*” M. Bignon’s way of settling this point is curious. “M. de Talleyrand,” he says, “se rappelant la mode suivie pour la paix d’Amiens, témoigne qu’il était prêt à admettre deux principes fondamentaux. Le premier était celui qu’avait indiqué M. Fox, une paix honorable pour les deux parties et pour leurs alliés respectifs. Le second, *qu’il proposait lui-même*, était la reconnaissance en faveur de l’une et de l’autre puissance de tout droit d’intervention et de garantie pour les affaires continentales et pour les affaires maritimes.” Thus we see how ingeniously the French negotiator contrives to get clear of his own objection by enveloping it in our proposal, and how the narrator of these transactions would fain secure for his chief the merit of having effected a compromise by turning

* M. de Talleyrand’s Despatch of April 1.

† Mr. Fox’s Despatches generally, and of April 20th in particular.

his concession into an offer, and our condition into the semblance of an equivalent concession on our side.

Ridding themselves thus of their own embarrassments, they began the business in form. Lord Yarmouth, detained in France ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, was about to return to England under an agreement between the two governments for a partial exchange of French prisoners of war, against those of his Majesty's subjects, who, residing or travelling in France when the war broke out, had been detained and treated as such. In accordance, therefore, with that rule for conducting the preliminary discussions, namely, that a British Plenipotentiary might stipulate for Russia as well as for England, which on the authority of the documents above recited, it will not be too much to affirm was mutually agreed upon between the parties, M. de Talleyrand took this opportunity of sending by his Lordship a confidential overture to Mr. Fox, proposing grounds of agreement on the points that separately concerned the two countries.

The substance of this overture, which it took some days to settle, was satisfactory as far as it went. France was ready to resign her pretensions to the restoration of Malta, to obtain from Prussia the restoration of Hanover to the King of England, and to leave the King of Naples in the undisturbed possession of his maritime dominions. With regard to Sicily in particular, M. de Talleyrand's words were too remarkable to be omitted. "*Nous ne vous la demandons pas. Si nous la possédions elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.*" He was too well aware that Great Britain never would consent to see Sicily united to France, or make a part of the French system, not to place this point out of the reach of cavil or dispute from the very beginning.

All this looked fair and promising, and particularly the temper manifested in the concluding words of the verbal communication to Lord Yarmouth: "Les sentimens de la France sont entièrement changés. L'aigreur qui caractérisait le commencement de cette guerre a cessé, et ce que nous désirons le plus c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne."

But the prospect was soon to be overclouded. On Lord Yarmouth's return with Mr. Fox's answer to this communication, he found that a material change had taken place in the sentiments and views of the French Government. They had begun to hope, during his absence, that they might induce Russia to make a separate peace; and consequently that by a dexterous management of the two negotiations, they should either bring about a similar one with England—the object of all their aims—or, what would be next best as a result, leave England in a war in which she must *de facto* be separated from all continental alliances.

The effect of this sudden change was soon made manifest. It has already been stated that Mr. Fox, in consenting by his letter of June 14th to enter into separate discussion with France, had ascertained that there would be no objection on the part of Russia to such a course. But Napoleon had ascertained something more—he had discovered that the existing Russian Cabinet was disposed not only to make peace with him, but to be satisfied with very moderate conditions, and he might form a probable conjecture as to his chance of concluding such a peace *separately*, from the tenor of the powers and instructions, of neither of which he could be ignorant, which so early as April had been given to the Plenipotentiary who was to negotiate it. Napoleon saw his advantage, and instantly struck out a new course for the conduct

of the English negotiation. Everything was now reversed. The confidential overtures to Mr. Fox through M. de Talleyrand were to go for nothing. These, it was pretended, were mere civilities between two old acquaintances, binding on neither of them when they should come to real business. Other means were to be brought into action; and in an evil hour for the world, and for the continuance of those better feelings in which our long interrupted intercourse had been resumed, this great effort for ending the revolutionary war degenerated from that time forward on the part of France into the old game of shift and stratagem, to be carried on with the common resources of diplomacy manifested in the least and lowest of its arts. And here began the deviation that led, and led inevitably, as we shall now proceed to demonstrate, to the loss of the treaty of 1806.

In the course now resolved upon by the French Cabinet, the first experiment was to be made by raising a question on the possession of Sicily. This certainly was a dexterous manœuvre. The altered aspect of affairs at Paris, produced by the discovery of amicable tendencies at St. Petersburg, presented Russia as the power to be first propitiated; and as the possession of Sicily by France was a point on which it would be far more easy to satisfy Russia than England, since the long projected plans of that power for a naval establishment in the Mediterranean pointed rather towards Corfu, this first move in the game was judged, and rightly so, to be an admirable contrivance for setting us together by the ears. Accordingly, in his very first interview with M. de Talleyrand after his return, Lord Yarmouth is told by that Minister, with an ease and *sang froid* which carried with it almost the appearance of levity, that since he was last at Paris a change had come over the mind of the Emperor; that his generals assured him that his brother Joachim could

not possibly do without Sicily, and therefore that he must insist upon its cession to him.

It was not enough it seems, for France to set out in this negociation with directly revoking the basis she had herself laid down for conducting it, but this must be done in such a manner as to fix, by our complying with his new demands, an indelible stain on the public faith and honour of Great Britain. Her ally, the King of Naples, had been driven from his continental territory. There was no hope, it is true, of regaining for him what he had lost, but we were now required to assist his enemy to turn him out by force from the little he still possessed. There is no example in the annals of negociation, of a demand so utterly devoid of all sense of shame or decency in the party proposing it.

Such an act of plain unblushing insincerity at the very threshold, justified, and under most circumstances would have caused, the breaking off at once of all further attempt at negociation; and such would have been its effect under any other English Ministry than that of 1806, strong and resolute enough to command their own line of action both abroad and at home. Discouraging therefore as this specimen of bad faith must have appeared to Mr. Fox, he would not suffer himself to despair. The demand of Sicily had been merely thrown out in conversation by M. de Talleyrand; and as no plenipotentiaries had as yet been appointed, it was in fact, as well as in form, unofficial. There was ground even to think that it might be retracted should Napoleon's hope of a separate peace with Russia prove abortive. For these reasons, and to obviate likewise M. de Talleyrand's complaint that Lord Yarmouth had returned to Paris without powers to treat, Mr. Fox transmitted to his Lordship without delay the necessary credentials.

But although not absolutely despairing of peace, it

is no wonder that from this moment, and even in the very act of sending credentials to treat, the hope of it was in the mind of Mr. Fox considerably weakened. It had begun to give way as soon as he saw the course of argument adopted by M. de Talleyrand with a view to engage him in a separate treaty. It was not improved by the refusal of France during five weeks to answer the plain question, "Will you negociate conjointly with Russia, or will you not?" It was further diminished by the information he had obtained of the manœuvres going on at St. Petersburg, and by this last step—the retraction by the French Government of their own proposal with regard to Sicily—it was shaken to its foundation. Indeed, in speaking of this negotiation, it will scarcely be a solecism to say that it was ended before it began. It was considered to be so, although most reluctantly, by Mr. Fox himself, then in the full possession of his faculties, of all the energy of his mind, and more than ever anxious for the success of the great object of his declining days. To this fact all and every one of his colleagues will bear witness.

In the full powers thus issued to Lord Yarmouth there was nothing defective; but at the same time there was nothing extraordinary. They were drawn up in the usual forms of office, and varied in nothing from the powers conferred on all ministers employed on similar business. Our foreign office is full of them. Powers exactly similar were given to Lord Malmesbury in 1795 and 1796, and such were those enumerated in the joint commission issued shortly afterwards to Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth. But as M. Bignon has made what he believes to be a discovery on this point, it may be well to see what it is worth.

This writer, never losing sight of his main purpose, represents the fact of issuing the above powers as the abandonment on the part of England of her original

condition of joint negociation, and by necessary inference, as a renunciation of her continental system. "Il est donc de fait," he says, "que le Cabinet de Londres s'est complètement désisté de la résolution d'abord exprimée de ne traiter que conjointement avec la Russie;" and again in the *résumé* of his general argument on this point, he says, "Cette question de forme a été tranchée par la Russie, qui a envoyé un Plénipotentiaire à Paris avec des pouvoirs pour traiter séparément. L'Angleterre elle-même a rénoncé à sa première prétention, et des pouvoirs, pour une paix séparée, ont été *pareillement* donnés à Lord Yarmouth. Les pouvoirs mêmes de Lord Lauderdale portaient encore aussi cette autorisation." To be sure they did; and so are all powers expressed, whether they be to treat for peace or for any other object. M. Bignon's way indeed of presenting the question would at once make an end of it in his favour, if the forms in which one state negociates with another were all. These forms requiring, for the sake of the business itself, that the powers to transact it should be as extensive and as general as words can render them, it is usual so to draw them up, even to a promise to ratify; although in practice the non-ratification of preliminaries is never considered to be a contravention of the law of nations. The reason is plain. A plenipotentiary, to obtain credit with a state on an equality with his master, must be invested with powers to do, and agree to, all that could be done and agreed to by his master himself, even to the alienating the best part of his territories. But the exercise of these vast powers, always under the understood control of non-ratification, is regulated by his instructions. M. Bignon, by the easy device of confounding the two, enables himself in the above passages to represent Russia and England simultaneously, and by common accord, submitting to the demands of

France, in all that she exacted for her pride, and all that she had contended for in principle; thus converting, with some dexterity it must be confessed, the general power into a special purpose—the general power to treat into the special purpose of renouncing the object for which they were to treat. But this is mere quibbling. *How* were these plenipotentiaries to use their powers? What were their instructions? Of the Russian instructions we know nothing; at all events they are out of court in this argument. Those of the English minister are before the public. In his letter to Lord Yarmouth of June 26th, accompanying the transmission of the credentials, Mr. Fox expressly reserves the two fundamental points of joint negotiation and of Sicily. His words are as follow: “It was on the faith of the *uti possidetis*, being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, that his Majesty was induced to authorise your Lordship to hold further conference with M. de Talleyrand:” and again, “Your Lordship is further directed to acquaint M. de Talleyrand, that if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance in concert with each other;” and to strengthen and make clear this concert the more, he sums up his instructions thus: “The result of what I have stated to your Lordship is this:—that Sicily is a *sine qua non*, on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place. If according to the hope conceived by your Lordship, this matter should be arranged, you may open your full powers, stating at the same time the *determination* of this court not to come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia.”

All these facts, and especially Mr. Fox's resolution with regard to Sicily, are of such decisive importance,

not only in determining the character of this whole transaction, but in rendering clear and manifest the true cause of the failure of the negociation, that they cannot be stated too often, or with too much precision and circumstantiality. Again, therefore, I shall transcribe the words of Mr. Fox himself; M. Bignon's shall follow: —

“ I have no conception,” says Mr. Fox, in reply to Lord Yarmouth's first communication to him of the offensive demand, “ on what grounds he (M. de Talleyrand) can recede from what he said so distinctly to your Lordship before upon the subject of Sicily. ‘ Vous l'avez. Nous ne vous demandons rien,’ are words that made the more impression upon me, because *those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his Excellency in one of his letters to me.* It was on the faith of the *uti possidetis* being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your Lordship, that his Majesty was induced to authorise your Lordship to hold further conference with M. de Talleyrand. Any tergiversations or cavil, therefore, on that article, would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in *its most essential part.*” — “ With regard to the complaint of the want of full powers, to avoid all pretence for cavil on that account, I am commanded by his Majesty to transmit to you the instrument accompanying this letter. But your Lordship should fairly state to M. de Talleyrand, that you are not authorised to make any use of them formally, until M. de Talleyrand shall return to his former ground with regard to Sicily.”

And now for M. Bignon's narration. He describes the course of proceeding which necessarily arose out of this conduct of his own government on the one part, and Mr. Fox's resolution not to be made the dupe of it on the other, in the following terms: —

“ Nous verrons les deux puissances s'écarter l'une et l'autre de ces bases, ou bien en vouloir forcer le sens selon leurs intérêts. Le gouvernement François s'éloignera sur le fait de la Sicile, mais sans détour, et en proposant des compensations. *Cette dérogation sera admise puisqu'on ouvrira la discussion sur la nature des compensations proposées.* L'Angleterre de son côté forcera le sens des mots sur deux points. Elle prétendra que la France a reconnu le principe de *l'uti possidetis*. On se souviendra que cette reconnaissance aurait été *tout au plus* tacite, car c'est *Lord Yarmouth* seul qui dit avoir vu l'équivalent de cette reconnaissance dans les termes ‘ nous ne vous demandons rien,’ de M. de Talleyrand. Il y a ici une distinction à faire. Sous l'administration de M. Fox cette prétention sera abandonnée, ou du moins on s'en désistara dans la pratique. Plus tard il y aura peu de bonne foi à y revenir, ou du moins à s'y attacher avec obstination. Sicile— *uti possidetis* — négociation unie ou séparée— voilà les trois questions, on pourrait dire les trois mots sur lesquels vont rouler les discussions qui dureront plusieurs mois. Ces divergences cependant ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles qu'au moment où la maladie que suivit la mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direction de la politique Anglaise. Jusque là on avait porté dans la négociation le désir de pouvoir s'entendre, et on avait fait quelques pas qui permettaient d'en attendre une heureuse issue.”

And further on :

Après quelques hésitations l'Angleterre cède, ou du moins admet *la discussion* sur l'indemnité ; elle n'est pas satisfaite de celle qui est offerte ; elle en voudrait une plus avantageuse. Ainsi le Cabinet de Londres a fléchi sur deux objets importants. D'abord il consent à une paix séparée. En second lieu, il ne repousse plus la cession de la Sicile, mais il l'admet

sous la condition d'un dédommagement à régler ; ce qui constitue une dérogation formelle au principe de l'*uti possidetis*."

These extensive quotations from M. Bignon's work will render a return to it, except in a very few instances, unnecessary. Distorted as are his facts, and false as are the inferences which he draws from them, his statement nevertheless is valuable. It enumerates the points at issue with precision, and in a way to expose his asseverations with regard to them to direct contradiction. Two of these points have already been disposed of ; first, the bold assertion that there was a war party in the English Cabinet, together with the fact more than insinuated that but for them Mr. Fox, if he had lived, would have made peace on the terms offered by Napoleon ; secondly, that on the question of joint negotiation with Russia, he ultimately gave way, and consented to make a separate peace, — a fact distinctly disproved by the official documents already quoted. That he never departed from the claim of negotiating his treaty on the basis of *uti possidetis* — that he never consented that France should have Sicily, and that so far from opening conferences* on the nature of the compensation to be proposed, he never would suffer the cession of that island to be talked of, unless France were prepared to offer to its lawful sovereign, not only such a compensation as he might accept for himself, but a *continental equivalent such as might afford security to Europe*, — is all that now remains to be proved in order to demolish the whole fabric of sophistry which his work has been so laboriously endeavouring to erect.

And first of the *uti possidetis*. But before entering into the argument on this head, it may be well to notice some of the doctrines of public law as taught

* "On ouvrira la discussion sur la nature des compensations proposées." See *supra*.

and practised in those days the glories of which M. Bignon has been selected to commemorate. It will be no less curious than instructive to ascertain what the French statesmen then understood by diplomatic intercourse; what value they set on authorised discussion, on confidential communications, and in short on all that is transacted between plenipotentiaries when they take their seats at the council table. It will be to take our example indeed a little out of the order of time, but from the illustration it affords of the spirit which they brought to this negotiation, it can no where be more usefully introduced than in this place. One of these doctrines was put forth by General Clarke (the minister named shortly after the period which we have reached to treat with Lord Lauderdale) so very plainly, and expounded by him, briefly indeed, but with such a *curiosa felicitas* of allusion, that it were doing him injustice to present it to the world in any words but his own. Lord Yarmouth, who had conducted the business up to this time, judged it necessary, on the first meeting of the plenipotentiaries after Lord Lauderdale's arrival, to read over the minutes of what had passed in his former conferences with the French ministers, and particularly that part of them which regarded the recognition of the *uti possidetis* as the basis on which alone Great Britain would consent to treat. To this recapitulation it was replied by General Clarke, that he could give no answer to what had been stated without alluding to conversations which were to be considered only as "*des romans politiques*." Incredible as these words may seem, the fact of their having been used, and used in earnest, is placed beyond a doubt by the joint despatch of Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated the 9th of August. These are their words: "General Clarke in reply said that he could make no answer to what

Lord Yarmouth stated, without alluding to conversations which he affected to consider as loose, calling them '*des romans politiques*;' at the same time by his silence he clearly admitted what Lord Yarmouth most distinctly stated."

That these were no light words thrown out at random, is evident from the whole tenor of what we have already read. And to what do they lead? To render all serious and consequently all honest intercourse between states, impossible. To call such conversations loose and leading to nothing, is nonsense, if not worse. There are none such in diplomacy. The propositions brought forward in conference are parts of the negociation. They are its records; and whether agreed to, or rejected, or reserved for further discussion, they are of the very essence of the transaction itself. How are we to believe a plenipotentiary who, after many days of grave deliberation on the most important of them all, namely, the basis, so soon as he finds a difficulty beginning to press upon him, turns it off with a horse-laugh, as if the proposal were nothing more than the *bavardage* of a couple of gossips? How are we afterwards to be sure that when all appears settled, and the substance of the conferences is about to be embodied in a treaty, some jocular kind of mental reservation, lurking within and infecting the mass, may not vitiate the whole contract? But this levity is no laughing matter. Mischievous to nations, it is fatal to negociators, both as to their character and usefulness. There is nothing that comprehends higher ideas of trust as well as of dignity than the credentials of an ambassador. In them we see the greatest interests confided to the best qualities—a people and their hopes to the sagacity and honour of their delegate. But according to General Clarke, all this must be reversed. The minister appointed to negotiate with

him must read his commission backwards; and presuming that the General, acting on his own avowed principle, will so read his own, mutual disbelief, in the intervals of their mutual *mauvaises plaisanteries*, must be the rule of their intercourse, in exact proportion to the extent and value of the objects committed to their care.

But to return to the *uti possidetis*. This we know to be the practical as it is the obvious basis for an adjustment between contending parties who are equal in force and means, and who mutually become tired of the combat although neither of them be compelled by necessity to quit the field. Like every human rule, however, this has its deviations and exceptions in cases which do not alter its essence. One of the belligerents, for example, finds himself at the opening of a treaty which takes the *uti possidetis* for its professed basis, in possession of a territory belonging to his adversary, of no possible use to himself in the economy of his own system, but essential to the very existence of the other. Here an exchange may be admitted without necessarily revoking the basis, and without prejudice to the distinctive character of the treaty by substituting, as a new and different basis, the principle of mutual restitution. Such, with the special reservation of Hanover, was the basis proposed for the treaty of 1806; communicated confidentially no doubt to Mr. Fox, as all such weighty matters must be in the first instance when men are disposed to undertake them in earnest. General Clarke, as we have seen, treats its admission by France as a "roman politique." M. Bignon goes farther—he stoutly denies the fact. He says it was all a mistake; that this basis never was thought of by M. de Talleyrand in his communications to Lord Yarmouth; and that there is no authority for stating it to have been so, except M. de Talleyrand's words *to his Lordship* on his

taking leave. "On se souviendra," he says, "que cette reconnaissance aurait été *tout au plus* tacite, car c'est Lord Yarmouth seul qui dit avoir vu l'équivalent de cette reconnaissance dans les termes 'nous ne vous demandons rien.'" Now what says Mr. Fox? In his letter to Lord Yarmouth above cited he expresses himself thus: — "'Vous l'avez; nous ne vous demandons rien,' are words that made the more impression on me because those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his Excellency in one of his letters to me." Here is a direct falsification of an important fact; for however it may suit this writer's purpose to dispute the construction of the words in question, the fact of their having been used by M. de Talleyrand, not only verbally to Lord Yarmouth, but in writing to Mr. Fox, is distinctly averred by Mr. Fox himself.

M. Bignon cavils, however, at the extended sense given to these words. Does he mean to deny this sense because they are but five in number — "Nous ne vous demandons rien?" He is a master of his language, and in his vocabulary perhaps may find some limit to the word "rien;" but gravely, and in a matter of serious business, such as that in hand, and intrusted to the agency of two such men as Mr. Fox and M. de Talleyrand, to affirm that this sentence, short though it be, did not substantially and fully convey and include, and was not intended to convey and include, the broad principle of an unfettered exercise of power over property — "use as your own what you possess" — can only be protected from severer censure by attributing to it an intention of trifling wholly misplaced in transactions of so much vital importance to the peace and happiness of the world.

But this is a case on which not a shadow of ambiguity must be suffered to rest. It is not enough

that the plain unsophisticated mind of Mr. Fox led him to put this construction on M. de Talleyrand's words ; his knowledge of the law of nations, in which no man in Europe was more thoroughly versed than himself, made it impossible that he could have understood them in any other. Rules are prescribed by that law, — plain, positive rules, for the interpretation not only of treaties, but of all acts leading to treaties. In cases of doubt as to the construction of words, it lays down their natural meaning as the rule by which to judge of their import. In cases of doubt as to the nature of an offer, it is to be taken from the words of him who offers. If there be obscurity in these, so much the worse for him ; "*pactionem obscuram*," it is the rule, "*vis nocere in quorum fuit potestate legem apertius conscribere* ;" and in cases of doubt as to the extent of an offer, it is to be interpreted against the party offering. To every branch of the case before us, these principles of interpretation directly apply. France told us that she wanted nothing of what we or our allies held in possession. France was the party voluntarily using the words by which that renunciation was expressed. France was the party offering to make peace with us on a basis which she herself proposed. What, therefore, did she mean when she engaged herself so to do ? What did she want when she told us that she wanted nothing ? Was it not her business to tell us ? or was it Mr. Fox's to find it out, and to enter hand over head into a negociation before he could see an inch of his way, for the chance of picking up a basis as he went ? Really there is no end to the absurdities in which the necessity of sustaining his negative does not involve this author at every step.

From the doctrines of General Clarke and M. Bignon, it would follow that confidential communications, the moment they begin to be acted upon,

lose their obligatory force, precisely *because* they are confidential. It is painful to observe, as we advance into the evidence on the subject of this negociation, how much appears in the conduct of his agents to justify a suspicion that Napoleon, from the moment of Lord Yarmouth's return, never intended to make peace; for no statesman like him could be ignorant of the uses of confidence in great affairs. It is in fact their very life and being. It enables the actors in them to reach their point quickly, and when reached to hold it securely. It helps them to escape from the wearisome path of fencing and finessing, in which a negociator may go on for months together, and after having, with consummate skill as he flatters himself, extorted at length a concession from his antagonist, feel himself as little sure of its definitive adoption as he was from the beginning. Confidence in such cases is amongst the most valuable of human means. Together with the ministers, it brings the two countries face to face, as it were, and in the interchange of proposals adds the sanction of public truth to the security of private honour. The ground thus prepared, as Mr. Burke observes in one of his letters on a "Regicide Peace," the peace is as good as made before the discussions begin. It was by reciprocal confidence, he says, in each other's good faith, and that of the countries they represented, that Sir William Temple and the pensionary De Witt were enabled to carry through successfully, in the short period of three days, the great treaty of Triple Alliance, one of the most important diplomatic transactions on record, and which, under any other circumstances, would have been one of the most difficult. Precisely of the same character was the opportunity presented in 1806 to the governments of England and France. That of England had come to the resolution of putting an end, if possible, to the war of the Revolution. In this for

the first time since 1792, Parliament and the country were unanimous. The union of our Cabinet for this object was complete. The confidence necessary for effecting it was, on the part of England, *personified*, one may say, in Mr. Fox; and all that was wanted to finish the work, and render it lasting, was a similar disposition on the part of Napoleon, equal steadiness of purpose, and good sense enough to understand the man and the government he had to deal with. But he mistook them both.

I now come to the main question as to Sicily, namely, Mr. Fox's readiness, according to M. Bignon, to cede that island to France; a point which he much labours to establish, and which he represents as having been nearly agreed upon before Mr. Fox's death. For what the author alleges on this head, he has not a shadow of authority, whether from the published documents, or from any other source whatsoever, written or oral. No such willingness, he must himself confess, is to be found in Mr. Fox's instructions to Lord Yarmouth, nor in his letters to his Lordship before he presented his credentials. It is not meant to deny that when, under circumstances to be stated hereafter, Lord Yarmouth had exchanged his powers and opened the negociation in form, some conversations may have taken place among the plenipotentiaries on the comparative importance of Sicily in the hands of France, or of its lawful possessor, as affecting the peace of Europe; but this was all. As a proposition, the question of its cession never was brought forward from first to last. Not a single conference was held upon it. Not a memorial was presented, not a step taken to bring even under discussion an estimate of its value with a view to fix a compensation for its surrender. On no ground indeed, except that of a general European interest, nor even on that without the full consent of its owner, could the negociators be

justified in allowing Sicily to be named. That island was part of the ancient dominions of the common ally of England and Russia, never possessed, never even attacked by France during the whole course of the war. Let this author show, if he can, on what principle of public law its cession could be bargained for, or on what ground he can maintain his proposition that Mr. Fox by consenting, under the qualification of the King of Sicily's consent, to enter upon a discussion as to its cession, gave up his original claim of negotiating on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Now as far as England was concerned, the *uti possidetis* had nothing whatever to do with this claim. The principle which governs this mode of negotiating relates only to conquests made during war by one of the belligerents over the other, and cannot apply consequently to the demand of a territory, the *possession* of which never had been out of its rightful owner. A demand for it, therefore, on the part of France, and a surrender of it on that of England, could be nothing but an act of naked undisguised spoliation, perpetrated against a third party for the convenience of the two others. But such an act, infamous as it would have been on other accounts, would not have constituted a departure on the part of England from the *uti possidetis*, or from any other recognised method of negotiation. Not so on the part of France who made the demand. Her preliminary renunciation of all and every possession belonging to England *and her allies*, was so ample as to cover this and every other conceivable form or principle on which treaties can be discussed. Nor can France pretend that if England did not deviate from her original principle of negotiation, neither did she deviate from hers, inasmuch as if the *uti possidetis* was not in question for one, it could not be in question for the other. The fallacy of this reasoning is palpable. It was France who asked *us* to negotiate with *her*.

She asked to do so under the above renunciation, and received value for it in our consent. This it was which constituted her title to be negotiated with ; not on this or that specified or defined principle, but to be negotiated with at all. France, therefore, when she claimed Sicily, did more than deviate from the *uti possidetis*. In effect she broke off the treaty ; and when England, at the desire of Russia, agreed to hear what she might have to offer to the *King of Sicily*, and what reasons she had to allege why we should admit of a deviation from her first proposal to us, it amounted in fact to no more than a permission *de novo* to set the negotiation upon its legs. The event confirms this view of the case. No proposal, acceptable or otherwise, with regard to Sicily, was ever brought forward during Lord Lauderdale's stay at Paris.

It is true no doubt, that speaking abstractedly and apart from the immediate point in view, and supposing likewise a general fusion of European interests, such as existed some years later at the Congress of Vienna, there might be imagined a way of disposing of Sicily, and even of giving it to France, under such arrangements as might render its cession not only acceptable to its lawful sovereign, but advantageous to the general security of Europe. An equivalent, practically speaking, for that island, the quiet possession of which by France would at all times depend upon her keeping at peace with us, might assuredly be found in other quarters, where a new and safer line of defence for the Austrian frontier might easily be devised ; such for instance as the setting up a strong and efficient sovereignty in the north of Italy, connected with Piedmont and the Swiss cantons. A plan of this sort might have had its advocates, even in 1806, among statesmen who looked beyond their day, and who felt the incalculable value of Austria as a preponderating and protecting power in the

European system. Nor could there be any fundamental objection of principle to bringing under the consideration of English statesmen a question of how far they might safely allow France to extend her military posts in the Mediterranean, provided that such an accession to her maritime strength were balanced by the cession on her part of a continental territory adequate to the establishment and consolidation of such a sovereignty. But nothing like this appears by the conferences to have been under contemplation.

Taking these principles for our guide, we will follow M. Bignon through the whole of what he has told us on this subject. Let us begin with Lord Yarmouth's return to Paris on the 16th of June, and his first despatch from thence of the 19th, in which he states that a demand had been brought forward for Sicily, and that complaint was made that he had returned without full powers. Mr. Fox replies on the 26th, rejecting the demand, but sending him the full powers with an instruction not to use them unless M. de Talleyrand should return to his first ground with regard to Sicily. At the first conference after this, on a renewal of the demand, Lord Yarmouth informs M. de Talleyrand that he cannot talk with him on that subject. Subsequently however, and during the same day, on that minister's return from St. Cloud with an offer of the Hanse towns in exchange for Sicily, his Lordship on consideration agrees to forward this new proposal to his Court. It is answered by another refusal, and by an order to Lord Yarmouth to return home if it should be persisted in. As it was so persisted in, his Lordship accordingly on the 9th of July applies for his passport. The French minister puts him off for a day, and then offers, instead of the Hanse Towns, Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, possessions as much out of

his power as Sicily itself, by way of compensation to the King of Naples. Lord Yarmouth again consents to transmit this proposal to his Court; and in stating to Mr. Fox his reasons for so doing, he says, "*Had not M. d'Oubril been here, I should have insisted on my passports.*"

That the presence of M. d'Oubril at Paris should have induced Lord Yarmouth to depart from the strict letter of his instructions requires some explanation. This was the minister appointed by the Emperor of Russia to co-operate with the English plenipotentiary, in the manner pointed out in Mr. Fox's several communications with M. de Talleyrand, on the so much disputed question between them of joint or separate negotiation. How well he co-operated with Lord Yarmouth will appear hereafter. Of one part of his proceedings, I am myself enabled to render some account. I have already mentioned that in his way from St. Petersburg to Paris, he passed through Vienna where he remained three or four days. During the whole of that time, and although lodging together under the same roof, he never came near me, but having once met him by accident at the Count de Cobenzel's, he informed me that the object of his mission was to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, and *to listen to any proposals that might be made to him for peace.* He then took occasion to ask me some questions with regard to the value annexed by the British government to the restitution of Hanover. I referred him to Mr. Fox's speech on that subject in the House of Commons. That I may not have occasion to return to this part of the subject, I will add that not being satisfied that his mission to the French capital was solely for the purpose of an exchange of prisoners, or of listening to pacific professions, I sent off without delay a special messenger to England to apprise Mr. Fox of the above circum-

stance, which, in the relative situation of the two governments, struck me as carrying an air of too much reserve towards myself, to be perfectly fair. I have since heard that M. d'Oubril had orders to communicate with me confidentially and fully on the object of his mission. He best knows whether this be true. At all events, his reserve towards me at Vienna may afford a clue to much of his conduct while he was at Paris.

There he arrived early in July, with powers, as it has since been ascertained, to make a treaty with or without England. I have been assured on no light authority*, that on leaving the Russian Court he had orders not to return without *some* treaty; a joint treaty, if possible, with us, but if not, a separate one for his own government. Be this as it may, it appeared to Lord Yarmouth that to ascertain how far he might depend on M. d'Oubril to act with him in resisting the new demand of France was a matter of sufficient weight to justify the suspension of the execution of his orders to quit Paris. Of the extent of M. d'Oubril's assistance he was not long in doubt; for it soon became evident that, whether specially authorised or not, he was not only ready to give up Sicily to France, but most anxious that England should do the same. As his first object was a joint peace, he seems to have exerted himself fairly enough to remove what he believed to be the chief obstacle to so desirable an event; but his efforts to this end were of a nature to convince Lord Yarmouth that, whether we should consent to the French demands or not, he was fully resolved on his own part to sign separately for Russia.

On considering this fully, Lord Yarmouth's reason for transmitting the second proposal for the exchange

* M. Pozzo di Borgo.

of Sicily was admitted by the British government; and Mr. Fox's despatch in reply to his Lordship on July 18th will bring under our view all that remains to be stated, not only as to this matter of Sicily, but as to its influence on his own hopes of success in the work he was labouring to effect. After observing, accordingly, that the demand, in whatever shape brought forward, was a direct breach of the original terms on which Great Britain consented to negotiate, Mr. Fox proceeds to examine—*not with M. de Talleyrand, but with his own representative*—the nature and value of the territories specified as a compensation to the King of Naples. He discusses the point with a view of exposing the utter inadequacy of these territories as a compensation, and the injustice of an act to give effect to which “they must first be wrested from independent and friendly states.” He throws out, indeed, that if it were proposed to annex Istria and the Venetian territories to Dalmatia, it might be possible “to submit such a proposal to the King of Sicily.” In the suggestion thus thrown out *to his own representative*, consists the whole extent of Mr. Fox's relaxation from his peremptory order to his Lordship not even to discuss such a subject. And why did he relax? To comply with the anxious desire of the Russian minister, and for that reason alone—to stop him, if possible, in his headlong course of concession on matters which vitally affected our alliance with his sovereign. “There appears so little probability,” he says, “of inducing France to extend her offer that any further discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril expressed his wish that this Court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a negotiation *now brought to a state which affords so little prospect of success*. It is only in compliance with that desire that his Majesty has been pleased to direct you

to continue the conferences with M. de Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practicable shape can be given to the proposal for the exchange of Sicily."

And why, it may here be asked, was Mr. Fox so anxious to keep on terms with the Russian plenipotentiary? This gentleman had written just at this time to Count Strogonoff, the Russian ambassador at London, a most ominous despatch to say that there were *circumstances and considerations which might induce him to sign a separate treaty*. To take from him all excuse or even pretence for such an act as arising from any difference between himself and the British Cabinet, Mr. Fox yielded to his proposal for "temporizing" on this point with the French government.

We have perceived over and over again the vital importance attached by Mr. Fox to the Russian alliance. "In the present circumstances of Europe," he says to Lord Yarmouth, "the last hope of averting those dangers (dangers that threatened Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Ottoman Porte, Spain, and Portugal) is to be found in the union of the only two powers on whom France has made no impression,—Great Britain and Russia." Any delay, therefore, that could have been interposed to arrest the execution of a measure which must have separated them,—for half a century perhaps,—appeared to Mr. Fox cheaply purchased at the expense of this very limited compliance with the wishes of a plenipotentiary, to whom the power of producing that separation had in an evil hour been entrusted.

The existence of that particular influence at St. Petersburg, under which M. d'Oubril's instructions had been drawn up, was not unknown to Mr. Fox: nor had he been inactive in his remonstrances against the wavering policy of that Court. It was easy to

perceive the bait held out by France, in offering to erect the last-mentioned territories into a state, which, nominally given to the King of Sicily, must essentially become Russian; and he did not fail earnestly to exhort the Russian Cabinet not to slacken in the great cause of European independence, for the sake of some trifling local advantages on the Turkish frontier. But M. d'Oubril at Paris was too quick for Mr. Fox at St. Petersburg, and in spite of Lord Yarmouth's remonstrances against any separate signature, — separate discussion he had consented to from the first, — never even communicating to Lord Yarmouth what he was about, nay even in spite of the readiness of the British Cabinet so far to comply with his wishes as “to ascertain whether any practicable shape could be given to the proposal for the exchange of Sicily,” M. d'Oubril signed and sealed! He refused even to wait eight and forty hours, to learn the sentiments of the Russian ambassador at London with regard to the step he was about to take.

On the plan adopted by the French Cabinet for the negotiation, this no doubt was a great advantage to them; and as such they followed it up. The point was to give a new turn to the demand for Sicily. Its preliminary renunciation had been made, as we have seen, by Mr. Fox the condition of the exchange of powers. In that case there could be no talk of its surrender. Its possession never could become an object to be negotiated about, nor its retention counted as an equivalent for something else. But by exchanging the powers first, and, after the pretension to its cession had been put forward and recorded, that possession, like all others, would be thrown into the mass, and brought to account in making up the settlement. Thus they would get rid, as they hoped, of their first basis of *uti possidetis*; and by substituting for it that of compensations and equivalents, open a

door to every sort of complication and delay that might suit their future convenience. Accordingly, on the very next day after M. d'Oubril's departure for St. Petersburg whither he had hurried off "*to lay his head,*" as he declared, "*at the feet of his master,*" Lord Yarmouth was told that he must produce his full powers instantly, or quit the country. In vain he asked for the delay of a few hours to consult his government on a case so important and unprecedented,—a case on which by all the established practice of diplomacy he had a right to apply for fresh instructions. In vain he appealed to the common rules of fair dealing,—to the distinctive character for frankness and honesty given by themselves to this negociation. The French Cabinet held fast the ground they had won; until at length Lord Yarmouth, seeing no alternative between compliance and the immediate renewal of hostilities, on the 21st of July exchanged his full powers with the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke.

Such is the brief summary of this extraordinary transaction! Such the boasted victory achieved by the French diplomatists! a victory indeed, if estimated according to the rules by which cards are shuffled in a way to secure the co-operation of fortune, but if judged by those of true wisdom working for great purposes, a most calamitous defeat.

And so in the sequel it proved to be. Neither of the two governments of England and Russia adhered to what had been done in their names. That of Russia refused to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty; and that of Great Britain, making every allowance for the difficulties of Lord Yarmouth's situation, never would consent to the admission of a new basis for the negociation.

M. Bignon, however, comments on this manœuvre with something of sarcastic exultation—"Ce n'est

pas la faute du gouvernement Français," he observes, in alluding to the breach of the condition prescribed to Lord Yarmouth for the production of his powers, "si le Plénipotentiaire Anglais s'affranchit de cette restriction." *Væ victis!* he would say—so much the worse for the loser! But this is dangerous ground. Is M. Bignon aware, in resorting to it, how much more he loses than he gains for his government? How for the sake of stealing a little credit for circumventing a young negociator under circumstances that would have puzzled many an older one, he sacrifices their whole character for prudence as well as sincerity? True, that the production of his powers by Lord Yarmouth was not a fault on the part of the French government. Their fault—and it was a great one—consisted in compelling him at the outset of such a negociation as this,—characterised as it had been with so much emphasis by themselves as an exception to all preceding ones by its superior pretensions to honour and faith,—either to break it off or to disobey his orders. Whether what *he* did was for the best, is one question; but *they*, it is clear, did for the worst by having recourse in their dealings with him to a scheme of trickery that could serve only the purpose of an hour, while it dashed to pieces at a blow the light fabric of incipient good-will, which after so many years of mistrust and hatred had begun to peer above the horizon, reviving and cheering the hopes of a troubled world.

What, therefore, did France gain by all these contrivances? Just nothing! For with regard to Sicily, their immediate object, they never advanced a step towards its cession; while by the instantaneous disavowal of M. d'Oubril, they failed in detaching Russia from England as completely as they had failed before in detaching England from Russia.

With the extracts above cited from the documents of the negociation, I might close my examination of M. Bignon's work. Yet I cannot take my leave of this author without thanking him once more for his rule of judging of the truth in diplomatic controversies. "C'est sur les pièces seules des négociations qu'il est aujourd'hui possible de connaître la vérité." Mr. Fox's despatch to Lord Yarmouth of July 18th was before him when he wrote his book ; yet in the face of that minister's declaration, — not (as I have already observed) to M. de Talleyrand, but confidentially to his own representative, and while instructing him how to act, — that the negociation had, by the conduct of the French government, been brought to a state which he considered to be "hopeless," M. Bignon has deliberately affirmed that if Mr. Fox had lived, peace would have been made at this time ; and he gives his readers to understand that before Mr. Fox died, the principle of an exchange for Sicily had been so well *settled*, that a recurrence to the subject as a cause of rupture subsequently on the part of England, was a proof of bad faith, in the surviving members of the British Cabinet. "Ces divergences," he says, enumerating the three points of difference, — *uti possidetis*, joint treaty, and Sicily, — "ne deviendront pour la paix des obstacles invincibles, qu'au moment où la maladie que suivit la mort de M. Fox placera dans d'autres mains la direction de la politique Anglaise." To venture on such a sentence with the above despatch lying before him, and in such manifest defiance of his own rule for judging of political truth, does it not exhibit, to say the least of it, an intrepidity of purpose more suited to the inventor than to the narrator of historical transactions ?

From the above plain statement of facts, derived from Mr. Fox's confidential as well as official corre-

spondence, it is clear that so far from there having been any understanding on the subject of an exchange for Sicily, the question had never even been seriously mooted between the two governments, whether by written or oral discussions, from the first moment of the negociation to the end of it. In deference to Russia, Mr. Fox authorises Lord Yarmouth to inquire how far, with the consent of the King, it might be possible to put such a matter in a negociable shape. That was the utmost of their understanding on this point; and it is needless to say that in such a shape it never was put either during Mr. Fox's life, or at any subsequent period until the final rupture of our intercourse with France on the 6th of October.

What more do we want to evince the soundness of Mr. Fox's views in adhering with such tenacity to his refusal on this point? What but the candid confession of M. Bignon himself of the true secret of the demand?

"Relativement à la Sicile," he says, "ce serait une étrange méprise de supposer que le seul but de l'empereur fût de procurer à son frère, le Roi Joseph, la totalité des états du Roi Ferdinand. L'objet véritable, le digne objet de la politique de l'empereur quand il se voyait contraint d'abandonner Malte au pouvoir de l'Angleterre, était de balancer l'influence et la navigation de cette puissance dans la Méditerranée, en y donnant pour point d'appui à l'influence et à la navigation Françaises l'admirable établissement de la Sicile, soit qu'il dût laisser cette isle exister comme province dépendante de Naples, soit qu'il nourrit le projet d'en faire céder plus tard la propriété à la France. Telle était certainement la pensée de Napoléon, et c'était par le même motif que l'Angleterre, qui ne s'y trompait pas, avait montré sur ce point une si longue résistance."

If these were Napoleon's views, he must have had

them at the very time that he disclaimed them — at the moment that he authorised the declaration to Lord Yarmouth that he asked nothing from England; and at the moment that M. de Talleyrand assured his Lordship that Sicily in the hands of France would prove rather an embarrassment to the negotiation than a help to it!

It is not my purpose to pursue further these remarks on M. Bignon's account of the negotiations of 1806; nor to enter into their history after they were put into the hands of Lord Lauderdale as plenipotentiary for England. The official documents and the notes that passed between his Lordship and M. Champagny and General Clarke, were published at the time, and are in every body's hands. To those conferences, and to the notes exchanged from the 9th of August until the 6th of October*, nothing can be added in elucidation of the facts of the case. On them the British government relies with confidence to justify the inflexible steadiness of their course. It were a waste of time, therefore, to enter into a particular defence of Lord Lauderdale from the personal attacks upon him in which the author has indulged. For these there is no more foundation than for his insinuated praise of Mr. Fox. Criminal facility in yielding all things to Napoleon is just as untrue when applied to the one, as is a settled determination to betray his trust, and obstruct the conclusion of a treaty, when applied to the other. So little does he know of the public men about whom he writes, that it will be new to him to learn that Lord Lauderdale was selected for this mission by Mr. Fox, *because* his public life and opinions had marked him out as the steady advocate for peace with France under every one of her governments, and because it was universally known

* This last to M. de Talleyrand, then at Mayence.

among his colleagues that, short of the surrender of national honour, there was scarcely any sacrifice he would not be ready to make to effect it.

Here therefore I should take my leave of M. Bignon were it not for the temptation of making one more extract from his history, the deliberately printing and publishing of which will appear incredible to those who do not know the work, but which to those who do, may afford some relief from the severer reflections which must have passed across their minds on perusing it.

“ Dans cet intervalle ” (the period between Lord Lauderdale's first note of August 11th and the 22d), “ Lord Yarmouth était retourné en Angleterre. Le Comte de Lauderdale, resté à Paris, semblait ne s'y trouver que pour renouveler sans cesse les demandes de ses passeports, et annoncer à tous momens le terme de sa mission. Les discussions verbales n'avaient pas plus de succès avec lui que les argumentations écrites. Pour mieux lui faire sentir que le Cap de Bonne Espérance, Malte, et le Hanovre, formaient une paix assez honorable pour l'Angleterre, on avait beau lui donner à entendre que, si elle s'y refusait, le sort du Hanovre pourrait dans quarante-huit heures être fixé autrement d'une manière irrévocable: le Comte de Lauderdale immuable dans sa position, sans égard pour les insinuations flatteuses ou comminatoires, n'opposait à tout que l'éternelle demande de *l'uti possidetis*.

“ Blessé à la fin d'une conduite aussi étrange le gouvernement Français laissa éclater son mécontentement dans une note dont la franchise alliait des formes décentes au langage sévère de la vérité. En se plaignant que le Comte de Lauderdale eût fait prendre une direction inattendue à une discussion qui jusqu' alors avait été calme et modérée, et qu'il voulait tracer autour du gouvernement Français le cercle de Po-

pilius," M. de Talleyrand ajoutait, " Si effectivement la mission du plénipotentiaire Britannique a été de rompre la négociation déjà si avancée, s'il a voulu en faisant succéder au langage doux et conciliant qui avait rapproché les deux gouvernemens le ton impérieux du reproche et de la menace, prolonger les calamités qu'il était dans son devoir de faire cesser, Lord Lauderdale a la triste gloire d'être arrivé à son but." And M. Bignon adds for himself in his character of authorised historian of these transactions: " Comme on reconnoissait l'impossibilité de conclure la paix avec un plénipotentiaire dont toutes les demandes étaient des offenses, et toutes les démarches des traits d'hostilité, *on lui expédiait enfin les passe-ports* qu'il avait demandés avec tant de persévérance."

And a little further he adds, " Après la note accusatrice que M. de Talleyrand *venait de remettre* à Lord Lauderdale, il semblait que ce plénipotentiaire ne devait pas demeurer à Paris un seul instant de plus."

Undoubtedly he ought not, *if such a note had been delivered to him.* The date of it is the 4th of September. Will it be believed that Lord Lauderdale never saw nor heard of it until after his return to England in October, when it was ostentatiously put forth in the *Moniteur* as one of the official documents? What is yet more astounding is that the note really sent to Lord Lauderdale on that day was an invitation to renew the conferences! It appears among our parliamentary papers in the following words: —

" Paris, September 4. 1806.

" The Minister for Foreign Affairs has received the orders of His Majesty the Emperor and King to hold a conference this day with his Excellency, Lord Lauderdale. He has the honour, therefore, to propose to

His Excellency to call at the office for Foreign Affairs at half past two," &c.

The history of all this will be found in Lord Lauderdale's previous despatch of the 30th of August. The French plenipotentiaries having refused to return to the original basis, and he himself having refused to deliver any *projet* of treaty until that basis should be re-established, he had applied on the preceding day for his passport. In the interval between that and his last angry conference, all appeared to have changed. MM. de Champagny and Clarke met him with smiles and affability. On delivering to them his valedictory note, he was told that, after all, "they did not know whether, *on a more particular explanation*, they might not arrive at a conclusion co-incident in its effects with the object he had in view," and they went on talking about Hanover, the East Indies, the Dutch Colonies, St. Lucia and Tobago, "in a style," his Lordship adds, "so perfectly different from anything I had before heard, that I should not be more surprised if, at our next conference, they should give them up, than I was at the change of tone manifested on this occasion." And he excuses himself to his government for consenting once more to listen to what they might have to offer.

It was in the midst of these blandishments that the terrible "note accusatrice," was concocted. The bolt was uplifted, and — where did it fall? Not on Lord Lauderdale, who was safe in England, but on the pages of the *Moniteur*! And does M. Bignon seriously think that this after-clap tends to the honour and dignity of France? Or, that it could please Napoleon, who possessed within himself so many sources, and achieved so many acts, of true renown? Or is it England that he humbles by this exhibition of his Emperor, like the hero of Virgil, clothed in all

his terrors, and rising in his wrath after having exhausted his forbearance —

“ Inde ubi tot traxisse moras, tot spicula tædet
Vellere, et urgetur pugna congressus iniqua,
Multa movens animo jam tandem erumpit, et inter
Bellatoris equi cava tempora conjicit hastam ” —

when instead of striking his adversary to the ground, he changes his spear for the pen of M. de Talleyrand, and most obligingly requests us to talk with him again about peace?

We did talk with him again, but to little purpose. The conferences went on until the 6th of October. The refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify D'Oubril's treaty had again brought England and her allies on the line on which they stood at the period of the first overtures to Mr. Fox. Napoleon was again at his manœuvres to decoy us into a separate peace. They failed, and Lord Lauderdale left Paris.

CONTINUATION.

IF the author, in examining the French account of the negociations of 1806, has adopted rather more of a controversial tone than may agree with the rules of strict historical statement, let it be remembered that he has undertaken not a bare narrative, but a vindication of those transactions, and of the statesman who directed them on the part of Great Britain. Impelled by his sense of duty to the memory of that minister, as well as by the demands of truth, he has set down his remarks in the spirit of one who communes with himself, and consequently under that impression of their correctness which renders all restraint painful that prudence and propriety do not impose. The despatches which follow contain only the recital of events as they successively arose during his mission, and call for no comment beyond such as may be useful to connect them clearly in the reader's mind, to lay open the nature of the difficulties which thwarted every project for mutual defence, and under the guidance of a fixed principle in English policy to carry him through the alternations of hope and disappointment which prevailed among the continental powers at the time of their several dates.

The transactions which they record will appear to divide themselves into three periods:—first, from the time of the author's arrival at Vienna, in June, 1806, until the battle of Jena, and its consequences; secondly, from the arrival there of M. Pozzo di Borgo, charged with a mission to the Austrian government, until the peace of Tilsitt in July, 1807; thirdly, until the termination of his own mission in February, 1808. His private letters to some distinguished men, and to his colleagues in the public service, will either be interwoven into the narrative, or be printed in the Appendix.

WE may now resume our statement of the chief matters in these despatches, at the place where it was interrupted, in order to discuss the character and the merits of the Paris negotiations.

In the front of them appear the disasters of the Prussian monarchy, and the efforts made to save it from destruction. In following the progress of these events, some apparent vacillation in the councils of Austria,—the inevitable consequence of the situation she stood in at the time of the battle of Jena, and long previous to it,—will be observed and accounted for. In reading the correspondence therefore, it will be proper carefully to trace the connection between transactions apparently remote from each other, but all of them contributing more or less to the calamitous termination of the struggle by the treaty of Tilsitt.

The mission of M. d'Oubril to Paris, as already related, led to my first serious conferences with the Austrian Minister. It will be seen too, that with the exception of recovering Dalmatia from France, (ceded by the treaty of Presburg, together with the fortress and territory of Cattaro, to make part of a kingdom to be set up in Italy,) we were ignorant,—both the Russian ambassador and myself,—of the terms which D'Oubril was to insist upon, or on what basis he was to rest his negotiation. My opinion on the subject was expressed in the accompanying extract of a private letter to Mr. Fox, more plainly than it might have been advisable to do in an official document. The Russian Cabinet, as it afterwards appeared, attached more value to the getting Dalmatia from France than to the retention of Sicily by its lawful owner.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

(Extract.)

" Vienna, July 23. 1806.

" Razamoffsky and I are equally puzzled by a part of D'Oubril's despatch of the 11th from Paris. It is true he would not sign when he was desired, but how could he ever get as far as that it should have been proposed to him to sign? It does not appear that Talleyrand ever receded from his demand of Sicily; nor, on the other hand, does D'Oubril say a word that leads us to believe that in the conversation about Dalmatia, he gave Talleyrand any reason to expect that it would be considered otherwise than as an indemnity to the King of Naples *for Naples alone*. D'Oubril's letter is very obscure in this place, and Razamoffsky thinks that he has exceeded his instructions even in his language.

" Razamoffsky is persuaded that unfavourable as the change in the Russian ministry may be, the Emperor Alexander never will consent to such a desertion of the King of Naples, and I conclude that on a point so clear in all its bearings, whether of honour or of policy, you will never think of receding from the instructions you have given to Lord Yarmouth."

The clear decided purpose of Austria was to abide by the treaty of Presburg, and faithfully to execute its engagements. These intentions agreed so entirely with the wishes of the English government, that there could be no difficulty in giving her honest counsel if she should be disposed on any occasion to ask for any.

At the same time, and as there are two parties to every compact, it was not inconsistent with this *neutrality* (so to call it) in the policy of a friendly power to watch over the due performance by France of that

of Presburg, and to maintain for Austria the sure possession at least of her state of peace, the one redeeming benefit of that unhappy treaty. The only means of obtaining that security for her were through mutual confidence and union among the Powers which were yet left standing in Europe. Time, it is true, and perhaps fresh misfortunes, were wanting entirely to remedy the faults which had been committed in German politics ever since the first outbreak of the French Revolution, and which, unhappily, were still in progress ; but Russia was a power whom it was so much the interest of France herself, under any system of her government, to stand well with, and so able at all times to afford effectual military assistance to Austria, that it would have been a neglect of his first duty in an English minister not to promote the most cordial harmony between that government and the Court to which he was accredited.

English politics, therefore, at the Court of Vienna, —to use the word in its enlarged sense—were at first confined to this object, which it was to be hoped that our intimate alliance with Russia might facilitate. The point was to dissuade the one from enforcing claims and indulging projects incompatible with the welfare of Europe, and to persuade the other not hastily to take offence at proceedings capable of being explained or renounced, or to suffer them to affect the course of action which the two Powers might hereafter resolve upon on a more extended view of the common interest.

The first occasion for applying this principle was in the case of Cattaro, which fortress Austria had agreed to surrender to France by the Treaty of Presburg ; but of which Russia had contrived to get possession by the help of her Montenegrin allies, just as it was about to be evacuated by the Austrian garrison.

| The second was the injudicious hankering after

Dalmatia by the Russian Cabinet. The occupation of this province, and the retaining it under their protection, appeared convenient to a large and powerful class of Russian statesmen as a stepping-stone to other objects, which, under a mistaken view of national greatness, ever present themselves to their imagination when troubles break out in the west of Europe.

The third, a consequence of the former causes for dissatisfaction, but later in its occurrence, was the entrance of a Russian army into Moldavia.

Thus far as to the endeavours of the English government to preserve a good understanding between Austria and Russia during the transactions recorded in these despatches.

Our next was a more difficult business, and seemed, indeed, to be desperate. It was to reconcile, if possible, thoroughly, but if not, to bring into better humour with each other the long adverse powers of Austria and Prussia. To effect this, it was to be ascertained whether, renouncing all schemes that went beyond the stipulations of their existing treaties with France, time and common misfortune might not have so softened their mutual animosities as to admit of a reconciliation solid enough to ground upon it a system of future defence for Germany. Nor was this a mere visionary conception; it was a case for practical experiment, arising out of the new circumstances of the world. Ever since the great change introduced by the Revolution into the relations of France with the European states, not one of the confederacies which had been entered into either to conquer or resist it had taken for its basis a pure, simple, unmixed principle of self-defence. Objects of a far different character were stipulated for among the parties to those alliances; but the successive defeat of every one of them seemed to render it reasonable to try a new course, and endeavour to secure what was left—not, indeed, by mere

parchment agreements with the common enemy of the old system, but by gathering together the remaining forces of the Continent, and by showing him a peaceful, indeed, but a determined front. If nothing would content Napoleon but an empire for himself in the West, a confederacy of the other powers to preserve their own limits in the East seemed to be dictated to them by the common instinct of self-preservation; and the time, it was to be hoped, had arrived, when the statesmen who governed their councils would seriously set themselves to work to secure for their respective countries the advantages—and these were yet many—of the new position they were compelled to take up. The causes, too, of ancient jealousies were fast disappearing. It was not for preponderance in the expiring Germanic empire that either Austria or her rival had to struggle. No frontier interest could beget quarrels between them. The recovery of Silesia had long ceased to be even desirable to Austria. Her renunciation of the Netherlands, and all her other cessions under the Treaty of Luneville, prejudicial as they were to the old European balance, and in some respects to Prussia herself, had removed the great source of hostility ever flowing from contiguity of dominion. Of all these old causes of quarrel, France had become the heir; while by pressing on to fresh usurpations at the expense of both these powers, she was herself laying a foundation for their union, and eventually for that of all Germany against her aggressions.

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Opposed to the just hopes which, viewed in the distance, such a state of things was calculated to inspire, there was to be reckoned, it is true, the ascendancy in the Prussian Cabinet of Count Harfegwitz, the patron of that system which gave a French bias to its engagements and its councils. But Napoleon was himself gradually undermining at Berlin the foun-

uation of his own edifice; and Count Hangwitz might have been aware, as in fact he became aware when it was too late, that neither the aggrandisement of his country by giving her Hanover, nor her preponderance by allowing her to set up a confederacy in the north of Germany in imitation of his own on the Rhine, ever entered into the thoughts of the French Emperor for any purpose of durable advantage to Prussia; that he never had it in his contemplation to consolidate on any reciprocally national principle—such for instance as the forming a barrier against the advance of Russia into Germany—a Prussian and a French alliance. The co-operation, therefore, even of Count Hangwitz was to be hoped for whenever the direct safety of the Prussian monarchy should clearly appear to him to be at stake.

A greater difficulty in the way of this union presented itself in the existing state of the relations between Prussia and Great Britain. With all our goodwill towards that Power, it was impossible for us to submit to her occupation of Hanover; but it was possible, and not unreasonable to hope, that we might convince her that the policy of its retention, as well as the fine-spun reasoning, by which it was excused, were most erroneous, and that it would be far better for herself, by surrendering that territory, to resume her natural rank in Germany, and those connections by which alone she could maintain it.

It was with a hope of being able to prepare the way for the necessary explanations on this point, that previously to my leaving London, I suggested to Mr. Fox that as my road to Vienna lay through the territories of the Duke of Brunswick, it might be advisable for me to endeavour to see and open myself to his Highness, whose influence over the councils of Berlin, might, in a decisive moment, more than balance that of Count Hangwitz. Mr. Fox was not unwilling to authorise this step; but on taking my leave of him he

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told me that the King was so offended with the conduct of Prussia, that he would not hear of my making any approach to her, even through that channel.

Events, however, were rapidly advancing, and got the better before long of this just cause of ~~resentment~~ on the part of his Majesty. It will be seen in the despatches, that an opportunity arose of setting on foot a correspondence on this subject with Prince Hardenberg; that his Majesty approved it, and expressed his pleasure that it should be continued.

My answer to the official note of the Austrian government, announcing the Emperor's abdication of the dignity of Emperor of Germany, was framed for the purpose of keeping still in view the old basis of union among its princes and states. To protest against the abdication would have been ridiculous; but to answer the official communication of the fact by expressing on the part of his Majesty, who as Elector of Hanover was one of the branches of that empire about to be dissolved without his consent, his continued interest in its preservation, was, although not a direct protest, a proceeding sufficiently in the nature of one to enable his Majesty to recur to it hereafter, in any scheme of action in which it might find its use.

The despatch of August 13th announces the first steps which were taken, in obedience to instructions from home, to ascertain the intentions of Austria in a contingency speedily about to arise; for although the English government was as far as ever from wishing to engage her in hostilities against her own judgment, there was an apparent nullity in her neutrality that appeared to us neither creditable nor safe. True it was, that the signature of D'Oubril's treaty gave her but little encouragement to engage with us, for by that act Russia seemed to have renounced her old friends and taken a new ground for her connection with western Europe. On the other hand, the refusal

to ratify that treaty, the news of which arrived at about the same time from St. Petersburg, augured well for an advance towards a defensive union, and as such was frankly and at once acknowledged at Vienna.

This, perhaps, was the moment for Prussia to re-despatch Baron Jacopi to England; but other councils prevailed, and thwarted all the effects of the friendly intercourse already established with Prince Hardenberg. She contented herself, therefore, with making overtures to Austria; but they were of so vague a character that no prudent government could listen to them. They will be seen in the despatch of September 7th.

It was to no purpose that, finding the Cabinet of Vienna unmoved by proposals pointing to nothing more distinct than the defence of Bohemia, and grounded on no preliminary re-establishment of confidence between these Powers, Prussia, awakened at last to a true sense of her own danger, came forward shortly afterwards with more specific declarations; such as that she would listen to no terms of accommodation short of the entire evacuation of Germany by the French troops, and that no further encroachments or exactions should be made on the Austrian territories. Mistrust, the bane of all useful union, prevailed; and the remembrance of old wrongs and baffled confederacies was decisive against entering into measures, the failure of which were sure to be visited — and visited perhaps alone — on the Austrian monarchy. It could not be forgotten, that but a few months before, the very minister then at the head of the Prussian government, sent as he had been to concert measures *with the allies*, and arriving at Vienna ten days before the battle of Austerlitz, waited until that battle was lost, and then signed a treaty *with Napoleon* — the very treaty which forced Austria afterwards into that of Presburg. All these things were

* Haugwitz

too fresh in her memory to give way at once to a sense of even true repentance—for true it undoubtedly was—then manifested on the part of Prussia; besides which, it did not fail to be remarked that the retention of Hanover was persisted in, and that Count Hapgwitz and the system of that minister were still predominant.

u It would be unbecoming in this memoir to insinuate that Count Hapgwitz had any private views of his own in the advice which he gave to his sovereign at this crisis. The very contrary was the presumption that was acted upon; and efforts were made to remove all prejudices against him grounded on past differences or errors, provided that he were now disposed to come forward in earnest, and embark in any plan which might really deserve the name of a common cause.*

In the midst of these sad uncertainties, the battle of Jena took place, and at one blow broke through all the ligaments by which it yet seemed possible to bind together the states of Europe for their common defence.

Neutrality, after this event, became for any of them a mere form of words. In fact, war or submission could henceforward be the only question with Austria; and war itself one only of sooner or later. But she was left to follow her own impulse; and the language of England was still the same, although the warning words of Mr. Fox, conveyed to the minister in my first audience, were more frequently and emphatically brought to his recollection. It was not until a later period, that warning became exhortation.

It cannot be supposed, however, that previously to the battle of Jena, the general aspect of affairs, and even the vagueness of the Prussian overtures, had not demonstrated to Austria the necessity of considering

* Private Letter to Lord Morpeth. See Appendix.

her own possible condition, both as to danger and the means of defending herself, in the event of the destruction of that monarchy. She had to take into account the extent of available succour which might be obtained from England and Russia, and the degree likewise to which she might rely on the steadiness of the latter power in the many turns of fortune that might occur during the continuance of hostilities. The assurances from England on the one hand, and on the other the refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, were, so far as they went, satisfactory; and these, it may fairly be presumed, encouraged her to hold firmly to the purpose which she had announced from the first, namely, not to renew war with France, but on the other hand not to bend to dishonourable exactions, nor to endure worse terms than those to which she had consented by the Treaty of Presburg.

A declaration of her neutrality was communicated consequently to the foreign Powers on the 6th of October.

The transactions of this second period therefore, namely, from the battle of Jena to the peace of Tilsitt, will be seen to bear on her part the impression of this line of policy; and in her assumption at length of the mediatorial character, which at one time she was ready to sustain by arms, she took the place that was due to her remaining greatness, and to the national bent of her government, presided over, as it then was, by one of the most virtuous monarchs that ever reigned.

But it is obvious that nothing could exceed the difficulty of maintaining such a post. To advance one step without being able to see where to make a second, would have been derogatory to her honour, as well as discreditable to her judgment. To offer mediation immediately after the battle of Jena would have been an attempt to whistle down a storm; nor

indeed in the tangled skein of public interests then presented to her view — in a state of things, for instance, which exhibited Prussia at war with England and France at the same moment, and England blockading the Prussian ports while Napoleon was marching upon Berlin — could Austria clearly discern her own relative situation towards the parties to whom it would be to be offered. It was first necessary for all of us to get out of this unnatural posture of affairs before any beneficial step could be thought of by her in the way of pacific interposition.

But it seemed scarcely possible for her to avoid much longer taking a direct part in the surrounding troubles. Difficulties began to press upon her from all sides. Her situation relatively to France was from that quarter one of continued insult and vexation, and of hostile exactions endangering her independent existence. With Prussia it was that of still unsubdued distrust — with Russia, that of amicable, indeed, but serious remonstrance against projects prejudicial in a general sense to Europe, but immediately and pressingly dangerous to herself. All these were obstacles to action, while they increased its necessity, and were to be removed before she could either stir a step in the path of peace which she had prescribed to herself, or make her choice in that of war into which events seemed to be forcing her.

Another obstacle, and that of a most decisive character as it soon proved, was at hand. It seems as if, in some shape or other, a "*question d'Orient*" is ever destined to draw away European statesmen from a steady consideration of their more direct interests: and the attentive observer will perceive in what manner the revolution, which about this time broke out at Constantinople, affected those interests, and influenced more or less the whole system of our operations from that day until the peace of Tilsitt.

A despatch from Mr. Arbuthnot, our ambassador at Constantinople, giving an account of an act of contravention on the part of the Porte of their treaties with Russia by the deposition of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia reached me about the 24th of October, and was transmitted to his Majesty's government, together with my own of that date, written soon after the destruction of the Prussian army was known at Vienna. This event had been brought about by the successful negotiations of General Sebastiani, the French ambassador ; and was intended to produce, as in fact it did produce, a diversion of the Russian arms from the proper line of their operations in Germany and Poland. War, therefore, between Russia and Turkey became scarcely to be avoided. To this new cause for alarm to the Court of Vienna must be added the delay on the part of Russia in surrendering the fortress of Cattaro, a subject of long and angry remonstrance, and even of serious menace, on the part of France.

By the despatch of November 22d, it will appear that the misunderstanding then existing between the two Courts seemed to be coming to a point ; and we soon afterwards received the account, which of all others was the most sure to embitter it, namely, that a Russian army of 40,000 men had advanced into Moldavia.

To calm the apprehensions of the Court of Vienna, not unnaturally excited by this step, and to engage her likewise in a decisive interposition in the cause of Europe, M. Pozzo di Borgo was despatched with a special mission from St. Petersburg.

In consequence of M. Pozzo's proposals, the question of a junction with the allies, or of an endeavour to mediate a general peace, again presented itself to Austria. Whether the explanations which he was authorised to give with regard to the occupation

of the principalities, together with the proffered guaranty of England* for their future evacuation, were of a nature to satisfy entirely the Court of Vienna, was not then so much a point of deliberation in their councils as the comparative expediency of those two courses. By the one, a chance was held out of ameliorating their own condition in point of security both in Germany and Italy, ill provided for under the Treaty of Presburg; by the other, a hope of securing the same interests under a general compact among the belligerents brought about by her intervention and under her auspices.

The Court of Petersburg strenuously pressed for the adoption of the first of these alternatives; in which it will be seen that Great Britain would have supported Austria had she resolved upon adopting it. But she preferred mediation and began seriously to set it on foot.

But these Powers unfortunately began acting before they fully understood each other's views. Thus they were at cross-purposes from the first. Russia and Prussia negotiated between themselves a new alliance against Napoleon. They signed a convention at Bartenstein, the purport of which was nothing less than the entire liberation of Europe; and they pressed Austria to accede to it.

On the other hand, Austria had at this time already offered her mediation, and all the parties, including Napoleon himself, had accepted it. This of course made it impossible for her to accede to the Bartenstein Treaty.

These and other negotiations occupy the period from M. Pozzo's arrival in December 1806, until the end of April 1807, when he was ordered to proceed to Constantinople. It will be well to give an uninterrupted summary of them.

* See Despatch No. 33., dated December 30. 1806.

Napoleon, who was not a man to miss or to neglect his advantages, fell in with both the negotiations above noticed, and by complicating them with a proposal of his own rendered them both abortive.

Here let us pause for a moment, and take a view of this state of *cross purposes*, — for such it was literally — which led to the final discomfiture of our endeavours to produce a real union among the three Powers.

The first mention of this matter of mediation is in a despatch of the 6th of December, 1806, marked "Separate." The second is in that of the 26th of February 1807.

From the last of these it will appear that immediately after the battle of Eylau, Austria, although not yet persuaded that Napoleon's distresses were such as to justify a deviation from the prudent course which she had prescribed to herself, saw that the time was arrived in which a step might be taken, and with some hope of success, towards effecting a general peace. She was not indeed in a situation to enforce her mediation on the belligerents, but the events of every day added something to the scale of her influence, and to the value of her eventual interposition.

Both Napoleon and Russia were aware of this intended move long before it was officially made. Napoleon, as already said, knew it at the end of February through General Vincent's communication to Talleyrand at Warsaw.* At Petersburg, it had long been a matter of confidential communication between the two Cabinets; and by the despatch of the 14th of March, it will appear that the Emperor Alexander had already signified that he was ready to come into such a measure.

This assent on the part of Russia determined Austria to enter upon the matter with all the seriousness

* See also Despatch of March 11. 1807.

that its importance deserved. She instructed accordingly her minister at Warsaw to offer the following terms to M. de Talleyrand as the basis for a general peace: —

First, the affairs of Turkey to be settled according to the former treaties of the Porte with the Powers at war.

Secondly, Poland to be left as before the war.

Thirdly, the affairs of Germany to be the subject of a general negotiation and settlement:— Austria not feeling herself secure under the existence of such a compact as that of the federation of the Rhine.

Fourthly, the affairs of Italy to be equally the subject of revision.

Fifthly, the admission of England as a party to the negotiations, and to the future treaty.

The above *projet* was communicated by General Vincent to M. de Talleyrand before the date of my despatch of the 14th of March, although the actual offer in regular form was not made until the 3d of April.

Napoleon, who knew in February that matters were coming to this pass, and whose policy never could admit of his entering honestly into a measure grounded on the only motives that could induce Austria to propose it, set himself to counteract this mediation *in limine*. For this he had great facilities. Apprised by this time of the plans for a new concert to which the re-establishment in the preceding month of our amicable relations with Prussia had given rise, under pretence of answering a letter from the King of Prussia of February 17th, which had been brought to him by Major Kleist, he sent General Bertrand to the king on the 26th, to propose a congress of all the Powers at war to meet at Memel for a general peace.

If this overture should be agreed to, there was an end of course to the mediation at once ; if rejected

and the treaty for a concert concluded, there was equally an end to it that way. If rejected simply, he stood only where he was before, well knowing that from a mediator, Austria had no intention of becoming a belligerent.

That his proposal must be rejected, however, he was sure from the beginning. "All" the Powers at war included Turkey, and Turkey *as his ally*. This he well knew never would be admitted by Russia, who might indeed have consented, as she did afterwards under the first article of the Austrian *projet*, to a peace with Turkey which should re-establish their former treaties with each other, but who never could consent to her being received into the European community as the ally and confederate of France.

On the other hand, the chances of perplexing his enemies were always in his favour. The proposal of a congress that should admit England—thus appearing to renounce the whole foreign system of revolutionary France—was in itself sufficiently plausible to embarrass at least any scheme for mediation; especially as that measure, how resolved soever the Court of Vienna might be to follow it up to its consequences, had not been accompanied either by an increased demonstration of force, or by any direct engagement to join us in the event of its failure. Besides this, even had his congress been agreed to, there were always ways enough for him to get out of it, as may be seen by the very letter in which he proposed it to his Prussian Majesty.*

The event answered his expectations. The deliberations at the head-quarters of the allies on the comparative expediency of a mediation or of a congress, were governed necessarily by the comparative

* See *Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*, vol. ix. p. 895.

chances of arriving through the one or the other at the great result, namely, a safe and honourable peace. But instead of adopting either, they determined, it seems, to be prepared for the failure of both—for the defeat of a congress through the possible extravagance of Napoleon's demands, and for the inefficiency of a mediation unsupported as it yet was by any concentration of the Austrian armies. So they resolved upon a course of their own, and entered into a convention at Bartenstein, of which the object has already been stated.

This was a deathblow to the mediation, and just such a conclusion to it as Napoleon could wish. For while he was weighing the nature of his difficulties, and considering which of the two events he had most to fear, namely, the being forced by the allies, without Austrian assistance, to accept such terms as this convention prescribed, or the being forced by a confederacy, including Austria, to accept the far more favourable ones of the mediation, he could have desired nothing better than a result which, for a purpose within the reach of prudence, substituted another, great no doubt and laudable in itself, but which there existed at that time no practical means of carrying into effect.

The *résumé* of this diplomatic transaction, in its known and apparent facts, may be given in a few words:—

On the 26th of February, and while he was yet reeling under the blow which he had received at Eylau, Napoleon sends General Bertrand to the King of Prussia to propose a congress for a general peace; and he instructs the General, in passing through the Russian lines, to try the ground in that quarter.

Russia, the preponderating party in these councils, and who was acquainted from the first with the mediatorial plan of the Court of Vienna, had her

choice on this 26th of February as to which of the two measures she would favour. She declared absolutety for neither. She rejected the congress (although not without discussing some points in the proposal), and entered into a treaty with Prussia for prosecuting the war; on the other hand, she accepted the mediation, but invited Austria to join the new confederacy.

Thus she fell of herself into the snare. Endeavouring to make a belligerent of Austria, she threw away the mediation; while Napoleon on his side, by bringing forward an inadmissible pretention with regard to the Porte, effectually prevented the formation of the congress which he had offered; and he cared little for the convention of Bartenstein, so long as Austria did not join it.

Such appeared to the author at the time, and on a re-perusal of his despatches, such appears to him now to be the true view of these communications between the Courts and head-quarters of the respective parties. Their dates correspond with his inferences. It will be for history to work out the whole truth from the opposing narratives of contemporaries.

After this, it was not to be wondered at that the Austrian minister, sensible that in laying down so broad a basis for his mediation as that which we have been considering, he had advanced too far in the line of hostile intervention to make it safe for him to remain there without support, should, in a subsequent explanation with myself, have taken a tone more in accordance with the difficulties in which the new convention had placed him, and entrenched himself behind the Treaty of Presburg. The despatch, No. 39., dated 29th May, 1807, will explain and account for a change which had become inevitable when the two Powers on whom he relied had repudiated his pro-

posal without offering him any other to which in justice to his own country he could accede.

Here it may surely be permitted to give way to a sentiment of regret for this termination of a proceeding from which great and decisive advantages might have resulted. There can be no doubt that either the mediation or an alliance ought to have been the sole object in view. If it was wise to reject Napoleon's offer of a congress, and try again for an alliance, the parties to the Bartenstein convention might have seen that such a result could only be reached *through* this mediation, and *after* it; but that the two could not be pursued together. "Courir deux lièvres à la fois"* produces nothing but distraction and fatigue. Thus it was, however, and three months and a battle left Europe a wreck!

It was no part of the duty of an English minister, whatever he might think of the comparative merits of the two plans, to discourage the accession of Austria to an alliance, the substance of which had been so repeatedly urged upon her both by M. Pozzo and himself. Having already made up her mind to the time as well as to the necessity of acting, the mode in which she should be advised to act became a question far different from that of pushing her head-foremost into a new struggle by means of promises and subsidies. In advancing so far as to propose the five articles, Austria well knew that if a negotiation upon them were seriously entered upon, to war it must inevitably lead. Making up her mind to that result, her accession to a confederacy, cemented and guarantied as this would have been by a close union with England, offered to her a fairer prospect of security than a continued submission to demands which diminished more and more every day her

* Count Stadion's own words to me. — R. A.

effective means of self-defence. Even her doubts with regard to Turkey would have been resolved; for the Austrian Cabinet was too well acquainted with England not to be assured that while we made part of such a confederacy, the Porte would be far more safe than if her fate were left to depend either on the wavering determination of Napoleon or the unfettered policy of the Court of Petersburg. It was a question therefore for herself to decide independently of all foreign counsel, and one, it may be added, in the critical position of Napoleon between the battles of Eylau and Friedland, not unworthy of the serious deliberation of her statesmen. Count Stadion was himself a man who with the most pacific personal inclinations could well understand that the boldest counsels are not always the most dangerous.

Other parts of this correspondence give an account of the endeavour to save the Silesian fortresses from falling into the hands of France. After the battle of Jena the progress of her armies was unresisted. Those valuable possessions were totally unprovided with the means of defence, and cut off from all communication with what was still unoccupied of the Prussian dominions. Under these circumstances, it was proposed to Austria to take possession of them provisionally, with the consent of course of his Prussian Majesty; and on her refusal, an attempt was made to relieve them by raising a sum of money for that purpose at Vienna. What was done on these two occasions was a stretch, undoubtedly, of Mr. Fox's discretionary instructions, but seemed to be justifiable in an emergency so unexpected as that which had occurred.*

It is right here to declare that this last proceeding was wholly without the participation or even know-

* See Correspondence with Lord Hutchinson. Appendix.

ledge of the Austrian ministers. Equally so was an arrangement entered into with the house of Arnstein and Eskeles, just before my departure from Vienna, for the payment of the allowances to the disbanded officers of the Condean army. The suspension of our diplomatic relations with the Austrian government rendered that measure indispensable.

The Turkish declaration of war against Russia on the 27th of December forms another link in the chain of the transactions of that eventful month. The news of it arrived at Vienna at a most awkward time for the public interests, and, as it will be seen, materially influenced the deliberations in the councils of Austria. In such a crisis, it became important that she should be tranquillised as to the steps intended to be taken by Great Britain, and that she should distinctly be assured that, although we were determined to support our ally in her just demand for the restoration of the old treaties, we were equally resolved to maintain the integrity of the Turkish dominions.

Of the deep injury to the public cause produced afterwards by Admiral Duckworth's retreat from before Constantinople, and the failure, consequently, of the great purpose which the expedition he commanded was sent out to effect, enough will be seen as we go on.*

It will not be matter of surprise that, amicable and confidential as was the general tenor of our intercourse, occasions arose on which the minister exhibited dissatisfaction at the earnestness with which he was urged by England to take a more decided course in support of a cause which we thought to be quite as much that of Austria as that of our ally. Marks of

* For a history of this expedition, and the true causes of its failure, see Sir J. C. Hobhouse's *Travels in Albania*, p. 1111. of the second edition.

this feeling, which after the retreat from the Dardanelles became a very general one at Vienna, appear occasionally in this correspondence. On this last occasion the public discouragement had reached its height. That unlooked for disaster strengthened more than ever a party, who, since the cession of the Netherlands to France, saw no inducement to continue the old connection with England; and who in the spirit, as it were, of anticipated recrimination, accused us of all imaginable wrongs—such, for instance, as the not sending expeditions, here, there, and everywhere, according to their fancy,—and above all of evincing no sympathy, as they said, with the suffering nations of the Continent. For their sakes they pretended, not that it was our duty to carry on the war with vigour, but end it at once, make peace, and deliver up our conquests.

On the other hand, the refusal of Austria to accede to the Bartenstein treaty was not more favourably viewed by either Prussia or Russia. The first exhibited her discontent by the terms, considered at Vienna to be even offensive, in which she rejected the mediation; and the second by an official declaration through her ambassador that, unless Austria would consent to join the allies, Russia must make the best terms that she could for herself.

During much of this period the direct communications between England and Vienna having been interrupted, it was necessarily left to the King's servants at that capital and at Petersburg and the Prussian head-quarters, to act in the best way they could for the execution of their instructions. Some private letters of the ministers at those Courts, together with the public ones now printed, will show the course pursued by them respectively in promoting what they knew to be the system of their government;

and also the steps which were taken at Vienna to assist M. Pozzo in his mission.*

It was on the 5th of April, 1807, that on the final failure of that mission M. Pozzo was ordered to proceed to Constantinople to make peace, if possible, with Turkey; and soon afterwards, on the change of administration in England, it was notified to me that Lord Pembroke had been appointed ambassador to the Court of Vienna.

The matters contained in the despatches, from the time at which this notification was received until the 15th of July, when they were discontinued in consequence of his Lordship's arrival, are in substance the same as will be found in those of May and June. The object of our endeavours was still the same, namely, to prevail on Austria to join us; until the accounts brought by Lord Pembroke of the total defeat of the Russian army at Friedland put an end to all solicitation on that subject, and gave no hope of engaging her co-operation by other means.

* Correspondence with the Marquis of Douglas, Lord Granville Leveson, Lord Hutchinson, and Mr. Stuart. Appendix.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, June 13. 1806.

SIR,

I HAVE this day had my first audience of the Emperor, to whom I had the honour of presenting his Majesty's letter.

I have received from Sir Arthur Paget the official correspondence and ciphers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, June 28. 1806.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that the messenger, Courvoisier, arrived here on the 26th instant, and delivered me your despatch of the 14th.

M. d'Oubril left Vienna on the 23d.

I am informed that Lord Yarmouth was at Paris on the 18th instant.

I shall send back the messenger after the arrival of your next despatches, which you give me reason to expect by Count Starhemberg's courier.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, July 3. 1806.

SIR,

M. D'OUBRIL having left Vienna only on the 23d ultimo, there is no reason to expect any accounts.

from him for some days. When they arrive I will send off a messenger without delay with whatever information M. d'Oubril may communicate to me, together with the result of the conference I propose again to have with Count Razamoffsky, on the points contained in the *note verbale* delivered to Lord Granville Leveson Gower.

In the mean time it may be material for his Majesty's service, that I should now acquaint you that until we hear from M. d'Oubril, I have no hope of learning from Count Razamoffsky the sentiments of his Court, with regard to any of the points which his Majesty's ministers consider as fit objects for negotiation, except Dalmatia. In our demand of Hanover and Malta, he assures me that Russia will support us; and with regard to Dalmatia, he tells me that Russia can never agree to its remaining in the hands of France. I understand further, that it is intended to propose to France that it shall be erected into an independent state.

The silence of Count Razamoffsky on the other points, viz. Naples, the King of Sardinia, the Independence of the Ottoman Porte, &c. &c., I can attribute to only one or the other of the two following causes:—either he is ignorant of the determination of the Russian Cabinet, or the Russian Cabinet itself has come to none. To this latter opinion I am inclined to adhere, as in the course of my conversations with him, when I have pressed to know whether he was or was not authorised to discuss with me the different articles of the *note verbale*, so as that we might send a joint instruction to M. d'Oubril upon them, he has constantly replied that he must wait until he receives despatches from M. d'Oubril before he can answer my question.

I think it my duty further to inform you that the erection of Dalmatia into an independent state, asso-

ciated (as the intention is supposed to be) with the republic of the Seven Islands, or any arrangement which may bring Russia so near the Austrian frontier, will be viewed with extreme jealousy by this Court. It is wished here that the belligerent powers may consent to its being given to the King of Sardinia.

* * * I have received no accounts from Constantinople of the state of affairs in that quarter; but from what Count Razamoffsky tells me, the further passage of troops through the Dardanelles has been forbidden to Russia. It is strongly his opinion, and he has desired me to state it to you, that the appearance of an English squadron in those seas would have a most beneficial effect upon the councils of the Porte, if it be the intention to act vigorously on that side. Assistance from England in money is also represented to me as highly necessary.

No notification of the evacuation of Cattaro has reached the government here; consequently the embargo on English and Russian ships still continues at the ports of Trieste and Fiume.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, July 13. 1806.

SIR,

I THINK it my duty to inform you that on Thursday last, the 11th instant, I received accounts from Lord Yarmouth, dated the 2d, relating to the projected changes in the Germanic Empire. I communicated them immediately both to Count Stadion and to Count Razamoffsky.

M. d'Oubril not having reached Paris on the 2d, and it appearing to me, under all the circumstances, that

the information was of a nature to make it necessary that it should be known at St. Petersburg with all convenient speed, I sent off an estafette to Lord G. L. Gower with a copy of Lord Yarmouth's despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, July 20. 1806.

SIR,

As Mr. Morier is going on immediately to England with his despatches, I take this opportunity of informing you that difficulties are still made on the part of the Russian governor at Cattaro in respect to the delivery up of that place to the Austrians. In particular he wants to take such a position with his troops as may render it impossible for the French to receive it from the Austrians without coming to an action with the Russian and Montenegrin forces.

This conduct has produced the worst effects here. The Austrian ministers are alarmed, and with reason, lest the French in revenge should take possession of Trieste and Fiume; and Count Stadion informed me, but in the strictest confidence, that orders had been given to the Austrian general who commanded the troops sent to receive the fortress of Cattaro, to use force to get possession of it if his representations should any longer be evaded.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. — A courier from M. d'Oubril, with despatches of the 11th from Paris, arrived here yesterday, and was sent on in a few hours afterwards to St. Petersburg by Count Razamoffsky.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, August 2. 1806.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that on Tuesday the 29th ultimo, I received accounts from Lord Yarmouth informing me that a separate peace had been signed between Russia and France on the 20th by M. d'Oubril and General Clarke.

On the same day, although by a different channel, I received information of its having been Lord Yarmouth's intention to produce his full powers on the 21st.

Deeming it of importance to his Majesty's service that no time should be lost in communicating facts of so much importance to his Majesty's ministers at Palermo and Constantinople, and likewise to the commander-in-chief of his Majesty's fleets in the Mediterranean, I forwarded the intelligence without delay, together with the articles agreed upon, to Mr. Arbuthnot, Mr. Elliott, and Sir Sidney Smith.

If in acquainting them, as I did at the same time, with my opinion that the British government would accede to no proposition for the surrender of Sicily to France I went beyond the strict line of the duties entrusted to me at this Court, I hope to be excused when the following reasons for my so acting are considered : —

First, my advices from England left me no reason to doubt that such was his Majesty's determination. Combining therefore Lord Yarmouth's instructions not to produce his full powers unless the demand of Sicily were renounced by France, with the fact of his intention to produce them on the 21st, it appeared more than probable that France had desisted from such pretensions. But on the other hand, the secret

article signed by M. d'Oubril, added to the fact of a negociation opened just afterwards by us (both of which events were sure to be known at Vienna, and to be represented by the French mission in whatever manner they might think fit), gave but too much countenance to the opposite conclusion, and to all the fears and irresolution which the belief of it was calculated to inspire.

Secondly, it appeared to be of the utmost importance to his Sicilian Majesty's affairs not to suffer the slightest suspicion to obtain credit among his subjects in that quarter, that Great Britain would abandon them to France. In this opinion I am confirmed by the Sicilian minister at this Court, who, since the circumstance of the separate peace and secret article has been divulged, urges me to make the most forcible representation to his Majesty's government upon the subject, and to implore from his Majesty prompt and efficacious succours, and an energetic declaration of the continuance of his friendly dispositions.

Thirdly, after the fullest and most confidential explanations with Count Razamoffsky, I perceive that he is of opinion with me, that in acceding to the terms in question, or indeed to any terms without the consent of Great Britain, M. d'Oubril has exceeded his powers. Independently of M. d'Oubril's assurances to us both upon this head, Count Razamoffsky asserts it to be a fundamental principle of Russian policy that Dalmatia shall not continue in the hands, or under the influence of France.

What may have been offered to Russia by way of compensation for Dalmatia, or what secret instructions may have been given to M. d'Oubril, are matters, I am satisfied, entirely unknown to Count Razamoffsky. I beg, however, to refer you to my private letter of the 18th of June, and to submit whether there be not some reason to apprehend, that notwith-

standing the article of guaranty to the Ottoman Porte, an accession of territory on the side of Moldavia may be the price of this extraordinary proceeding.

Accounts have been received of M. d'Oubril's having passed through Frankfort on his way to St. Petersburg on the 25th. He had not thought proper at that time to communicate any part of his transactions to Count Razamoffsky, not even the fact of his having signed preliminaries of peace.

I am not informed of the resolutions of this Court respecting the intended changes in the Germanic Empire, but from all I can gather, it appears to be that of submission. The march of French troops in different directions alarms them, but they seem equally to dread having recourse even to the show of defensive measures. I have reason to believe that upon the subject of Cattaro, some very angry representations have lately been made by France; but it is hoped that the signature of the Russian preliminaries will relieve Austria as well as Germany for the present.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, August 4. 1806.

SIR,

By a despatch which Count Razamoffsky has just received from M. d'Oubril, dated Berlin, July 28., and which contains the only information which the Count has received of his proceedings at Paris since the 11th of that month, it appears that in signing the preliminaries of a separate peace with France, M. d'Oubril not only transgressed his instructions, but that there is reason to think he has exceeded his powers.

* * * * *

M. d'Oubril's despatch is rather an apology for his conduct than a justification of it under any existing necessity. He states the danger to which the House of Austria was exposed by the hostile preparations of the French in Germany as one of his reasons for hastening to sign what was pressed upon him; and that another motive was his hope that by so doing he should accelerate the maritime peace.

He states himself to be thoroughly aware of the responsibility to which his conduct has exposed him, and that he is proceeding with all despatch to St. Petersburg to explain the motives of it, and to receive his punishment if he should have offended.

The articles which he has sent to Count Razamoffsky differ materially in two points from those which Lord Yarmouth communicated to me, and which I therefore conclude that his Lordship has transmitted to England.

There is no provision in them, notwithstanding the danger with which M. d'Oubril appears to think the House of Austria is threatened (and with which it really is threatened), for the immediate evacuation of the Germanic empire. That measure is not to take effect until three months after the definitive treaty between Russia and France.

The secret article concerning the King of Naples expresses that the Balearic Islands, which it is proposed to obtain from Spain to serve as an indemnity for the cession of Sicily, are to be given with the title of King to the hereditary Prince Francis—his present Majesty to be provided for as may be. It likewise stipulates that the ports of those islands shall be shut against English vessels during the war.

These transactions of M. d'Oubril are of a nature to inspire such a mistrust of the conduct and sentiments of the Court of St. Petersburg, that I should not think myself justified were I to omit sending you

the earliest advices of a fact so material as that of his having acted in direct defiance of his instructions, and in contradiction to his own most positive declarations, both to Count Razamoffsky and myself, while he was at Vienna; and as his whole conduct has been such, as to furnish a considerable degree of doubt whether he has communicated to Count Strogonoff the proceedings of which I here send you an account, I think it expedient to forward it to England by a special messenger.

Count Razamoffsky is firmly persuaded that his Court, notwithstanding the change in its administration, will not ratify the treaty; in confirmation of which opinion I may add the authority of a despatch received by the Commander Ruffo from the Neapolitan minister, at St. Petersburg, dated July 21., in which he says that he had seen Count de Budberg, the new minister, who had expressly assured him that no change of system had taken place, either with regard to the Court of Naples or that of Great Britain in their several relations to that of St. Petersburg.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. I conclude that Mr. Wynne has informed you that M. de Goertz had arrived at Dresden from the King of Prussia, with proposals to the Elector to enter into an alliance with him and the Court of Copenhagen and the Elector of Hesse Cassel, to defend themselves against the consequences of the French proceedings in Germany.

Mr. Adair to the Right Hon. C. J. Fox.

Vienna, August 9. 1806.

SIR,

It is with great concern that I transmit to you the copy of a communication which has this day been made to me by Count Stadion, of the Emperor having abdicated his dignity as head of the Germanic empire.

I enclose likewise a copy of the Act of abdication. Count Stadion having mentioned the intention of formally notifying this event to his Majesty's government through Count Starhemberg, his note appeared to require no other answer from me than that which I enclose to you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure B.

Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.

Le Soussigné, ministre plénipotentiaire de S. M. Britannique, a reçu la communication que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a bien voulu lui faire de l'acte par lequel S. M. I. R. Apostolique se démet de sa dignité de chef de l'Empire Germanique, et de la Couronne Impériale y annexée.

En témoignant au ministre le vif regret dont cette notification l'a pénétré, le Soussigné n'a d'autre vue que celle de donner à son Excellence une nouvelle preuve des sentimens amicales du Roi son maître envers l'auguste Maison d'Autriche, et d'exprimer en même tems l'intérêt qu'il ne cessera jamais de prendre, tant comme Roi d'Angleterre que comme Electeur d'Hanovre, à tout ce qui regarde le salut de l'Empire Germanique et l'indépendance générale de l'Europe.

Le Soussigné, &c. &c.

(Signé) ROBERT ADAIR.

à Vienne, ce 9. d'Août, 1806.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 9. 1806.

SIR,

FINDING that no communication had been made to the Austrian government of a circumstance which eventually may turn out of so much importance to its interests as that of M. d'Oubril's having transgressed his instructions in signing a separate peace for Russia, I have confidentially imparted the fact to Count Stadion. It is not difficult to foresee that in the event of the Emperor Alexander not ratifying the treaty, Bonaparte will endeavour to attack him on the side of Poland, and that the war re-commencing on the northern and southern frontiers of Austria, her neutrality may not be of very long duration. Under these possible circumstances, it appeared to me that the Austrian government could not take too early a moment to consider of the conduct they will have to pursue. I have urged, therefore, in the strongest manner their most serious deliberations upon these matters.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 11. 1806.

SIR,

I HAD the honour of receiving your despatch dated the 28th of July, on Saturday last the 9th instant.

I lost no time in executing the instructions it contained, and in a few days I hope to send you a satisfactory account of the result.

By my despatch of the 4th instant, which I sent by Courvoisier for the reasons therein explained.

you will perceive that the suspicion respecting M. d'Oubril's having transgressed his instructions both in signing separately, and in signing what he did, is confirmed.

I have already acquainted you that on the 11th of July I wrote to Lord Granville Leveson Gower, informing him of the meditated changes in the Germanic Empire, and enclosing the heads of the plan, such as they were sent to me by Lord Yarmouth. My letter would have reached him on the 25th; and the contents of it, added to Count Razamoffsky's despatch of the 29th, on which day I informed him of the separate peace and secret article, will, I trust, produce the effect of confirming the Emperor Alexander in his good dispositions towards the common cause before M. d'Oubril will have arrived at St. Petersburg.

I have the satisfaction of informing you that nothing can be more fair, confidential, and cordial, than the manner in which Count Razamoffsky co-operates with me in all my endeavours to obey his Majesty's commands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. I beg to be permitted to correct a mistake in my despatch No. 10., in respect to the period fixed in the treaty with Russia for the evacuation of Germany. I had understood from Count Razamoffsky, that it was three months after the signature of the definitive treaty. It appears by the copy you have sent me, to be three months after the signature of the preliminaries.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 11. 1806.

SIR,

THE Pope's nuncio at this Court has been with me this day to communicate to me the important in-

formation that upon the peremptory requisition of Bonaparte to his Holiness the Pope to sign a treaty with France, putting at her disposal all his fortresses, and excluding us from all his ports, as well during the present as in every future war with Great Britain, his Holiness had with becoming dignity and spirit rejected the demand.

The nuncio detailed to me the conversation between Bonaparte and Cardinal Caprara, at Paris, on the 3d of July, at which this requisition was made, accompanied with the menace, in case of refusal or hesitation, of instantaneously dispossessing his Holiness of all his dominions.

It is to be feared that, before this intelligence can reach his Majesty's government, the menace will have been executed.

I shall inform myself more particularly of the motives which have induced his Holiness to adopt a determination which, in the present circumstances of Europe, amounts to a resignation of his dominions. For the present I can believe them to be no other than such as he has himself declared in his answer to Bonaparte, namely, that as head of a religion whose principle is peace, he will not put himself in a state of war with a power from which he has experienced none but the most friendly dispositions and acts.

Under the circumstances stated to me by the nuncio, I did not hesitate in assuring him that if events should compel his Holiness to seek a temporary asylum in countries under the protection of the British arms, he would be received in them with every mark of reverence and respect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 13. 1806.

SIR,

IN consequence of the instructions contained in your despatch of July 28th, I have had some explanations with Count Stadion, which are important, inasmuch as they have enabled me to ascertain more distinctly the system of the Austrian Court under the present circumstances.

After showing me the notes which had passed between him and the French minister, upon the subject of his Imperial Majesty's resignation of his dignity as Emperor of Germany — and likewise the note from M. de la Rochefoucault, in which his Imperial Majesty had received a summons equally peremptory, to acknowledge Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples and Sicily, together with the Emperor's refusal to be the first to take that step among the great powers, Count Stadion proceeded to explain to me, but in the strictest confidence, the course which his Imperial Majesty intended to pursue in future.

* * * * *

I can obtain no positive information of the state of their forces, or the degree of preparation in which they are to resist an attack, but Count Stadion assures me they are very forward. I have another account, however, which reduces to 130,000 men the army on which they can depend.

The great question which may speedily arise, namely, as to the part they will take, should the Emperor Alexander not ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, and should France in that case call upon them to declare for or against her, — a question on which I have never ceased pressing the few persons to whom I can open myself at this Court to come to an eventual resolu-

tion,— does not yet appear to be decided. Just at this moment it is too early, perhaps, to urge them; but when the occasion shall arise (and of this Count Razamoffsky will be the fittest judge), I propose in concert with him to press for further explanations, which, indeed, it is obviously as much for the interest of Austria herself as for that of the allies, to communicate to us.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 13. 1806.

SIR,

IN the distressed condition of the Austrian finances, it appears to be the intention to lay a tax of 10 per cent. upon property throughout the hereditary states. I have thrown out, in conversation with Count Stadion, that if this tax could be collected without difficulty, and be made a settled part of the Austrian revenue, means might possibly be found in a case of war, to enable them to raise a loan upon it in England. Count Stadion caught eagerly at the suggestion, and is soon to speak further with me upon the subject. It may become of importance that I should be authorised to inform them how far they may count upon such a resource.

* * * * *

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 23. 1806.

SIR,

IMMEDIATELY on the receipt of your despatch of the 8th, which arrived on the 20th instant, I waited

on Count Razamoffsky, who communicated to me without reserve the whole of his advices both public and private from Count Strogonoff.

In consequence of most positive injunctions received but a short time before from St. Petersburg, Count Razamoffsky had already expedited the order for the surrender of Cattaro to General Bellegarde. It is to be apprehended therefore, that that fortress is already in the hands of the French. If fortunately any further delay should have occurred, the measures which have just been taken will save it; and at all events there are hopes of its being recovered almost as soon as surrendered.

It is with great satisfaction that I have now the honour of informing you that Count Razamoffsky has just received despatches from St. Petersburg, of the 12th instant, which contain a direct and formal disavowal by the Emperor Alexander of all M. d'Oubril's transactions at Paris, declaring that he had exceeded both his instructions and his powers, refusing absolutely to ratify the preliminaries, and notifying to France, in a note which the Emperor has ordered to be presented to M. Talleyrand, that Russia will listen to no terms of peace, except the following conditions be included in it:—

The total evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by France; that Sicily (at least) shall remain to its sovereign; and that the King of Sardinia should receive something to indemnify him for the loss of his territory on the continent. The Emperor further declares, that even on these terms he will sign no peace until the state of war between Great Britain and France shall have ceased.

Directions have been sent to all the Russian commanders to pay no attention to M. d'Oubril, but to consider everything he had done as null and void. Count Razamoffsky had already received advices from

Admiral Seniavin, who commands in the Adriatic, stating that he had heard of M. d'Oubril's having signed, but that he considered the information as a mere stratagem of the enemy.

In the new situation of affairs which this decisive conduct of the Court of St. Petersburg will create, a renewal of hostilities upon a more extended scale may with certainty be anticipated. I will not fail again to impress upon this Court a serious view of its situation, nor to repeat the generous offer of his Majesty, if that case should occur which you point at in your despatch of July 28.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 23. 1806.

SIR,

THE general aspect of affairs, the rejection by Russia of M. d'Oubril's preliminaries, the vexations of France renewed and extended over this unhappy country, and above all the apparently serious dispositions of Prussia to secure herself against similar treatment, have led me to think that the private intimation in your despatch of July 28., relative to this latter Power, might be used in such a manner as to produce the most beneficial consequences.

* * * however, to whom I gave the hint as directed by you, does not seem to me to be precisely the person through whom a matter so difficult as that of inducing Prussia to do anything displeasing to France, can be negotiated. He has already given Prussia to understand, indeed, that all would be forgotten if she would come fairly forward; but he has no means of discovering the ulterior objects of this counter-federation, nor whether Count Hangwitz has or has not any secret

views of his own in setting it on foot. Some late communications with Mr. Wynne induce me to suspect that all is not fair in the Prussian proposals, more especially as we have the fact before us of a large French army on her frontiers, and nothing done by it to interrupt the project. Count Stadion acknowledges himself to be quite in the dark respecting the transaction viewed on this side. An opportunity, therefore, having presented itself, through a channel secure and unsuspected, of opening a correspondence with Count Hardenberg, I have had it intimated to him that if I could be sure that these movements of Prussia proceeded from a real change of system with regard to France, means might be found of reconciling such dispositions very greatly with her interests. If you approve of what I have done, I shall request your particular instructions how to proceed further, and likewise that you would send me an abstract of those parts of the treaty of Potsdam which it may be advisable to attempt renewing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, August 23. 1806.

SIR,

IF the measures already in train for the retention of the fortress of Cattaro should prove too late, the recapture of it, together with the expulsion of the French from Dalmatia and Albania, will naturally become one of the first military objects of the allies. A general officer of most distinguished merit, and whom I see occasionally, but very privately, has at my request drawn up a plan for attacking the enemy in that quarter. He knows every step of the ground on which such an operation would be con-

ducted, and every little island, rock, or position, whether for land or naval attack, from one end of the coast to the other. He is very sanguine in his expectation, that if, in addition to the other measures he recommends, the Montenegrins were properly supported, especially the Bishop, the French could not maintain themselves long in Dalmatia. Pecuniary means, although not to any great extent, are essentially necessary to this object.

I enclose you two memorials which he has transmitted to me, the first, No. 1., under the title of "Mémoire raisonné," the other, No. 2., under that of "opérations militaires."

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, September 3. 1806.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that official accounts were yesterday received from Cattaro, dated August 15th, stating that the Russian commander had positively refused to surrender that fortress.

This fortunate delay may, in a great measure, be ascribed to General Lauriston having insisted upon receiving it only from the Austrians. The measures which have recently been taken will, I trust, secure the retention of that important post.

My information is not from Count Stadion, but from a quarter which renders it equally authentic.

From Count Stadion I learn that a large Prussian force is assembling in Saxony, and that the Elector of Hesse Cassel had signed the treaty of counter-federation, notwithstanding all the temptations and even threats of Bonaparte to induce him to join the allied

Powers of the Rhine. I find Count Stadion, however, still reluctant to make any, even the most distant, communication to Prussia of our dispositions towards that Court, in case she could be brought to act for the common cause. I wait, therefore, with great anxiety for your further instructions upon this point, in order to know how far I may follow up the step I mentioned having taken in my last despatch marked separate, No. 1.

The Emperor and all his ministers are perfectly well disposed towards Prussia, and are ready to sacrifice all their just causes of resentment if they could see any reasonable prospect of inducing her to act a firm and decided part. But while Count Hangwitz is minister, they will venture nothing. The belief is general among them that upon hearing of the non-ratification of the Russian preliminaries, Bonaparte will find the means of accommodating his differences with Prussia, either by guaranteeing Hanover to that Power, or by offering her some further exchanges or accessions of territory. Count Stadion is himself thoroughly impressed with this opinion, more especially as the present armaments of Prussia are against the wishes of Count Hangwitz.

I will endeavour in the mean time to procure a copy of the treaty signed by the Elector of Hesse, and to find out whether it be of a nature to include all the smaller states of northern Germany in a reciprocal guaranty of their respective possessions. It appears to me that this will afford some test of its future objects, particularly as I know that the Hanse Towns were at one time proposed to be given to the King of Naples, as a compensation for Sicily.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, September 7. 1806.

SIR,

As it is possible that my messenger who is charged with despatches for the India Company may arrive in England before the post of the 3d inst., I will re-state for the information of his Majesty's government, that an Austrian courier arrived here on the 2d from Cattaro, which place he left on the 15th ultimo, with an account that the Russian commander had then positively refused to deliver up that fortress to the French.

I have no further information to send you respecting the Northern league. Propositions have been made directly by Prussia to this Court, but they were of so vague a nature, as to render it impossible to listen to them. I have been given to understand, that the object of them went to nothing further than the defence of Bohemia. As this is considered to be an object in which the immediate interests of Prussia are nearly as much concerned as those of Austria, the proposition so limited has not tempted this Court to alter its system, nor produced any more favourable impression of the ulterior views of the Cabinet of Berlin.

If, however, that Cabinet could be induced to support Austria in refusing the passage of French troops through Bohemia, in the event of their demanding it, to attack Russia, this would be an object of so much importance to the common cause, that I shall feel myself justified in endeavouring, in concert with Count Razamoffsky, to remove as far as may relate to such a proposal the mistrust which prevails among the Austrian ministers, of every thing coming from Count Hangwitz.

By what I learn from Count Stadion, there prevails

an equal degree of mistrust of Prussia in the councils of the Elector of Saxony. That prince had signed nothing on the 2d of September: and with regard to what the Elector of Hesse Cassel has signed, Count Stadion is still unacquainted with it. I suggested to him the necessity of his requiring from Prussia a frank and explicit communication of the treaty; but whether this or any other suggestion will be attended to, is more than I can venture to promise.

In pursuing the objects relative to Prussia to which I have alluded in my late despatches, you will be sensible that I require the means of speaking somewhat more explicitly than your Instruction of July 28th appears to authorise me to do. It may become of the greatest importance that I should be enabled to state, upon an emergency, the views and sentiments of his Majesty, as I have reason to know that General Andressy has endeavoured to induce this government to reduce its army, and that when it was answered to him that the preparations of Prussia rendered such a measure insecure, he replied, "*that Prussia should soon cease to give alarm to her weakest neighbour.*"

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, September 13. 1806.

SIR,

By Count Starhemberg's courier who arrived here on the 11th instant, I received Sir Francis Vincent's despatch dated August 29th.

The preparations of Austria are in a state of some forwardness. The armies are now concentrating in the different provinces, and considerable magazines are forming in Moravia.

The language of Bonaparte towards Austria has of

late considerably softened. On the 2d he told Count Metternich "that he saw plainly the Russians would not give up Cattaro either to France or to Austria, but that he should soon settle that matter, having given orders to take it by force."

This unusual abstinence from insult and menace upon the subject of Cattaro is attributed to his having received the account of the non-ratification of the preliminaries with Russia, and likewise to the increasing strength and consolidation of the Northern league.

Of the Prussian armaments however, Bonaparte affects to speak in terms of the lowest contempt. He declared both to Count Metternich and General Vincent that by a single threat of recalling M. Laforet from Berlin, he could always bring Prussia to his own terms.

Lord Lauderdale wrote to me on the 1st from Paris. He had not then heard of the non-ratification.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Fox.

Vienna, September 19. 1806.

SIR,

By the messenger Kaye I received yesterday Lord Spencer's despatch marked separate, and dated September 5th.

It affords me the most heartfelt satisfaction that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve what I had done with regard to the Prussian correspondence. It is now my duty to inform you that on the same day on which your messenger arrived, I received a most important communication from Count Hardenberg upon that subject. He signified to me

that he had taken the commands of his Prussian Majesty upon the subject I had opened to him, and that he was fully authorised to communicate directly with me upon the best mode of bringing about an arrangement such as you hinted at in your despatch of July 28th.

After mentioning that he was so authorised, he desired me, but with expressions of much personal civility, to state distinctly the objects which I was authorised by my government to propose with a view of bringing about so desirable an end.

He assured me that the nature of the present armaments, and of all the measures connected with them, were decidedly hostile to France; that war appeared inevitable; that both in the army and the public in general there was but one voice, namely, that war *must* be undertaken and carried on with the utmost vigour, in order to save their own honour, and to prevent the total slavery of Europe.

On the point of Hanover he touched very lightly, considering it but as a secondary object, and one on which two Powers united against such an enemy as France would, in case of success, easily be brought to understand each other.

He did not disguise, however, his mistrust of those persons who, when Prussia last year appeared to be actuated by similar principles, forced her to break her faith with Europe, to submit to the mandates of France, and to become the instrument of her usurpation; and in terms the most forcible he cautioned all those who might be willing to try another struggle with France in defence of what was left to them first to see clearly their way, but by all means to get rid of that influence which produced all the disasters and disgraces of the last war.

I was assured that the strictest secrecy would be observed with regard to whatever we might have to

communicate to each other, and that Count Hangwitz was perfectly ignorant of the transaction.

Such in substance are the contents of his letter. I regret that it is out of my power to send you a copy of it; but for reasons unnecessary now to enter upon, I was not authorised to take one.

The despatch I received on the same day from England, in which I am directed to pursue this correspondence if any opening should appear, naturally pointed out to me the steps to be taken upon receiving the above communication. I answered it accordingly by a letter, of which I have the honour to enclose you a copy, and without having recourse to the medium of a third person.

It appears to result from this intercourse, as far as it has hitherto proceeded, that no time ought to be lost in enabling me to make some distinct offer to his Prussian Majesty. Under these circumstances I have despatched the messenger Kaye to Hamburg in order the more speedily to receive his Majesty's further commands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in above.

Mr. Adair to Count Hardenberg.

Vienne, ce 18^{me} Sept. 1806.

Je suis infiniment flatté, M. le Comte, de la manière franche et amicale dont vous avez bien voulu répondre à l'ouverture que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous faire par notre ami commun * * *. Cette démarche de ma part a été fondée sur l'intérêt commun et évident de nos deux gouvernemens ; et c'est avec un vrai plaisir que je viens d'apprendre par un courrier arrivé aujourd'hui, que ma conduite à cet égard a reçu l'approbation gracieuse de mon souverain. Animés donc mutuelle-

ment par le même dévouement pour nos maîtres, par le même amour de leur gloire, et le même désir de voir cesser les usurpations qui désolent l'Europe depuis tant d'années, voyons ce qu'il y aura à faire dans ce moment décisif de sa destinée. Je m'ouvre à vous sur ce sujet sans phrase comme sans réserve.

Je suis entièrement de votre avis sur la nature de l'obstacle qui pourrait en premier lieu, et dans d'autres circonstances empêcher toute communication confidentielle entre nous. Non pas que je me dissimule les difficultés sur tous les rapports que présente cette question délicate, mais il ne s'agit pas ici, comme vous me l'observez bien, d'objets qui sont pour le moment purement secondaires. Il s'agit de nous opposer tous à l'ennemi commun, de réduire sa puissance dans de justes bornes, et de nous garantir de nouvelles attaques.

Mes dernières dépêches ne s'expliquent pas autant que je l'aurais désiré en détail sur les articles que l'on pourrait présenter comme projet d'une nouvelle fédération. Mais encouragé par l'accueil que vous avez fait à ma proposition, je dépêcherai un courier à Londres sans perdre un moment pour demander les instructions les plus précises et les plus positives à cet égard.

En attendant pour ce qui regarde l'objet essentiel, il me semble qu'on ne pourrait mieux faire que d'en prendre pour base le Traité de Potsdam* de l'année dernière; en y portant toutefois tels changemens que les circonstances auraient rendus indispensables.

Sans attendre d'autres explications ou d'autres pouvoirs de ma cour, je me trouve déjà pleinement autorisé à discuter cette matière sur les principes énoncés par ce traité, tant pour ce qui regarde les arrondissemens calculés sur le *status quo* des possessions de S. M. Prussienne d'alors, que pour les subsides dont il y étoit question.

* Between Prussia and Russia.

Si vous croyez, M. le Comte, que de pareils arrangements, à peu de chose près, pourraient convenir à l'état et aux dangers actuels de l'Europe, je crois pouvoir répondre de ma part que nous pourrions bientôt nous entendre. Dans 24 jours d'ici j'aurai la réponse de mon gouvernement : mais pour ne pas perdre tout-à-fait un tems si précieux, j'ose vous demander en attendant votre opinion sur ce que je viens de vous communiquer. Les ordres que je recevrai du ministère Britannique me décideront alors ou à vous proposer de recevoir un homme de confiance nommé par M. Fox, ou de vous aboucher avec moi selon les circonstances. Agréez maintenant, M. le Comte, les assurances de ma plus parfaite estime. Sans avoir l'honneur de vous connoître personnellement, c'est un sentiment qui date de loin en moi, et que la voix commune de l'Europe vous assure de plus en plus.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Fox.

Vienna, September 29. 1806.

SIR,

HAVING in the absence of the messenger Kaye, whom I sent last week to Hamburg, entrusted some despatches for the East India Company to a very careful person frequently employed upon that service by Sir Arthur Paget, I take the opportunity of his departure to write more fully to you than I could by post of the 24th instant, concerning the state of affairs at this Court.

Your despatch of July 28th, having already authorised me to speak to the Austrian government on the subject of pecuniary aid provided any reasonable

purpose could be answered by administering it, I have lately reverted to this topic, with a view of discovering, although by no means with that of influencing, their determinations.

On the 13th of August I had the honour of communicating to you the views and situation of Austria, as they had then been confidentially imparted to me by Count Stadion.

Since that time, the refusal of Russia to ratify M. d'Oubril's Treaty, and yet more the state of affairs between Prussia and France, have encouraged them to take some steps towards a system more consonant with their dignity, and in the end with their safety, than they seemed disposed before to hazard. Great facilities in council have been afforded to the party which has always seen their situation in this light, by the continually increasing demands of Bonaparte, and by the disgusting insolence with which he has enforced them. The execution of a bookseller at Braunau for having in his possession a pretended libel on the French government, and, more than all, the condemnation to death, by regular process, of two peaceable Austrian subjects, inhabitants the one of Lintz and the other of Vienna, for imputed offences of a similar nature, have taught this Court that if submission be their system to their submission there can be no limits. On the other hand, the steady vigour of his Majesty's councils, the success of his arms in Calabria, and the example of that gallant people and of the Montenegrins in Dalmatia, join with these causes in inspiring some degree of spirit into their measures. They have, accordingly, continued their preparations without interruption, and indeed with as much vigour as could be expected from them in the present state of their finances. The resolution is taken to refuse the passage of French troops through Bohemia. They are assembling a large force in the neighbourhood of Tabor.

It has been signified to Bonaparte, that these measures of preparation were solely with a view to preserve their neutrality, but that they would not be discontinued. In short, the conduct and language of Austria is materially changed.

Such being the dispositions of the Austrian Cabinet, Count Stadion, on the 24th inst., expressed to me his desire, as I have already had the honour of communicating to you, of entering into some explanations with the British government in conjunction with Russia and Prussia. On renewing this subject with him, I find, as indeed it was to be expected, that he meant this in case Prussia should be once fairly, and without the possibility of retreat, engaged in the contest with France.

I am not entitled, therefore, to consider his communication to me as an official overture, although I can perceive by it that the hopes of the Austrian ministers in regard to Prussia are greatly increased, and that their apprehensions of embarking with her are reduced to personal mistrust of Count Hangwitz. How far this continued hesitation be well or ill-founded, and likewise how far it may be prudent to attempt removing it, you will be enabled to judge after I shall have briefly laid before you what has just come to my knowledge.

I rely upon Mr. Wynne's having informed you of several very important details concerning Count Hangwitz and the interior of the Prussian councils. It is possible, however, that he may not have had the opportunity which has presented itself to me of learning his Prussian Majesty's last instructions to his ministers at foreign courts. In these, his Prussian Majesty unequivocally declares, that he will listen to no accommodation with France without—first, the entire and immediate evacuation of Germany by the French troops; secondly, that no obstacle shall be raised by

that Power to the accession on the part of any of the smaller states of Germany to the Northern federation; thirdly, that some effectual security shall be provided for the future peace of Germany, by engagements among the Powers chiefly interested in its maintenance, with which France shall not interfere; and fourthly, that no further attempts shall be made against the Austrian territories, possessions, or independence. In this paper, which has been officially communicated to Count Stadion, his Prussian Majesty exhorts the Emperor in the most energetic language to make common cause with him. He pledges his royal word to the permanency of his present system; and he likewise declares, in the most solemn manner, that when once engaged he will never separate himself from any Power who shall assist him in the great work he has undertaken.

To the assurances contained in this paper of instructions, I may add from other and correct sources of information, that the Elector of Saxony has joined Prussia on the express assurance that no secret instructions have been given to Count Knochelsdorf.

I have the same reason for believing that Count Hangwitz has communicated to Prince Hohenlohe all the correspondence which has passed between the Prussian and the French governments since December last, and that the perusal of it has convinced that Prince that Count Hangwitz had long ago seen the utter impossibility of persevering in his first system with regard to France. Prince Hohenlohe's military instructions are to defend the Austrian territories.

These particulars I have thought it necessary to lay before you, in order to your instructing me in the conduct you would have me to pursue with regard to Count Hangwitz, should it on any occasion be left to me to express the opinion of his Majesty's government on this very delicate subject. Whenever the matter

of subsidies comes into discussion, as it may with Prussia, the voice of the British Cabinet will necessarily have a decisive influence on all questions connected with their due application. But in the present circumstances, the use to be made of this power is really a matter of great difficulty to resolve, and a question well worth your deliberate attention. On the one side it is almost certain, that in any concert which this Court may be desirous of establishing with Prussia, and afterwards with other Powers, they will make the dismissal of Count Hangwitz an indispensable condition. On the other, considering the resolution so strongly manifested by the King to support him, and the imminent danger to which both Prussia and Austria would be exposed if Bonaparte were allowed to take these two Powers separately, it surely would be most deeply to be lamented that even a just dislike and well-founded mistrust of this minister should present invincible objects to an union which has been prepared by circumstances beyond his control, and which is called for by the general voice of Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Earl Spencer.

Vienna, October 8. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, dated September 15th, communicating to me the melancholy information of Mr. Fox's death, and likewise that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to appoint your Lordship, ad interim, to the office of Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

I have, in consequence, requested Sir Francis Vin-

cent to lay before your Lordship all my private letters to Mr. Fox which relate to public affairs or the interests of his Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Earl Spencer.

Vienna, October 8. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acquainting your Lordship that I have just received a letter from Count Hardenburg, of which the enclosed is a copy.

I shall transmit to your Lordship without delay whatever further communications may reach me from that quarter. In the mean time I take the liberty of calling your Lordship's attention to a circumstance which it may be of some moment to consider.

In the letter which accompanied the enclosed, Count Hardenberg again positively affirms that Count Hangwitz is ignorant of the correspondence carried on between him and me. On the other hand, the mission of Baron Jacobi to England is undertaken at the express recommendation of that minister. A question, therefore, of some importance towards the discovery of the real views of Prussia appears to arise out of this circumstance.

* * * * *

I suggest the observation to your Lordship chiefly with a view of inducing his Majesty's ministers to consider whether, notwithstanding Baron Jacobi's mission, it may not be advisable that this correspondence should go on with a view to counteract the designs which many persons still ascribe to Count Hangwitz, in case the first successes of the war should be on the side of France.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in above.

Count Hardenberg to Mr. Adair.

J'AI reçu la lettre dont vous avez bien voulu m'honorer en date du 18^{me} de ce mois, Monsieur, et je me trouverais infiniment heureux de travailler avec vous à établir la plus parfaite union de principes et de mesures entre nos deux souverains. Persuadé qu'il ne peut exister dans ce moment qu'un seul grand but pour tous les deux, les autres objets devroient facilement s'arranger. Depuis huit jours le Roi est à l'armée ; il ne me reste donc que de rendre compte à sa Majesté de ce que vous venez de m'écrire, et d'attendre les ordres dont elle daignera me munir, d'autant plus que des pour-parlers ont été entamés entre le Baron de Jacobi et M. Thornton à Hamburg. Le Traité de Potsdam, conclu sous des circonstances très-différentes entre la Prusse et la Russie, ne pourra guère servir de base aux arrangemens à prendre entre nos deux Cours, tant pour les subsides que pour les autres objets, quoique l'esprit doive sans doute être le même. Mais il faudra toujours s'occuper d'un nouveau projet de traité adapté à l'état actuel de choses. En attendant les ouvertures ultérieures que vous me faites espérer, Monsieur, je ne manquerai pas de mon côté de vous informer des intentions du Roi mon maître, aussitôt qu'il aura plû à sa Majesté de me les faire connoître.

Agréez, Monsieur, &c.

à Templeberg le * de Sept. 1806.

* Date effaced, but as this letter was an answer to mine of the 18th, it was probably written on the 24th.

Lord Morpeth was appointed on the 1st of October, and arrived at head-quarters the 12th. — R. A.

Mr. Adair to Earl Spencer.

Vienna, October 9. 1806.

MY LORD,

IN a late conversation with Count Stadion respecting the preparations now going on in the Austrian States, that minister took occasion to enter into the financial difficulties of the Austrian government, and he pointed out to me very clearly not only the reasons which precluded all possibility of their acceding at this moment to the propositions of the Court of Berlin, but those also which retarded, and might in a great degree prevent their putting their own army on that footing which the state of affairs renders so eminently necessary.

In the course of this conversation he requested that I would again state the nature of his Majesty's most generous proposal, in the event of the Emperor being driven to resist by force the encroachments and vexations of France. On reading to him, which I did distinctly, that part of Mr. Secretary Fox's despatch dated July 28th, in which are the following words — "Should it be the determination of the Emperor to resist the demands of Bonaparte, you may assure Count Stadion that whatever means of vigour the Emperor may be inclined to pursue, arguing any reasonable probability of advantage, this country will support him," we discussed fully the question — whether the British government might be disposed to consider the present armaments of his Imperial Majesty as offering such a prospect of advantage to the common cause as to induce a compliance with a request for pecuniary aid.

Our discussion was long and unreserved; but not feeling myself authorised to come to any result upon a matter of such importance, I recommended to Count

Stadion to address himself directly to his Majesty's government through Count Starhemberg for a full explanation of his Majesty's sentiments and views.

There were some obvious points, however, depending upon the principle of a combined and well-concerted resistance to France, to which I could accede without hesitation. I made no difficulty therefore in giving it as my opinion that if it was the intention of the Austrian government gradually to increase its forces until they reached the complete war establishment, avoiding in the present time any further concessions to France, and with a view *bonâ fide* to resist her ultimately, I could not doubt that his Majesty's ministers would consider the execution of such an intention as furnishing a case in which pecuniary aid might reasonably be granted.

It is not for me to presume under these circumstances to offer any opinion to his Majesty's ministers. All I shall observe is, that Austria will scarcely ever find such an opportunity of arming as she possesses at this instant from the appearances of general hostility by which she is everywhere surrounded, and that the necessity for her arming is equally strong whether success or failure attend the present exertions of Prussia. If success, it is impossible to say what advantages may not arise from a situation so perfectly new to the Continent since Bonaparte has been at the head of France. If failure, it can as little be doubted that Austria will again have to experience all his insolent menaces and exorbitant demands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Viscount Howick.

Vienna, October 17. 1806.

MY LORD,

By the messenger Donaldson, who arrived here on the 13th inst., I received your Lordship's despatches of September 30th.

Conceiving that it would be of importance to his Majesty's service in the event of Lord Morpeth's accomplishing the first object of his mission, to remove as far as possible all difficulties in the way of a general union against France, I requested a conference with Count Stadion to this effect.

Your Lordship will have already observed that a deeply-rooted distrust of Prussia, while the direction of affairs continues to be entrusted to Count Hangwitz, forms one material obstacle to a cordial understanding between the two Courts.

It is my object to remove this mistrust in case Prussia shall evince a steady resolution to repair by her future conduct the calamities of which she was last year the cause, and to give an earnest of her good faith by complying with the just demands of his Majesty.

I have the satisfaction of informing you that it has been explicitly declared to me, that the conduct of Prussia towards his Majesty in the present instance will be considered as the test of her sincerity on other points of general interest.

I shall endeavour to induce Count Stadion to make a similar avowal to the Prussian Minister.

As it appears expedient that Lord Morpeth should be apprised of the effect which a liberal conduct on the part of the Cabinet of Berlin would have at this Court, I have despatched the messenger Kaye to his

Lordship at the Prussian head-quarters with a confidential letter for this purpose.*

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 24. 1806.

MY LORD,

THE accounts from Constantinople being such as to require the immediate transmission of Mr. Arbuthnot's despatches to his Majesty's government, and the security of the communications by post, appearing to be very doubtful since the misfortunes which have attended the Prussian arms, I have judged it necessary to forward them to your Lordship by a special messenger.

I am grieved to inform your Lordship, that the consternation here since the defeat of the Prussian army on the 14th, is so great as to render it impossible to say what bad effects it may not produce on the Austrian councils. Of their assisting Prussia there is not at this moment the smallest prospect. I should even fear that they would not resist a peremptory demand to disarm.

With regard to what more immediately concerns the interests of his Majesty and his allies, namely, the passage of troops through their territory, I can no longer trust to the assurances which have repeatedly been given both to Count Razamoffsky and myself, that such permission would on no account be granted. A war between Russia and the Porte in particular will give France a pretext for marching to the assistance of her ally, and as there exists already a convention with Austria, for the passage of troops into Dalmatia, there can be but little doubt that

* Vide Appendix.

she will avail herself of it to the utmost extent, in order to penetrate into the heart of the Turkish provinces.

Under these circumstances, allow me to suggest to your Lordship the necessity of your pointing out to me very precisely the line of conduct which his Majesty would have me to adopt. This will be the more expedient, as there is every reason to believe that my communications with England by the usual channels will be cut off, and that I shall in some sense be left to act alone. In the mean time, I shall not fail to remonstrate with every degree of force I can reasonably employ, if, after the confidential overtures which have been made to me lately, any new agreement should be entered into with the French government, or any interpretation of former stipulations be consented to, contrary to their true tenor, or prejudicial to the interests of his Majesty or of his allies.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 28. 1806.

MY LORD,

THE position of the French armies being such as to cut off all my communications with England by the direct road to Hamburgh, I am at present under the necessity of sending my despatches by Breslau and Stettin. I will do my utmost, however, to find some nearer channel of correspondence by which I may convey either duplicates, or the heads of such information as it may be of importance for your Lordship to receive and in my power to collect.

I have little at present to add to my despatch,

No. 23., which I sent by the messenger Donaldson. In the uncertainty of the present alarming moment all resolution seems to be suspended at this Court. The armaments, however, still continue; and if Prussia should hold out, and Russia come forward in time, I see no reason to apprehend any immediate compliance with insulting demands from France.

But I am grieved to remark two circumstances which may be productive of serious evil to the common cause.

The discontent of this Court at the delay in surrendering up the fortress of Cattaro by the Russians, which seemed to have been quieted during Lord Lauderdale's negotiations, as well as by the hopes that the war in the north of Germany would have commenced with better success, has lately broken out afresh, and with some share of acrimony. The successes of France render this Court more anxious than ever to put a stop to what they think a just ground of complaint on her part, while the same causes which have hitherto led the Russian commanders in the Adriatic to retain that fortress, appear likely to operate with still stronger force under the present circumstances.

It is in the next place observed with concern that Russia appears to have a very inadequate force in readiness on the side of Poland. The views of Bonaparte on both Saxony and Poland, in which latter country he expects great assistance, are now evident to demonstration. The Court of Vienna, therefore, which sees its own destruction in the success of those views, surrounded, as it would be, on every side by France, complains of the preference which seems to be given at St. Petersburg to a war on the side of Turkey.

Your Lordship will, therefore, be aware of the necessity of interposing the powerful influence of the

British councils, in order effectually to clear away all causes of jealousy between these two Powers. The time is fast approaching when one, or perhaps both of them, will have to undertake the last struggle for their independence ; but I much fear that this is one of those cases in which the most obvious common danger will not be able alone to lead men to a just sense of their interests.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 1. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE received your Lordship's circular of September 25th, together with its inclosure, and likewise your Lordship's despatch No. 3.

No information has as yet reached this Court respecting the part Prussia means to take in the present conjuncture ; but as the conduct of the Emperor will be materially influenced by it, I have requested Lord Morpeth, through whom I forward this present despatch, to send me the earliest intelligence of any steps which may be taken towards peace.

Should that be the event, there is little hope that the fate of Austria can long be deferred after the occupation of Saxony by France. All that can be done will be to prepare resolutely for the worst. Allow me, therefore, to press upon your Lordship's consideration the necessity of engaging Russia to direct her utmost efforts on the side of Poland.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 10. 1806.

MY LORD,

THE Hon. Mr. Burrell intending to set out this day on his return to England, I have entrusted this despatch to his care.

I have the honour of acquainting your Lordship that on Saturday last Sir Harford Jones arrived here from Constantinople, which place he left on the 20th ultimo, with accounts that Mr. Arbuthnot had succeeded in procuring the re-establishment of the deposed Hospodars.

As he (Sir Harford) intends setting out for England whenever I can put him in a way to travel by a safe road, I shall reserve myself for the moment of his departure to communicate to your Lordship such observations upon the state of affairs at this Court as I have been able to make since the date of my last despatch.

In the mean time, I beg leave to request that your Lordship would permit Mr. Burrell to wait upon you, and to give you verbally such general information as his residence at Vienna, and the opportunities he has had of observing the progress of events, have enabled him to collect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 10. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of October 17.

This despatch, together with those of Mr. Arbuthnot, will be delivered to your Lordship by Sir Harford Jones, a gentleman of distinguished merit in the service of the East India Company.

As it is much to be apprehended that the disasters which have overwhelmed the Prussian monarchy will also destroy the good effects of Mr. Arbuthnot's judicious proceedings at Constantinople, his Majesty's government will see perhaps the necessity, more than ever, of supporting his representations, and of enabling him to retrieve our affairs by a timely display of the British power in those seas.

I took care to inform him in time of the fatal result of the battle of October 14th. Unhappily I had nothing to counterbalance the bad effects it would necessarily produce, except the information that Lord Lauderdale had quitted Paris, and that the negotiation had been broken off upon a point* by no means affecting any immediate interests of his Majesty's dominions, but directly and deeply affecting the very existence of the Ottoman Empire.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 11. 1806.

MY LORD,

NOTWITHSTANDING the importance of what is every day passing so near me, I have little to transmit to your Lordship for the information of his Majesty's government. Independently of the difficulty of obtaining any intelligence which I can warrant to be authentic, matters are approaching so rapidly to a

* The occupation of Dalmatia, and surrender of Sicily.

crisis that whatever speculations I might hazard upon a present view of affairs, or upon whatever cases of doubtful expediency I might call for your Lordship's directions, both the one and the other will be decided by the irresistible course of events long before this despatch can reach England. It were useless, therefore, to trouble your Lordship with accounts either of the dangers of every description which are gathering round the Austrian monarchy, or of the perplexity and irresolution which appear to prevail in its councils. Rather than dwell too much upon effects which never fail to accompany the sense of imminent peril, I have endeavoured to find out some principle of fundamental national interest on which I might assure his Majesty's government that Austria would take her stand, and risk her existence on the issue.

It would be to mislead your Lordship greatly, were I to offer any consolatory prospect as the result either of my inquiry or observation. All I can venture to promise for this Court, advised as it is at present, is, that no proposition of sharing in the partition of the Prussian territories, whether on the ground of exchange or compensation, will on any account be listened to.

With regard to positive resistance, I see no reason to believe that any measures to that effect will be adopted, until the moment when all resistance will perhaps be vain. No man here doubts Bonaparte's views on Poland, or is so blind as not to see the speedy destruction of Austria if those views should be successful. It is hoped, indeed, that before he can get there, a Russian army may have arrived sufficiently strong to resist his progress. But if no such army should be ready, he is not likely to meet with any impediment from the Austrian government. Recently, it is true, a movement has been made towards Galicia, but the same policy which prevented their union with Prussia

will, in my opinion, equally prevail against their opposing the French in Poland, unless they should be encouraged by some signal success on the part of Russia.

No distinct demand has yet been made on Austria to disarm; but from the language publicly held by the French mission, the time I am afraid is not very distant at which it may be expected. It has already been insinuated that in the state to which Prussia has been reduced, the keeping so large a force in Bohemia, as is now assembled there, bears more the appearance of hostility towards France than of reasonable caution for the safety of their frontiers.

Under the circumstances of the present moment, therefore, as far as they are known to us, your Lordship will readily perceive that no certain reliance can be placed upon the conduct of Austria, except in the instance I have particularised.

I have heard that the Emperor has declared that if he should be finally forced to take up arms, it was his determination to put himself at the head of his subjects and perish rather than submit to further insults. Often since my residence here I have had occasion to witness the virtues which personally distinguish the Emperor of Austria. I will not doubt, therefore, that such will be his behaviour; I am equally confident that he will be bravely seconded by his army, and, except in Poland, by his subjects at large; nor would there be any reason to despair of the resources of the Austrian empire in a distant or protracted war. But so great are the immediate difficulties of its government, and so little the ability to provide against them, that even with the assistance of Russia, I should look with apprehension to the contest.

This view of affairs, my Lord, which is not taken without due examination, I think it my duty to lay before his Majesty's government, in order that if his Majesty in his wisdom should think fit to assist the

House of Austria in a conflict which, sooner or later, is inevitable, more may not be granted than may be found consistent with a rational hope of good, nor more be expected from her than her condition will enable her to perform.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 16. 1806.

MY LORD,

Not thinking it safe to send my regular despatches by the road by which you will receive this letter, but conceiving that there is a chance for its reaching you safely and more expeditiously, I now acquaint you with the substance of my last numbers.

Mr. Arbuthnot on the 12th and 13th ultimo, succeeded in forcing the Turks to re-establish the deposed Hospodars. His despatches, with the details of his negotiations, are now on the road to England in the care of Sir Harford Jones, who is returning from Bagdad.

But as this great good had been effected partly by the fear of seeing a British fleet before Constantinople, and partly by the expectation that Prussia and the other continental powers would be able to put a stop to the progress of France, it is greatly to be feared that all will be undone by the reverses which have attended the Prussian arms.

Mr. Arbuthnot implores the British government to support his representations. In effect, if he be not supported, that country will become totally devoted to France, and in the present calamitous situation of affairs, may be made an instrument in her hands to occupy half the Russian forces on their own frontiers.

It is my opinion, from all I can observe, that Austria will do nothing unless the French should meet with great disasters in Poland. There will be no exchange of Galicia for Silesia, nor will Austria participate in any shape in the division of the Prussian territories.

Bonaparte has demanded provisions and other succours, but hitherto none have been granted.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 19. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatches, Nos. 5. and 6.

In consequence of his Majesty's commands, I have seen Count Stadion, and distinctly stated to him the only grounds on which his Majesty could consent to grant pecuniary aid to Austria.

That minister repeated to me the reasons which had prevented at the outset the co-operation of this government with Prussia, and which I have stated in my former despatches. He assented fully to the truth of all the general reasoning your Lordship has so forcibly urged with regard to the public danger, and likewise to the certainty that Austria would soon be compelled to have recourse to arms for her defence. He assured me also, that this was the firm persuasion of his Imperial Majesty himself, and the unanimous sense of his advisers. But in answer to my question, why the Emperor did not give orders to his troops to march, he urged a variety of reasons, of which the three following are the chief: —

First, the uncertainty of the determination of Prussia respecting peace. Should Austria declare

war, and the next day peace be made between Prussia and France, the destruction of this country is believed to be inevitable.

Secondly, the distance of the Russian armies. Bonaparte would be at Vienna before they could come up.

Thirdly, the doubt what part Russia will herself take when she knows the full extent of the calamity.* A messenger is expected every hour with the greatest impatience. The accounts by him will determine the Emperor as to what line he will adopt.

Your Lordship will observe with concern from this, as well as from all my despatches since the accounts of the Prussian disasters reached Vienna, that great part of the irresolution of Austria is grounded upon the very extent itself of the dangers by which she is surrounded. It is the more difficult to combat this feeling, as the arguments which seem best calculated to oppose it are those from which it is derived. In the present circumstances, it certainly is the design of Austria rather to give way apparently to the progress of events, than openly to bear up against them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 22. 1806.

MY LORD,

HAVING learned that Lord Morpeth had embarked early in the present month at Cuxhaven, to return to England, and it appearing to be very doubtful whether his Lordship could have received his last instructions with respect to Prussia; it appearing likewise that there exists no immediate communication with Eng-

* The battle of Jena.

land by which the object of them can be conveyed to his Prussian Majesty, I had intended to send the Honourable Mr. Jenkinson, of whose zeal for his Majesty's service I have had repeated proofs, to headquarters for this special purpose, when the arrival of Mr. Wynne at Vienna, and his obliging offer to be himself the bearer of the communication, determined me to entrust it to his care.

The urgency of the case, the obvious necessity in the distressed situation of his Prussian Majesty of showing him that he is not abandoned in his misfortunes, added to what it is impossible not to see must be the effect of his signing a peace on such terms as he is likely now to obtain, will I trust excuse me to his Majesty's government for hazarding this step.

I have given Mr. Wynne every information in my power with respect to the state of affairs at this Court.

Since I had the honour of writing last to your Lordship, I have again seen Count Stadion, who has received a despatch from St. Petersburg, written subsequently to the time at which intelligence of the Prussian disasters had been received there. This despatch has occasioned a considerable degree of uneasiness at the Court of Vienna.

It appears, in the first place, that the extent of the Prussian loss had not produced the effect upon the Emperor of Russia of inducing him to call forth all the resources of his empire to oppose the progress of the French in the Prussian territories. It had likewise been notified to Count Meerfeldt, the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, that the Russian army on the Dniester had been ordered to march into Moldavia.

It is to be feared that, unless Count Razamoffsky shall very speedily receive some communication of a more satisfactory nature from Russia, they will be

still less disposed than they are at present at this Court to enter into any measures for the common defence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 4. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch marked separate, of November 11. No accounts of the ratification of the armistice between Prussia and France have yet been received here.

A considerable part of the Austrian army is assembling in Galicia. General Bellegarde has been recalled suddenly from his government at Gratz, and appointed to the command in that province.

The Elector of Saxony, whose country exhibits a scene of devastation beyond even that of the Seven Years' War, has been obliged to set out for Bonaparte's head-quarters, which, by the last accounts, were still at Berlin. The Austrian minister at Dresden has been removed from thence at the desire, I am sorry to say, of the French commander, for having refused passports to some French officers going to Vienna.

Count Razamoffsky has heard nothing as yet from his Court, to justify the hope of such efforts on the part of Russia as are alone adequate to the present crisis. I can obtain no account fit to send to his Majesty's government either of the number or disposition of the Russian troops already arrived on the Vistula.

Warsaw was not occupied on the 17th of November.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 6. 1806.

MY LORD,

THE communication made by M. de Talleyrand to Count Lucchesini, on signing the armistice at Berlin on October 16th, will, I have reason to believe, be productive of an offer from this Court to Bonaparte of its mediation for a general peace.

I have stated this circumstance in my letter to Mr. Stuart of this day, cautioning him against the effect such a measure may have in relaxing the exertions of the Court of St. Petersburg.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 6. 1806.

MY LORD,

IMMEDIATELY upon receiving information from Mr. Jackson, of the King of Prussia having refused to ratify the armistice, I lost no time in entering into further explanations with Count Stadion respecting the measures this Court proposed ultimately to adopt.

Nothing I find can stir them from their present system, unless Russia can be induced to come forward in a manner very different from that in which she now appears to be acting. Russia has not at this present moment more than 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of the Vistula. She has about 70,000 at Grodno. We know of no other army out of her own territories.

I have again written in the strongest manner to Mr. Stuart at St. Petersburg, telling him that all I

may be able to effect here will depend upon Russia. There is not that confidence between the Austrian and Russian governments which can alone save them both from perdition.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 14. 1806.

MY LORD,

I HAVE at length received your Lordship's despatches by Sir Arthur Paget's messenger.

All ordinary means of communication with England being now completely impracticable, I am under the necessity of transmitting my despatches by such opportunities as the circumstances of the moment may offer. I forward this through Mr. Jackson at the King of Prussia's head-quarters.

Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, nothing has occurred to alter the neutral system of the Court of Vienna. The refusal of his Prussian Majesty to ratify the armistice signed at Berlin, on November 16th, has not inspired any corresponding energy into the councils of this government. It is still complained of that Russia does not speak out to them, although it must be confessed that they themselves appear to take no proper measures for ascertaining the intentions of Russia or conciliating her assistance.

The entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia has given great uneasiness here. I learn likewise that the order for their entering that province was the cause of a remonstrance on the part of this Court, extremely ill-placed, to say no more of it. No exertion indeed ought to be omitted in order to induce the Emperor

of Russia to make his principal, indeed, his utmost efforts on the side of Poland; but there is a wide difference between so doing and reviving at such a crisis as the present any jealousies concerning the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of the Porte; for whose safety the strict union between his Majesty and Russia must offer the most ample security both to Austria and to the Porte itself.

I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that the army of observation in Bohemia is entirely broken up. I do not believe, indeed, that any formal demand for its dislocation has been made by France. * * * With regard to other demands on the part of France, I can only say that no communication of any such, whether official or confidential, has been made to me; and I rely too much on the good faith and frankness which have hitherto characterised our mutual communications to believe that any proposal prejudicial to the interests of his Majesty or of his allies will be entertained without my receiving timely notice of it.

But however disposed to temporise Austria may be at the present moment, the inevitable consequences of indecision must come upon her at last. In some shape or other her independence will infallibly be attacked, and she will be compelled before long, in substance if not in terms, to take part either with France or against her. That Austria should even have the choice of these alternatives has ever appeared to me to depend upon the time at which that question shall be put to her. If she should prefer putting it to herself, she may yet maintain a struggle for her independence. If she should prefer waiting the convenience of France, it will be put to her at a moment when she must decide as France shall dictate. It has struck me very forcibly, therefore, — (and I most earnestly hope that his Majesty's

ministers will neither dissent from the opinions I take the freedom of expressing, nor disapprove of what I have done in consequence of them) — that since the rejection of the armistice by Prussia, one last interval for deliberation is afforded to Austria; that it being now certain that the war will continue during the winter, some moment of declaring herself to advantage must present itself; that whether this be when France shall exact some concession with which it is impossible to comply, or when the dispersion of her forces and other embarrassments which we may hope for, shall afford an opportunity palpably favourable for attacking her, the moment itself may not be greatly distant; and that consequently it is a most important object *now* to press Austria to come to some decision upon a question which otherwise will come upon her by surprise, accompanied by all its attendant inconveniences. When to these views it be added that, if finally forced, Austria must act, and be but too glad to act, in close and intimate concert with Prussia, as well as with Great Britain and Russia, the advantages of a previous understanding seem to be such as infinitely to exceed the inconveniences of too free a communication with a power of which she may yet be suspicious.

These considerations operating very seriously on my mind, at a moment in which I have nothing to guide me but a general knowledge of the views of his Majesty's government, have led me to submit a proposal to his Prussian Majesty, the object of which, as your Lordship will see, is to bring this Court forward in a manner and at a moment most advantageous to itself, first, by putting into its hands the best means of defence on the side more immediately exposed to the enemy; and secondly, by giving it a pledge of the firm determination of his Prussian Majesty to persevere to the last extremity in the contest. I have

therefore requested Mr. Jackson to lay the inclosed paper before the King of Prussia for his consideration; and as I am sure of the co-operation of the Russian ambassador in this object, there is good reason to hope that if his Prussian Majesty should approve it, one main difficulty in the way of Austria adopting a rational system of defence will be entirely removed.

Whatever may be the result of any negotiation to which this proposal may give rise, an effort will at least have been made for preventing what is now most emphatically threatened, the final destruction of Europe without even a struggle on the part of Austria either for its preservation or for her own.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure referred to.

TELLE que puisse être la nécessité dans laquelle l'Autriche se trouve actuellement de temporiser avec la France, tout nous porte à croire que de moment en moment elle sera forcée d'abandonner son système de neutralité. Comme il paraît de la dernière importance d'accélérer autant que possible sa détermination de se mettre en état de défense contre toute agression de la part de la France, et afin de l'engager le plus tôt possible à prendre un parti dans lequel elle pourrait autrement entrevoir plus de danger immédiat que d'avantage, on se propose de consulter S. M. Prussienne pour savoir jusqu'à quel point sa Majesté serait disposée à remettre entre les mains de l'Empereur d'Autriche, sous la garantie spéciale de l'Angleterre et de la Russie pour leur restitution à la paix générale, les forteresses de la Silésie qui pourroient servir de barrière à l'Autriche contre les opérations de l'ennemi de ce côté-là.

Cette ouverture suppose naturellement que la Grande

Bretagne, dont les dispositions sont déjà connues de S. M. Prussienne, devrait se servir de tous les moyens auprès de l'Empereur d'Autriche pour l'engager à y concourir.

Vienne, ce 12 Dec. 1806.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 18. 1806.

MY LORD,

My despatch No. 31., which I have desired Mr. Jackson to forward, contains a proposal which I requested him to lay before the King of Prussia. It is that his Prussian Majesty should offer to put his Silesian fortresses into the hands of Austria, by way of barrier for her against France, under the special guaranty of England and Russia for their restoration at a general peace.

M. Pozzo di Borgo is just arrived, and by order of the Emperor of Russia has communicated to me the object of his mission. His first conversation with Count Stadion has not been wholly unfavourable.

As Austria can now no longer have any pretence for doubting the sincerity of Russia or even of Prussia, I have thought it my duty to press the minister in a much stronger manner than I have ever yet done, to take a part. Last night I had a conference of two hours with him upon this express point. Great difficulties are still in the way. The principal one, however, I hope to remove in my next conference. It is a jealousy of the views of Russia on the side of Turkey. I have offered, in the most decided and explicit terms, the security of our national good faith that Russia, while she is in alliance with us, shall not extend herself on that side.

In a word, the minister has consented to my bringing on some explanations with M. Pozzo di Borgo upon this point, which I will venture to say will be satisfactory.

The next difficulty is the state of their army. I proposed their relieving the fortresses of Silesia. The minister affects to say that he has no more than sixty thousand men of immediate disposable force. The army cannot be ready to act until the spring.

The third difficulty relates to the numbers to be employed by Russia. This Court requires 300,000 men to be actually in the field on the side of Poland.

These points arranged, it was half assured, half insinuated to me, that Austria would act in the spring. It was in vain that I represented that all Silesia would be conquered before then.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 30. 1806.

MY LORD,

SINCE I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, M. Pozzo di Borgo's negociation has come to a final and unsuccessful issue. It has been productive, however, of explanations, some of which may be highly useful in future, and of others, which I regret to say had become necessary between the two Courts since the advance of the Russians into Moldavia.

I mentioned to your Lordship in my short ciphered despatch by Lieutenant Drachbrawa, that I had supported the object of M. Pozzo's mission. I could not then explain either my motive for so doing, or the extent to which I had done it. Your

Lordship will, I hope, receive with indulgence the account I have now the honour of laying before you, of the part I have borne in his negotiations.

The instructions I received, as well from your Lordship, as from Mr. Fox, to do nothing which should induce Austria, against her better judgment, to embark in a contest with France, left me no doubt how to act on almost all the occasions which have occurred since my residence here. It was not of less importance, however, in the situation in which Europe stood at the breaking out of the war between Prussia and France, to learn thoroughly how Austria intended to act.

* * * * *

Not to trouble your Lordship with too many details, I will observe generally that the pretended moderation of Bonaparte never deceived this Court. The question of entering or not into the war has been simply a question of convenience. The question whether they should make common cause with Prussia, when Prussia was engaged in hostile discussions with Bonaparte, stood upon exactly the same footing, and was governed by the same mode of reasoning, as the question whether they should resist him when he was insulting General Vincent at Paris and dividing Germany among his vassals. This question at the beginning was viewed by the different parties at Court in very opposite lights. On some occasions I have been surprised by tokens, not in words alone, but in measures, of vigour and decision; but after the battle of Jena, it was the unanimous opinion, so expressed to me in the strongest terms, that the minister would deserve death who should persuade the Emperor to draw his sword.

After this, if I had been ever so much inclined to urge Austria to a declaration, it would have been useless, and consequently imprudent to attempt it. All I could do was to obtain from the minister what I have already had the honour of communicating to your Lordship in my despatch, No. 28., namely, the avowal that this system of abstaining from all interference was grounded upon doubts of Prussia persevering, upon doubts of Russia coming forward in sufficient force, and upon doubts of the power of Russia, even were she disposed to exert herself to the utmost.

I need not trouble your Lordship with the reasoning which has been employed to prove to Austria a proposition so apparently clear, as that Russia was not likely to be conquered upon her own territory. I have only to say that such reasoning, good or bad, has been unsuccessful.

The submission resulting from these councils, however, neither diminished the arrogance of Bonaparte upon the misfortunes at Jena, nor appear even to have much delayed the meditated execution of his views on Austria herself; when the rejection of the armistice by Prussia, and the march of the second Russian corps, together with other embarrassments arising from sickness and distress among his troops, again lowered his tone, and obtained for Austria the respite for which she was so anxious.

Such was the situation of affairs upon the arrival of M. Pozzo di Borgo. It was evident then, as it had been all along, that between Austria and France the question of beginning the war resolved itself simply, and this on both sides, into one of sooner or later. Austria wished to take her own time for declaring herself, and Bonaparte his own convenience for attacking her.

The mission of M. Pozzo is already well known

to your Lordship. As it was greatly wished at St. Petersburg that I should aid it, the fullest communications were made to me by that gentleman, whom I soon found to be a man deserving in an equal degree my political confidence and personal esteem.

When I saw, therefore, that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to come forward with the whole forces of his Empire, that he wished to act in the most intimate concert and connection with Austria, that to this effect he had given the most extensive powers to M. Pozzo, and that his means of acting were in the greatest forwardness;—when fresh proofs of the King of Prussia's constancy and fortitude in his misfortunes reached me every day, together with accounts which denoted that his affairs were by no means desperate;—when I contrasted this with Bonaparte's advanced position in Poland, with what was known of the state of his army, and with the certainty that he had left but an inconsiderable number of French troops behind him in the countries he had overrun;—when I considered also the vast importance of relieving the Silesian fortresses, the facility of relieving them, but also the facility of taking them in their actual state,—I confess that the moment did appear to me to be that in which Austria might declare herself to advantage,—to more advantage at least than she would ever be able to do at any future period. I concurred, therefore, entirely in the Emperor of Russia's invitation to Austria, and resolved to support M. Pozzo to the utmost.

I humbly implore his Majesty's pardon if my zeal in this instance should have misled me.

The most perfect confidence having been soon established between M. Pozzo and myself, it was agreed between us that he should see Count Stadion, and enter fully into the business first, and that after com-

municating the result to me, I should ask for a conference the ensuing day.

In my despatch, No. 32., which I forwarded by Lieut. Drachbrawa, I gave your Lordship an account in general terms of this conference. I will now state it more particularly.

I observed to Count Stadion that the three causes which he had before assigned for the neutrality of Austria, and which had appeared to me so reasonable, no longer existed; that he must be satisfied that both Prussia and Russia were determined to persevere to the utmost in opposing the monstrous views of Bonaparte, and that now the question was reduced to a mere question of the numbers to be employed by Russia, which, as M. Pozzo had full powers to arrange them, would be ascertained to the satisfaction of Austria.

Intending to keep the discussion as closely as possible to these points, I was greatly concerned to find the minister totally wave them in the first instance, and point my attention to the occupation of Moldavia by the Russian troops. He condemned this measure on the ground, first, of its being unnecessary for the restoration of the Hospodars; and secondly, of its dividing the Russian forces, which on every account could be more usefully employed on the Vistula, and particularly so if Austria were to risk an immediate declaration against France.

I combated his reasoning to the best of my power, first by showing that the restoration of the Hospodars amounted to nothing unless they were supported; that upon the news of the French victories General Sebastiani had returned to his first demands, and the Turks to their former aggressions; and that the army destined for the defence of Russia on that side was neither greater than she could spare, nor more than she wanted in the critical circumstances of those provinces.

With regard to the original entry into Moldavia, I reminded him that after the communications I had made to him of Mr. Arbuthnot's and M. d'Italinsky's late proceedings at Constantinople, he had himself acknowledged that the line we had been obliged to follow respecting Turkish affairs, ever since General Sebastiani's arrival there, was purely in our own defence. I argued that the entry of the Russians was but a consequence from this state of things, and that if originally necessary, nothing had happened to render it less so.

In the other view he had suggested, namely, that of its being an injudicious distribution of the Russian forces, this was a question simply military. As such I acknowledged having long ago recommended in a letter to Mr. Stuart, at St. Petersburg, the propriety of getting possession of Belgrade (if it could be done consistently with the faith of treaties), and attacking the north of Italy from Dalmatia. Whether any operations upon this scale had been determined upon, or even thought of, was more than I could say, but at least my having recommended them was enough to exculpate Russia from the charge of being stimulated to this measure solely by her own ambition.

But in order to sift this subject of grievance to the bottom, to find out whether any lurking jealousy of the ulterior views of Russia occasioned the present shyness of this Court, and if so, to counteract its effects, I pointed out to Count Stadion, not only the security he possessed in the acknowledged personal character of the Emperor Alexander, but that which resulted from the fundamental principles of that monarch's policy; that his foreign system appeared now to be bottomed upon a close, confidential, and honourable union with Great Britain; that the very basis of our alliance was a guaranty of the integrity of the Turkish empire; and I went so far as to pro-

pose the accession of Austria as a party to the alliance for this express and particular purpose.

When we came to the more immediate question, namely, the propriety of Austria coming forward at the present moment, Count Stadion repeated to me nearly the same language he had used on all former occasions, namely, that their finances were exhausted, and their army still at such a distance from its true point of completion that it was impossible to act; that in the mean time they were pursuing with the greatest activity all measures of preparation and internal security. When I reasoned upon the necessity of relieving the Silesian fortresses, he answered that it was out of the question to think of beginning hostilities now,—that Austria had not an immediately disposable force of more than 60,000 men. He admitted, however, that it was morally impossible in the present state of things to look forward to neutrality as a permanent system. On this I put it home to him, whether, upon a balance of advantages and disadvantages, the loss of the Silesian fortresses would not outweigh any benefit he might expect from retarding the period of war? He assured me distinctly that it would not, for that the government felt comparatively easier on the Silesian frontier.

Such was the substance of our conversation, although in relating it I have adopted a more regular form than either of us observed in explaining ourselves. Before it finally closed, I again reverted to the jealousy which had been expressed with regard to the views of Russia; and judging that if some method were not taken to remove it, an event no less fatal to Europe than the complete and hostile separation of Austria from Russia might be the consequence, I took upon me to offer in the name of his Majesty's government any security Austria could expect or desire against any extension of the dominions of Russia on the side of Turkey.

Although I could not prevail so far as to obtain an immediate renunciation of these apprehensions, Count Stadion gave way so far as to accept the proposal with which I ended, namely, my taking the part of mediator, and obtaining from M. Pozzo a distinct and formal disavowal in the name of the Emperor Alexander of any views against Turkey, other than those of counteracting the designs of France. This disavowal has been given in the most explicit terms.

Two days after this conversation, despatches until the 1st of December (which I have already forwarded), arrived from Mr. Arbuthnot, and from them I obtained additional grounds to justify the entrance of the Russian troops into Moldavia. I have the satisfaction to say that we have made such use of this information as greatly to soften the first anger of the Austrian government, and indeed to reduce it to what is a reasonable feeling after all — a desire to see the utmost efforts of Russia directed to the war in Poland.

But with regard to the main point, namely, that of inducing Austria to act, we have hitherto been able to effect nothing. M. Pozzo's mission, however, even if it should end here, has not been without its use.

* * * * *

In the memoir which I have the honour of enclosing, and which is drawn up by a Prussian officer of great merit, your Lordship will find many of the arguments which were employed both by M. Pozzo and myself to determine Austria to an immediate decision. They will, I trust, convince your Lordship that my concurring in this advice was grounded on considerations so serious, as not to be very far removed from necessity itself.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 3. 1807.

MY LORD,

A RUSSIAN messenger has just arrived from Petersburg with accounts that the Emperor of Russia has ordered a levy of 600,000 men. I do not expect that these measures of vigour will produce any immediate change in the system of this Court.

The Servians have taken the town of Belgrade.

My accounts from Bucharest make me apprehend that, notwithstanding the arrival of Admiral Louis at Constantinople, the Turks will declare war against the Russians.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 7. 1807.

MY LORD,

SINCE the arrival of the despatches from St. Petersburg, to which I alluded in my last, and the communication of their contents to Count Stadion, language rather more encouraging has been held to us upon the subject of Austrian co-operation eventually. I shall not trust to it until I see their armies march to relieve the Silesian fortresses.

Our last intelligence from the armies is of the battle of the 26th of December.* It was by no means so unfavourable to the Russians as the French official accounts represent. I can send your Lordship no details of it, as our only intelligence comes in

* Pultusk.

great secrecy from Warsaw. The general result is shortly as follows:—

Actions every day from the 17th to the 26th of December have been fought on the Bug and the Narw. On that day the Russian line from Sachochin to Pultusk was attacked. At Pultusk by the French accounts, it was forced, which occasioned General Beningsen to retreat to Rozau, and afterwards to Ostrolenka.

The next day a strong division of the French army under General Augereau, accompanied by Bonaparte in person, marched on to Bialystock where the Russian magazines are. The French are in such distress for every thing, that unless they take them, their army will be in great danger. On the other hand, it is to be feared that the Russians must risk an engagement to save them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S.— The above account is in a letter of the 30th from Warsaw.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 10. 1807.

MY LORD,

No official accounts of the battle of the 26th of December have reached us from the Russian headquarters, but day after day something transpires from Warsaw, which makes it appear that the issue of it was in many respects highly favourable to the Russians.

I have very bad accounts to send your Lordship respecting Silesia. Breslau cannot hold out many days. The exertions of the Prince of Plesse to re-

lieve that important place have been unsuccessful, and the greatest apprehensions prevail that the rest of the fortresses, unless relieved from this side, will fall. Breslau contains almost all the arms and money which the former governor could collect together from the different dépôts in Silesia after the battle of Jena. The present governor, the Prince of Plesse, is wholly destitute of the means of making an army.

* * * * *

In short, it is to be feared that without speedy succours he will not be able to defend either the country or the fortresses.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

THE accounts which daily reach us of the result of the actions of the 25th and 26th are most satisfactory. They are productive here of the best effects.

* * * * *

So great is the distress of Silesia, and so fatal would be the loss of it, that I have felt myself obliged to risk a step which admits of no justification except that of a necessity paramount to all other considerations. Upon a representation made to me by the Count de Goetzen, who was sent to Silesia by the King of Prussia, that the army he had collected there must absolutely be disbanded without immediate pecuniary aid, I have made use of the credit of his Majesty's government at Vienna to procure him an advance of 20,000 ducats. This sum is to be de-

ducted from the first subsidies which it may be his Majesty's pleasure to grant to Prussia.

I did not finally resolve upon this measure until I had again made an effort with this government to induce them to take the defence of Silesia upon themselves. But finding them obstinately bent upon doing nothing as yet, no other alternative was left me except that of agreeing to make the advance, or of seeing the Silesian army disbanded, and its fortresses fall into the hands of France.

A much larger sum was wished for; but as I had just heard of Lord Hutchinson's arrival at the King of Prussia's head-quarters, I thought it most expedient to limit the advance to a sum sufficient to meet the immediate necessity, until I could learn his Lordship's sentiments.

The urgency and importance of the service will, I hope, excuse me in the opinion of his Majesty's ministers, and induce your Lordship to implore for me his Majesty's gracious forgiveness for venturing upon a step of this nature without having received for it his Majesty's express commands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Separate.*)

Vienna, January 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

IN consequence of what I have already had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my despatch of this day, the sum of 20,000 ducats in gold has been issued to Count Finkenstein for the service of his Prussian Majesty, for the value of which being 10,526*l.* 19*s.* I have drawn bills upon the Treasury.

I am sorry that the ducat could be obtained on no

better terms for his Prussian Majesty, but the secrecy necessary to be observed in the transaction deprived me of the advantage of negotiating the bills on the Exchange.

By the first opportunity I shall transmit to your Lordship an extract from the Count de Goetzen's letter to Count Finkenstein, and likewise Count Finkenstein's agreement with me for the repayment of the money.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 21. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE nothing further to communicate to your Lordship respecting the state of affairs here, except that the rapid progress of the Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia, nearly the whole of which provinces are now in their possession, continues to be viewed with much uneasiness.

The jealousies arising out of this important subject, however, must soon be discussed, and settled between the Russian and Austrian ministers and myself. I expect that these jealousies will be brought to a point whenever the great question of the accession, or not, of Austria to our system receives its final decision. I rather think that in order to enable them to make their decision, the ministers are now waiting the result of General Vincent's mission to Warsaw, the object of which they keep a profound secret, but which I still think is connected with a proposal to be the mediators for a general peace.

I have written fully to Lord Hutchinson, apprising him of all that is going on here, and mentioning of

what weight his communications with me may become in accelerating the determination of this Court.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 23. 1807.

MY LORD,

HAVING an opportunity of writing to Lord Hutchinson, I enclose this despatch to his Lordship under a flying seal, in order that he may be the better possessed of the grounds upon which I acted in making the advance of 20,000 ducats to Count Finkenstein for the Silesian government.

The two enclosures which I have now the honour of transmitting to your Lordship are, the one a statement from the Count de Goetzen of the pressing necessity of the case, the other a memorandum drawn up between Count Finkenstein and myself, containing a stipulation for deducting the sum advanced from any subsidies which his Majesty may think proper to grant to the Court of Prussia.

These are the papers to which I alluded in my separate despatch of January 14th.

I have the honour to be, &c.

First Inclosure.

Extrait d'une Lettre du Comte de Goetzen au Comte de Finkenstein.

Reysse, le 6. Janvier, 1807.

* * * Nous n'avons pas été heureux ici, et si nous ne sommes bientôt secourus la Silesie est perdue.

Nous avons un besoin urgent d'argent, dont le manque peut nous obliger à licencier nos troupes, qui avec les garnisons montent déjà à quarante mille hommes, surtout puisque l'ennemi nous coupe tous les jours davantage nos moyens de subsistance.

Ne pourroit-on pas négocier de l'argent par le ministre d'Angleterre, dont la cour est sans doute intéressée à voir se former ici journellement des troupes capables d'agir dès le moment où le succès des armées alliées les mettroit dans le cas d'entrer en lice avec les Français? Il nous faudroit au moins 260,000 écus à employer pour l'entretien de l'armée, et pour lesquels on pourroit donner des garanties. Mais la chose presse extrêmement puisque nous manquons presque de tout déjà dans ce moment, et que la conservation des forteresses encore à nous dépend beaucoup de la promptitude de cet envoi d'argent.

Second Inclosure.

Convention particulière entre le Ministre d'Angleterre à Vienne et le Ministre de Prusse, &c. &c.

Les Soussignés, ministres de leurs Majestés les Rois d'Angleterre et de Prusse, sont convenus entre eux des points suivans : —

Vû la nécessité où se trouve dans le moment actuel le gouvernement de la Silesie d'un secours pécuniaire prompt et efficace pour en défendre les forteresses contre l'ennemi commun, il sera fourni sans délai au Comte de Finkenstein la somme de 20,000 ducats en or pour le dit service, la quelle somme sera déduite des subsides que sa Majesté Britannique pourroit éventuellement fournir à sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, en vertu des explications amicales qui ont déjà eu lieu entre les deux Cours, et des engagements ultérieurs qui devroient en résulter.

En cas que dans les arrangemens à prendre entre les deux souverains, il ne seroit point question de subsides, cette avance de 20,000 ducats sera considérée comme emprunt.

Il est convenu que la somme à déduire ou à repayer (selon les circonstances) montera en argent d'Angleterre à 10,526 livres sterling 19 schellings.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont muni la présente convention particulière de leurs propres signatures et du sceau de leurs armes.

L. S. ROBERT ADAIR.

L. S. FINKENSTEIN.

Vienne, ce 14. Janvier, 1807.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 24. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE now great hopes that matters are sufficiently advanced between Austria and Russia to promise a co-operation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 28. 1807.

MY LORD,

WHEN I wrote last to your Lordship I had but a moment's time to say that there appeared to me great hopes of Austria co-operating with us before long. I will now state to your Lordship on what this opinion is founded.

The Archduke Charles is the person who has hitherto opposed all measures of a warlike tendency.

The late events in Poland have considerably shaken his resolution. About a fortnight ago, M. Pozzo submitted a plan of military operations to the Emperor, grounded upon the eventual co-operation of Austria, on which he was commanded by the Emperor of Russia to consult the Archduke Charles and to concert with him all measures which circumstances might render expedient. Strong expressions of an inclination to co-operate were, soon after this, thrown out both to M. Pozzo and myself; but on the day on which I wrote last, a series of regular critical remarks on his military plan, and suggestions of a nature to remove obstacles, were communicated to him by the Archduke's authority, together with an intimation that similar remarks had been transmitted to Count Meerfeldt, who had also been put in possession of the sentiments of this government on all points which could come into discussion with that of Russia. More consolatory representations were likewise made respecting the state and disposition of the Austrian forces. The army at this present moment is 220,000 strong, by which your Lordship will perceive that either Austria has been very active in her exertions since the period at which I gave an account of the first negotiations with M. Pozzo, or that a change has taken place in her views, of such a nature as to render her no longer afraid of acknowledging the extent of her preparations. Orders have likewise been issued for the troops to occupy stations in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia, where they may be ready to act upon the first signal. Six weeks from the present time is given as the period at which all will be in readiness.

With regard to General Vincent's stay at the headquarters of the French army, the strongest assurances are given that it is for no particular object beyond that of obtaining correct information of what is going on there. I cannot, however, dismiss my suspicions

that, although Austria would be sorry to see a separate peace concluded by Prussia, or even a peace concluded at this moment by Prussia and Russia together, she would seize with eagerness any opening that might be afforded to be the mediatrix of a general peace, in the discussions for which her own interests might be likely, under such circumstances, to be considered.

Against these favourable appearances, I have still to place the reluctance to take any step towards occupying Silesia, the loss of which they know to be certain in a very few weeks. No pains have been spared by me to set this part of the subject in its true light; but, hitherto, my representations have been ineffectual.

Such are the grounds on which Count Razamoffsky, M. Pozzo, and myself, have formed our hopes of the co-operation of Austria. Whenever I can establish a safe communication with Lord Hutchinson, I shall not fail to inform him of what may be agreed upon.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 28. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE this instant received your Lordship's despatch No. 9.

I have only time to say, in answer to it, that I have written eleven times to your Lordship, from the 24th of October to the 1st of December, and often sent duplicates of my despatches.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Private.*)

Vienna, January 29. 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I PERCEIVE with great concern that so late as the 30th December, even if not so late as the 7th of this month, none of my letters of a date ulterior to the 24th of October have reached you. All I can say is that I took the best means in my power to secure their conveyance, and that those means were pointed out to me by commercial men, whose channels of correspondence are always the most secure and the most ready. I am grieved beyond what I can describe at this delay; first, because you would have seen distinctly (although my letters were necessarily very short) what were the dispositions of Austria, and on what depended our chance of her co-operating with us; and, secondly, because so long a silence must have appeared to his Majesty's ministers as if I had neglected my duty. My despatches, Nos. 24. and 25., are, I fear, totally lost. The former of these, dated Oct. 28., was important, as it contained an intimation of a growing jealousy, on the part of this Court, of the views of Russia, — an idea which I took the liberty of stating should be removed by the influence of British councils. The second, dated November 1., was no otherwise material than as it might prove to you that I was attentive to the main point on which the future conduct of this Court would greatly depend, viz. the continuance of the war by Prussia. All communication with Hamburg having ceased, those despatches were sent round by Breslau. During the month of December (as I trust it will have appeared long before this can reach you) I wrote five regular despatches. I should have written more had

not those negociations begun between M. Pozzo, myself, and the Austrian ministers, of which I sent you the first account by Lieut. Drachbrawa. This was of so much importance that I thought it better not to send any vague report of their progress, but rather to wait for some result from which his Majesty's ministers might receive a correct impression of the probability of ultimate success. Early in January I enclosed my dispatches to Mr. Thornton, through whom I always wrote very concisely, in order that my letters might not bear a suspicious appearance at the different post-offices through which they must pass, and I generally addressed them to Sir Francis Vincent. I earnestly hope, therefore, that you will acquit me of neglect, however imperfectly I may have discharged my other duties.

I am, &c. &c.

P. S. I have just received despatches both from Lord Hutchinson and Mr. Stuart. From what the former states, if I had no other guide, I should think very ill of any chance of effecting a good understanding between Prussia and Austria; but at the time of his writing, which was on Dec. 30th, he probably had no occasion to enter into further explanations with Prussia than such as related to the restoration of peace with his Majesty.

My correspondence with the Count de Goetzen, and especially the fact contained in my despatch, leads me to differ from Lord Hutchinson in the above conclusion. Bad impressions relative to the disposition of this Court have been given by *****; but the truth is, that nothing confidential is ever communicated to him. My accounts from Mr. Stuart, which are of the 19th inst., are of a discouraging nature; and they would be most distressing did not fresh conversations with Count Stadion lead me to a different conclusion.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 31. 1807.

MY LORD,

SINCE I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, I have received from the Count de Goetzen, who possesses the King of Prussia's confidence in the highest degree, and who states himself to be duly empowered to make the offer, direct authority to enter into negotiations with the Austrian government for the provisional cession of Silesia. I am sorry to inform your Lordship, that, upon my opening the business to Count Stadion, he refused to listen to it, or to allow the Count de Goetzen permission to come to Vienna.

I have also received despatches from Mr. Stuart, dated the 19th inst. He gives an account of the bad effects produced by the first reception at Vienna of the overtures of the Emperor of Russia. But as the Baron de Budberg, who seems thoroughly sensible of the necessity of union at this important crisis, still refers everything to the negotiations now going on at Vienna, of which I gave your Lordship a more particular account in my last despatch, I am greatly in hopes that with temper and moderation we shall still overcome all difficulties in the way of a cordial union between the two Powers.

If an union however should be formed, and Austria should be induced to act, your Lordship is already aware that she will want subsidies, and these to a considerable amount. Let me entreat your Lordship therefore to send me some provisional instructions upon this point, and likewise with regard to the basis which his Majesty's ministers would consider fit to be adopted either for a treaty of subsidy, or for a treaty of alliance. Under the present circumstances, al-

though I am perfectly aware of the general dispositions of his Majesty's government, and cannot possibly mistake the spirit of your Lordship's instructions, I should nevertheless feel greatly embarrassed if the order for marching against the enemy should be accompanied by demands, any long delay in coming to an understanding upon which might expose the object itself to the risk of failure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 4. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE nothing new to communicate by this post relative to the negociation with Russia. Matters remain precisely as they were when I wrote my two last despatches. In about ten days hence we expect despatches from St. Petersburg, which will probably bring the question of the co-operation of this Court to a decisive issue. We shall then know distinctly whether Austria will act,—when she will act,—and how she will act.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that the Porte declared war against Russia on December 27. My information is from the Prussian minister, who has received despatches of January 9. from Constantinople. M. d'Italinsky had left Constantinople, but it appears that Mr. Arbuthnot was still there. I expect his despatches every day. When they arrive I will forward them by a conveyance which I have reserved for an important occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 7. 1807.

MY LORD,

ON the 28th of last month the French army made a forward movement, and on the 30th Bonaparte left Warsaw to put himself at its head, and bring the Russians to a general engagement. We are naturally in the most anxious expectation of the event, as the success of all our negotiations will in a great measure depend upon it.

The effect at this Court of the Turkish declaration of war has been rather unfavourable to Russia. Added to the terror inspired generally by France, there exists here a very strong party hostile to Russia. Any defeat of the Russian army just now would prove therefore of most serious detriment to our affairs, and perhaps throw them back into the same situation in which they were immediately after the battle of Jena.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 7. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE received information which I am inclined not absolutely to discredit, that Bonaparte has proposed an alliance to this Court grounded on the affairs of Turkey; but I have also reason to know that the Emperor just now is inclined to refer all his differences with Russia respecting Turkey to the mediation of the British Cabinet, on the principles which I stated to your Lordship in my despatch of December 30th.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 11. 1807.

MY LORD,

I AM still without any accounts from Mr. Arbuthnot, and have the mortification to learn from Bucharest that for several days preceding the 18th of January, all communication with Constantinople had entirely ceased. The despatch therefore which I received from your Lordship for Mr. Arbuthnot, dated November 2., and all my letters to him containing accounts of the state of affairs on the Vistula at the beginning of January, were still at Bucharest so late as the 22d of that month, on which day Mr. Summerer's last despatch to me was dated.

Mr. Summerer also writes me word that in consequence of the change of affairs in Moldavia and Wallachia his functions are at an end, and that he cannot resume them without letters of credence to Prince Ipsilanty, and that he must apply to me for instructions how to act. This circumstance is, for many reasons, greatly embarrassing, but principally so on account of the objection to our doing any act which might be taken by Austria as a recognition of the new government established in those provinces. On the other hand, his Majesty's government might suffer great detriment if no English agent were suffered to reside there. All things considered therefore, I have judged it most expedient to apply to Count Razamoffsky for a letter to General Michelson, requesting permission for Mr. Summerer to continue his residence at Bucharest, and to correspond with me as usual until his Majesty's pleasure could be known respecting the propriety of sending an accredited agent to Prince Ipsilanty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. — Accounts to the 31st of January have within this hour been received from General Beningsen, stating that he had gained several advantages over the left wing of the French army. He has gained the Vistula, which he can cross whenever he sees occasion.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

SINCE I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, I have received a letter from Lord Hutchinson, who not only approves of my having advanced the 20,000 ducats for the relief of Silesia, but authorises me to advance as far as a total sum of 500,000 dollars for the same object. I shall use this authority, however, with extreme caution.

The accounts from the armies are important and favourable. General Beningsen has transmitted to Count Razamoffsky an account of his operations up to January 31st, during the ten days preceding which he had been continually advancing upon the two corps of General Ney and Bernadotte, who were marching on to gain Königsberg and the sea-coast. On the 31st he had succeeded in driving them from all their positions, and establishing himself at Mohrungen with his right to the Vistula. These operations, it seems, obliged Bonaparte, to the great dissatisfaction of his army, to break up his cantonments, and put his army in march from Warsaw on January 28th. He himself followed it on the 31st, and arrived on the 3d instant at Passenheim, where he was on the 5th, and had undertaken nothing against Beningsen. We have no accounts of what had passed between

Beningsen's army and the corps of Ney and Bernadotte, from the 1st of February until the 5th.

But the situation of Bonaparte at Passenheim will appear embarrassing, if not critical, when the successful operations of the second Russian army under General Essen are considered. On the 1st or 2d instant, that general attacked the French under General Lasnes at Ciechanow on the Bug, drove him back, and took his magazines and some prisoners at Brock. On the 3d a more serious engagement took place at Wyskrow, in which General Essen obtained a great advantage, took 1,600 prisoners and some cannon, and drove the French beyond the Narew. This success is of the utmost importance, as it will enable General Essen to act upon Bonaparte's flank if he should continue at Passenheim.

I am still without information of any kind from Constantinople.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. No time has been lost in profiting by the present aspect of affairs to engage Austria to co-operate with us. Matters are not yet sufficiently ripe for me to say more on this subject, than that the result of Baron Krusemarck's mission to Petersburg has not counteracted the measures which have been taken by the Russian minister and myself to this end. The affairs of Turkey will form the most serious obstacle.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 17. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE this day received your Lordship's despatches of January 13th, which were brought to me by Krauss.

By the next post I will inform your Lordship more fully than the time will now permit me of my conversation with Count Stadion on communicating to him his Majesty's proclamation of January 7th. Having already seen a copy of it in the Frankfort Gazette, he had sent to me some days before, to ask an explanation of what was meant by the expression of "ports under the control of France," and whether I understood it to extend to Trieste and Fiume? Count Stadion at the same time took that occasion to inform me that measures were taking to open those ports again to British vessels.

I answered his question with respect to Trieste and Fiume by acknowledging that a distinction appeared to exist between those ports whence we were excluded by virtue of a particular convention between Austria and France, of which we had notice, and those where France exercised a direct influence. I recommended it to him very strongly however (and repeated my recommendation this day) to take off the restriction, as the readiest and the clearest manner of solving all doubts upon the subject.

General motives of policy, and a most anxious desire to remove as far as possible every obstacle in the way of Austria's co-operating with us, have induced me to seek for the mildest interpretation of the phrase in question, until his Majesty's pleasure on this point can be distinctly communicated to me. .

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that there is great reason to apprehend that M. Pole has been arrested on his way to Vienna, and that his despatches have been taken from him. As soon as I can thoroughly ascertain the fact, I mean to see the Turkish chargé d'affaires at this Court, and represent that such a violent proceeding, unless immediately atoned for, will inevitably be resented in the severest manner, by his Majesty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 17. 1807.

MY LORD,

IN consequence of a second application from Count de Goetzen, who is now secretly at Vienna, I have this day made use of the authority given me by Lord Hutchinson, and advanced him a further sum of 200,000 dollars, for which I have also drawn bills on the Treasury to the amount of 35,087*l.* 14*s.* 5*d.*

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that Schweidnitz has fallen.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. It gives me great pleasure to communicate the following extract of a letter received within this hour by Count Razamoffsky: —

“*Feb.* 12*th.*—I hasten to communicate to your Excellency the news I have just received from General Beningsen. Bonaparte attacked him with all his forces on Feb. 8*th* near Eylau; but he met with so obstinate a resistance, that he was obliged to renounce his enterprise with a loss of 25,000 men. General Beningsen has marched to Wittenberg.”

• *The same to the same.*

Vienna, February 24. 1807.

MY LORD,

ON communicating to Count Stadion his Majesty's proclamation of January 7*th*, I did not fail to observe that any connivance by neutral powers at the decree of blockade issued by Bonaparte, would infallibly produce a still stricter enforcement of the principle of reprisal adopted by his Majesty for the protection of

the commerce of his subjects; and as the terms on which we transact business together authorise a great degree of confidence, I thought it best to read to him so much of your Lordship's despatch as relates to this point.

The communication was received without observation or comment of any kind. It did not, indeed, require any, as hitherto the French have taken no measures to obtain any assistance from the Austrian government in forwarding the object of the decree. I had written on the first publication of it both to Mr. Stanley and to Mr. Leard to give me immediate notice of any steps that might be taken to that effect; but I received satisfactory assurances that nothing had been attempted.

In answer to a question from Count Stadion, whether I continued to put the same interpretation as at our last conference on the phrase of "Ports so far under the control of France, as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat?" I answered that the distinction contended for in the case of Trieste and Fiume was not noticed in your Lordship's despatch, but that I wished it to be understood by the Austrian government, that, in consideration of the mutual good understanding which subsisted between us, and the hopes of a still closer connection, I should at all times be ready to admit the most favourable interpretation of whatever measures restrictive of the commerce of his Imperial Majesty's subjects I might have to announce.

A strong opinion having of late prevailed here (derived, I believe, from false intelligence circulated at Paris), that his Majesty's government appeared less disposed than heretofore to persevere in standing up against the destructive progress of the French power, and that even some symptoms of a renewal of negotiation had appeared at Paris, I took occasion to

assure Count Stadion, in the words of your Lordship's letter, that never was her Majesty's government more firmly united, and more resolutely determined, nor were the means of Great Britain ever more competent, to resist the enemy's pretensions, than they were at the present moment. I also earnestly requested Count Stadion, — who appeared happy to comply with my request, — to communicate this assurance to his Imperial Majesty in whatever manner he might deem it most likely to produce its proper effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 26. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to enclose to your Lordship a copy of General Beningsen's letter to Count Razamoffsky of February 11th. We are in the most anxious expectation of further accounts.

Nothing had been received at Warsaw on the 17th instant from the French head-quarters of a later date than the 11th.

I wish I could add to the favourable appearances resulting from General Beningsen's operations, that they had produced upon the Austrian councils the effect of inducing its government to step forward in this decisive moment, and to re-assert its character and its dignity. But fresh obstacles seem to arise in the way of all vigorous determination, and to gain strength from those very causes which would appear rather calculated to remove than to increase them.

In a former despatch, I mentioned to your Lord-

ship that the difficulties in the way of a good understanding between Russia and Austria appeared to be gradually wearing away. What I then stated was correct. The negotiation to this effect had been conducted with so much ability by Count Razamoffsky and M. Pozzo di Borgo, that most of the alleged obstacles to co-operation, grounded on the want of sufficient preparation on the part of Austria, and the deficiency of means on the part of Russia, were actually removed. So far had we a right to consider them removed, that after the battle of Pultusk, the ministers not only gave us assurances of their wish to co-operate, but they suddenly raised the statement of the numbers of their disposable army from 60,000 to 220,000 men; they announced two months as the period when they should be ready to act; and above all, they entreated us to oppose at our respective Courts any steps towards a peace in which the general interests of Europe should not be included. There remained, therefore, only the affairs of Turkey, which were admitted to be such as not to furnish of themselves a reasonable cause even of hesitation as to the part to be adopted for the common safety.

After such assurances (I may say such near approaches to an engagement with us as may fairly be inferred from the desire expressed that neither Great Britain nor Russia would make peace), it was natural to expect that, if no material reverse should take place in the intervening space, the general tendency of all their measures, as well as of their conferences with the ministers of the allied Powers, would be such as to prepare the way for an avowed concert and a vigorous effort in the spring. In any view of the subject, it never could enter into the imagination of any one that the success of the Russian arms would be a motive for a change either of language or intention on the part of Austria.

This, however, is actually the fact * *

* * * *

Neither the gallant resistance made by Russia during these last two months, nor the important advantage of the 8th, at Eylau, heightened both in its consequences and its glory by being gained over Bonaparte in person, has produced any disposition in this Court to second the common efforts, or to partake in the great results which its declaration at this moment would infallibly secure to us. M. Pozzo, it is true, in a recent conference with Count Stadion, has clearly ascertained their expectations as to the best terms which they can expect for themselves, even in the event of success, from the unassisted efforts of Great Britain and Russia. They acknowledge that they do not look forward to any peace under such circumstances which shall not leave Bonaparte at the head of the confederacy of the Rhine; but they say that he will derive no more real power or influence from this station (which they affect to consider but as a title), than the Emperor of Austria derived from his station as head of the empire.

With persons governed by these sentiments it is hopeless to argue. It is equally useless to represent to them either the effect or the character of a neutrality grounded on such principles, and which they must see is fast assimilating itself to that very policy which has caused the downfall of the Prussian monarchy.

Since the last discussions, therefore, between Count Stadion and M. Pozzo di Borgo, which took place last week, and in which the rejection of all overtures for a concert with Russia was more decidedly pronounced than it had yet been, it has appeared, I confess, to me that I should do best to adopt the tone

of leaving Austria totally to her own politics. It appears fit that these ministers should understand that their refusal to enter into any explanations which might prove that Austria still belonged to the ancient federative system of Europe, would place Great Britain and Russia under the necessity of attending to their own security in the new settlement for which the world appeared to be preparing. I have thought it expedient, therefore, to lower in some degree the hopes I had before given of the interference of his Majesty's councils, for the purpose of obtaining from Russia the surrender of Moldavia and Wallachia at a peace; making the whole of the arrangements on that head to depend upon their considering France and the French power as constituting the grand paramount mischief of the world, and the object against which all jealousy and every effort was to be directed.

This state of affairs naturally puts an end for the present to any conversation respecting subsidies. I shall attend most strictly to your Lordship's instructions with regard to this point, nor suffer a word to be said upon it, unless I see the Austrian army actually marching against the enemy.

The changes of sentiment in this Court have lately appeared so frequent, that it is impossible to form any opinion whatever as to what may be their ultimate resolution. The ministers now say, that if Bonaparte should persist in refusing to negotiate for a general peace upon a reasonable basis, Austria will join us. I cannot believe she will do so on a mere refusal to negotiate. * * *

* * * * *

This question, however, will speedily be brought to an issue. On the 6th of December, I addressed a few lines to your Lordship in cipher, to say I had

great reason to believe Austria intended offering her mediation to Bonaparte, on the grounds of the communication made by Talleyrand to MM. Zastrow and Lucchesini, on signing the armistice in November.* The Emperor of Russia's answer to the propositions laid before him by Major Krusemarck, has encouraged them in these views, and I can now state to your Lordship, from authority, that the mediation has been offered by General Vincent.

No answer, I believe, has yet been received to this proposal. The measures to which either its adoption or rejection may lead, will be necessarily of such importance that I shall neglect no means of giving your Lordship the earliest notice I receive of them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 26. 1807.

MY LORD,

THE affairs of Turkey have now become of such consequence, that I think it my duty to advert to them on the present occasion, more especially as your Lordship is not likely to hear soon from Mr. Arbuthnot. I am afraid that Mr. Pole is still detained; but my information concerning the fact is not yet sufficiently correct to authorise my recommending measures of reprisal to Captain Campbell, who commands his Majesty's squadron in the Adriatic.

From other quarters, however, I learn that Mr. Arbuthnot was still at Constantinople on the 24th of

* Which was not ratified by Prussia.

January. This is a most fortunate circumstance, as it may be possible to re-establish matters before the French shall have made any further progress in Poland.

I cannot entertain the smallest doubt, that in the present state of this question, your Lordship will be of opinion that the re-establishment of peace with the Sultan, upon such terms as shall leave Russia no fears from French machinations on the side of Turkey, will be the most desirable event. It will, perhaps, be no less evident to your Lordship that this can only be effected through the armed mediation of Great Britain. The junction of Austria, as a mediating power, would also be highly desirable. Russia could not now withdraw her forces without leaving the whole of the Turkish empire at the disposal of France.

It is not for me to say by what display of naval power it may be necessary to support any plan of pacification which your Lordship may think fit to propose to the Divan, but it seems to be the opinion of well-informed persons that a smaller force than ten sail of the line would not be sufficient.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 5. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a despatch I have just received from the Danish minister at Constantinople, from the contents of which your Lordship will be enabled at length to form some opinion respecting the state of our affairs

there on February the 9th. The courier did not leave Constantinople until the 12th.

Having myself heard a report just as I was about to forward your Lordship's despatches of Jan. 13th to Mr. Arbuthnot, that he had embarked on board Admiral Louis's squadron, I thought myself justified in delaying them for a few days until I could learn with certainty how to direct to him. On receiving the Danish minister's despatch I lost no time in forwarding my packets by the way of Trieste, through Commodore Campbell, and have sent duplicates by the Danish messenger returning to Constantinople.

I am yet ignorant, nor can I discover by Mr. Arbuthnot's letter, whether Mr. Wellesley Pole has been arrested in his way to Vienna. The courier he mentions having sent to me, is not yet arrived. It gives me therefore additional concern to inform your Lordship of the loss of H. M. S. *Nautilus*, carrying despatches from Admiral Louis to Gibraltar and to Lord Collingwood, and possibly to his Majesty's Government. I inclose your Lordship the account which has been transmitted to me of that melancholy event.

I also transmit to your Lordship some information relative to the state of Silesia and Germany, which may be useful to his Majesty's government, particularly that part which relates to the fortress of Colberg, and the attack which may be made from thence on the rear of the French line.

Accounts from General Beningsen to February 19th have been received by the Russian minister. From the 12th to the 18th of February there had been continual skirmishes and attacks on the French advanced posts by the Cossacks, the result of which had been a loss to the French of about 1000 killed and 1000 prisoners. On the 18th it appears that they evacuated Eylau, leaving behind them several of their sick.

General Beningsen had received reinforcements, and was advancing to harass the enemy in his retreat.

Count Stadion has just received the following information from General Vincent, who is still at Warsaw —

“Bonaparte has retreated to Thorn. He had received the Austrian proposal for mediation; but had returned no answer to Talleyrand.”

Count Stadion has also received the strongest assurances from Petersburg that the Emperor Alexander would negotiate no peace without the thorough participation of Austria; and also that no proposals would be listened to that came from Prussia alone.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 5. 1807.

MY LORD,

I TAKE the liberty of requesting your Lordship's attention to the situation of those brave and loyal foreigners, to whom his Majesty has been graciously pleased to extend his benevolence, in assigning them pensions in proportion to their rank and services in the army of Condé, and in the different Corsican and other foreign corps employed by Great Britain during the last war.

Since the irruption of the French into Germany, it has been impossible for them to comply with one material condition of their continuing to receive this allowance, namely, that they shall not have lived in any countries subject to the arms of France, or her allies. Since the decree also of the 20th of November, interdicting all correspondence with England, they

have not been able to obtain payment of their drafts from the bankers at those towns and places in Germany which they had chosen for their retreat.

I receive various applications upon this subject from different parts of the interior of Germany, and have judged I should best fulfil his Majesty's benevolent intentions by dispensing, in some cases, with the condition of residence expressed in M. Noguier's circular letter, and by authorising the house of Arnstein at Vienna to continue paying them until his Majesty's pleasure could be further made known to me.

In the mean time, I am endeavouring to procure from this Court permission for them to reside in Hungary; but I meet with great difficulties in my application to this effect.

Should it be the pleasure of his Majesty to require their immediate removal into any other part of Europe not yet overrun by the enemy, allow me to remark to your Lordship that several of these gentlemen are very aged and infirm, and that it will be scarcely possible for many of them to sustain the expense of removing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 5. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing to your Lordship some despatches addressed to me by Mr. Summerer, respecting his situation at Bucharest, and his claims upon his Majesty's government.

I have already given your Lordship an account of what I did in consequence of his request to be accredited to Prince Ipsilanty. With regard to his claims

on government, I am necessarily a stranger to them; but am happy to bear my testimony to the zeal, industry, and perseverance with which he has executed the duties of his office since my arrival at Vienna, and my correspondence with him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 11. 1807.

MY LORD,

THE successes of the Russian, and the disasters of the French, army continue. General Beningsen writes on February 17th that the French are in full retreat; that they abandon artillery, ammunition, stores, and provisions every where on the road; and that his Cossacks had already brought in between 3000 and 4000 prisoners. All the bridges on the Vistula have been carried away by an inundation, so that Bonaparte may find himself reduced to the most serious difficulties if the reinforcements which are already on their march to join General Beningsen should fortunately arrive before the bridges can be re-established. We are grossly deceived, indeed, by all concurring accounts of the state of the French army, if it be possible for Bonaparte to make another general attack.

From Warsaw, by accounts of the 4th instant, we learn that the greatest consternation prevailed there. All persons of note connected with the French were preparing to go off to Berlin.

Nothing but vague assurances of a wish for peace have hitherto been given by Talleyrand to General Vincent, in answer to the Austrian offer of mediation; and Talleyrand has fairly owned that, since Bonaparte's departure for the army, their correspondence has

ceased. It is Count Stadion's intention to instruct General Vincent this day to require a positive and immediate answer, which if he should not obtain, he is to consider the offer as rejected.

This end of the business, if well improved, may bring us in some little degree nearer to co-operation; but the intentions on this head have varied so often, that I think it unadvisable to hold out any hopes of its taking place until their language shall be confirmed by some positive demonstrations. Count Stadion distinctly says that there is no other method of engaging the Arch-Duke Charles except through the refusal of France to treat for a general peace; but even then, and when all obstacles are removed, in my opinion there must be other motives to determine him.

I have reason to believe that a very good understanding subsists between Austria and Saxony. The leaders of the military councils here seem to consider Bonaparte's retreat to the Oder, if he should be compelled to it, as extremely favourable to any offensive operations which may be undertaken from hence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. The Russian admiral in the Adriatic sailed from Corfu on the 22d of February with eight sail of the line and 900 troops, to join Admirals Louis and Duckworth.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 11. 1807.

MY LORD,

By the last post I forwarded a despatch to your Lordship which Mr. Horne brought me in person from Lintz in order to its being cyphered.

It will, I trust, afford some consolation to his Majesty in the midst of those anxieties which must so deeply affect his royal mind concerning the treatment experienced by the illustrious Princess his daughter, to know that a safe channel of communication is now opened to her Royal Highness, through which she may at all times acquaint his Majesty with her real situation.

Mr. Horne is still at Lintz, but he hopes soon to return to Ratisbon.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE at length the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that a step has been taken by the Austrian government, the result of which may prove of the most beneficial consequences to Europe.

Finding that the Emperor of Russia had accepted the proffered mediation of Austria for a general peace, Count Stadion wrote to General Vincent (as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my last despatch) to insist upon a direct answer from Bonaparte whether he, likewise, would accept it or not.

I must inform your Lordship that in the preceding conversation with General Vincent, M. Talleyrand had entered into some unofficial explanations of the grounds on which mediation might be accepted by France, but he took care always to insist upon the principle of separate discussion and arrangement with each of the Powers at war.

The reply of this government, which was sent off

on Wednesday last to General Vincent, although necessarily unofficial likewise, contained a detailed basis of mediation of which the outline is as follows:—

1. The affairs of Turkey to be settled precisely according to the former treaties of the Porte with all the Powers at war.

2. Poland to be left as before the war.

3. The affairs of Germany to be the subject of general negotiation and settlement; Austria not feeling herself secure under the Federation of the Rhine simply, and without further stipulations and arrangements.

4. The affairs of Italy to be equally the subject of revision and fresh arrangement, Austria feeling that Italy in its present state must be the source of continual disputes.

5. The absolute necessity of making the peace general, and consequently of admitting England as a party to the negotiations.

When Count Stadion communicated these terms to me, which it is easy to foresee will never be acceded to by France, I observed that nothing could be wiser than the system which the Austrian government seemed disposed to adopt, provided it were the intention to support it by vigorous and decisive measures. His answer was, that he had every reason to hope such measures would be immediately adopted upon the notification of Bonaparte's refusal to treat on the above principles.

It were to expect more from the steadiness of this Court than I can trust to, were I to give your Lordship the same hopes which Count Stadion appears himself to entertain. I shall neglect nothing, however, which may confirm these favourable dispositions, and will contrive to send a messenger to your Lordship with the earliest information I may obtain

of Bonaparte's answer, and the conduct of Austria in consequence of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Count Stadion read me a letter he had received from Constantinople, dated February 18th, by which it appears that Mr. Arbuthnot had on the 16th sent in a note to the Divan demanding the passage of the Dardanelles for his Majesty's fleet, in order to his proceeding to Constantinople, and resuming the negociations; and threatening to force the passage in case of refusal. The letter adds, that General Sebastiani had received assurances from the Turks that they would resist, but that he did not believe it.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 21. 1807.

MY LORD,

I YESTERDAY received a despatch for your Lordship from the Danish Minister at Constantinople, dated February 26th. As the packet is too large to be enclosed to Mr. Thornton, I have sent it to Lord Hutchinson in order to its being forwarded safely to England, and now transmit to your Lordship the enclosed abstract of its contents

As I have authentic advices from Corfu of the sailing of the Russian squadron on the 22d of February, consisting of eight ships of the line and a frigate with about 900 troops on board to join his Majesty's squadron under Admiral Duckworth, I cannot doubt that the presence of so considerable a force before Constantinople on the one side, and the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia on the other, will very soon oblige the Turks to accept Mr. Arbuthnot's terms.

The effect which this intelligence has already produced at Vienna has been most favourable to our negotiations. I shall not neglect improving it to the utmost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 25. 1807.

MY LORD,

No further intelligence is arrived from Constantinople since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship.

No military operations appear to have been undertaken by either the Russians or the French up to the 14th instant.

The remaining fortresses in Silesia still hold out, and a favourable opportunity now presenting itself, means have been taken to relieve them, and to throw succours into Kosel, the most important of them all.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Accounts have just been received from Constantinople of the 3d instant. Mr. Arbuthnot had not on that day succeeded in making any impression on the Divan. It is known, however, that he had declared that the negotiation was no longer in his hands, but in Admiral Duckworth's. Admiral Duckworth had retired from Constantinople further into the sea of Marmora.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 25. 1807.

MY LORD,

ON the representation of the Count de Goetzen, who is just returned to Silesia, to profit by the opportunity now offered of succouring the fortresses which still hold out, I have advanced him a further sum of 240,000 dollars, for which I have this day drawn bills on the Treasury for 42,105*l.* 5*s.* 0*d.*

As this last sum makes a total of 500,000 dollars advanced to the Count de Goetzen on account of his Prussian Majesty, and as Lord Hutchinson limited to this sum the pecuniary aid he thought necessary to be sent from Vienna for this particular service, I acquainted the Count de Goetzen that I could assist him no further without positive instructions to that effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 28. 1807.

MY LORD,

LORD Hutchinson will have already communicated to your Lordship a proposal conveyed to his Prussian Majesty by General Bertrand, on the 28th of February, by which Bonaparte offers to consent to the assembling a Congress at Memel, to consist of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, France, and the Ottoman Porte, for negotiating a general peace.

A despatch from his Prussian Majesty, containing this intelligence, was received here yesterday by Count Finkenstein, who being confined to his house by indisposition, requested me to communicate its contents to the minister for foreign affairs.

I availed myself with pleasure of this opportunity of representing to the Austrian government the situation in which they might soon be placed by their neutrality; and of aiding to the best of my power those negotiations for a common union and concert which have been so long depending at this Court.

I observed that it was evidently Bonaparte's object to prevent Austria not only from obtaining any advantages under the new settlement of the affairs of Europe which must be discussed and arranged at such a Congress, but from having any share whatever in the negotiation of the continental peace. That his first proposals were always addressed to his enemies separately, and that even now, when he affected a disposition to treat jointly in a Congress, it was still with a view to the same principle of separation applied to Austria, and to the dividing her for ever from her natural friends and allies. That under these circumstances it was worthy the consideration of Austria whether Bonaparte, apprehending her eventual junction with us, might not offer such terms as it would be impossible for us to reject, unless we should receive some specific assurance of her determination to come forward and to make herself a party either to the peace or to the war. That Austria having offered her mediation upon the basis already notified to me, the refusal of it (which now might be considered as certain) would afford her the fairest opportunity of uniting her interests with ours; for that instead of discussing with Bonaparte the specific points of her proposed mediation, and her interests in Germany and Italy, the question now was, whether he would admit of her interference at all, or even suffer her to state her case at a Congress, which could consist only of the Powers actually at war.

Count Stadion assented without difficulty to these observations, and assured me that the principle he had

constantly been labouring to establish both at home and in his correspondence with St. Petersburg, was, that no peace ought to be made which did not embrace the interests of all Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. M. Pozzo di Borgo is this instant returned from a conference with Count Stadion, in which he has been endeavouring, with his usual zeal, to impress the Austrian government with the necessity of their adopting immediately a decided course. What he tells me is highly important. A despatch has just arrived from General Vincent, stating that Talleyrand had received the proposal of mediation, such as I explained to your Lordship in my despatch of the 11th instant, with great satisfaction; that he had agreed that its general objects presented a just basis for negotiating a peace in which Austria might participate, and that he had transmitted it to Bonaparte, from whom he expected an immediate answer. Count Stadion acknowledges that he is himself thoroughly persuaded of the necessity of joint peace or joint war; and adds that the Archduke must now come into the same opinion.

The same to the same.

Vienna, March 28. 1807.

MY LORD,

I LOSE no time in acquainting your Lordship that I have been totally misinformed by Mr. Summerer with respect to the supposed changes in the governments of Moldavia and Wallachia. General Michelson has written to Count Razamoffsky, in answer to the letter which that ambassador wrote at my desire on February 11th, respecting Mr. Summerer, and has

distinctly assured him that no innovation whatever had taken place in the administration of those principalities which are still acknowledged as forming part of the Turkish empire. General Michelson assures the ambassador that Prince Ipsilanty has not been proclaimed Hospodar of the two provinces, but that the nobility and clergy of Moldavia, finding themselves abandoned by Prince Morouzy, had requested Ipsilanty to take on himself the provisional administration of the province, until either the return of Morouzy or the appointment of another Hospodar.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 1. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this day the Emperor left Vienna to open the Diet at Buda.

No material information has been received from the armies since the 17th of last month, at which time the Russian head-quarters were at Bartenstein.

Letters of March 10th have been received from Constantinople, but Mr. Arbuthnot had not then succeeded in bringing the Turks to any terms.

The hesitation of this Court upon the great question of the part it will take in the transactions of Europe, is now fast approaching to an end. Much will depend upon the answer of the Emperor Alexander, the communication of which is expected here every day, to Bonaparte's proposal to the King of Prussia. Much also will depend upon Bonaparte's answer to their own proposal of mediation, which is likewise expected very shortly. Until one or possibly both of these

answers arrive, I can offer no opinion to your Lordship as to the final result of the deliberations, which of late have been unremitting in the Austrian councils.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Private.*)

Vienna, April 1. 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

ALTHOUGH I do not like in my public despatch to hazard an opinion as to the final decision of Austria, I have no hesitation in acquainting you with what I think it will be. The difficulty has always lain with the Archduke Charles. To force him into measures contrary to his opinion or inclination, has always appeared to me in the highest degree absurd; I have therefore constantly objected to every step which had such a tendency; but finding that not only his consent to vigorous measures, but his warm approbation of them would immediately follow the determination of Bonaparte to listen to no modification of the affairs of Germany or Italy, I have most earnestly pressed the engaging him thoroughly in the offer of mediation upon the principle already stated in my despatches. The Emperor is decidedly for war if the mediation should be refused; and Count Stadion supports this sentiment almost to the point of co-operating with us in the measures necessary to the great result at which we are aiming. He has proposed the immediate assembling of an army of 80,000 men at Cracow. The Archduke is rather alarmed at this proposition, but I have reason to think he will come into it if Bonaparte's answer be not extremely conciliatory. It is my opinion, therefore,

that Austria will be with us at last either for joint peace or joint war. But what distresses me beyond measure is the delay in hearing from Constantinople. If the contest were terminated there, and terminated as we have a right to expect, I have no doubt the question for assembling the army would be carried immediately. I have no time for more just now, but I must beg of you to obtain, if possible, a trifling reinforcement of small fast-sailing vessels for our squadron in the Adriatic, with orders to Commodore Campbell to hold one always in readiness for my despatches. He is very obliging and extremely desirous of assisting me, but lately his small squadron has been diminished.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 4. 1807.

MY LORD,

It has been this day officially communicated to me by Count Stadion, that Bonaparte has accepted the offer made by the Emperor of Austria, to be the mediator of a general peace.

When I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, I had seen only a private letter from Constantinople of March 10th, by which it was evident that Mr. Arbuthnot had not at that time been able to effect anything with the Turkish government; but I have now the mortification to state to your Lordship, that so early as the 3d, the British fleet, with Mr. Arbuthnot, had repassed the Dardanelles, without its appearing that any military operation had been undertaken against the Turkish capital.

The Danish minister at the Porte to whom Mr.

Arbuthnot entrusted the concerns of the British mission, when he quitted Constantinople, not having thought proper to send me any notice whatever of this event, although he wrote an account of it to several persons in Vienna, I must necessarily confine myself for the present to the relation of the fact and of its immediate consequences.

All British property is confiscated, and all British subjects are made prisoners throughout the whole of the Ottoman Empire. General Sebastiani is completely master at Constantinople, presides over the deliberations of the Divan, and directs all their measures.

The unsuccessful issue of this business has produced likewise the worst possible effect upon the councils of the Austrian Cabinet.

In spite of those difficulties, the nature of which I have had occasion frequently to state to your Lordship, the negotiations with Russia had once more assumed a favourable aspect, and the Archduke Charles had himself begun to acknowledge the necessity of adopting a vigorous course. By my two last despatches, your Lordship will have seen how anxiously we were expecting Bonaparte's answer to the Austrian offer of mediation, as likewise the Emperor of Russia's answer to the French proposal of a Congress. Every thing was to depend upon those answers, and such was the good understanding which began to prevail, that their contents, whatever they might be, could hardly fail of bringing us to that most desirable of all results—joint peace or joint war. Sorry am I to acquaint your Lordship that the news from Constantinople has thrown everything back to its former state of uncertainty, and again given the ascendancy to those advisers whose system it is to separate Austria from her most faithful friends, and who are particularly hostile to the renewal of any connection with Great Britain.

The first bad effect of that intelligence, which arrived nearly at the same time with Bonaparte's answer respecting the mediation, has been to preclude all hope of inducing Austria to assemble an army. The second is to render it extremely doubtful whether she will afford any very efficacious support to her mediation now that it has been accepted.

Upon this most material point M. Pozzo di Borgo brought the ministers yesterday to a trial. He asked Count Stadion whether he was ready, in concert secretly with Russia, to propose an armistice of which one condition should be, Bonaparte's retiring to the Oder; and if that condition should be refused, whether Austria would agree to put her army in motion? Count Stadion frankly declared that under the present circumstances he had no hope of being supported in such a measure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. The armies are very near each other, and it appears that Bonaparte is preparing to attack the Russians.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 5. 1807.

MY LORD,

AFTER I had closed my despatches yesterday, a courier arrived from St. Petersburg with orders and full powers to M. Pozzo di Borgo to proceed immediately to Constantinople, and to negotiate a peace with the Turks.

He is instructed to offer them peace on the basis of the perfect integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and according to the events which may have taken place, to act jointly with or separately from Mr. Arbuthnot.

In order to give additional weight to the efforts which M. Pozzo is about to make for the restoration of peace, I should humbly recommend that he be furnished by your Lordship with such recommendations to Mr. Arbuthnot, as may ensure their co-operation in an object of so much importance to the common cause.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Private.*)

Vienna, April 5. 1807.

I DO assure you, my dear Lord, that towards the success of the business I have communicated to you in my despatch of this day, *every thing* will depend upon M. Pozzo di Borgo. Do, therefore, let me request that you will send out instructions to Mr. Arbuthnot to act with him. No man is so competent to give advice as M. Pozzo. Independently of his great abilities, and of his knowledge of the views of his own Court and of ours, he is now thoroughly master of the views of the Court of Vienna—a most material article among his means of negociation at the place to which he is going.

I am, ever, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 11. 1807.

MY LORD,

• I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of March 7th.

In all my conversations with Count Stadion on the subject of subsidies, I have presented the question

exactly in the same point of view as that in which it is seen by his Majesty's government. I have never allowed him to consider me as having offered them by way of inducement to Austria to join us; and whenever it has been thrown out to me that Austria, in the present state of her finances, could not support a war, but must look to Great Britain for assistance, I have not failed to answer, that such assistance must depend totally upon the circumstances of the case when Austria should find herself actually engaged.

Seeing, however, that such circumstances must embrace the principle on which Austria would become a party to the war, and the objects which she would propose to herself by it, I pressed your Lordship (with more importunity, perhaps, than the case immediately required) for some provisional instructions, in order to be prepared with an answer to the proposals I might receive, whether for a treaty of subsidy, or for a treaty of alliance.

That matters were verging to a crisis at which the neutral system of Austria could no longer be persisted in, appeared to me evident, although it was impossible to fix the period of its cessation; and that I should be furnished with the means of entering into such engagements with her, under your Lordship's directions, as might accelerate her declaration, appeared to me to be desirable from the peculiar value of time in the present state of affairs, and from the very critical situation of the French armies on the Vistula.

But if it should be thought that the certainty of pecuniary aid might indirectly operate as an inducement to Austria to declare war, I can venture positively to assure your Lordship that she would not make war for the sake of that aid alone. On the other hand, the certainty of receiving none might operate as an inducement to the most fatal submissions, and

from submissions might lead her possibly to the most destructive connections.

When I arrived at Vienna, such was the anxious desire of the Emperor, of all his ministers, and of all his subjects to preserve peace, that to offer subsidies as an inducement to war would have been ridiculous, and even prejudicial to those interests which we had to recover and to preserve. Even at the present hour such is the reluctance to hear of war, that subsidies are only considered by those who most see the necessity of them as the means of bringing sufficient forces into the field to act upon a plan of combined operations.

Such were my motives for venturing to make the request contained in my No. 8.

With regard to the influence of the Archduke Charles over the public councils, I have to state to your Lordship that it is decisive. He has the entire government of the army, and the direction of all military operations. War could not be carried on with any prospect of success, if begun against his consent. Knowing, therefore, his power I have abstained from supporting any views tending towards a war undertaken without his thorough conviction and participation. The measure of mediation has by the concurrence of many events become a measure through which his approbation of war under certain circumstances may be looked upon as secure.

No distinct views, with respect either to Germany or Italy, have yet been opened to me. None, I believe, have been formed; so little was it expected that Bonaparte would admit of a real negotiation for peace, or allow Austria to become a party to it. The great object at present is to keep the Archduke steady to the point to which he has advanced, and to conduct the negotiations in such a manner as to convince him at their close (should they not close in peace) that if

things remain on any thing like their present footing in Germany or in Italy, there will be an end not only of the greatness, but possibly the existence of the Austrian monarchy.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

It is with great concern that I inform your Lordship of the death of the Empress on Monday morning last.

The Emperor is deeply affected by her loss ; but he has regained sufficient possession of himself to return to the Diet of Hungary, where his presence is of the highest importance.

The chief propositions which have been made to the Diet are, — 1st. That the insurrection should be rendered permanent and disposable ; 2dly, that 30,000 recruits should be raised to complete the Hungarian regiments ; 3dly, that Hungary should take upon herself some proportion of the public debt. It is supposed that this last proposal will meet with the greatest objection.

By the absence of Count Stadion I am unable to inform your Lordship whether anything has occurred within these few days likely to accelerate the motions of the Austrian Cabinet. Previously to his leaving Vienna he had proposed assembling an army in Galicia, but he lost the question in council. The Archduke, however, has issued orders to a great many regiments to be ready to march at a moment's notice. The truth is, that the government is afraid of making Galicia the seat of war, and hopes that the

intended operations of General Beningsen on the Lower Vistula may fix it in that quarter.

Bonaparte has sent a message to the Senate, demanding the conscription for the year 1808, and stating as his reason that, although he is strong enough to resist the Russians and Prussians, the armaments of a great Power in his neighbourhood oblige him to have recourse to that measure.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 14. 1807.

MY LORD,

I HAVE at length received despatches for your Lordship from the Danish minister at Constantinople; but as they are only to March 16th, and contain nothing but what I have already communicated to your Lordship in substance, I have sent them round by Memel.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 22. 1807.

MY LORD,

By the absence of Count Stadion, I am prevented from sending your Lordship any further information respecting the progress of the different negotiations in which the Court of Vienna is now engaged. I have no reason, however, to believe that any material alteration has taken place in the state of affairs since the offer of mediation.

The declarations of the Emperor of Russia to this Court continue to be most encouraging; and although

his presence at the army is looked upon with some anxiety, no fears are entertained of his being induced by the artifices of Bonaparte to enter into separate negotiations.

I have no intelligence whatever from Constantinople, but am informed that the last accounts received at Count Stadion's office mention that his Majesty's fleet had returned to Malta.

Some troubles have arisen in Croatia, but they are now appeased.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 22. 1807.

MY LORD,

IN a letter I have just received from Commodore Campbell, there is the following sentence, to which I think it proper to call your Lordship's attention:—

“I feel much obliged by your recommending the force here to be augmented, as by what I can learn from their preparations at Venice, I shall have enough on my hands in the summer.”

I have suggested to Commodore Campbell the propriety of his applying directly to the Admiralty, but transmit this information to your Lordship in order that no time may be lost.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, April 28. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatch, No. 1., dated April 7.

It gave me great satisfaction to be able to renew by his Majesty's commands those promises of support and co-operation to Austria, whenever she should determine upon the adoption of a vigorous conduct, which I have uniformly given her. I lost no time in communicating them to M. Hudelist, who officiates in the foreign department during Count Stadion's absence, and took that opportunity of repeating all the arguments of policy, convenience, and honour by which I had on former occasions supported M. Pozzo di Borgo's negotiations for a general concert.

The opinion you do me the honour of communicating to me as that entertained by his Majesty relative to the probable non-acceptance by the enemy of the Emperor of Austria's proposal of mediation, is in every sense conformable to his past and present conduct. I have reason to believe that notwithstanding his formal acceptance of that proposal, he is now actually endeavouring to enter into separate negotiations at the Imperial and Prussian head-quarters. No hope therefore can be entertained that a basis so rational as that which Austria has proposed for a general peace, can be seriously admitted by him, nor proceeded upon with any other intention than that of disuniting the allies, and delaying the declaration of this Court.

The only point of view in which I have ever considered this mediation as likely to produce a good effect, has been that of gaining through it the Archduke Charles to our side, without whose clear and decided opinion in favour of war, none could be carried on with any prospect of success.

I am induced therefore to believe that, under the present circumstance, I can pursue no course more agreeable to his Majesty, as there is none more consonant with the practical purpose of inducing Austria to join us, than that of keeping this government steady

to the views it has announced, and pressing it by every means in my power to follow up the rejection of the terms of the mediation (which will infallibly happen), by an immediate junction with the allies.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 29. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to you three inclosures which I have just received from Mr. Foresti, his Majesty's Resident at Corfu, one of which is a letter from Mr. Arbuthnot; another one from Admiral Duckworth; and the third Sir Sidney Smith's relation of his proceedings after the passage of the Dardanelles.

I have likewise inclosed to you copies of two despatches from Mr. Foresti to myself of the 6th and 11th instant.

In this last you will perceive with satisfaction that a British force of 6,000 men, under the command of General Mackenzie Fraser took possession of Alexandria on March 20.

I have also the honour of inclosing to you the copy of a note delivered to me by M. Hudelist (who officiates in the foreign department in the absence of Count Stadion), containing a serious complaint against the proceedings of his Majesty's squadron in the Adriatic, in regard to the neutral trade of the ports of Trieste and Fiume.

Having received no copy of the instructions sent out to Commodore Campbell, I have in my correspondence with that officer only been able to recommend to him, in general terms, as much indulgence

towards the Austrian flag as might be consistent with the due execution of his orders. I did this from a sense of the superior importance at the present moment of conciliating the Court of Vienna, and of removing all obstacles in the way of her accession to the common cause; and although for obvious reasons, I did not think proper to communicate any particulars to Commodore Campbell on this point, I have not failed to state to him in the clearest manner that considerations of deep political interest weighed with me in the recommendation I had given him.

I earnestly hope that his Majesty's government will concur in this sentiment, and admit the interpretation I hazarded in my conversation with Count Stadion on the 24th of February (the particulars of which were stated in my despatch of that day), of what was truly meant by the Order of Council of January 7th.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, April 29. 1807.

SIR,

IN my separate despatch of the 5th instant, I informed his Majesty's government that M. Pozzo di Borgo had received orders to proceed to Constantinople, and to endeavour to negotiate peace with the Turks. I mentioned also that he had been instructed to act jointly with or separately from Mr. Arbuthnot, according to the state in which he might find affairs on his arrival at the place of his destination. The departure of Mr. Arbuthnot for England would have placed M. Pozzo therefore in the situation of being able, if not to act as a direct negociator for Great

• Britain, at least to enter into such explanations with the Turkish government as might remove the chief difficulties in the way of peace with us, and this task would be rendered the more easy to him from his knowing that Great Britain had entered into the war solely for the purpose of supporting her ally, the Emperor of Russia.

It is to this point, that I feel most particularly anxious now to call the attention of his Majesty's government. I need not observe how necessary it is to avoid giving Russia any just cause, or even any plausible motive, for jealousy in respect to our transactions in the Mediterranean. It is my duty to acquaint you that the failure of our attempt before Constantinople has produced (from causes of which I am ignorant) much discontent and ill blood between the British and the Russian commanders and negotiators. I also think it right to remark to you that the taking possession of Alexandria by his Majesty's forces, appears very likely to occasion jealousy, and may possibly produce embarrassment in our future operations, should it be the intention to carry on any operations in that quarter in common with our ally. As I cannot suppose it to enter into the views of his Majesty's government to retain Alexandria, or any conquests we may make in Egypt at a peace, I humbly take the liberty of suggesting the propriety of giving without loss of time some satisfactory assurances to the Court of St. Petersburg to that effect. On my part I will endeavour to the best of my power to obviate in this quarter any misunderstanding which may arise from the failure of the one expedition or the success of the other ; but in order to do this effectually, it will be necessary for me to be able to say something positive and distinct. There are two reasons which make me much wish to have this power. As I have stated before, M. Pozzo di Borgo is the

only channel through whom at this moment we can have any amicable communication with the Porte. Independently therefore of giving him, as the negotiator for Russia, such satisfactory explanations as may induce him still to consider the British and Russian interests as the same, it seems to me useful that he be enabled to ascertain what advantages to the common cause might be procured by the retrocession of this conquest.

Should his Majesty's government see this matter in the same light that I do, and should you do me the honour to transmit to me your instructions in consequence, I could immediately convey them to M. Pozzo, with whom my means of correspondence are open, and thus save much time and explanation at a period and under circumstances when prompt decision is so essential.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 2. 1807.

SIR,

THE absence of the Emperor and of the Archduke Charles still prevents my being able to send you any fresh information with regard either to the dispositions of this Court, or the further extent of its preparations. Immediately on the return of Count Stadion I propose renewing my exhortations to a vigorous conduct on the part of Austria, and at all events to a decision as to the line to be adopted in the event of failure of the present pacific attempts.

The return of Baron Hardenberg to the councils of his Prussian Majesty will, I trust, inspire some degree of confidence into this Court in the steadiness of that

of Prussia. The prevalence of opposite sentiments has hitherto been a principal cause of the difficulties in the way of effecting a solid union and concert among the remaining powers of Europe; and if this mediation be seriously to be proceeded with, and a Congress appointed for settling the articles of a general peace, nothing can be more necessary to its success, in the way in which success would be most desirable, than the extinction of all previous suspicion among those Powers who are to form it. Baron Hardenberg's restoration to office therefore is in this view an important circumstance; and I shall not fail to make every advantage of it in my power.

The subject of further subsidies for the assistance of Silesia has been mentioned to me by Count Finkenstein, but although (trusting to his Majesty's gracious forgiveness,) I was ready to take upon myself the responsibility of advancing the sum first demanded under the particular circumstances of the moment, and when his Majesty had no minister resident at the Prussian Court, I cannot feel myself justified in acceding to the present demand, without either first hearing from Lord Hutchinson, or receiving the express sanction of his Majesty's government to that effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 5. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to you the copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to Count Stadion*, which has just been sent to me from Buda, with a

* This note was, in fact, from Talleyrand to General Vincent, the Austrian Envoy at Warsaw. — R. A.

desire that I would immediately forward it to his Majesty's government.

In replying to this communication, which, under any other circumstances, I should have done in terms of mere general civility, I could not possibly pass over in silence a passage in M. Talleyrand's letter, containing a repetition of the usual false accusations against Great Britain.

By what Count Finkenstein has communicated to me within these few days, it appears that Copenhagen had been proposed by his Majesty's government for the assembling of a Congress. At that period it could not have been known in England that Austria, in proposing her mediation, had offered a town in her own territories for that purpose. The importance of gaining Austria to our side (in which object I cannot too often repeat there seems little hope of success, except by coming to an understanding with her *during* a Congress) had induced me to recommend to this government that the negotiations should be carried on in some town under her more immediate direction and influence. The utility of this with a view to the almost certain result of a Congress, is far greater than would at first be imagined. Saxony, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and in general all the interior of Germany, Switzerland, the Tyrol, even Italy itself (where there is no French army of any consequence), would wait with the most anxious expectation for the signal which the accession of the House of Austria to our alliance would hold out to them for rising in arms. The communication with leading persons in the countries I have named would be direct and rapid. Without implicating the British government in any ill-considered intrigues, assurances of support and protection might be given to the inhabitants of those countries, all suffering alike under the harshest oppression; and measures might silently

be taken to bring them forward under the auspices of the House of Austria. This advantage must be foregone should the Congress be held at Copenhagen, or at any place very distant from the Austrian capital.

In these sentiments the Russian ambassador assures me that he thoroughly concurs.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure referred to.

M. de Talleyrand au Général Baron de Vincent.

Varsovie, le 19. Avril, 1807.

LE Soussigné, ministre des relations extérieures, s'est empressé de mettre sous les yeux de S. M. l'Empereur et Roi la note que S. E. M. le Général Baron de Vincent lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 7^{me} de ce mois.

S. M. l'Empereur Napoléon accepte pour lui et ses alliés l'intervention amicale de S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche pour le rétablissement de la paix si nécessaire à tous les peuples. Sa Majesté n'a qu'une crainte; c'est que la puissance qui jusqu'ici paroît s'être fait un système de fonder son élévation et sa grandeur sur les divisions du Continent, ne cherche à faire sortir du Congrès qui sera formé de nouveaux sujets d'aigreur et de nouveaux prétextes de dissensions. Cependant un moyen par lequel on peut espérer de faire cesser l'effusion du sang, et de porter enfin des consolations dans le sein de tant de familles, ne doit pas être négligé par la France, qui, comme toute l'Europe le sait, a été entraînée malgré elle dans la présente guerre.

S. M. l'Empereur Napoléon trouve d'ailleurs dans cette circonstance une occasion naturelle de témoigner hautement la confiance que lui inspire S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, et le désir qu'il a de voir resserrer

entre les deux peuples des liens qui ont fait en d'autres tems leur prospérité commune, et qui peuvent aujourd'hui, plus que toute autre chose, consolider leur tranquillité et leur bonheur.

Le Soussigné, heureux d'avoir à manifester ces sentimens au nom de son auguste Souverain, renouvelle à S. E. M. le Général Baron de Vincent les assurances de sa plus haute considération.

(Signé) Le Prince de Talleyrand.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, May 5. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE thought it necessary to transmit to you the inclosed copy of my answer to Count Stadion's note, by which he informed me of Bonaparte's acceptance of the offer of mediation made by Austria.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure referred to.

Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.

Vienne, le 4. Mai, 1807.

LE Soussigné a l'honneur d'accuser à S. E. M. le Comte de Stadion la réception de sa note du 2^e Mai, contenant la réponse du ministre François à l'offre faite par S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche de ses bons offices pour le rétablissement de la paix générale.

Le Soussigné s'empressera d'expédier cette réponse à son gouvernement. Dans ces circonstances le Soussigné s'interdit toute observation sur les présomptions offensantes contenues dans la note de M.

de Talleyrand relativement à la conduite et au système de l'Angleterre ; bien convaincu que S. M. Impériale et Royale verra avec un déplaisir également sensible, et les imputations injurieuses contre une puissance amie, et un manque si total d'égard pour son caractère de médiateur.

Le Soussigné saisit avec empressement cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) ROBERT ADAIR.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, May 9. 1807.

SIR,

FEELING the necessity at the present moment of keeping up the best understanding possible among all the allied Courts, I sent off last night a confidential letter to Mr. Drummond at Palermo, communicating to him Bonaparte's answer to the Austrian proposal of mediation. I also took upon myself to assure him that he might safely promise his Sicilian Majesty that in any Congress which might assemble for the settlement of the affairs of Europe, the interests of his Sicilian Majesty would be an object of primary attention to Great Britain.

I have been induced to take this step in consequence of information respecting the internal state of Sicily, and the factions which prevail at the Court of Palermo ; and I have deemed it the more necessary from the consideration that neither the grounds on which Austria first proposed her mediation, nor M. Talleyrand's note of April 19th, had been communicated to the Sicilian minister at this Court. I likewise know that during the late negotiations at Paris very false information was transmitted by Prince Castelcicala

to his Sicilian Majesty respecting the views and disposition of Great Britain.

Having likewise received despatches addressed to his Majesty's government from Mr. Foresti at Corfu, in which he states that great preparations appear to be making from the opposite coast of Italy for an attack on the Seven Islands, and that on the other hand a Russian force of about 6000 men had proceeded to attack the territories of Ali Pacha in Albania, but that he himself, owing to the want of instructions, was unable to concert with the Russian minister the necessary measures of defence or attack; in either of those cases, I have thought it right not to lose a moment in recommending to him to co-operate to the utmost in all the views of Russia. To this end I have transmitted to him an extract from Lord Howick's despatch to me of March 6th, together with a passage from the first instructions I had the honour of receiving from you, dated April 7th, taking upon myself the responsibility of an advice which appears to me to be consonant with his Majesty's unvaried dispositions throughout the long contest in which his Majesty has been engaged.

As Mr. Foresti's despatches are too voluminous to send by the post through Germany, I shall take the first opportunity of forwarding them to you by Lord Hutchinson. All that they contain material, except what I have already stated, is that the Russians took possession of Tenedos on the 23d of March, and that the Russian admiral had declared all the Turkish ports in the Archipelago and the Mediterranean to be in a state of blockade.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Drummond.

Vienna, May 7. 1807.

DEAR SIR,

I LOSE no time in sending you the copy of a note which has just been communicated to me by Count Stadion, containing Bonaparte's acceptance of the Emperor of Austria's good offices for the restoration of general peace.

Neither the note, nor I believe the measure itself of mediation, has been officially communicated to the Commandeur Ruffo, but you may safely assure his Sicilian Majesty, as I have myself assured the Commandeur, that his interests will form a subject of primary attention to Great Britain in any Congress which may be assembled for the restoration of peace to Europe.

Of course this letter is confidential, but I leave it entirely to your discretion to make what use of it you may think prudent for the preservation of the good understanding which so happily subsists between his Majesty and the Sovereign at whose Court you reside.

Believe me, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Foresti.

(Referred to in the preceding Despatch.)

Vienna, May 8. 1807.

SIR,

BEFORE this letter can reach you I trust that you will have seen M. Pozzo di Borgo, and that he will

have informed you of my having safely received all your despatches.

A great pressure of business at the present moment prevents my answering so fully as I could wish your letter of April 17th, accompanying your despatches to Lord Howick, Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.; but your No. 12. contains at the close of it a passage so extremely material to the furtherance of his Majesty's service, that I cannot permit myself to lose a moment in offering you the best opinion in my power upon it.

You mention that your want of instructions prevents your communicating with the Russian plenipotentiary on the political affairs of the Seven Islands, or on the means to be taken for their defence, or the projects of attack on Albania; and that you are likewise prevented by the same circumstance from receiving through his channel the information connected with those important subjects.

I think it proper, therefore, to inclose you an extract from the last despatch written to me by Lord Howick, and dated on March 6th. The instructions it contains will deserve your attention the more particularly, as they were sent out to me for the express purpose of satisfying some inquiries I thought it my duty to make, in regard to points needless just now to state to you, but on which it was necessary that I should learn the sentiments and dispositions of government.

Since that period his Majesty has been pleased to change his administration, and I have the satisfaction of informing you that my very first despatch from Mr. Secretary Canning, to whom his Majesty has been graciously pleased to deliver the seals of the Foreign Office, announces the same vigorous determination in the new government to support the common cause, and particularly "*his Majesty's constant and*

invariable disposition to cultivate and maintain the most cordial union and good understanding with the Emperor of Russia."

I cannot hesitate a moment, therefore, in earnestly recommending it to you to co-operate to the utmost with the Russian minister in all those measures on which you appear at present to entertain doubts, for want of sufficient instructions. I take willingly upon myself the responsibility of this advice, which I shall also mention having given to you in the strongest terms, in my next despatches to government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, May 9. 1807.

SIR,

FROM some information which has lately reached me, I am very much afraid that the Austrian Court is permitting the passage of French troops into Dalmatia in far greater numbers than is consistent either with the spirit of their Convention with France on the subject of Cattaro, or with the repeated assurances of Count Stadion to myself as well as to Count Razamoffsky. Want of proper information of the fact (which ought to have been sent me from Trieste) has obliged me to defer any remonstrance against a proceeding so contrary to all notions of neutrality. Whenever I obtain that information I shall not fail to act according to the instructions which already have been sent to me with a view to that possible case. I perceive that this is likely to become a very embarrassing affair to us; but you may depend upon it that nothing shall make me lose sight of the main object,

which is, and must be, by every effort, and almost at any price, to gain Austria to our side.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 13. 1807.

SIR,

COUNT Stadion returned on Saturday to Vienna. Immediately on his arrival I had a long conversation with him on the present posture of affairs.

It gives me great satisfaction to inform you that Count Stadion was himself so sensible as well of Bonaparte's unjustifiable expressions concerning Great Britain contained in his answer to the Austrian proposal of mediation, as of the gross indecency of addressing them to the Power whose good offices to restore peace he had just accepted, that he had immediately and without waiting for my note of the 4th instant, ordered General Vincent to remonstrate in the strongest manner against a conduct and language in every sense so improper.

It is another satisfactory circumstance that the insidious invitation to Austria at the close of M. Talleyrand's note, to renew her connections with France, has totally failed of its effect. It is considered in no other light by the Austrian Cabinet than that of being intended to sow mistrust and jealousy among the different Powers before opening the negotiations.

A third consolatory topic is that of the supposed passage of French troops through the Austrian territories towards Dalmatia. Before adopting the more serious course of presenting an official note to the Austrian government, I requested Count Razamoffsky to ask a confidential explanation upon the subject.

The fact is most positively denied by Count Stadion, and this with such vehemence and apparent good faith that, even if my information of the demand be correct, I am confident the passage has not been authorised. At all events the steps which have been taken in regard to this affair will, I trust, prevent the recurrence of an evil which, in the present weak state of the Seven Islands, would threaten the most fatal consequences.

These I am concerned to say are the only points of a favourable nature which I feel myself justified in representing as the result of my conference with Count Stadion. I can perceive no symptom whatever of a disposition in the preponderating part of the Austrian Cabinet to enter into the views, or even to meet the wishes of the allies, further than I have already had the honour of stating in my former despatches.

Some correspondence has taken place respecting an armistice; but the views of the parties are so different, Russia requiring that Bonaparte should retire behind the Rhine, and Bonaparte requiring that Russia should retire behind the Pregel, he himself remaining on the Vistula, that before a middle point can be arrived at, hostilities will most probably have recommenced. Austria has proposed the Elbe as the line of demarcation. If we could prevail on Austria to insist on this line, and to support the proposition by putting her army in motion, a great advance would indeed be made in our affairs. But of this I see no prospect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 16. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing you the extract of a letter which I have just received from Commodore Campbell, dated May 7. The purport of it is of such consequence that I should have forwarded my despatch by a special messenger if I could have found any person of trust to go with it through Germany.

Count Stadion is returned to Buda. My second conversation with him was even less satisfactory than my last. He expressed his belief that negotiations were carrying on *very actively* at head-quarters; and in answer to all I could say favourable with regard to the appointment of Baron Hardenberg, and the dismissal of Zastrow, he replied that there was nothing to be hoped for from that measure, further than the benefit which might be derived from the individual integrity of Baron Hardenberg. Much he admitted would depend upon the nature of the convention understood to have been signed between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, the communication of which is expected here every day; but from the general tenor of his conversation, I confess I have no hopes of Austria stepping in the slightest degree at this moment out of her character of mediator.

In other respects affairs continue nearly the same as when I had last the honour of writing to you. The military preparations go on with unabated vigour.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure.

*Commodore Campbell to Mr. Adair.**(Extract.)*

H. M. S. Unité, Trieste, May 7. 1807.

WITH regard to the preparations at Venice, they are very active in building gun-boats, large brigs, and praams. They have desisted working on their frigates and line-of-battle ships, and thrown all their strength on the small vessels. They will have a formidable flotilla early in the summer — about forty gun-boats, four or five brigs, two praams, and one heavy frigate. The other two at Chiozza I learn are not sea-worthy.

By information I had that the French were sending a quantity of ship-timber from the island of Veglia to Venice, I was induced to run up there, and took from thence some Trabacolos laden with excellent timber for line-of-battle ships and frigates, and 350 pieces off the island, which were on the coast ready to be shipped off.

Finding the French had evacuated the island of Lusin, I was induced to enter the harbour to refit my ship; it is a most excellent one, and could be kept by a few hundred men against a large force, provided we kept command of the sea. The proximity of Pietro di Nembo induced me, as it was a great shelter to the enemy's gun-boats, as also to secure any thing we might send into Lusin, to attempt its reduction. I went there on the 28th with the Weazle, and succeeded in getting possession of the fortress on the 30th without any loss, making the garrison prisoners. The enemy have not now a soldier on any of the Dalmatian islands. I think I could, with the addition of a few small vessels, make the situation of their army in Dalmatia very unpleasant by cutting off their supplies.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, May 20. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatches of the 28th ultimo, together with their inclosures.

In obedience to his Majesty's commands I did not fail immediately to notify to the Austrian minister, that his Majesty had been pleased to nominate the Earl of Pembroke to be his plenipotentiary at the Court of Vienna.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 23. 1807.

SIR,

I HAD yesterday the honour of receiving your despatch, No. 4. Count Stadion will return this day to Vienna, when I will not fail to communicate to him his Majesty's consent that embassies should be reciprocally established between the two Courts of London and Vienna, if such should be the wish of his Imperial Majesty; and likewise that the Earl of Pembroke would be furnished with credentials as ambassador, to be produced at whatever time the Court of Vienna might be desirous of seeing him assume that character.

As I have no doubt that I shall receive some communication from Count Stadion respecting the progress of the Austrian Court in its mediation, I shall most probably re-despatch Lieutenant Drachbrawa in a day or two.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 27. 1807.

SIR, .

IMMEDIATELY on Count Stadion's return to Vienna I communicated to him the purport of your despatch, No. 4., relative to the establishment of embassies between the two Courts of London and Vienna; and to obviate all possibility of mistake, I made the communication in the very words of the despatch.

I received for answer from Count Stadion that this question having on former occasions been brought under the Emperor's consideration, who, after mature deliberation, had deemed it more expedient that the intercourse between the two Courts should continue on the same footing on which it had stood for so many years, his Imperial Majesty, all circumstances considered, was still of the same opinion.

This answer was accompanied by professions of the most amicable dispositions on the part of the Austrian government, and by an observation from Count Stadion, that as the intercourse between the two countries during the period of their strictest alliance and concert had been conducted by envoys, it was hoped that the Emperor's declining the proposition of investing the ministers respectively with a higher character, would in no sense tend to diminish the good understanding which subsists between the two Courts, nor be considered by his Majesty as any want of attention to his royal wishes.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Private.*)

Vienna, May 27. 1807.

SIR,

I INTEND either despatching a messenger to England in three or four days, or writing to you by the return of Prince Starhemberg's. Things are not going on at all to my satisfaction. The Prussian answer to the proposal of mediation is greatly censured here. It is *almost* called impertinent. The accession of this Court, therefore, to the Convention of the 14th of April is still at a great distance. Indeed I never entertained a hope of their acceding to it simply and at once. An agreement substantially of the same nature between Russia and Austria was the very thing which M. Pozzo di Borgo and myself were so ineffectually labouring at during the winter, and which we saw at last no chance of bringing about, except through the mediation, and as a result from it.

Nothing, however, is as yet finally resolved upon; nor will anything be determined until Dantzic be either taken or relieved.

Yours, with great truth, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, May 29. 1807.

SIR,

THE moment Count Stadion arrived from Buda I had an interview with him for the purpose mentioned in my despatch, No. 37., which I forwarded yesterday by the post. On this occasion I endeavoured also to learn what might finally be expected from Austria in the situation to which our affairs are now brought.

It will here be proper for me to inform you that about ten days ago, Count Finkenstein received the King of Prussia's answer to the Emperor's offer of mediation, together with a copy of the Convention* entered into on the 26th of April between his Prussian Majesty and the Emperor of Russia. Count Razamoffsky received also, at the same time, the answer of the Emperor of Russia, accompanied by an instruction to press Austria in the strongest manner to accede to the above Convention. It was in consequence of these despatches that Count Stadion was sent for from Buda by the Russian and Prussian ministers.

I lament to inform you that the King of Prussia's answer has given great dissatisfaction to this Court. It is censured both in substance and in form. The Convention itself, too, is not more favourably considered. The demands of the allies are deemed too high for it to be expected either that Bonaparte will comply with them, or that the allies themselves will adhere to them.

What is proposed with regard to the future condition of Germany is called vague and unsatisfactory. In short, I see nothing as the result of these communications but a more than ordinary degree of shyness on the part of Austria, and an increased unwillingness to come forward.

What gives me the most uneasiness is, the altered tone of Count Stadion himself. After his first return from Buda (on which occasion I wrote my despatch No. 3.), he said, in the course of our conversation, that *he thought peace would be the best thing that could happen*. This phrase struck me the more from its being coupled with a sort of explanation of the basis of the mediation which, I will venture positively to assure you, never was in his contemplation at the time

* The Convention of Bartenstein.

it was proposed. In order to try how far he was disposed to adhere to this basis (viz. the five articles as in my despatch, No. 18.), I remarked that both in spirit and substance the proposed Convention between Russia and Prussia (for it had not then been actually signed) offered more favourable terms to Austria than she seemed disposed to ask for herself; and that, so far at least as affording additional aid to her own views, obtaining a secure frontier for her, and enabling her to recover a great portion of her influence in Germany, such a Convention must be attended with the most beneficial effects to Austria. Count Stadion immediately answered, "*You must recollect that the Peace of Presburg is the point from which we must set out in all our negociations.*" If Austria can be got to act on no higher principle than this, — if she be not thoroughly impressed with the necessity of preserving what remains of the federative system — and if her mediation be not directed to this great end, the prospect for Europe is calamitous indeed!

In this point of view it is much to be lamented that the answer of the Prussian Cabinet was not a simple acceptance of the Emperor of Austria's proposal. Considered with reference to its ostensible object, the allies never could have been entrapped through it into a disadvantageous peace, while, as an instrument of bringing Austria forward, the mediation might have been used with the best effect. It seemed not difficult, with good management, to induce Austria, engaged as a mediating Power in the discussion of interests so dear to her as the state of Italy and the Federation of the Rhine, to exact on these points such concessions from Bonaparte as the violence of his character would never suffer him to listen to. On his refusal to make such concessions, and, above all, to give such securities as might easily be suggested for the maintenance of peace, Austria would have fallen into her true place

in the new struggle, and would have found herself engaged in it naturally, justly, and without any violence to her pacific inclinations. It is to be feared that these hopes are nearly destroyed by the Prussian answer.

I will not yet, however, totally despair. No positive refusal to accede to the Convention has yet been given, nor will any be given until the fate of Dantzic shall be decided. In the mean time I shall not fail to do every thing which depends on me to determine this Court either to accede directly to the Convention, or to give some intelligible answer to the various propositions which have been made to it, or to tell me to what extent they mean to support the propositions they have made themselves ; and although, since your communication of his Majesty's pleasure to me respecting the cessation of my powers at this Court, I can no longer speak from authority, I shall not hesitate to urge every motive which may be derived from a confidence that the most vigorous prosecution of the war, and the most determined support of the House of Austria, is the sentiment and the resolution of all ranks and descriptions of his Majesty's subjects, and particularly of those whom he has at any time honoured with his confidence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. I shall send a copy of this despatch to Lord Pembroke, in order that his Lordship may make such use of it as his own judgment and the instructions you may send out with him, may suggest.

The same to the same.

(*Private.*)

Vienna, May 29. 1807.

SIR,

THE letter from M. de Vaudreuil which accompanies my despatches relates to the unfortunate Marquis de Rivière speedily about to be sent to Cayenne, unless means can be found of helping him to escape from his prison. If you should deem this an object worthy of the generosity, or perhaps the justice (considering by whom he was employed) of the British nation, let me entreat you to send out orders without delay to Lord Pembroke to furnish the means of effecting it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, June 3. 1807.

SIR,

DESPATCHES were received two days ago by the Russian and Prussian ministers, ordering them to propose to this Court its immediate accession to the Convention of the $\frac{14}{26}$ th of April, and to require a categorical answer to the proposition.

I reserve myself until such answer shall be given to write more fully to you, and I propose sending off Lieut. Drachbrawa through Germany with my letter.

I have received despatches from the Danish minister at Constantinople of April 29. and May 10. The Porte seems very pacifically inclined towards Great Britain, the Grand Admiral's orders being to avoid attacking any of his Majesty's ships. Other pacific symptoms appearing likewise in these despatches, I

have in consequence written to the Danish minister to inform him that Sir Arthur Paget was coming out, and that, as his Majesty would never separate his cause from that of the Emperor of Russia, the Turks had better in the mean time listen to any overture of peace which might be made to them by Russia.

I alluded in this to M. Pozzo di Borgo's mission, but did not think proper to mention it to the Danish minister, whom I suspect to be friendly to France.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Mr. Adair to M. Hubsch, Danish Minister at Constantinople.

Vienne, ce 1 Juin, 1807.

MONSIEUR,

J'AI reçu hier les dépêches que vous avez eu la complaisance de m'adresser pour le gouvernement Britannique. Sa Majesté vient de nommer le Chev. Arthur Paget, autrefois son Envoyé Extraordinaire à la Cour de Vienne, à la mission de Constantinople. On peut donc espérer, d'après ce que vous me mandez des dispositions apparentes de la Porte Ottomane, qu'on trouvera moyen de s'entendre. Je dois cependant vous prévenir que jamais sa Majesté ne séparera sa cause de celle de l'Empereur de Russie ; jamais elle ne fera la paix sans que les conditions qu'y mettra son illustre allié ne seraient acceptées et remplies à la lettre. Que les Turcs se règlent sur cet avis ; qu'ils prennent leur parti au plus vite, et qu'ils ne négligent aucune ouverture pacifique qui pourrait leur être faite de la part de l'Empereur de Russie. Le tems est précieux pour eux, car je leur suppose assez de bon sens pour être revenus de

l'espérance de voir une armée Française se réunir à eux sur le Dniester, ou même sur le Danube. De l'autre côté ils mourront de faim dans deux mois d'ici.

Agréez je vous prie, Monsieur, &c.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, June 10. 1807.

SIR,

THE great question is still in deliberation at this Court. The Emperor returned on Monday to Vienna, and yesterday Count Razamoffsky had an audience at which in obedience to his last positive instructions, he pressed his Imperial Majesty in the strongest manner to accede to the Convention of the $\frac{14}{26}$ th of April. Count Razamoffsky, as I am informed, represented to his Imperial Majesty that under the present circumstances Russia could not possibly do more than defend her own frontiers, and that she could not even risk a battle, the loss of which must be her own destruction, as well as that of Europe. He also took occasion to state plainly, although not in any manner which could be misconstrued into a menace, that unless Austria would consent to join the allies, they must make the best terms they could for themselves. The Emperor's answer was, as I learned, still very general.

The impression on Count Razamoffsky's mind from this audience, as well as from the conversations he has had with Count Stadion lately, is that Austria will in the end accede to the Convention, but he fears it will be too late to do any material good.

By information received from an authentic channel, Bonaparte is preparing for a grand and deci-

sive attack on the whole of the Russian army. It is supposed that his plan is to turn their left wing, and by cutting off their communication with Galicia oblige them to evacuate the whole of Prussian Poland, and retire behind the Niemen. This was his plan last winter, in which he was disappointed by the resistance he met with at Pultusk. If he should execute it now, Austria may consider Galicia as lost.

The extent of the preparations of Austria, and the activity in the war department, especially in the article of providing subsistence for an army, are considerable enough to justify better hopes than I can yet venture to give you. But until I hear that orders are issued for assembling an army, it would be only misleading his Majesty's government to place the prospect of co-operation from this side in a stronger point of view than I have now done.

On the subject of the mediation, I have heard nothing more from Count Stadion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, June 17. 1807.

SIR,

SINCE writing my last despatch, I have been in daily and anxious expectation of learning the answer of this Court to the Russian proposals. It is still delayed ; but as the Emperor is again about to leave Vienna, the Russian and Prussian ministers have fixed next week as the period beyond which they cannot delay communicating to their respective Courts the success or failure of their efforts.

It is intended by the ministers to despatch Count

Stutterheim (a very intelligent officer, and well disposed towards active measures) to the allied armies, in order to verify the statements which the Russian and Prussian ministers had given in of the number and military disposition of the combined forces. I wrote to Lord Hutchinson on the 7th instant (ordering the messenger to deliver my despatches to Lord Pembroke in case Lord Hutchinson should have left head-quarters), and took occasion to recommend Count Stutterheim to his particular attention, as it is from him that his Lordship will be able to obtain the most complete information, not only of the state and disposition of the Austrian forces, and of their readiness for immediate action, but also of those causes which have so long operated to prevent Austria from entering into the confederacy.

The fall of Dantzic, and the expectation of a decisive action between the grand armies, have delayed the Austrian answer for so many days. Upon the success of that action, and of the first operations of the British expedition *, a great deal will of course depend. As Count Stutterheim's reports will be much relied upon by the Archduke Charles, the general cause would in my opinion be essentially promoted by showing him the utmost confidence.

The diminished state of the French army in the Neapolitan dominions has encouraged the Prince of Hesse to make a descent at Reggio with about 4000 men. A further force was to follow. He has been joined by a considerable number of the inhabitants. I have no intelligence on which I can depend respecting his progress.

The French General Gardanne is now at Vienna, on his way to Persia. Bonaparte is indefatigable in

* It was not dreamt of at Vienna that this was designed against Copenhagen. — *R. A.*

his efforts to establish the French influence in that part of Asia.

I am sorry to inform you that affairs are going on very ill indeed on the side of Turkey. The Russians have been obliged to evacuate Wallachia, the Turks having crossed the Danube in considerable force. The Russians are thus entirely separated from Czerni Georges; Austria is greatly alarmed for her frontiers; and this is another difficulty we have to contend with in our endeavours to obtain her co-operation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Important accounts have just arrived from Constantinople. The Grand Signior is deposed by the Janissaries, and his cousin Mustapha placed on the throne. The heads of several of the chief officers, among others of the Reis Effendi and the Bostangi Busha, were sent to the Janissaries by Sultan Selim, but nothing short of his deposition would satisfy them. It is said that they have sent for the heads of the Grand Vizier and several others at the army.

The same to the same.

Vienna, June 20. 1807.

SIR,

NOTHING has occurred here since writing my last despatch. We have received the accounts of the Russian successes on the 5th and 6th instant, on the Passarge, and we are in anxious expectation of the result of the general engagement which it is supposed has already taken place.

The Danish minister at Constantinople having given me no account of the deposition of the Grand Signior, I am not able to send you any accurate de-

tails respecting this important revolution. By all concurrent information however, it appears to have been entirely produced by the Grand Signior's persisting in his attempt to introduce the European discipline in his armies. It began by an accidental insult offered to a Janissary, which was resented by that formidable body, who assembled instantly in arms, and proceeded, under the authority of the Mufti, to the deposition of the Grand Signior for the four following reasons:—his having no children, — his having addicted himself to Christian vices and adopted Christian manners, — his having increased the taxes, — and his having acted as the lieutenant of a Christian Prince in investing the French ambassador at Constantinople with the order of the Legion of Honour.

Before descending from his throne, the Grand Signior, as I understand, made some slight resistance, but no one declaring in his favour, his cousin Mustapha was placed upon it, and the deposed Sultan was the first to acknowledge his authority and to do him homage.

Accounts differ as to one important point, namely, whether the war, and particularly the war with Great Britain, has been sufficiently felt at Constantinople to have assisted in producing these events; but I have the satisfaction of informing you that Count Stadion's despatches mention positively the sending away of the French engineers.

It now remains to be seen whether M. Pozzo di Borgo, of whose mission I apprised his Majesty's government on the 5th of April, will be able to profit by this opportunity to make peace. We expect despatches from him every day, and I shall forward by a special conveyance through Holland whatever material intelligence he may transmit.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, June 24. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 9th instant.

In my No. 41. I mentioned that the Russian and Prussian ministers had determined to press for an answer within the course of the present week to the proposals which have been made to Austria by their respective sovereigns. I am to see Count Stadion this day, when I will again press upon his consideration all those motives for immediate decision which you have so clearly stated, and so forcibly urged in your despatch.

Some days however will still elapse before we shall obtain a definitive answer. Couriers are following couriers with accounts of the operations of the adverse armies; and until the success of one or the other be determined, I am afraid nothing will persuade Austria to stir. When I re-despatch Lieut. Drachbrawa with the definitive answer of Austria, I will enter more at large into the motives which appear to me chiefly to have produced this deplorable inactivity. At present, I will only refer you to a former despatch, in which I mentioned my belief that fears for the safety of Galicia operated considerably on the mind of the Archduke Charles. I am now confirmed in this belief by its having been made almost a condition of Austrian co-operation that the main body of the combined army shall have reached the Bug.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Separate.*)

Vienna, June 24. 1807.

SIR,

THE information contained in the concluding part of your despatch is become so material in consequence of the recent occurrences at Constantinople, that I shall send it off instantly to M. Pozzo di Borgo. I am just at this moment embarrassed about the means of conveying it to him, as nothing can be trusted to M. Hubsch, at Constantinople. I hope, however, speedily to get over this difficulty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, June 27. 1807.

SIR,

I WROTE on the 24th to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 9th instant, and likewise to inform you that I expected very shortly to send off Lieutenant Drachbrawa with the definitive resolution of this Court.

The fatal intelligence is at length arrived from General Vincent of the battle of the 14th, and of the total defeat and dispersion of the Russian army.

Although the Russian official accounts have not yet been received, and for that reason some slight hopes may still be entertained that General Vincent's statement from Warsaw is exaggerated, the degree of truth which appears in the substance of his report, and above all the effect which it has produced at this Court, render the period so extremely critical that

I think it my duty to send off Lieutenant Drachbrawa immediately with this despatch.

The consternation of the Austrian government is extreme: they begin already to tremble for Galicia, and for the preservation of that peace for which they have made so many sacrifices, and lost so many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. Into what this feeling may subside I cannot pronounce — most probably into a confirmed stupor and inaction, and a complete resignation to events.

To this conclusion I am led by the tenor of almost all my late conversations with Count Stadion. I gave you an account of two of them in my despatches, Nos. 33. and 38. Three days ago, I read him yours of the 9th instant. He admitted fully the truth and justice of almost all the reasoning contained in it, but I could make no further progress. He had then received some information which led him to anticipate the calamitous events of the 14th.

Whatever hope, therefore, might once have been entertained of the co-operation of Austria through the effect of our representations and other measures, it appears for the present to be completely at an end. In communicating the intelligence to me, Count Stadion said most distinctly that he feared there was nothing now to be done but to make peace. I observed that these fresh successes would lead probably to fresh pretensions on the part of France, and that Bonaparte, to whom no project seemed preposterous or impossible, might adopt that of carrying his army into the heart of Russia, and attempt to dictate the law even at St. Petersburg. Count Stadion agreed that this would give us one chance more; but his belief was rather that Bonaparte would immediately offer peace.

But in order to leave no means unattempted, (being thoroughly convinced that if Austria were to

declare herself even now she would have a better chance of safety than she can hope for three months hence,) I assured Count Stadion that if the delay of Lord Pembroke's arrival kept back any resolution which the Court of Vienna might otherwise be disposed to adopt on account of subsidies, I was ready to take upon myself the responsibility of guaranteeing any sum that might be wanted to put their army *instantly* into motion. To this offer he was silent.

I have not stopped here. Some days ago Prince Radzivill, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, arrived at Vienna, charged to convey personally to his Imperial Majesty the sentiments and views of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia. His private audience was, for some reason or other, delayed until yesterday evening, when it took place at Laxemburg, whither he was summoned by special invitation from the Emperor. As I am in the habit of much confidential intercourse with Prince Radzivill, he imparted to me this intended interview, and likewise the topics it was his intention to urge. So favourable an opportunity of conveying truth to the ear of his Imperial Majesty was not to be neglected. I recapitulated to Prince Radzivill, therefore, all the arguments contained in your despatch, and entreated him to lay them before the Emperor, accompanied by every inducement to come forward derived from the fresh dangers which are gathering round the Austrian monarchy. I urged him to represent to his Imperial Majesty that some forward motion — some sign of life on the part of Austria, appeared to be most peculiarly necessary at the present moment, as without it, Bonaparte would probably begin first by insisting she should disarm; and I renewed most warmly the offer of pecuniary assistance, provided the army were but once fairly put in motion.

If any success should have attended this effort,

which I shall know before sealing my despatch, I will add a postscript. You will see by what I have now the honour of communicating to you, that although our prospects are unfavourable to nearly the greatest possible degree, the case is not absolutely desperate. A considerable Russian army may yet exist; and the mere loss of territory, exhausted as are those districts into which the French have now advanced, is nothing in the scale of ultimate success. Could Austria be convinced of this, and that, considered with a view to military operations, she would gain more in point of position by the forward movement of the French armies than she would lose by the disadvantages consequent upon a partial defeat of those who would be her allies, the effects of this terrible calamity might yet possibly be retrieved. Under this supposition, although the speedier her decision the better, delay would not be absolutely fatal.

Such being the situation of affairs, Count Stutterheim left Vienna yesterday on his journey to the Russian head-quarters. The object in view, when he first received orders to proceed thither, was to obtain accurate information of the numbers and condition of the allied forces; but I have now strong reason to believe that he carries with him the most earnest entreaties from this Court to the Emperor of Russia to make peace if it can be had on any tolerable terms. Such a mission would naturally be concealed from me, but I hope that by what I have already written, both to Lord Hutchinson and Lord Pembroke (and particularly to the former) respecting this officer, they will soon discover whether this be or be not the object of it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, July 4. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Lord Pembroke arrived here yesterday, and that his Lordship intends seeing Count Stadion this evening or to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, July 15. 1807.

SIR,

THE Earl of Pembroke having this day presented his credentials to his Imperial Majesty, I have the honour of informing you that, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, I have delivered up to his Lordship the ciphers and official correspondence in my possession.

I have the honour to be, &c.

ROBERT ADAIR.

FROM LORD PEMBROKE'S ARRIVAL AT VIENNA, UNTIL
THE CESSATION OF DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE BE-
TWEEN ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA.

LORD PEMBROKE presented his credentials to the Emperor on July 15th. He brought out with him those of ambassador extraordinary, as well as minister plenipotentiary, but he was received only in the latter capacity.

The objections on the part of the Austrian government to receiving his Lordship in the character of ambassador, are stated in my No. 37., dated the 7th of May; and as he had brought out no letter of recall for me, I found myself, in consequence of the refusal to admit him in his higher character, placed in an awkward and somewhat difficult situation.

To explain this, it must be observed that the credentials of minister plenipotentiary, in which character I had been received at the Austrian Court, are a simple autograph letter, in which the sovereign accrediting requests that confidence may be given to the bearer of it by the sovereign to whom he is accredited, until he shall be recalled, or until a minister of a higher character shall be appointed to succeed him. It seems that in this case the Austrian government,—whether right or wrong, is a question of precedent and practice,—considered that to such an appointment two parties are necessary; namely, the sovereign who should nominate to it, and he by whom the person nominated was to be received; and that until such reception and recognition on his part, the appointment was not complete. On applying, therefore, for my passports, and the usual audience of

leave, (after having surrendered the correspondence and cyphers to Lord Pembroke,) I was asked for my letter to the Emperor announcing my recal, and on my observing that the character in which I had hitherto acted was extinguished by the appointment of an officer of higher rank, and consequently that no such letter was necessary, the distinction above noticed was opposed to my request — not indeed of my passports, but of my audience, which I was distinctly told by Count Stadion could not be granted me. He added also, that knowing nothing officially of the fact of my being either recalled or superseded, he still should consider me as the regular resident minister, Lord Pembroke having been received only in the character of plenipotentiary, on a special mission.

It will be obvious that the situation in which this objection placed me, was neither a pleasant nor an easy one. My own government had put an end to my functions, and ordered me to give up the cyphers and correspondence to Lord Pembroke. That was easily commanded, and cheerfully obeyed; but, on the other hand, the government to which I was accredited, acting in conformity to the credentials which I had delivered, and having no knowledge of their abrogation, continued to recognize me in my public capacity, and — the case in their judgment not having arisen — refused me consequently the distinction above mentioned, invariably granted on the amicable termination of a diplomatic mission.

Out of this embarrassment there was one way of escape indeed, namely, to quit Vienna without taking leave; but such a step would have been contrary to all usage, except on a rupture of pacific relations, offensive to the Emperor, who had graciously intimated his wish through his minister at London, that I might not be removed from his Court, and unworthy

the station I had occupied as representing the policy of the English government, under the direction of such men as Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Lord Grey.

Under these circumstances, I addressed the following letter to Mr. Canning, and took the resolution of remaining at Vienna until I should receive his answer; abstaining in the meantime from all political intercourse, whether with the Austrian government, or with the ministers of any of the other Powers.

“(Private.)

“Vienna, July 10. 1807.

“DEAR SIR,

“I WROTE on the 4th inst. to give you notice of Lord Pembroke's arrival at Vienna. His Lordship with that politeness for which he is well known, and with a kindness of manner I shall never forget, delivered to me the duplicate of your despatch No. 3.; but as he has brought me no letters of recal, I find myself placed in a situation of extreme awkwardness in regard to the general business of the mission. It appears that his Lordship's credentials as plenipotentiary are not considered here as conferring a rank beyond that of *minister* plenipotentiary, and it is in that character alone that this Court will receive them. They do not, therefore, necessarily revoke mine, and (as I am informed by Count Stadion, after his having read the copy of the letter to be presented by Lord Pembroke,) I must still be considered as accredited until I present letters of recal, or until this Court shall consent to receive a minister of superior rank. I am also informed by him, that without such letters, I cannot have my audience of leave. Now to quit Vienna without taking leave, would be to the highest degree improper, more especially since my having learned that the Emperor had done me the high

honour of expressing his wishes to his Majesty that I should remain at his Court. I will thank you, therefore, to relieve me as soon as possible from this embarrassment, the nature of which in all its points of view, no man can more fully understand or more sensibly feel than yourself.

“ Believe me, &c.
“ (Signed) ROBERT ADAIR.”

To this letter I received no answer; but early in September, Lord Pembroke notified to me his intention of returning immediately to England, and proposed to me to carry on the business of the mission until his Majesty's pleasure should be made known respecting the recal which I had solicited.

In consequence of this proposal, I resumed my correspondence with Mr. Canning on the 15th of September.

During the interval of its cessation, the peace of Tilsit had been concluded between Russia and France. The circumstances under which it had been negotiated, and the hard terms on which the peace was extended to Prussia, are too well known to require recapitulation or comment.

The despatches thus resumed are continued until the 22d of February, 1808, a few days previously to which (as it will appear in its place), on the non-acceptance by his Majesty's government of a mediation proposed by Austria for what, in the phrase of the day, was called “the maritime peace,” Prince Starhemberg had been recalled from London, and it was intimated to me that our diplomatic relations were at an end.

In effect, the utility of an English mission at Vienna, as far as the old continental system was concerned, ceased when such a peace as that of Tilsit was signed. By that act, the power of

Napoleon was rendered confessedly predominant, and all that Europe had to do was to submit, and wait for better times. The interests of the world also were now beginning to take another direction, and Constantinople was the point around which they were gathering.

But with this new direction, a new element was introduced into our differences with Russia, which required to be watched cautiously in their commencement, and touched with the tenderest hand. Her situation was this:—At the moment of her rupture with us, she had a large fleet in the Mediterranean; she had a numerous garrison at Corfu: on the question of Turkish politics she had changed sides, holding out her hand to France as the Power most likely to assist the new prospects opened to her by the recent treaty; and in pursuance of her altered politics, and against all right and public law, she had agreed to surrender to France the military possession of Corfu, and with it practically the protectorate of the republic of the Seven Islands.

In any other case we should immediately have set about to do her all possible mischief—in the Mediterranean and every where else—and have begun by seizing her ships, than which nothing was more easy. But the other side of the picture presented larger and wiser views. The Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding his unjust anger against England, was not yet in actual alliance with France; and although he had yielded to the fascination of Napoleon, much was yet wanting to give steadiness to their incipient connection. It was not the business of England, therefore, to force matters into a state which might consolidate and render it permanent. Wars of resentment never enter into the plans of English statesmen; and in this case for England to

have put forth her strength merely to punish an act, the ill consequences of which were sure, if left to their own operation, to fall upon those who were parties to it, would have been the summit of political imprudence. Independently of all other mischiefs, Austria, if not absolutely their victim, must have become deeply and immediately the sufferer by a real alliance between Russia and France.

Considerations of this nature forbade any hostile proceedings against Russia ; the very reverse indeed was the policy that was followed. Under the date of the 23d of January, 1808, will be found a despatch opening some views upon this subject, which subsequently were acted upon, and not without success.

On the other hand, it could not be permitted that Russia should, unopposed, assist France in executing her projects in the Mediterranean ; nor that Corfu and the other islands should be quietly transferred to that Power, if by any effort of ours it might be possible to prevent it. This matter is the subject of the several letters, subjoined in the Appendix, to Sir Alexander Ball, Lord Collingwood, and General Sir John Stewart.

With our altered relations towards Russia, those towards Turkey were now to be attended to. As we had gotten ourselves into a war — our only war, be it remembered, with the Turks since their establishment in Europe — entirely for the sake of Russia when she was our ally, there could be no reason for persisting in it when she had ceased to be so. Sir Arthur Paget, therefore, had been sent from England with a commission to restore the peace. The progress and failure of his negotiation may be traced in the correspondence. While it was going on, all preparatory good offices were rendered to the Porte and her subjects. Peace with Russia was almost indispensable to her. Sir Arthur did what he could to promote it ;

and on my being appointed, some months afterwards, to renew his negociation, I followed the same course.*

Meanwhile the peace of Tilsit, among other of its consequences, had necessarily altered the footing on which the English and Russian legations stood towards each other at Vienna. Count Razamoffsky had been displaced. His successor was Prince Kurakin, on whose entrance upon his functions all intercourse, except that of common civility, ceased between the missions.

The very first despatch to Mr. Canning, dated September 15th, notifies an act on the part of Russia of a nature not only to justify but to provoke hostilities with her. This was the landing of the garrisons of the Ionian Islands at Venice, then blockaded by a British squadron under the escort of Admiral Seniavin's fleet, which had so lately been co-operating with us at the Dardanelles. It will appear from the unsatisfactory conference with Prince Kurakin on this point, how difficult it was to avoid a rupture.†

The landing of 5000 Russians on the Continent of Italy, considering the facility of adding to their numbers from the interior of France, was by no means an indifferent matter; for about this time there appeared strong symptoms on the part of Napoleon — natural enough when assured, if not of the co-operation of Russia, at least of her not opposing it — of setting up a maritime kingdom in the Adriatic. It was with a view to this danger, that the project already alluded to for getting possession of Corfu and the other islands, had been recommended to the consideration of Sir Alexander Ball.

At Vienna, matters at first continued much as before this fatal treaty. No immediate demand had been made to occupy Trieste and Fiume, or to close

* See a Despatch from M. Pozzo di Borgo. Appendix.

† See Letter to Commodore Campbell. Appendix.

the Austrian ports to British vessels. Austria was well aware of the possibility of these and even worse exactions, and assuredly was in no condition to resist them. She waited, therefore, with anxiety for intelligence from Paris before taking any determination as to her future course ; but I will bear testimony to this truth — that she waited with a firm determination to abide the struggle, should it become unavoidable unless by the sacrifice of her honour.

By the 7th of October, this long expected despatch had arrived. It was not of a nature to increase the fears of Austria as to an immediate attack on her territories or independence. Her situation, however, was one of complete paralysis ; and so much so that she positively refused to take any steps towards bettering it. She was afraid that any attempt to re-establish, even for the purposes of peace, a good understanding with other Powers, would draw down upon her the vengeance of Napoleon ; for even the evacuation of Braunau, in execution of the treaty of Presburg, had been delayed by him under pretence that the Austrian army had not been sent into cantonments.

Compliance, however, with this demand was to be expected when it should be made. The march of French troops through the Austrian territories into Dalmatia was regular and continued ; and soon afterwards came the Convention of the Isonzo, by which a military road was granted for their passage. On this condition, Braunau was at length surrendered ; a condition which, in fact, was an additional article to the treaty of Presburg, and a fresh concession exacted from Austria since its signature.

It was easy in this state of things to foresee that my mission was about to close. Towards the end of October, therefore, and on learning that some Russian ships of war had been admitted into Trieste,

I thought it right to come to an explanation with the minister as to the situation in which we were standing. My No. 50., of the 31st of October, contains the result of this conference.

I was not surprised afterwards to learn that four days before the date of the above despatch, instructions had been sent to Prince Starhemberg to offer the mediation above alluded to; and I began immediately to make provision for an event that was no longer doubtful.

Two objects were essentially proper to be provided for. The first was to make some arrangement for securing to the officers of the disbanded Condean army the payment of the allowances made to them by the British government, and which had hitherto been effected under the authority of the English minister at Vienna. An arrangement, therefore, for this purpose was entered into with the House of Arnstein and Eskeles; to carry which into effect, I drew bills on the Treasury of England for 12,000*l.* sterling, being the amount of two years' allowance for the whole corps. With the consent of such of the officers as I could confer with, the superintendence of these payments was entrusted to the Comte de la Farre, Bishop of Nancy, who resided at Vienna in the supposed character of agent to Louis XVIII.

The next object was to establish some method of communicating with England, and to which, for reasons which will be well understood, the Austrian minister could not be a party. It was effected through Count Razamoffsky, Count Hardenberg (the Hanoverian minister at Vienna), the Commandeur Ruffo (minister from Naples), and M. Pozzo di Borgo.

But, beside these concerns, there was a matter to be ascertained of immediate importance to the common welfare, and in which it was necessary that England should see her way. In the possible, if not

projected, dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, what part was Austria to take? It could not be doubted that in any great scheme of partition she would be offered her share; and that share, comprising the fortress and territory of Belgrade, was a tempting acquisition. I brought forward the subject, therefore, in my final interview with the Austrian minister, and received from him the most distinct disclaimer — together with the expression of his desire that I would communicate it to my government — of any participation in the projects attributed to the new alliance, and the no less positive determination under no circumstances, either to accept any extension of territory at the expense of Turkey, or to countenance such projects in others; and I well remember the warmth with which he assured me that the public feeling with which the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia would be regarded at Vienna, was much the same as that with which the possession of the Isle of Wight by France would be regarded in London.

My correspondence with England closed at the end of February, 1808; and having, on my way to Trieste, to cross the military road granted to the French by the Convention of the Isonzo, I asked for and obtained an Austrian escort.

DESPATCHES CONTINUED FROM LORD PEMBROKE'S
DEPARTURE TO FEBRUARY 21. 1809.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Canning.

Vienna, September 15. 1807.

SIR,

I THINK it necessary to acquaint you without delay that two days ago I received a letter from Commodore Campbell informing me that a Russian force, consisting of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 Russian troops on board from Cattaro, had anchored off Pirano on the coast of Istria; and that the Russian commander had acquainted him that he had orders to land them at Venice.

The Russian commander also signified to Commodore Campbell his intention of sending on the transports under the escort of a frigate.

The Commodore, entertaining doubts how far their being suffered to enter Venice would be consistent with the blockade of that port, represented to the Russian commander that it could not be permitted unless he went with a superior force. It was agreed accordingly, that nothing should be done until he could receive instructions from Prince Kurakin at Vienna.

By the Commodore's desire I had yesterday an interview with Prince Kurakin on the subject, the result of which I have now the honour of communicating to you.

Having stated the object of my desiring to see him,

I mentioned that Commodore Campbell, with a view to avoid even the appearance of a misunderstanding with a Power which had been so long and so closely connected with Great Britain, had proposed a middle course, namely, that the Russian Commander should land his troops at Garda (which is immediately opposite Pirano, and only twelve miles distant from it), from whence they could easily be conveyed by inland navigation, or marched along the high road to Venice. To this proposal I requested Prince Kurakin's consent, and likewise that he would immediately issue the necessary instructions to the Russian Commander.

It was not my good fortune to persuade Prince Kurakin to adopt this suggestion. He alleged his want of powers: and I could only obtain from him a declaration that, upon his honour, the landing of the troops at Venice was with no hostile intention, but merely a measure of convenience and arrangement.

An answer so little satisfactory occasioned my writing immediately to Commodore Campbell (who had earnestly solicited my advice how to proceed in a case so new and difficult), recommending to him, if the Russian Commander should persist in sending troops by sea, and under the convoy of a frigate only, to oppose by force their entry into Venice. If he should come with his whole squadron, then to deliver him a strong protest in writing, drawn up as closely as possible to the spirit of his instructions, against so flagrant a violation of the right of blockade.

It appears to me fit that his Majesty's government should, without loss of time, be made acquainted with a transaction which may lead to the most serious discussions between the two countries. More Russian ships are expected every day with troops from Corfu, which important station has been put into the pos-

session of France by virtue of the secret engagements at Tilsit. All these troops, it appears, are destined for Venice, and by the inclosed letter from Mr. Foresti to Commodore Campbell, you will see that there is some reason to fear that a part of the Russian fleet has been ceded to the enemy.

It has not yet been in my power to ascertain this fact, or whether, as it is more probable, Russian ships have been used in transporting the troops which were to take possession of Corfu. Either of these acts would approach very near to positive hostility on the part of Russia, and would require to be seriously resented by us; but I think it prudent to avoid any steps which may increase the number of our enemies, except such as are dictated by the most imperious necessity. Of this nature, I trust you will consider the advice I have thought it my duty to give to Commodore Campbell.

Under the present apparent relations between Russia and France, and considering our many just causes of alarm from what has already transpired of the secret articles of the peace of Tilsit—the meaning conveyed in the limitation to one month of his Majesty's acceptance or rejection of the Russian mediation—the recent surrender of Corfu—the known determination of Bonaparte to attempt every thing to get possession of Sicily—and the too probable apprehension that he will endeavour to force this Court into his measures, I could not help looking upon the assemblage of a large body of troops in the North of Italy as a measure extremely suspicious (to say the least of it), and as one which his Majesty's government would by no means suffer to be carried into effect through the abandonment of the blockade of the port of Venice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, September 19. 1807.

SIR,

My preceding despatch has been delayed by the extreme difficulty of finding a trusty person to take charge of it through Germany.

This delay affords me an opportunity of soliciting the attention of his Majesty's Government to the situation of the Republic of the Seven Islands. Of their importance to Great Britain in the present state of the world there can, I apprehend, be no doubt. Since yesterday, I have obtained information which may be depended upon, that a very general disposition prevails among the inhabitants to seek his Majesty's protection. I am pursuing this line of information with diligence and secrecy, and endeavouring to ascertain what strength will be wanting to drive the French from the forts, and to retain possession of them. In general, I learn that Corfu may be taken by blockade, but that Cephalonia, Zante, and Ithaca may be carried by a *coup de main*. At Cephalonia there are 300 vessels and 7000 excellent sailors. The harbour of Argostoli is represented to me as safe in all seasons, and able to contain the largest fleet. Not far from it there is a fortress, which, with a little exertion, might be made as strong as Gibraltar.

I shall send all my information to Sir Alexander Ball and General Moore. It will be for them to determine whether there be any thing sufficiently distinct in it to call for immediate operations without waiting for orders from home. In the meantime it will be of great use for me to know the sentiments of his Majesty's government with regard to a regular enterprise of this nature (provided nothing

can be done by a sudden blow), and what engagements they will authorise me or any other person to enter into with the leading persons in the republic. One of them is now at Vienna, and will wait here for your answer. His description of the state of public opinion in the Islands is shortly as follows:— they rely on the generosity of England to maintain their constitution as it was settled and guaranteed to them in 1802; but rather than have the French, they would be content to become British subjects.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, September 24. 1807.

SIR,

INFORMATION has been received here of the occupation of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States by the French. It appears, also, that Bonaparte is speedily expected at Venice, that he has given orders for fitting up a palace for his reception not far from Udina, and for tracing out a camp to hold 80,000 men, between Udina and the Tagliamento. I cannot perceive, however, any increase of preparation on the part of this country to meet the danger which awaits it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, September 30. 1807.

SIR,

YOUR despatch of the 5th instant, addressed to the Earl of Pembroke, was opened by me, in consequence

of his Lordship having left Vienna, and I immediately proceeded to execute the instructions contained in it.

For this purpose I had an interview with Count Stadion, in which that minister assured me in the most distinct terms, that no propositions had been made either by Russia or by France to Austria, to shut her ports against British vessels, or to assent to the principles of maritime law which Russia appears disposed to re-assert. He assured me, also, that France had not yet made any requisition for the possession of Trieste and Fiume, although he was not ignorant of Bonaparte's views in that quarter, nor uninformed of the public language of his generals, particularly of those who command in Italy. At the same time that he gave me these assurances, he did not flatter himself that France would long remain quiet, or abstain from bringing forward these, and perhaps still more extensive pretensions.

As to their subsisting relations with France, he informed me that no variation had taken place in them since the peace of Tilsit. That their reciprocal communications were civil, and apparently even amicable; dispositions which Austria was endeavouring by all means in her power to cultivate.

I then asked him to tell me confidentially, what he thought would be the course which France intended to pursue towards Austria, since leaving her long at rest appeared so little probable.

He answered, that in a few days he should have a courier from Count Metternich, from whom he expected more distinct information on this point than he was then enabled to give me, and he promised that he would duly inform me whenever he should know any thing positively himself. With regard to any sudden attack on the side of Italy, the French were not in sufficient force there to attempt it, and in general he thought that the pretensions which France

might feel disposed to urge, would be deferred until Bonaparte's arrival at Venice.

From the manner in which he talked on this and other matters, which fell naturally within our conversation, I am sure that he expects that this demand of the sea-coast of the Adriatic will speedily be made; and I am also inclined to think it will not be very vigorously resisted.

My reasons for thinking so are derived from the evident impossibility of Austria sustaining a war, in which she will have France, Germany, and Italy to contend against, without the hope of succour, possibly even with the dread of hostility, from Russia.

* * * * *

Whether other possible demands on the part of France will be rejected by Austria—whether she will risk a war rather than recognise Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, or rather than assent to the meditated changes in Italy and Germany, and to the possible transfer of the Duke of Wurtzburg to Tuscany, is, I firmly believe, more than Count Stadion or any other member of the Emperor's Cabinet can tell. All that can be said for the present is, that Austria is not unprepared for the worst, and that if she is doomed to fall, she will not fall without a gallant resistance. By the arrangements already made, four armies can be assembled at a very short notice, and all accounts agree that the composition of them is superior to anything which she has brought into the field for many years.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, September 30. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you, that on the 21st instant, the Russian commander conveying the troops from Cattaro to Venice, sailed for that port with his whole force, and that Commodore Campbell has remonstrated strongly against the proceeding.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 3. 1807.

SIR,

I YESTERDAY received despatches for his Majesty's government from Sir Arthur Paget, dated from Tenedos August 6th, and addressed under a flying seal to Lord Pembroke. As they contained no account of any progress in the negotiation with the Turks, and as the packet is too large for conveyance through Germany by the post, I have forwarded it to Lord Granville Leveson.

From Commodore Campbell, however, I learn that he had received intelligence from Lord Collingwood's fleet of September 4th, informing him that the negotiations were then going on, and that it was supposed they would have a favourable issue.

Information has just reached me of a circumstance which, coupled with what you must undoubtedly have heard from St. Petersburg, may not prove unimportant in its effects. In consequence of the death of General Michelson, which took place about the time when the armistice was negotiating between the Russian and French armies, the Russian general

officer next in command to him refused to evacuate Wallachia until the return of a courier who had been sent with despatches to St. Petersburg to learn the Emperor's pleasure. The answer was received on September 13th, and in consequence of positive orders (as I am assured) the Russians have now refused to execute this article of the treaty of Tilsit. A French courier passed through this place two days ago for Paris in great haste, with intelligence (it is supposed) to the above effect. You already know that on August 14th the Emperor Alexander wrote to Bonaparte complaining bitterly of the delay in evacuating the Prussian states, and of the heavy contributions imposed on them. If the politics of the Russian Cabinet could be judged of by any rule of reason, the probability would be that the order for the non-evacuation of Wallachia had been given in consequence of the conduct of France towards Prussia; but their own conduct in the Adriatic forbids me to entertain this belief, or to hope that any good will result from this apparent misunderstanding. I just learn that they have sold all their military stores to the enemy, and that the Russian commander who convoyed the garrison from Cattaro to Venice has now sailed for Corfu to assist in establishing the French in that and the other islands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

(*Separate.*)

Vienna, October 3. 1807.

SIR,

I AM sorry to acquaint you that by orders from Lord Collingwood, Commodore Campbell is obliged

to quit the Adriatic with the squadron under his command. For the present, therefore, no English ship of war will be left in that sea, and the intercourse between the coasts of Italy and Dalmatia and the Seven Islands will be completely re-established. This intelligence disconcerts for the present any plan for an attack on those Islands by a small force; but I shall nevertheless pursue the object mentioned in my despatch No. 49., and collect all the information I can, in order to facilitate the measure when it shall be judged practicable. It appears that Lord Collingwood is apprehensive of an attack upon Sicily, but, by what Count Stadion tells me, the French are by no means in sufficient force to make the attempt.

On September 25th, I sent Mr. Summerer with despatches to Sir Alexander Ball, inclosing him a memoir relative to the present state of the Seven Islands which had been drawn up and put into my hands by the person alluded to in my No. 49., and I accompanied it with a letter, recommending an attack particularly on Cephalaria, if a sufficient force could be spared for such an enterprise. Some movements in favour of the English have already taken place at Zante; but they have been suppressed, and I have recommended most strongly to my correspondent that no manifestation whatever of the public sentiment should be made until matters are sufficiently prepared for a concert between the inhabitants and a British force.

The operations recommended by this gentleman are first to attack Cephalaria and Zante, and then to form the blockade of Corfu, which must in the end belong to the Power which possesses the dominion of the sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 7. 1807.

SIR,

HAVING learned that the courier expected from Paris had arrived, I again waited upon Count Stadion, in order to ascertain more exactly than I had been able to do in my former conference, the nature of those objects which are at present under discussion with France. I am still unable to state them to you with as much precision as I could wish; but I learn from him in general that no fresh pretensions have been advanced, and that the discussions, on whatever point they may turn, are likely for the present to end amicably, although not satisfactorily.

His expression on this point was remarkable. When I repeated the question in my No. 51., namely, what course France appeared likely to pursue towards Austria, he answered that he could not exactly tell, but that "*tant bien que mal les affaires s'arrangeront.*"

As he informed me that he expected very soon another courier from Count Metternich, I thought it as well not to question him closely respecting the two points to which this expression of *tant bien que mal* most probably refers, namely, the restoration of Braunau, and the reduction of the Austrian army. But I gave the conversation a more general turn, in order to reason with him on the policy of coming as soon as possible to a good understanding with Russia, which you have so forcibly urged in your despatch to Lord Pembroke of August 7th. On this ground I could advance but little; and when I mentioned to him, according to the tenor of your instruction to his Lordship, that he was at liberty to communicate through Count Meerfeldt to the Russian government the views entertained by his Majesty of the perma-

nent and unalterable policy of Europe, he answered by a direct refusal to take any step of that nature at the present moment; feeling, as he declared, thoroughly satisfied that its effect would be to widen the breach which exists unfortunately in the European system, to unite Russia still more closely with France, and more especially to expose Austria to the immediate vengeance of Bonaparte. All I could get him to agree to was the fact that the interest of the remaining states of Europe was still the same, and that no jealousy of Russian aggrandisement ought to stand in the way of a more close connection with her whenever there appeared a reasonable degree of stability in her councils.

From another quarter on which I place much reliance, I am informed that the matter immediately in agitation between Austria and France is the surrender of Braunau, and that the Duke of Wurtzburg is charged with the negociations for this purpose at Paris. The answer which was at first given by Bonaparte was, that he would surrender Braunau as soon as the Austrian army should be put on the footing of peace, and the different regiments were retired into cantonments. From Count Stadion's communication to me, I can scarcely hope that any more favourable answer has been since received.

I have also been informed that the number of Russian troops on their frontier nearest to Warsaw has of late been augmented, and this to such a degree as to occasion very strong remonstrances on the part of General Davoust.

By accounts of the 11th ultimo received from Constantinople nothing had been concluded between Sir Arthur Paget and the Turkish ministers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 14. 1807.

SIR,

NOTHING of moment has occurred at this place since I had last the honour of writing to you. There are no accounts from Constantinople which can be depended upon.

I am informed, but cannot entirely rely upon my authority for the truth of it, that the Russian prisoners in the interior of France are to be marched into Italy, and added to the garrisons of Corfu and Cattaro lately landed at Venice. The whole Russian force in Italy would then amount to about 30,000 men.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 17. 1807.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH I have no certain information, I think it right to acquaint you that a very strong report is current here that the definitive arrangements respecting Italy are at length settled as follows:—the Milanese to be incorporated with France—Venice to be the capital of a new maritime kingdom to be called the Kingdom of the Adriatic—and the dominions of the Queen of Etruria to be given to M. Baciochi.

I mentioned this report to Count Stadion, partly with a view of discovering whether he had himself any authentic information on the subject of the intended changes, but from his answer I am led to believe that he has none. He told me that his reason for doubting the truth of those which I had mentioned

was, that fresh proposals had been made to Lucien Bonaparte to establish him in Italy, and that it was scarcely probable that if he accepted them, the dominions allotted to him would be inferior in extent or value to those given to his other brothers. I think it clear from this answer that Count Stadion is uninformed of the projected arrangements, if any indeed be yet agreed upon.

The establishment however of a naval power in the Adriatic by the enemy is a design so probable in itself, and one in which so great a progress is already made by his possession of Dalmatia, of Corfu, and of the adjacent islands, that no assiduity on the part of those who are intrusted with his Majesty's interests in this part of the world ought to be spared to counteract it. My attention will be unremittingly directed to this object; and I have the satisfaction of acquainting you that by a letter just received from Commodore Campbell, dated Lessina, on the 2d instant, in which he acknowledges the receipt of my despatches to Sir Alexander Ball (mentioned in my separate of the 3d instant), it appears that our cruisers are indefatigable and very successful in preventing the entrance of reinforcements into Corfu.

Commodore Campbell, to whom I sent the above despatches under a flying seal, agrees perfectly in the necessity of our becoming masters of this island; but he says it will now require a blockade and a siege to take it. The others, he thinks, would easily fall into our hands. I am in great hopes therefore, that Sir Alexander Ball may be able to spare a small force before the French can throw in a sufficient body to take complete possession of them. The only thing to be feared is, that they will contrive to get the assistance of the Russian admiral for that purpose. Whether it be in his instructions or not, to favour the French so far, is more than I can find out; but at all events

I shall again enforce upon Prince Kurakin's attention (which I have the means of doing very efficaciously) the necessity of Russia observing the most exact neutrality in the Adriatic if she wishes to avoid a rupture with Great Britain.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 21. 1807. .

SIR,

THE post from Constantinople of the 3d instant has brought no accounts from Sir Arthur Paget; I have however the best reason for believing that the Turks are most anxious to make peace with his Majesty, and that they are only prevented by the menaces of General Sebastiani.

I have also reason to believe that some hostile demonstrations against the Turks on the part of France are apprehended by this Court. The demand of a passage for French troops through Croatia, if it has not already been notified, is certainly expected to be made, and I fear will be granted.

A courier was despatched yesterday to St. Petersburg, and I took the opportunity of writing to Lord Granville Leveson, *in clear*, informing him of the above circumstances.

M. Pozzo di Borgo is arrived at Vienna after the unsuccessful termination of his mission to the Porte.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 24. 1807.

SIR,

I AM still without any accounts from Sir Arthur Paget; but according to some private advices received here from Constantinople, of the 3d instant, it does not appear that any progress had been made in the negotiations for peace either with his Majesty or with the Emperor of Russia.

These advices state that the chief Dragoman of the Porte had been beheaded; together with the extraordinary fact that the negotiations for peace between Russia and the Porte had, through the influence of the French ambassador, been transferred to Paris.

The beheading of the Dragoman is explained as follows: — the Turks had obtained information of some secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, containing stipulations for the eventual partition of their empire in Europe. The knowledge of their danger having disposed them to conclude peace with his Majesty, Sir Arthur Paget had profited by this disposition to sign an agreement with them by which a mutual good understanding was *essentially* re-established, although it could not, with safety to the Turks, be openly avowed. The secret of this transaction was betrayed by the Dragoman (Suzzo), in consequence of which he had been beheaded.

* * * * *

The march of French troops into Dalmatia by the road of Trieste is becoming serious. Ten days ago about 800 passed, and they will be followed by other detachments. Being no longer supported by the Russian mission, any representations I might make to the Austrian government on this subject would be

fruitless, and perhaps even prejudicial. I am aware however, that in the event of peace with the Turks, or the capture of Corfu by his Majesty's forces, it may become necessary to ascertain distinctly what degree of succour his Majesty's enemies will be permitted to derive from the resources and position of the Austrian territory.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 28. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE no other information to transmit to you by this post except that a further corps of 1,200 French troops were to pass by Trieste into Dalmatia, on the 22d instant.

The occupation of Bosnia, and even Belgrade, by their armies seems at no great distance. How Austria can suffer this it is difficult to conceive, but how she can resist it is still more so.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, October 31. 1807.*

SIR,

HAVING been informed by Mr. Stanley that two Russian frigates had been suffered to enter the port

* Four days before the date of this, viz. on October 27th, Count Stadion had sent instructions to Prince Starhemberg, to offer us the mediation alluded to hereafter in my separate of Nov. 25. — R. A.

of Trieste, I asked immediately for an interview with Count Stadion, in order to learn from him whether orders had been issued for the re-admission of the British flag into the ports and harbours of Austria; and I thought it expedient likewise to take the opportunity to ascertain whether any fresh engagements had been entered into between the Austrian government and that of France since my conversations with him on the 30th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, of which I had the honour of transmitting you an account in my despatches, Nos. 51. and 53.

It is with the deepest concern that I now communicate to you that from what passed at this last interview, I can no longer doubt that arrangements are on the point of being concluded with France, involving not only sacrifices of territory on the part of Austria, but the sacrifice, virtually, of her independence.

Having first obtained an acknowledgment from Count Stadion, respecting the re-opening of the Austrian ports to Russia, and likewise that no orders had been issued for the admission of British vessels, I asked him (although in terms the most amicable) in what manner I should represent these facts to his Majesty's government.

Count Stadion's answer was, in substance, as follows: —

He assured me that Austria had by no means become the ally of France, although the preponderance of that Power, and the immediate dangers to which the country was exposed by it, rendered a compliance with almost any demands she might make absolutely necessary for the moment. He told me that the peace of Presburg was made with a view of saving Austria as an *independent* nation, but that the peace of Tilsit had rendered their situation so much worse, that they must now consider only how they could preserve their existence. To this system he

said they were reduced by the certainty, that if war were again to break out with France, they should receive no assistance from any quarter ; and he hinted that, on the contrary, there were Powers ready to avail themselves of any fresh embarrassments to which Austria might be put. He added, also, that their internal situation was another motive for submission.

Such being the circumstances, Count Stadion informed me that he would communicate to me in a few days the extent and nature of the *sacrifices* which had been exacted by France, and with which they should be under the necessity of complying ; but he told me that it was not then in his power to state them to me more distinctly.

Having ascertained that this short delay would afford no additional advantage to the enemy, in any designs he might entertain upon the property of his Majesty's subjects at Trieste and Fiume, I thought it most expedient to close the conversation, reserving any observations I might have to make upon what Count Stadion had told me to the period he had fixed for his more detailed communication.

I did not omit on this occasion to inquire concerning the march of so large a body of French towards Bosnia, as appeared, by the accounts I had received, to be passing through the Austrian territories. It is Count Stadion's opinion, that the occupation of that province by the French is a matter concerted with Russia, and he joined me in apprehending that Belgrade also would soon be in their possession.

It cannot, I think, after this be doubted that the sacrifices on the part of Austria, of what nature soever they may be, will be limited only by the will of Bonaparte ; nor should I be the least surprised, from the peculiar stress laid by Count Stadion upon the word "*Independence*," at receiving a notification

that the functions of a British minister at this Court had ceased.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 11. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE at length received some information which may be depended upon, although it has not been given me by Count Stadion, relative to the engagements which have recently been entered into between this Court and Bonaparte.

According to this information, a fresh * convention has been concluded, by which a free passage is granted to the French troops through Croatia, without any limitation as to number or time.

Gradesca, and a portion of territory in its neighbourhood, is to be ceded.

The exclusion of the British flag from the Austrian ports and harbours is to be continued.

In return for which sacrifices, Braunau is to be restored to Austria.

There is an affectation of not communicating this convention, or its contents, officially to me until the return of a courier from Paris with the ratification of it. Until then, indeed, Count Stadion would probably find it difficult to assure me that the above concessions comprised the whole of the demands of France.

I have the honour to be, &c.

* The convention of the Isonzo.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 11. 1807.

SIR,

IF the sentiments of the Russian Cabinet towards Great Britain may be guessed at with any degree of probability by the conduct of Prince Kurakin towards myself, I have some hopes that they are improving. Since my interview with that minister on September the 14th, on which occasion I was under the necessity of stating very freely my opinion (always guarding it with the qualification of its being my individual opinion) respecting the new system Russia seemed disposed to adopt, I have had no intercourse with him whatsoever. It were useless to trouble you with trifling details on matters merely ceremonial; I will, therefore, only inform you that finding my attentions not answered as they ought to have been on his side, I judged it right to observe at least an equal, and a still more marked distance on mine. The result has been, that yesterday he sent M. Pozzo di Borgo (who is rendering us the most essential service) to make all the advances I could desire towards establishing an amicable intercourse between us. I yield to them with the greater readiness, as there is reason to believe that he will soon be prime minister at St. Petersburg, and as it is certain that at this present moment the Emperor Alexander listens to him more than to any other person.

Through a channel on which I can confidently rely, I learn that what is called in the cant phrase of the day, "the liberty of the seas," is considered by Russia as the sole obstacle to peace with us. Bonaparte has persuaded the Emperor Alexander to devote himself to this object. Most powerful reasons have been urged to Prince Kurakin, to convince him

not only of the impossibility of ever extorting from Great Britain her assent to the system which goes under the name of "the liberty of the seas," but likewise of its total inutility to Russia in any view either of policy or of commerce. These reasons, although not of a nature to be justly appreciated by Prince Kurakin, are, I know, transmitted to St. Petersburg. Another great point is the convincing him that the peace of Tilsit, which he considers as the masterpiece of modern diplomacy, is not likely to be executed by France in any of its essential articles. He already confesses that he cannot comprehend what France is about, but that he hopes for the best.

As among the reasons mentioned by him to Mons. Pozzo for his wishing to be on good terms with me, he has alleged that many things might be explained through us which could not be explained through Prince Romanzow, I have, of course, an additional motive for accepting and returning his civilities.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 18. 1807.

SIR,

By accounts which have reached me both from Trieste and Fiume, and which mention the arrival in those ports of several vessels from Malta and Sicily, it appears that our troops from Alexandria, whose arrival at Messina I mentioned in my despatch of the 7th instant, sailed from thence on October 26th (without having landed), on a secret expedition. Lord Collingwood was off Syracuse on October 28th, with ten or twelve sail of the line, waiting for the transports, which are stated to be about fifty in

number. Reports are already circulated of his having taken Corfu.

Although this last intelligence is probably premature, I have thought it highly expedient to send off without delay to Lord Collingwood the person whom I have already had the honour of describing to you in my despatch, No. 49., and who since that period has been occupied in carrying on such correspondence in Zante and Cephalonia, as may facilitate the expulsion of the enemy from the whole of those islands, and their settlement under his Majesty's protection.

It is expedient that this person should reach Lord Collingwood immediately; but if he were to proceed openly to the fleet, his whole property would instantly become the forfeit, and the most successful issue of the enterprise would scarcely afford him an adequate indemnification. What we have concerted, therefore, is as follows:— that he should embark at Fiume and make the best of his way to Zante, and that after having seen and concerted his measures with the leading persons there and at Cephalonia on whom he can depend, he should re-embark and contrive to get taken by some of Lord Collingwood's cruisers. I shall furnish him with the necessary passports to Lord Collingwood, who will be able to compare his own information with what he may receive from this gentleman.

The reduction of the fortress of Corfu will, I am afraid, be the work of some time, although by the vigilance of our cruisers, several detachments of French troops have been intercepted in their way from Otranto. For whatever difficulty his Majesty's forces may experience in obtaining possession of this island, we shall have to thank the Russians, who sold to the French an immense quantity of military stores before they left it. In this, therefore, as in every similar case, and particularly when we look forward

to the future condition of the world under any possible arrangement with France, to secure the confidence and attachment of the inhabitants of the Seven Islands will become highly important. The assistance which this sort of possession would afford to his Majesty's arms in time of war, especially if a good understanding be cultivated with Ali Pacha, and the commercial advantages to be derived from it in peace, are of a nature too obvious to require demonstration ; but I learn from my informant that a great party spirit prevails there, that Russia and France have each their several factions, and, in short, that whatever footing we may obtain even by conquest, we can only preserve by the greatest degree of management and conciliation. It has been suggested to me that the connection with Great Britain would be best maintained by preserving the Republican government, and assimilating its administration as much as possible to that of Malta.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 25. 1807.

SIR,

I YESTERDAY received a despatch from Lord Granville Leveson Gower containing a copy of the note presented to his Lordship on the 8th instant by Count Romanzow, accompanied with information that he was about to quit St. Petersburg without delay.

I despatched a messenger to Lord Collingwood with this intelligence a few hours after it reached me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 25. 1807.

SIR,

IN consequence of the communication made to me by Lord Granville Leveson Gower, I thought it necessary to see Count Stadion in order to learn from him what were the intentions of this Court with regard to its future relations with Great Britain.

On this occasion his Excellency acquainted me for the first time* that a distinct demand had been made by France that Austria should make common cause with her, and put an end to all diplomatic relations between our two countries. He informed me that this demand was accompanied by a threat of immediate war if not complied with, and that in the present condition of the Austrian monarchy, and the almost hopeless state of Europe, the Emperor had found himself compelled in some degree to yield to it, if his mediation to restore peace which he had again offered, were rejected.

With expressions of the most lively sorrow (which I have no doubt are sincere), Count Stadion assured me that no concession which his Imperial Majesty had been called upon to make during the whole course of his reign, affected him more deeply than the measures which had been extorted from him upon this occasion.

He excused himself for not having communicated this transaction to me at an earlier period. On my urging him however, by all those considerations of amity and common interest which still subsisted between the two countries, to give me due notice of any determination which might be in view, in order that I might take the necessary measures for protecting

* See the preceding Despatch, Oct. 31.

the persons and property of his Majesty's subjects, he not only promised me the most unreserved confidence in this respect, but expressed his wish to concert with me the means of keeping up a sincere and friendly understanding should Austria after all be obliged to submit to the hard necessity of suspending her ostensible intercourse with his Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, November 28. 1807.

SIR,

THE accession of Russia to the system and views of France appearing to be likely to extend its effects to the remotest countries, I have thought it my duty to transmit to Lord Minto* an account of the principal transactions which have taken place in Europe since the Peace of Tilsit, and I have inclosed for his Lordship's information a copy of Count Romanzow's note of the 8th instant to Lord G. L. Gower, and of Lord G. L. Gower's answer.

It has appeared to me the more necessary that his Lordship should be apprised of these events (especially of the change of system in the Russian Cabinet), from my having had frequent occasion to notice within this last year the activity with which the enemy has been carrying on his intrigues with the Court of Persia.

I was also assured in the course of last week, and previously to my receiving Lord G. L. Gower's despatches, that the intention of attacking the British possessions in India through Persia had been seriously resumed.

* Governor-General of India. See Appendix.

A plan for such an attack was undoubtedly formed during the life of the late Emperor of Russia. I have seen it in the possession of Sir John Coxe Hippesley. Visionary as it may have appeared at that period, it must afford matter for serious consideration now, when the subjugation of the European Continent, and the alliance of France with Russia, have removed the first material obstacles to its success.

My despatch was inclosed to Sir Alexander Ball, whom I requested to forward it by the most expeditious conveyance to the Governor-General at Calcutta.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 5. 1807.

SIR,

COUNT Stadion has at length imparted to me the despatch which he wrote to Prince Starhemberg on October 27th, in which the Emperor of Austria renews to his Majesty the offer of his mediation to restore peace.

After reading it over by Count Stadion's permission, I could no longer wonder at his reluctance to communicate to me the full extent of the submissions which this government thinks itself under the necessity of making to the enemy; submissions of which, although it was impossible for me to know the precise details, I have not been disappointed on learning the result, as my despatch of October 31st will evince.

The communication being confidential but not official, I contented myself with stating my opinion with regard to the success to be expected from such

an offer while Great Britain continued to enjoy a remnant of her ancient spirit or independence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 12. 1807.

SIR,

As no courier has yet arrived from Paris, the departure of Count Stadion for Buda, where the Emperor is gone to close the Diet, will prevent my receiving any official communication from him until his return on the 17th.

By accounts of November 18th from Corfu, no attack had then been made on that island, nor was Lord Collingwood in those seas; and I am also sorry to learn that the messenger I despatched from hence on November 24th to his Lordship with an account of the Russian declaration, did not embark at Trieste until the 4th instant, owing to contrary winds.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, December 30. 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE just received information on which I can depend respecting a transaction in Italy, which, if it produce no immediate good effect on the conduct of the Emperor Alexander, will at least afford him ample proof of Bonaparte's dispositions, and of the degree of estimation in which he holds his new allies. On his road from Venice to Milan he fell in with a corps of Russians encamped somewhere near Verona.

These troops were proceeding towards the Austrian frontier in their way to their own territories. At the sight of them Bonaparte flew into a violent passion, inquired why they staid in Italy, and gave orders that they should be told instantly to continue their march. The Russian commanding officer explained that he was following the route assigned him, and for which provision had been made by the Commissaries appointed to regulate their march. Bonaparte became still more violent upon this answer, insisted on their instant departure, and exclaimed "*Qu'on me débarrasse de ces barbares-là.*" These commands having been signified to the Russian commander, he replied that he was acting under the orders of his Emperor, that he was responsible to no other Power, that he would not stir from his ground before the hour appointed, and that if attacked he should defend himself to the last extremity.

This intelligence has, I know, been received by Prince Kurakin.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 6. 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that the marriage between his Imperial Majesty and the Archduchess, Mary Louisa Beatrix of Austria, was celebrated this day at half past six in the evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 9. 1808.

SIR,

AT the Court which was held by their Imperial Majesties immediately after the celebration of their nuptials, some circumstances occurred with which, together with what followed them, I think it my duty to acquaint you.

A material deviation from the ancient form took place in the admission of the ambassadors to the presence of their Imperial Majesties. Hitherto the nuncio had enjoyed the unquestioned precedence over all other foreign ministers, and the ambassadors have been called in, each in the order of his arrival. On the present occasion, the nuncio and the two ambassadors of Russia and France entered the presence-chamber together. The Emperor, by what I have since learnt, addressed his conversation solely to the ambassador of France.

At the supper of their Majesties, it is not usual for ambassadors to appear; but the ministers of the second order are placed on his Imperial Majesty's right-hand, who from time to time signifies by his grand master his desire to speak with one of them.

It is undoubtedly true that no order or etiquette is fixed, with regard to the priority of their admission to this honour; but I am informed that it has hitherto been the usage, in consideration no less of the respect and veneration due to the person of his Majesty, than to the rank held by the British nation among the Powers of Europe, to call first to the British envoy; and that if any deviation from this form has at any time taken place, it has only been in favour either of the Saxon envoy, as the oldest member of the *corps diplomatique*, or the Neapolitan envoy, in consideration of the family connection of the two Courts.

I was, therefore, surprised and hurt to observe that, after the Saxon and Neapolitan envoys had respectively been honoured with the notice of the Emperor, the grand master called successively to his presence the envoys of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Prussia.

For a moment I was in doubt whether it was fit for me to remain longer at the ceremony; but, considering that a step so marked as that of retiring suddenly from the circle, would have put me under the necessity of exacting a reparation, which, in the present melancholy state of the affairs of Austria, it is impossible for her to make, I preferred a different course, and waited patiently until my name was pronounced, which was after the Prussian envoy had retired.

The next day, which was the day fixed for the presentation of strangers, I waited upon Count Stadion, and told him that, after what had passed on the preceding evening, it would be impossible for me to attend the circle unless I received some marked reparation for a neglect which I could not help thinking intentional; and that, with this view, I required that, immediately after the ambassadors, I should be the first envoy spoken to by their Majesties, and admitted to present the English gentlemen who attended me.

After some discussion between Count Stadion and myself, in the course of which he repeatedly assured me that there was nothing intentional in the circumstance of which I complained, and that, if I pleased, he would say so in writing, he agreed to grant me the reparation I asked, and that in a manner sufficiently distinct to attract the general attention. I then further made a point of his arranging this matter himself with the Emperor; and on receiving his promise so to do, took my leave.

I have the satisfaction of informing you that the

promise was faithfully kept, and that immediately after the Russian ambassador, and before that of France*, I was spoken to by both their Imperial Majesties, and admitted to present the English gentlemen to the Empress.

These circumstances, which in any other times would scarcely have called for a detailed communication, may perhaps deserve the attention of his Majesty's government in the present very critical situation of our relations with the Continent, and with Austria in particular.

I must not omit reporting to you that her Imperial Majesty expressed, on this occasion, the warmest and the most particular wishes for the long continuance of their Majesties' health and happiness; and that, in the course of the evening, the Archduchess of Milan, with whom I had the honour of conversing, took every opportunity of testifying to me how deeply she felt, and how gratefully she remembered, the notice with which she was distinguished by their Majesties during her residence in England.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 20. 1808.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH in the present situation of suspense respecting the Austrian offer of mediation, it is not in my power to transmit to you any interesting information immediately relative to this country, I receive from time to time various articles of intelli-

* This was an attention on the part of General Andreossy, personal to myself. — R. A.

gence, which it may not be wholly unimportant to communicate to you.

Of this nature is what has just reached me from a quarter on which I can depend, relative to Bonaparte's interview with his brother Lucien. It appears certain that what is called the kingdom of Etruria, together with the most considerable portion of the ecclesiastical States, including the city of Rome, was destined for Lucien. The following is the substance and sum of his answer to Bonaparte's proposals:—

1. That he would accept no kingdom.
2. That he would not attempt anything against his brother, but that he thought it necessary at the same time to declare to him that he totally disapproved all he had done for these last four years.
3. That he would never consent to annul his marriage.

The ill success of this negociation may partly account for the ill-humour Bonaparte manifested during his whole stay in Italy, and for his sudden return to Paris.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 23. 1808.

SIR,

CONCEIVING that, in the present state of the intercourse between Great Britain and the Continent, any information, however general, relative to the sentiments and dispositions of Russia may be useful to his Majesty's government, I think it right to acquaint you that great dissatisfaction continues to prevail at Petersburg in consequence of the non-execution of the treaty of Tilsit by France.

My sources of information on this subject are at Vienna; and making due allowance for zeal, they are such as may be depended upon as far as they go.

It is known here to the Russian embassy that France, and France only, prevents the conclusion of the Turkish peace, and the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Much of Bonaparte's conduct in Italy has been offensive to Russia; and a considerable impression has been produced by a declaration which he thought proper to make there: — "That no treaty *now* subsisted between himself and the Emperor Alexander."

From Paris we understand that Bonaparte's pretended anxiety for peace with his Majesty is caused, not only by the difficulties he finds in reconciling the Emperor Alexander to the non-execution of the treaty of Tilsit, but by the necessity of obviating his Imperial Majesty's disappointment on finding that the rash declaration of November 8th has produced no other effect than that of involving the Russian empire in a war which no man believes she can sustain for twelve months.

It is hoped from these general symptoms that the time is not distant at which an attempt may be made to dissolve the relations which subsist between these two Powers, and that, at any rate, the gigantic plan of uniting the whole Continent in active operations against Great Britain may be counteracted and finally defeated.

In my next despatch I may perhaps be enabled to speak more fully on this point, and to submit to your approbation a measure* founded on the concluding

* The clause in my instructions when going on my mission to Constantinople, and which Mr. Canning at my suggestion adopted, authorising me to be the mediator of a peace (if the opportunity should offer) between Turkey and Russia, was grounded on this state of things. — R. A.

part of his Majesty's declaration of the 19th of December, which may eventually lead to the re-establishment of our amicable relations with Russia.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 27. 1808.

SIR,

THE courier from Prince Starhemberg arrived yesterday from London with despatches of the 10th instant, and in the evening I saw Count Stadion, who communicated to me the state of affairs as they then stood between his Majesty's government and that of Austria.

He informed me at the same time that he feared that in a very few days he should be under the necessity of presenting a note to me declaring the motives which had led his Imperial Majesty to put an end to the relations subsisting between the two countries.

Although fully prepared for this issue to the offer of mediation of October 28th, I must confess that it will be extremely painful to me to receive an intimation of this nature, without any instructions as to my conduct in a situation so full of difficulty and responsibility.

Notwithstanding what has passed, I am persuaded that it must be the wish of his Majesty's government to consider Austria as a Power to whom every facility should be afforded of resuming at a favourable moment her amicable relations with Great Britain. You must be aware, however, how little can be effected towards this object by my mere personal and unas-

sisted efforts, and that no plan of future correspondence or confidential intercourse, still less any provident arrangement with a view of counteracting the enemy in his designs on Turkey, or of preventing the consolidation of a continental league against Great Britain, can take place, unless under the sanction of his Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. I have just heard that the French ambassador received four days ago a fresh order to insist upon the expulsion of the English mission, and I know that he has complained of some pretended intrigues by which his demand has been resisted. Coupling the date of Bonaparte's message to England of the 3d instant with the probable date of Andreossy's first orders, you will observe that if his Majesty's government had listened to his offers, and if Austria had obeyed his commands (both of which were sent off at about the same period), he would have been by this time in a state of amicable discussion, and Austria in a state of positive hostility, with Great Britain.

The same to the same.

Vienna, January 30. 1808.

SIR,

NOTWITHSTANDING the present discouraging aspect of affairs, I shall not quit Vienna without an endeavour towards the future re-establishment of our intercourse with this Court, and even for the renewal of those more general relations with other Powers which the present crisis has suspended.*

* Letter to Count Stadion, February 22., on leaving Vienna.

After discussing this subject under all its views with the persons by whose assistance alone any plan of this nature can be effected, it appears that the first measure in any degree practicable must be to induce the Emperor Alexander to conclude the long depending Turkish peace without the intervention of France. The terms of such a peace would be immaterial compared with the importance of taking the negociation for it out of the hands of Bonaparte.

It is hoped that this peace may be brought about by prevailing on the Emperor to depart from his pretensions to Wallachia and Moldavia, and to be content with some augmentation to the security of his frontier on that side.

The expectation of success in this endeavour is derived principally from what has passed at Paris between Count Tolstoy and the French government, and from the increasing dissatisfaction which that minister expresses against Bonaparte, in his correspondence with his Court.

It is also hoped that a peace concluded separately with the Turks may lead to a change of system at Petersburg with regard to any further partitions ; and that the Russian Cabinet, maturely weighing the danger of permitting Bonaparte to establish himself at Constantinople, may be convinced of the necessity (at least for the present) of supporting and upholding the Ottoman empire.

On this measure *it is hoped* that the grounds may be laid for renewing amicable explanations between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna ; the motives to which are so obvious since the recent arrangements in Poland.

It is not difficult to see that the re-establishment of anything that bears the resemblance of a good understanding between this country and Russia, must include the return to a certain degree of amicable dis-

positions on the part of Russia toward us, and that it must at all events materially influence the conduct which Austria may adopt after the departure of the British Legation from Vienna. There can be no doubt that Bonaparte's views lead to the formation and consolidation of a grand continental confederacy, consisting of all the states under his influence, forced into one common bond of union, to subsist, even after a peace, against Great Britain; and that to this confederacy, Austria will be summoned to furnish her contingent both in men and money. I need not observe how useful the friendship of Russia may prove in enabling her to avoid this last of disgraces.

A material share in the protection of the Ottoman empire may be borne by Great Britain independently of any communication or private understanding with either Russia or Austria. It is with this view that I again take the liberty of calling your attention to the occupation of Corfu and its dependent islands, as a point of considerable advantage, whether to prevent the conquest of the Morea by France, or to embarrass, in concert with Ali Pacha, the assemblage or subsistence of any large French army in the neighbourhood of Albania; or to disquiet the enemy on the shores of Italy; or to assert and preserve our naval superiority in the Adriatic, or finally, for such eventual disposal of them at a peace as the system of policy growing out of the new state of the world may then require.

The attainment of these objects, although not sufficient of itself to recover for any of the Powers of Europe that entire freedom of action of which the peace of Tilsit has deprived them all, is yet considerable enough to deserve the attention, and to animate the exertions of every man who remains faithful to the ancient cause. It is for this reason that the gentle-

man * to whom I have often had occasion to allude in my correspondence, and who will be principally concerned in giving effect to the measures in contemplation, will leave Vienna for Petersburg as soon as I receive from Count Stadion the notification of the termination of my mission. I confess that I am anxious for his stay here until the arrival of the next and final courier from Prince Starhemberg, as I will not yet abandon the hope of receiving some instructions from you which may serve as a guide for his conduct as well as my own in this eventful moment. It was my intention to have stated to you more in detail his intended operations, but he is desirous for many reasons that they should be reserved for verbal communication.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 6. 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I this day received an official note from Count Stadion, acquainting me that Prince Starhemberg had quitted London on January 20th, after having failed in his endeavours to induce his Majesty's Government to enter into negotiations for peace with France; that all diplomatic intercourse, therefore, between Great Britain and Austria must be considered as broken off, and that he had the Emperor's commands to send me passports for my departure.

In consequence of this communication I shall remain no longer at Vienna than will be necessary for me to learn how I can quit the Austrian territories, and

* M. Pozzo di Borgo.

bring away in safety the cyphers and official correspondence entrusted to my care.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 7. 1808.

SIR,

It is very generally believed here, and it has been stated to me on such authority, and even accompanied by such particulars that the fact would appear scarcely doubtful, that a triple alliance between France, Russia, and Austria, is already signed for the partition of the Turkish dominions in Europe.

According to this account, Austria is to furnish an auxiliary army of 60,000 men under the immediate command of General Bellegarde, and is to have Bosnia and part of Servia for her share.

Some hostile incursions have already taken place on the frontier of the latter province, but on inquiry I find them to have been accidental, and that the Turks were the aggressors.

What makes me doubt the fact of the actual signature of the alliance is the great anxiety Bonaparte has all along shown that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, his reiterated and lately renewed personal assurances to the Turks that not a foot of their territory should be wrested from them, and above all his not being ready himself for any attack on Albania or the Morea. Prince Kurakin also knows nothing of the matter; and on his asking Count Stadion the other day what he was to understand from the rumours in circulation, he received for answer that they were totally devoid of truth.

Putting all these considerations together, and adding

to them the extremely bad terms on which Count Tolstoy has lived with the French government ever since his arrival at Paris, and his repeated complaints to his Court of the impossibility of getting Bonaparte to execute the treaty of Tilsit, it has occurred to the persons with whom I occasionally communicate on these and other matters, that Bonaparte may be pressing Austria forward at this moment with a view to make her the instrument of inducing Russia either to evacuate the territories in her possession, or to consent that Austria shall have Bosnia and Servia; an alternative the first part of which he expects that Russia will readily accept rather than lose her influence in Servia, or see the House of Austria in possession of Belgrade; while for his own part, and if he should fail of inducing Russia by these means to withdraw her troops, he has it always in his power to force Austria to grant him an equivalent on the side of Bohemia or Galicia for any augmentation of territory he may permit her to acquire on the Turkish frontier.

His promises to the Turkish ministers, however solemn and explicit, cannot it is true weigh for much; yet it is singular that he should so repeatedly have made them, and within these two months have renewed them (especially to so weak a Power as Turkey), if there did not still exist some difficulties in the way of the final accomplishment of his projects which are increased by the continuance of a Russian army in a position that may be said to command Constantinople.

With regard to the general consequences likely to result to Europe, and to Great Britain in particular, from the partition of the Turkish dominions, and especially from the possession of Constantinople by France, it were needless to offer you an opinion; but there is one consequence attached to the attempt,

as well as to the success of the enterprise, to which I will shortly take the liberty of adverting.

There is no doubt that the Turks will defend themselves to the last man, and that whatever number of troops may be employed in reducing them, they may delay for a long time the conquest of their country. If succoured by a British force (and when the danger is evident and imminent they can scarcely be mad enough to refuse it), they may maintain themselves some months at Constantinople, and at the last sell it dearly to the confederates. Driven to the other side of the Bosphorus, they may become our most useful allies if any thing serious against our Oriental establishments be to be apprehended from the side of Persia. This speculation I am induced to hazard as an additional motive for the occupation of Corfu, and for keeping up a considerable military force in Sicily, Malta, and other parts of the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 7. 1808.

SIR,

AFTER receiving from Count Stadion the note of which I yesterday gave you an account, I called upon him for the purpose of obtaining explanations with regard to several matters to which, although I am not honoured with your instructions, the duty I owe to his Majesty will not allow me to be insensible.

There is a matter most materially interesting to his Majesty's paternal feelings, concerning which I received instructions from Lord Howick in the month of December, 1806. I greatly fear that it will not be in my power before my departure to arrange any sure

plan by which his Majesty may receive information on so interesting a topic; all that it is at present in my power to say, is, that * * * * * will remain at Lintz, and that every attention which the circumstances can admit will be paid to his correspondence.

With regard to the persons and property of his Majesty's subjects, as the Austrian government does not consider what has passed to be a declaration of war, it is promised to me that they shall not be molested. I have thought it my duty, however, notwithstanding this assurance, to explain to the English at this place how little they could rely upon any security for themselves after Austria had put an end to all intercourse with Great Britain. Six weeks ago I gave notice to the merchants at Trieste of this impending event.

The arrangements which I am making provisionally, and until the signification of his Majesty's pleasure can reach Vienna, with regard to the gallant remains of the Condéan army, will receive from this government every facility which it may be in their power to afford.

In these arrangements I am assisted in such a way as to exceed all praise, by the humane and disinterested zeal of the Bishop of Nancy. If accidents should prevent my explaining personally to his Majesty's government how greatly I am indebted to him for the furtherance of an object which they must have warmly at heart, I beg leave to recommend him to your protection, more especially as the precarious and scanty means of subsistence which he has hitherto enjoyed are speedily about to be diminished, if not wholly suppressed.

The great interests of the two countries, separated although they may be for the present, will as far as possible be left in such a state as to facilitate any overtures to an accommodation, and to prepare the

way for any return on the part of Austria to a just and energetic system of policy. On this subject it is impossible for me to enter into much detail. It will suffice for your present information, that the recent marriage of his Imperial Majesty is an event propitious to views of this nature.

All that remains for me now to acquaint you with, is that the Austrian government, desirous no doubt of testifying to the last their respect for his Majesty, has shown every attention to the British Legation which the circumstances admit of. Those circumstances, however, are so new and embarrassing, and I feel so anxious that my public conduct should stand clear in the judgment of my sovereign, that I must trouble you with a statement rather more particular than would be justifiable if my private feelings were alone concerned.

On being informed by Count Stadion that no despatches for me had been given to any of the couriers who had passed from London to Vienna during the late intercourse on the subject of the mediation, and likewise that he knew of no means which his Majesty's government might have provided, for bringing away in safety from a country surrounded by the enemy the cyphers and correspondence entrusted to my care, I asked him how he proposed that I should leave the Austrian dominions, since it was neither consistent with his Majesty's dignity that I should remain here after the note which he had delivered to me, nor possible for me to quit the country in safety while the enemy were masters of the Adriatic.

He answered that the Austrian government would grant me every accommodation in its power, and with this view he offered me an Austrian frigate to convey me to Messina or Malta: but he suggested at the same time the necessity of my having a passport from the French ambassador. In the course of the same

day I received a message from the Archduke Charles, placing the frigate entirely at my disposal, or offering to equip any other vessel (if their frigate should not be in readiness), and to give me a guard for my better security, but accompanied with the same suggestion as to the passport.

Having judged it highly improper to accept this part of his Imperial Highness's offer, and considering how little it was to be hoped that the cruisers from Venice would respect even a flag of truce, if they knew the English Legation to be on board, I trust that you will see the necessity I was under of sending off a letter to Sir Alexander Ball, explaining my situation to him, and requesting the assistance of an English frigate, if one could be spared consistently with the due execution of his Majesty's service.

I think it my duty to state these matters to you, in order that if, after all, I should be under the necessity of destroying the cyphers and correspondence, his Majesty's government may be convinced I had no other choice left me except that of submitting to sail with them under the protection of a French passport.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The same to the same.

Vienna, February 21. 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inclose you copies of Count Stadion's note to me of the 6th instant and of my answer, as likewise of the note from Count Stadion, which accompanied my passports.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A.

Count Stadion to Mr. Adair.

LE Soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangères, a communiqué à M. Adair dans son tems les démarches dont M. le Prince de Starhemberg a été chargé par S. M. I. R. A. auprès du Cabinet Britannique, afin de l'engager à donner la main à des négociations de paix sur des principes conformes au vœu des Puissances y intéressées; et il ne lui a pas caché dès lors les conséquences qui résulteroient du refus de la Cour de Londres de donner suite à ces propositions amicales. Un courrier arrivé de Paris venant d'apprendre à S. M. que les instances de M. le Prince de Starhemberg non seulement sont restées sans effet, mais que ce ministre a déjà quitté Londres le 20. Janvier, le Soussigné se voit, quoique avec un véritable regret, dans le cas d'annoncer à M. Adair, que toutes communications diplomatiques doivent être regardées comme rompues entre l'Autriche et l'Angleterre, et que son auguste Maître lui a donné l'ordre de délivrer à M. Adair, ainsi qu'aux personnes composant sa mission, les passeports nécessaires pour leur départ.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de renouveler, &c. &c.

(Signé) STADION.

Vienne, le 6. Février, 1808.

Inclosure B.

Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.

LE Soussigné a reçu la note que S. E. le Comte de Stadion, ministre des affaires étrangères, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 6. de ce mois, et il n'a pu apprendre qu'avec la peine la plus sensible la

résolution de la Cour de Vienne d'interrompre toute communication diplomatique avec celle de Londres.

N'ayant reçu de la part de son gouvernement aucun éclaircissement ou instruction quelconque sur les motifs qui auraient déterminé le Cabinet Britannique à ne pas se prêter aux ouvertures faites par M. le Prince de Starhemberg, le Soussigné se borne à exprimer à S. E. le Comte de Stadion tous ses regrets du parti que la Cour de Vienne s'est décidée de prendre en mettant fin aux communications diplomatiques entre deux Puissances appelées par leurs intérêts mutuels à conserver entre elles l'harmonie la plus inaltérable; — parti dont la suite ne peut être que de perpétuer ce système de désunion qui a déjà causé tant de malheurs à l'Europe, et qui paroît destiné à les augmenter encore d'une manière et pour un terme incalculable.

Dans ces circonstances si affligeantes, le Soussigné attendra les passeports que son Excellence a bien voulu promettre de lui expédier pour la légation Anglaise.

Il saisit cette occasion, &c. &c. &c.

(Signé) ROBERT ADAIR.

Vienne, ce 10. Février, 1808.

Inclosure C.

Count Stadion to Mr. Adair.

LA note que M. Adair a fait l'honneur d'adresser au Soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangères, en date du 10. de ce mois, ne lui étant parvenue qu'hier, il croit ne devoir pas tarder de lui transmettre ci-joint le passeport que M. Adair attend pour se rendre avec la légation Anglaise de Vienne à Trieste. Le Soussigné s'empresse de le prévenir en même tems, que pour le cas où le bâtiment Anglois sur lequel

M. Adair compte s'embarquer, tarderoit d'arriver à Trieste, il y trouvera un bâtiment Autrichien convenablement disposé pour le recevoir à son bord avec les personnes attachées à la mission, de même que leur suite, et que les précautions nécessaires seront prises d'avance pour faire respecter de toute façon le dit parlementaire dans son trajet, le Soussigné priant M. Adair de vouloir bien agréer l'assurance de sa considération très distinguée.

(Signé) STADION.

Vienne, le 20. Février, 1808.

A P P E N D I X.

APPENDIX.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Fox.

(Extract.)

Dresden, June 2d, 1806.

BY Sir Arthur Paget's messenger, Smidt, you will have received the account that in consequence of the definitive refusal of Russia to evacuate Cattaro the ports of Trieste and Fiume are shut against British as well as Russian vessels.

Connivance with the conduct of Austria to the utmost limits I know to be necessary in her present situation: but I request your most particular instructions as to the extent to which it can be shown in the possible event of the capture or detention of British vessels, or of the adoption of any measure affecting British property.

&c. &c.

R. ADAIR.

Mr. Adair to Sir Sidney Smith.

Vienna, June 28th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

IT gives me great satisfaction to think that the situation to which his Majesty has been pleased to appoint me at Vienna may afford me the opportunity of corresponding with you occasionally, and of co-operating with you hereafter in some measures for the public good.

Your receipt of this letter will ascertain whether I have chosen a safe and expeditious method of communication,

and your answer to it may possibly suggest some method by which you can hear regularly from me in future. I must apprise you that I have no precise instructions upon the subject; but from my near knowledge of Mr. Fox, I can at the same time answer for it, that he will approve all my voluntary exertions for the success of his Majesty's arms and councils.

As the Neapolitan courier who is the bearer of this, together with the Commandeur de Ruffo's despatches for his Sicilian Majesty, is going off immediately, I have not time to inform you in any detail of the situation in which I have found our affairs at this Court. I must content myself with communicating to you that having been instructed by Mr. Fox to act with the Russian ambassador in the strictest union and confidence, I am in the habit of receiving from him in return the fullest and most candid communications of all the Emperor Alexander's views for the common benefit.

One of these views, I think it important for you to know, although in my opinion it will fail of success. It is that of endeavouring once more to open negotiations with France for the restoration of a general peace. M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from St. Petersburg on the affair of Cattaro, has had passports for Paris from M. de Rochefoucault, and is now on his journey thither. In addition to which Lord Yarmouth has returned to Paris, where he arrived on the 17th, to co-operate with him, and see what can be done.

With regard to terms, I have reason to believe that we shall make the restoration of Hanover and the evacuation of Dalmatia indispensable conditions of peace.

It is with pleasure I inform you that by despatches of the 14th of this month, I learn that the Emperor Alexander adheres to all the principles of negotiation laid down in the recent correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand; the chief of which is, that of listening to nothing without mutual communication, and concluding nothing without mutual consent. I shall of course be immediately apprised of M. d'Oubril's success or failure, and if we can devise any method of safe correspondence, will immediately let you know.

I beg of you to command me in anything you may think of advantage for the King's service. Knowing how much

you must occasionally take upon yourself in the command with which you are entrusted, without waiting to consult the government at home, it has appeared a point of duty with me to send you all such information as should reach me, which it is material for you to know. If the negociation should break off, the season for acting will come, and then you will instruct me confidentially with regard to those points which you would wish to press upon Russia, and also with regard to those where you think you can do better alone. Our policy is to keep this unhappy country from being exposed to a renewal of its sufferings. With the King of Prussia we are in a state of war; but the ports in the Baltic are not blockaded. The King of Sweden has rejected the Emperor Alexander's mediation between him and the King of Prussia, to whom he has proposed a personal interview.

Believe me, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. Adair to Sir Sidney Smith.

Vienna, July 29th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WROTE to you on the 28th of last month. A Sicilian courier carried my letter with the Commandeur Ruffo's despatches to General Acton.

I mentioned to you in that letter the intended negotiations between Russia and France for the restoration of a general peace, and likewise Lord Yarmouth's being at Paris to co-operate in that object, if a reasonable basis could be agreed upon. I likewise mentioned to you the terms on which I thought it likely we should insist as constituting such basis; and I added that the Emperor Alexander had given us the most positive assurances of his adherence to the great principle of negociation laid down in Mr. Fox's correspondence with M. Talleyrand; namely, that of concluding no peace except by mutual consent.

It is with great regret I now inform you that by a letter

I have received from Lord Yarmouth of the 21st inst. it appears that a separate peace between Russia and France was signed at Paris on the 20th.

The conditions are:—1. The immediate evacuation of Germany. 2. The reciprocal guaranty of the independence of the Ottoman Empire. 3. Swedish Pomerania not to be attacked. 4. A secret article, by which Russia engages to obtain the consent of the King of Naples to receive Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica in exchange for Sicily.

Thus you see we are once more left alone to carry on the contest, which I trust we shall do to extremity rather than subscribe to suffering France to gain possession of Sicily under any circumstances, still less under those of aiding in the forcible dispossession of its lawful sovereign of the remainder of his dominions.

This conduct of Russia I can only attribute to the change which has lately taken place in the administration at Petersburg; Prince Czartorisky having resigned his office in consequence, I understand, of his having advised a more vigorous line of conduct than the Emperor Alexander was disposed to follow.

I have entrusted this letter to Mr. Matthews, who is passing through Vienna on his way to Sicily. Mr Matthews is private secretary to General Armfelt, and in the service of his Swedish Majesty. He brought me a confidential letter from Mr. Pierrepont, dated Stralsund, July 16th.

Mr. Fox has been ill, but on the 18th was very much recovered.

Since I began my letter, I have heard that Lord Yarmouth had delivered his full powers at Paris, and had opened the negociations; at the same time I have received a cypher from England of which I inclose you the copy.

I conclude from this that France has given way upon the point of Sicily.

Yours ever, &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

Lord Yarmouth to Mr. Adair.

Paris, July 2d, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

I THINK it right to give you the earliest intelligence of the great changes which the Cabinet of St. Cloud has determined to make in Germany; by which you will see that the constitution of the empire is entirely destroyed.

I do not give you these details as official, but as being such as I consider to be very accurate.

Article 1. The dissolution of the Germanic Empire.

Art. 2. The small immediate states situated in the circles of Bavaria, Rhine, and Westphalia, with the exception of the possessions of the Houses of Salm, Hohenzollern, Nassau Weilbourg, Nassau Usingen, Prince d'Isenbourg, Duc d'Arenberg, Comte de Leyen (who have found means to be peculiarly favoured), are to become dependent upon the greater sovereign states, which are to form a new federation under the protection of France.

Art. 3. The arch-chancellor is to be the head of the union; he is to present a plan for its organisation, and conclude an alliance defensive and offensive with France.

Art. 4. The arch-chancellor will receive an augmentation of territory, and reside at Frankfort.

And this determination of France is to be notified to the diet on the 15th of this month.

I wrote to Mr. Fox yesterday, but was then ignorant of what I now communicate to you; indeed it has not been many hours determined upon.

Gen. St. Vincent is so good as to send this letter by a courier he means to despatch to-morrow.

I have the honour to be,

Dear Sir,

With great truth and regard,

Your very obedient Servant,

YARMOUTH.

*Mr. Adair to Mr. Fox.**(By Sir Arthur Paget.)**(Extracts.)*

Vienna, July 18th, 1806.

“ I LEAVE all farther explanations respecting the state of the Court, and particularly the footing they are on with Russia, to Sir Arthur, who is perfectly master of this, as well as of every other subject connected with his mission, and who, let people say what they will, is very much liked by the Emperor.

Now to other matters:— In my despatch of July 3d, I mentioned to you that the Russian scheme about Dalmatia was likely to be viewed with great jealousy by this Court. If ever you get so far as this point in the negociation with France, which I greatly doubt, do you not think that it would be judicious to propose, in the first instance, the retrocession of Dalmatia to the House of Austria? As a barrier to the Turkish Empire, it would be best perhaps in the hands of Russia; but it strikes me that the proposal to give it back to Austria would have the best effect, even if it failed, of reconciling Austria to the Russian plan; which after all they could not dislike so much as its being in the power of France.

Before I close this letter, which will not be for twenty-four hours, some account will probably be received from Ratisbon; and I will add in my postscript whatever it may be worth while to say. At present, although I am afraid that much cannot be done, I see enough of the effect which the formal abrogation of the old Empire will produce here, to augur some distant hope of bringing about an understanding between Austria and Prussia. This last Power has certainly not been consulted in the arrangements, and must feel almost an equal interest with Austria in resisting many of their consequences. A *real* good understanding between Austria and Prussia might pave the way, through Austria's mediation, to a reconciliation between England and Prussia, and if matters should be favourable, the joint guaranty of those Powers for Hanover; for I conclude we shall not think of accepting the guaranty

of France for Hanover. These things, and much more, are upon the cards, if you have time and better health.

You know by this time that Czartorisky is out. I understand that the reason is his having advised firmer counsels than the Emperor is willing to follow.

&c. &c. &c.

R. A.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot.

Vienna, July 29th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your letter of the 27th ult. by Mr. Morier, who passed through Vienna on his way to England, on the 21st inst. He arrived here on the 19th.

I had already written to you by the post of the 18th, inclosing a letter from Mr Fox's office.

You know, I suppose, that on the 22d of June, M. d'Oubril went from hence to Paris in order to open negociations for a general peace; and that Lord Yarmouth, who in his way from Verdun to England had passed through Paris about the beginning of the same month, and had there received overtures from M. Talleyrand tending to a renewal of the negociations with us, which were broken off in April, returned to that place on the 17th of June with orders to listen to what might be proposed to him, and to act in all things in concert with M. d'Oubril. Lord Yarmouth was not to appear in any diplomatic character unless a reasonable basis of peace could first be agreed upon.

It is with great regret that I now inform you that by advices I have this day received from Lord Yarmouth, a separate peace between Russia and France was signed on the 20th inst.

The conditions are—1st, the immediate evacuation of Germany.

2. A joint guaranty of the independence of the Ottoman Empire.

3. Swedish Pomerania not to be attacked.

4. A secret article, by which Russia engages to obtain the

consent of the King of Naples to abandon Sicily, and receive in exchange the Balearic Islands.

Great Britain, therefore, is once more left alone to carry on the contest; and as there seems every reason to hope that Sicily is in a good posture of defence, and the King of Naples determined to hold out, we have to fear no further extension, for the present, of the power of France in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Fox has lately been extremely ill, but I am happy to say that all serious alarms are now over; by accounts from England, so low as the 18th inst., he was very much recovered.

I thank you very much for sending me the Constantinople despatches. They are indeed highly interesting. You give, as you always have given, the best advice.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Most truly yours,

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. I have heard, but not from Lord Yarmouth directly, that he was to produce full powers to open a negociation on the 21st inst., and since my writing the former part of this letter, I have received the inclosed communication from England.

I conclude from it that France has given way about Sicily.

R. A.

Mr. Adair to Lord Granville Leveson Gower.

Vienna, Aug. 16th, 1806.

MY DEAR LORD,

I THINK it material to the public service to acquaint you confidentially with the result of some conversations I have had with Count Stadion, in consequence of instructions I received from London, dated July 28th.

Those instructions, as far as they relate to Russia, are stated to me to be a summary of what have been sent to you, in consequence of M. d'Oubril's separate treaty, and as far as they relate to the Court of Vienna, to promise assistance in

case the increasing demands of Bonaparte should force her once again to take up arms for her own defence.

It is on this latter point that I have chiefly to write to you at present.

I find so much discouragement still to prevail among those on whom the chief reliance for a vigorous conduct would naturally be placed, and so much indifference among the rest, that except in the last necessity, I can see no reason to believe Austria will depart from her pacific system.

Count Stadion assures me indeed, that there is a point beyond which they are determined not to yield, and this is, the further cession of territory to France. I have reason to fear however, that upon another point of nearly equal importance to themselves, and of more importance to the neighbouring Powers, they will not be so resolute; and this is, the passage of French troops through their territories. I will explain to you why I think so.

Upon the signature of the preliminaries by D'Oubril, it appeared to me that he had exceeded his instructions; that consequently the Emperor Alexander might refuse to ratify the treaty, and that then Bonaparte would seize the pretext afforded him to pour his whole army instantly into Germany. It seemed probable too, that he would insist upon Austria not remaining neuter, but most certain that he would demand a passage for his troops through Bohemia and Moravia. Now this, after what we know of French armies, would be nearly the same thing as the military occupation of those countries, and but another word for forcing Austria to take part with her in the war. These things considered, I lost no time in speaking to Count Stadion, and warning him of the dilemma in which Austria, notwithstanding all her pacific inclinations, might eventually be placed. It is since this conversation that I have had it communicated to me that Austria did not feel herself in a condition to refuse the passage of troops to the French government.

Under these circumstances it may be material for you to consider how far Russia ought to press for a more particular explanation of the intentions of this Court, in the event of the disavowal of D'Oubril, and the consequent renewal of the continental war.

Another point of my instructions relates to the Court of

Berlin. Great dissatisfaction at the conduct of France in the arrangements concerning Germany appears to subsist in Prussia, and a counter-federation has certainly been proposed by her to Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark. Saxony has proposed to this Court its accession to the confederacy, and has received an answer in substance highly favourable to the project, but declining to act just now ; giving the Elector to understand however that such a time might come, and that then, although they had little to thank Prussia for, they would stand by her to the utmost if she should be attacked. Something surely may be grounded on these dispositions, especially as I have reason to think that we are ready, not only to pardon Prussia, but to assist her if she could be brought to act on any reasonable system. I have stated this also to Count Stadion, but he seems to have no hope of Prussia while Hangwitz is at the head of affairs.

I have nothing further at this moment to trouble you with ; indeed the subject of chief interest, both here and every where else, is the ratification, or not, of D'Oubril's preliminaries.

Believe me, &c. &c.

R. A.

P.S. I hope you have received my letter * by estafette of the 11th July. It related to the projected change in the Germanic Empire.

R. A.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot.

Vienna, August 25th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

YOU will have heard without doubt from M. d'Italinsky that the Emperor of Russia has disavowed M. d'Oubril, and refused to ratify the preliminaries he signed on the 20th of July at Paris. It will be additionally satisfactory to you to learn that he has done this entirely from his own sense of

* This letter containing a copy of Lord Yarmouth's of July 3d (see *supra*) was entrusted to a Russian courier, but never reached its destination.—R. A.

what was due to the faith of his engagement with Great Britain, and without waiting for any representation from us.

This honourable and decisive conduct will infallibly produce a renewal of the war on a very extended scale. You will have more difficulty than ever to encounter in your very laborious and important situation ; but I trust that you will be efficaciously seconded from home.

Every effort must now be directed to recover Dalmatia from France. I sent home by a courier yesterday a plan of operations against the enemy in that quarter, which had been given me by an officer who knows every part of the country and coast, and who is sanguine of success, if the Montenegrins be properly supported. The success of this enterprise may be greatly accelerated if we can get any assistance from the Porte ; the reverse, if France should succeed in getting her to declare openly against Russia. I need not say more to one so well informed and vigilant as yourself.

It is not difficult I am afraid to anticipate the immediate effect of the renewal of the war in this part of Europe. The neutrality of Austria cannot long be preserved. The worst part is, that they may go on from concession to concession, until France has drained the country of all its resources. It is difficult however to advise them just at this instant to a contrary conduct : much will depend upon the success, and still more upon the character, when it can be discovered, of a measure now in agitation for uniting the northern states of Germany in a defensive and separate league. This measure is given out to be a counter-federation to that of the Rhine. Prussia has proposed it to Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark, inviting those Powers to put their armies immediately upon the war establishment, and offering to furnish herself 200,000 men. All this sounds very fine ; but when I remark to you that Hangwitz is still minister, and the only one the King consults, you will easily account for the doubts which exist as to the ulterior objects of the plan. This matter however must now be brought speedily to the test. Bonaparte is not a man who will suffer it long to be in doubt who are his friends and who are his enemies ; and I think it may reasonably be inferred, that if he allows the confederacy to go on, it is either an instrument of his own forging, or will be rendered one for his use.

I have not heard lately from Paris ; but as Lord Lauderdale would naturally do nothing until the ratification of D'Oubril's treaty, that event not having taken place, it is most probable that both he, and the remainder of the Russian mission, will leave Paris at the same time.

My last advices from London are of the 8th instant. Mr. Fox was then better, and his physicians had great hope of preventing the recurrence of his malady.

Believe me, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Elliott.

Vienna, August 25th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

HAVING an opportunity of writing to you by a courier despatched by the Commandeur Ruffo to Palermo, I will now state to you more distinctly than I could in my short letter of the 24th the important event to which I alluded.

It is with infinite pleasure that I inform you that the Emperor of Russia has not only refused to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, but that he has utterly disavowed him, alleging that he transgressed both his instructions and his powers in signing it. The Emperor has indeed sent fresh proposals to Paris, but they are all so wide of Bonaparte's claims and expectations, that you may consider the renewal of hostilities as certain.

The Emperor demands the evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by France, that Sicily, at least, shall remain to the King of Naples, and some indemnification agreed upon for the King of Sardinia. Above all, he refuses any peace without England. Think of Bonaparte having proposed, and D'Oubril having signed, an article by which the present King of the Two Sicilies was to be utterly set aside, and even the miserable indemnity stipulated for Sicily, viz. Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica, was to be given to his son with the title of King !

Our part of the negociation at Paris has in point of fact

been suspended ever since D'Oubril's signature of the preliminaries with Russia. He acted so notoriously contrary to his instructions, that we had scarcely a doubt of his being disavowed. We did not, however, trust to this, but sent out the strongest remonstrances to St. Petersburg. Lord Lauderdale of course could do nothing except provisionally until the arrival of the Emperor's answer; and that answer being what I have stated, I have no doubt that both he and what remains of the Russian mission at Paris will be ordered to leave it directly.

The state of affairs however must now experience a material change all over Europe by this stoutness of the Emperor Alexander. The continental war will probably be renewed upon a very extended scale. In this event the neutrality of Austria has no chance of being long respected. Bonaparte is tired of the peace of Presburg; and on a renewal of hostilities with Russia, pretences will easily be found to force this unhappy country, either into a war directly, or into fresh sacrifices, and still more painful humiliations to avoid it. Immediately on my hearing of M. d'Oubril's signature, I thought it my duty to warn this Court of the possibility, in the event of his being disavowed, of their being called upon by Bonaparte to declare either for or against him; that he would insist *here* upon knowing who were his friends and who were his enemies; and that he would accept nothing as a proof of friendship which did not leave the whole resources of Austria at his disposal. The case supposed has now happened, and I lament to say that nothing is prepared for resistance. The state of the army and treasury is such, that unless they can contrive to ward off the blow a little longer the worst consequences are to be apprehended.

On the other hand, a measure is in agitation, of which I dare say you have heard something, the object of which is professedly to form a counterpoise to the Federation of the Rhine. All we know of it is, that Prussia has proposed to the Elector of Saxony, to Hesse Cassel, and to Denmark, to enter into a defensive league, and to put their forces immediately upon a war footing, Prussia herself furnishing 200,000 men. Prussia is in fact arming with great celerity. The treaty however goes on but slowly: its character is not yet understood; indeed, as Count Hangwitz is still the minister

at Berlin, great suspicions are entertained of its ulterior objects. I have hopes of procuring some light into this matter; but before my information can reach me, it will probably be developed by the course of events. If Bonaparte suffer the league to be formed within the reach of his army, it will clear up in my mind all doubts respecting its nature. If not, and it should go on in defiance of him, I should not even yet despair, notwithstanding all our misfortunes, of the cause of Europe.

The Pope's nuncio was with me some days ago. His Holiness has been threatened with the loss of all his dominions unless he consents to join Bonaparte in a perpetual league against England. The nuncio assured me he had refused: on this I did not hesitate offering him an asylum any where under our protection. He might serve the common cause efficaciously, if any means could be found of securing his retreat to Sicily. I have been entreated by the nuncio to keep this communication secret, but it is fit that you know it, and likewise Sir S. Smith.

Having no time to write to Sir Sidney, as the courier is now waiting for this letter, may I take the liberty of requesting that you will communicate its contents to him?

My last advices from England were of the 8th inst. Mr. Fox was then going on as well as possible, and his physicians had great hopes of preventing the return of his malady.

Believe me, dear Sir,

&c. &c. &c.

R. A.

Count Starhemberg to Mr Adair.

(*Extract.*)

London August, 29th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I CANNOT let my messenger go without thanking you for the two letters you wrote me, which both bear the stamp of that intimate friendship and confidence you promised me, and which I flatter myself mutual inclination has created, and the reciprocal interest of our countries must enforce.

My despatches chiefly relate to the agreement entered into between the British ministry and me about the remnant of our subsidies.

* * * * *

I seize this opportunity to repeat again and again to Count Stadion how many reasons we have to be completely satisfied with the conduct of the present ministers, whose feelings, moderation—nay, even partiality for Austria, leave Mr. Pitt and all his colleagues at any period whatever, far behind them. If something is still able to restore the House of Austria to its former power and glory, it must be looked for in the closest intimacy and union of plans and principles with Great Britain. I entreat you to preach firmness and courage at Vienna, and exhort them to prepare their utmost energy for the great day of vengeance which will certainly present itself sooner or later. It would be quite unnecessary to recommend them to avoid for the present the renewal of hostilities.

* * * * *

I am afraid I trespass a great deal on your time, but I was anxious to avail myself of this good opportunity.

Believe me,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) STARHEMBERG.

Mr. Adair to Mr. Arbuthnot.

Vienna, Sept. 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

MR. MANDEVILLE arrived here on the 4th inst. and brought me your letters and despatches for government. Having no messenger in waiting I was obliged to forward them by my valet-de-chambre as far as Hamburg, where I can depend upon Mr. Thornton's taking the greatest care of them.

I had a letter from Lord Lauderdale on the 11th, dated September 1st: he had not then heard of the non-ratification, but expected it. He seemed to think that there was no

chance whatever of getting the French government to listen to any thing reasonable. As the conduct of the Emperor Alexander, especially that part of it in which he refuses to hear of any terms without England, would put him upon stronger ground, there was every reason to expect a speedy and an unsuccessful end of the whole.

The only reason which gives a colour to a contrary speculation is, that this Northern confederacy wears a more serious appearance than was at first imagined. Prussia is arming in good earnest, and, what is more, has persuaded Saxony to arm too. Nothing can be more warlike than both her language and her posture. But somehow or other, not a man believes in her striking a blow against France. Be that as it may, Bonaparte perceives that it will require a lower tone than he has lately adopted to get rid of the embarrassments this new confederacy may cause him. He has accordingly in some degree adopted that tone towards Austria. It is so changed in this respect, that all immediate apprehension of his demanding a passage for his troops through Bohemia has subsided. Whether he will extend his moderation to the Powers with whom he is actually at war, and renew the negotiation upon the terms proposed by Russia, remains now to be seen. I will not fail to let you know the moment anything of a decisive nature occurs.

You will soon hear of an attack on Cattaro by the French. They are so pressed in Calabria that they must endeavour to disengage themselves from the Montenegrins and Russians, or they will risk the loss of both their armies in those quarters.

Your account of the battle with Regnier on the 4th of July was quite new to me. The difficulty of getting intelligence from the South of Italy, especially since the ports of Trieste and Fiume are shut to English vessels, is inconceivable. A story is just now circulated of General Stewart's having defeated Massena in the early part of August. There is a letter in town from Pisa to that effect, but I cannot trust to the writer's accuracy.

Believe me,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. Stuart to Mr. Adair.

St. Petersburg, Aug. 30th, 1806 (N. S.).

SIR,

AN unusual press of business at the moment which succeeded M. d'Oubril's arrival from Paris prevented my early acknowledgement of yours by estafette.

I am this day honoured with your letter, dated 18th August, and directed to Lord G. L. Gower. As the ambassador left St. Petersburg five weeks ago, and very material changes in the opinions and foreign politics of the Russian ministers have taken place since that period, I feel it incumbent upon me to communicate to you such details as may render you master of the views of this Court towards that of Vienna in the present crisis.

The administration now in office commenced their career by a determination to cultivate the friendship of Prussia, and at all hazards to prosecute war against France to the southward, not only on the shores of the Adriatic, but by advancing a great part of the disposable force in Poland against Turkey without regarding the remonstrances of Austria, a Power which naturally would view with jealousy such an extent of her frontier exposed by the probable conquest of provinces, of which in the course of time she herself might have hoped to obtain possession.

Since the refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, these sentiments appear, however, to have given way to the expectation of organising such a resistance to France in the North of Europe, as may prevent the further progress of the enemy's encroachments in that quarter.

Uncertain if the counter-federation planned by the King of Prussia is not a scheme originating at Paris, the request of a guaranty on the part of Russia has been hitherto coldly received; and it has been alleged that the Emperor will wait until events shall develop the sincere intention of the Court of Berlin to oppose France before any proposition from thence (while Hangwitz is in office) will be sanctioned. At the same time they have received strong assurances of support in case of hostility, and it has been hinted that in the present state of affairs I should do well to *cease my instances on the*

Hanoverian question until the line to be adopted by Prussia shall be fully decided.

It results from these causes that the aid, or at least the perfect neutrality, of Austria will become highly necessary. General Budberg therefore assures me that no measure will be pursued which can in any way commit the Court of Vienna; that whether actively fighting against France, or remaining a tranquil spectator, she is the left wing of the mass opposed to the common enemy, and even in the latter case 100,000 French will be necessary to watch her movements. I do not find the minister apprehensive that France may require a passage through Bohemia and Moravia. He argues that the preservation of the Austrian provinces in Poland are a stronger motive to induce her to withhold her consent, than any which can be urged from hence, for the same purpose.

Should the French government actually commence hostilities against Austria, when the passage of troops destined to act against Russia shall be refused, M. Budberg asserts that every feeling of interest and honour will induce the Emperor to support the Court of Vienna with the most effectual assistance in his power.

The march of troops to Dalmatia, which was formerly with justice the cause of so much complaint, is no longer weighed upon with the asperity which was remarkable in the language of this government, at the time they refused every conciliatory offer on the part of Austria.

I beg you will observe that the above reasoning is rather what I have heard from M. Budberg than my own opinion, and is merely the abstract of my despatches to the office for the last six weeks.

If you conceive a regular correspondence will contribute to the advantage of the King's service, I hope you will be assured that so long as the business of this embassy is conducted by myself, I shall not fail to communicate whatever can be useful, although I have not the honour of your personal acquaintance.

I am, Sir,

With great truth and regard,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

CHARLES STUART.

*Baron Hardenberg to Mr. Adair.**(Copy.)*

à Tempelberg, le * de Sept. 1806. .

J'AI reçu la lettre dont vous avez bien voulu m'honorer en date du 19 de ce mois, Monsieur, et je me trouverai infiniment heureux de travailler avec vous à établir la plus parfaite union de principes et de mesures entre nos deux souverains. Persuadé qu'il ne peut exister dans ce moment qu'un seul grand bût pour tous les deux, les autres objets devoient facilement s'arranger. Depuis huit jours le Roi est à l'armée : il ne me reste donc que de rendre compte à S. M. de ce que vous venez de m'écrire, et d'attendre les ordres dont elle daignera me munir, d'autant plus que des pour-parlers ont été entamés entre le Baron de Jacobi et M. Thornton à Hambourg. Le traité de Potsdam conclu sous des circonstances très différentes entre la Prusse et la Russie, ne pourra guère servir de base aux arrangemens à prendre entre nos deux cours, tant pour les subsides que pour les autres objets, quoique l'esprit doive sans doute être le même. Mais il faudra toujours s'occuper d'un nouveau projet de traité, adapté à l'état actuel des choses. En attendant les ouvertures ultérieures que vous me faites espérer, Monsieur, je ne manquerai pas de mon côté de vous informer des intentions du Roi mon maître, aussitôt qu'il aura plû à S. M. de me les faire connoître. Agréez l'assurance de toute la sensibilité avec laquelle j'ai reçu les témoignages de votre estime et de votre confiance et de la considération la plus distinguée avec laquelle

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signé) HARDENBERG.

* Date effaced, but it must have been about the 24th.—R. A.

Mr. Adair to Baron Hardenberg.

(Copy.)

Vienne, ce 16 Oct. 1806.

JE m'empresse, M. le Baron, de répondre à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Tempelberg, et de vous communiquer l'heureuse nouvelle que le Lord Morpeth, fils aîné du Comte de Carlisle, a été nommé par sa Majesté Britannique pour traiter directement avec le Cabinet de Berlin des grands intérêts qui ont motivé notre correspondance.

J'espère tout de cette démarche de mon gouvernement, cependant j'aurois préféré que le Lord Morpeth n'eût pas quitté Londres avant l'arrivée de mon courrier que j'avois expédié le 19 Septembre, jour où j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire.

Ainsi j'attends toujours la réponse à ma dépêche en date de ce jour-là, dont je ne manquerois pas, Monsieur le Baron, de vous rendre compte aussitôt que je l'aurois reçu.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signé) R. A.

*Substance of a Letter from Mr. Adair to Mr. Stuart,
dated Vienna, Sept. 30. 1806.*

Importance of establishing a correspondence between the British legations of Petersburg and Vienna, in the present state of our relations with the one, and of my hopes as to the other.

That I had received the new cypher.

Since the non-ratification (of D'Oubril's treaty), the French plenipotentiaries civil to Lord Lauderdale; and, since the Prussian armaments, Bonaparte smooth to Austria.

That Prussia might be got to act, in her present good dispositions, even with Hangwitz; but, if Hangwitz continued minister, would they go on against reverses?

My instructions and the conduct of Russia agree exactly

on the three main points of, 1. negotiations for peace; 2. understanding with Prussia; 3. advice to Austria to preserve her neutrality.

Inclose a letter to Lord Douglas, requesting him to make use of all the influence of the British legation to retain Count Razamoffsky at Vienna.

Mr. Stuart to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, Oct. 9th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE been honoured with your obliging letter by a Russian messenger, and I am happy to assure you that the communication of its contents to the Russian minister, together with the assurances received from the Austrian ambassador, have been productive of the happiest effects.

The jealousy which the progress of affairs in Turkey had already created between the two Imperial Courts has, I flatter myself, been very materially done away by repeated representations of the necessity which renders politic the sacrifice of every other consideration to the more essential object of advancing the moment when war is to commence in the North of Germany; and your letter was an evidence in favour of the language I have constantly held during the last three months.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that an army of 64,000 men, under the command of General Beningsen, has orders immediately to march to Silesia to support the Prussians and cover Bohemia. This government hopes that a demonstration on the part of Austria, in the latter province, will prevent any hazard from operations of Bonaparte on their left flank. General Meerfeldt has endeavoured to satisfy them on this point, by showing that his Court is fully determined to defend her own frontier by assembling an army so placed as to prevent the Russians being turned, in case such an operation should be threatened on the part of the French. The Court of St. Petersburg requires *nothing farther* from Austria at the present moment.

Major Krusemarck is arrived empty-handed, to the great disappointment of this government, who expected many communications by his conveyance.

It is generally supposed that this mission is a manœuvre of M. de Hangwitz, by which that minister hopes so far to conciliate the Emperor as to avert any measure from hence likely to remove him from office. He will, however, be mistaken, as orders are sent to urge an immediate change in the Prussian councils.

I am, and ever will be,
 With great truth and regard,
 Your obedient, humble Servant,
 CH. STUART.

Mr. A. to Viscount Howick.

Vienna, Oct. 17th, 1806.

MY DEAR LORD,

No post from England having reached me since that of the 19th Sept., it is only from your despatches, brought by Donaldson, that I learn of your appointment to the Foreign Office. I heartily rejoice at it. In the sad scene that public life now exhibits, this, at least, is something to be pleased with.

Sir Francis Vincent will put you in possession of all my private letters to our lost friend. I had not a thought concealed from him; nor have I one on public affairs which I do not wish to lay open to you. All I ask is, that you will indulge me, as he did, with the liberty of speaking out. Your own judgment will determine afterwards the value of what I may say.

On the present occasion I shall only call your attention to one point, on which you will see, by my secret despatches, I have been a great deal occupied. I mean my correspondence with Count Hardenberg.

On being apprised of Lord Morpeth's mission, I thought it right to acquaint the Count with the fact that a regular negotiation had been commenced between our two governments,

the result of which would determine whether they could agree upon those matters which had given occasion to our intercourse.

My next suggestion to you is the importance of making use of all the influence we may have with the Emperor Alexander, to get Razamoffsky to be re-established as ambassador here. I know Razamoffsky's faults; but they have been greatly exaggerated. He is thoroughly in the common interests; and such a man will be greatly wanted in the prosecution of the long struggle of which we have the prospect.

You will, I hope, approve of my sending off to Lord Morpeth a confidential letter, apprising him generally of the state of things here. It was necessary from what I know will be represented to him of the dispositions of Austria. Count Finkenstein is pressing them much too hard.

* * * * *

At some moment of comparative leisure I shall have much to say to you upon the subject of correspondence. I have already established a personal correspondence with Constantinople, Petersburg, Stockholm, Hamburg, and Dresden. I am trying to establish one, through the North of Italy, with Sicily; but this will be attended with expense, as men must risk their lives. If a general war should break out, I have another and a very extensive plan for a correspondence with, and operations in, Switzerland and the Tyrol. This I shall shortly submit to your consideration, apprising you, in the mean time, that I have no dealings with any but approved men, recommended by actions of distinguished and acknowledged merit. There is at this hour a great deal going on in Switzerland, which, if the French have one great reverse in Germany, will break out in spite of all attempts to hold it back.

Nothing further occurs to me just now, except to inform you that your squadron is arrived off Venice. It was high time; as the Russian admiral suffered the French, about three weeks ago, to transport 14,000 men *by sea* from Zara to Ancona, where they were marched to reinforce the army against Calabria.

Cattaro is still in the possession of the Russians, who seem

to care about nothing else. It is again strongly given out that the Austrians are preparing to storm it.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. A. to Lord Morpeth.

(Copy.)

Vienna, Oct. 15th, 1806.

MY DEAR LORD,

THE messenger Donaldson arrived here the day before yesterday with despatches from Lord Howick, announcing your mission, and communicating to me a copy of your instructions. I request you to accept my most sincere congratulations on the choice which has been made of you for this important charge. I cannot say how much it gratifies me.

You will have learned, among the first confidential overtures made to you, that the King of Prussia has applied in the strongest terms to the Emperor to join him in his present measures against France; and that the answer has been that the extreme distress of the Austrian finances, and the absolute necessity of gaining time, as well to put them in order, as to raise their army to a proper degree of force, prevented them from departing at present from their neutrality, but that they would send 70,000 men into Bohemia in order to make their neutrality respected. This resolution has been notified to M. de la Rochefoucault as well as to the Prussian minister.

I can assure you from the most attentive personal observation that Austria can do no more. It is well that they do so much. You will observe that their troops are to occupy a position which covers the left wing of the Prussian army and protects Silesia; and I have accurate private information that this corps d'armée of 70,000 is already 90,000, and in a fortnight's time will be upwards of 100,000 men. Besides this there are armies in Styria and Anterior Austria of from 25,000 to 30,000 each; and every exertion

is silently making to get up to the complete war establishment.

Independently however of their great pecuniary difficulties, there is one obstacle to their joining cordially with Prussia, which it is of the utmost consequence that you should know, and this is their deep distrust of Count Hangwitz, and their fear of the want of steadiness and perseverance in the King notwithstanding the confidence they place in his honour and in his present good dispositions.

This point I find it most difficult to touch. On the one hand, the immediate junction of Austria might afford infinite advantages, and perhaps decide the fate of the war. On the other, it must be considered that this would be the last war in which Austria could ever engage, and that the total ruin of her House and Empire would be involved in its bad success. Indeed when we reflect that Hangwitz has the conduct of it, and full possession of the King's confidence, there is a most fearful responsibility in advising its being undertaken.

Under these circumstances the course I have adopted for the present is as follows:—never to urge Austria beyond her strength, but to assure her, as I have done, by the desire of our lost and lamented friend, that whenever she chose to act Great Britain would support her to the utmost.*

* * * * *

I leave it, my dear Lord, entirely to your discretion and judgment to determine upon the use you will make of this information as a motive for inducing Prussia to accede to the just demands of his Majesty. I will only observe that it is the secret of the Austrian government, and that if it were communicated to that of Prussia plainly and directly, which is perhaps the only way in which it could produce any effect, there would always be the risk of its being divulged to France as long as Hangwitz and Lombard are the King's confidential advisers.

This brings me to a point on which I am extremely anxious to have your opinion after you shall have had

* I have not been able to recover from the *brouillon* of this letter the precise words of the paragraph which follows next; but the substance of it is a distinct declaration from the Austrian minister to me, that all mistrust of Prussia would be removed if she would give proper satisfaction to his Majesty on the subject of Hanover.—*R. A.*

time and opportunity to form one. What is really the truth about Count Hangwitz? Is he in earnest in his present system of resistance to France? or is there any "dessous des cartes" in his game? Observe that Talleyrand and Clarke are in Bonaparte's camp, and I am most positively assured that on the first of this month a Prussian officer of distinction passed through Mayence, to find Bonaparte, wherever he might be, with fresh proposals. If the fact should turn out to be so, you will have a right to demand a communication of such proposals. On the other hand, if he (Hangwitz) is really acting fairly, your opinion, I make no difficulty in saying, will greatly determine me in the line I mean to take when the time comes for ulterior explanations with this Court. Both Austria and Russia wish for the removal of Hangwitz as a preliminary step, but if I hear any thing from you to make me think that they are pushing their objections to him too far, and risking the loss of this, perhaps the last opportunity of forming a solid union against France, I shall of course use my best endeavours to get them to be more reasonable.

I have now nothing more to add. Having stated how matters stand here, I shall not in future have to trouble you so much at length.

Regular correspondence will be impossible, but occasions may occur by which you may let me hear from you. The success or failure of your mission it will be most material for me to know, likewise if Hangwitz should be playing any tricks with Talleyrand. Dresden at present seems the safest centre of communication.

Have the goodness to forward my messenger to England; and

Believe me,

&c. &c. &c.

R. A.

Mr. A. to Mr. Arbuthnot.

Vienna, Oct. 25th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I SEND back Mr. Morier's messenger, Colomb; and it grieves me to the heart to say with the most afflicting intelligence.

The Prussian army has been completely defeated, and nearly ruined. The French will most probably be at Berlin by the end of this month.

Hostilities began on the 8th. All we can collect here (for we have no detailed official accounts) is, that, after more or less fighting on the four succeeding days, the left of the Prussians under Prince Hohenlohe was turned, that the King of Prussia had resolved upon attacking with the whole army on the 14th, and that on the morning of that day he was not only attacked himself, but attacked in such a manner as to give the enemy the full advantage of surprise.

The battle was fought near Naumberg. The result was a most complete, and I fear irreparable, defeat. I cannot give you particulars; even at this day the full extent of the mischief is not known with sufficient accuracy.

In general we reckon here the loss of the Prussians on that day alone at 24,000 men, killed and prisoners, and 184 pieces of cannon. The Duke of Brunswick was wounded, and is since dead.

Since this dreadful day, disaster appears to have succeeded disaster. Just now an account is come that Marshal Mollendorff and the Prince of Orange have been taken prisoners with a corps of 6000 men at Erfurt. The fact is undoubtedly so, although we cannot understand how they came there.

The army appears to be completely separated. What remains of the centre and the right wing were by the last accounts at Halberstadt, from whence they will probably fall back on Magdeburg. Of Prince Hohenlohe and the Prussian left wing there is no intelligence. The King is supposed to be either gone or going to Kustrin. The Queen was at Stettin.

The Elector of Saxony has made his peace and withdrawn his troops. If the King of Prussia can get any tolerable con-

ditions (of which I confess there appears little chance) it would not surprise me to hear that he had done the same.

A Russian army of 64,000 men under General Beningsen is by this time not far from the borders of Silesia. But the Emperor must send three times that number if he wishes to save Poland.

I do not know where Lord Morpeth is, or what he has been able to effect.

Lord Lauderdale has quitted Paris. It may be useful for you to learn that the point on which the negotiations broke off was our insisting upon the evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania.

This Court perseveres in its neutrality; but Europe is now in such a state that nothing with the least semblance of system, whether for war, for peace, or for neutrality, seems likely for some time to be arranged.

Fare you well, my dear Sir; on which side soever we turn ourselves, this is indeed a life of troubles!

Believe me,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. A. to Mr. Stuart.

Vienna, Nov. 2d, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHEN I wrote to you last I had only time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 9. I will now enter more fully upon one or two points, which, in the present disastrous moment, seem to be of the utmost importance.

The views of Bonaparte on Poland are now evident to demonstration. I have heard from very good authority of his demanding the Elector of Saxony's daughter for his brother Jerome, in whom it is intended to revive the kingdom of Poland, and thus to carry into effect the double project of surrounding Austria, and erecting a barrier against Russia on that side of Europe. Austria feels her danger to the greatest degree. She has a most difficult part to act, and, as far as I can see, she is acting it well. Her armaments, notwithstanding the deplorable state of her finances, are continuing with

redoubled activity; and I trust that before Bonaparte can totally destroy Prussia (before which time he will hardly call upon Austria to disarm) they will be completed to the full establishment.

Even then her danger will be but little diminished, unless Russia, feeling her own in an equal degree, shall come forward with her chief force on that vulnerable side of her empire. I do most fervently hope, therefore, that no temptation of advantages on the side of Turkey will prevail upon the Cabinet of Petersburg to divide its armies, so as to leave Poland in a state of jeopardy.

If I might venture to suggest a plan of operations suited to the political views which present themselves at this moment, it would be one on something of the following outline:

* * * * * *

* * * * * *

The great body of the Russian forces could then act on the side of Poland, and perhaps restore our affairs in the East of Europe.

On the other hand, such is the internal state of the Turkish provinces, that Russia can have no reason to apprehend offensive operations on that side, especially too as the Turks can derive no succour from France. But let her seriously contemplate the consequences of another Austerlitz in Poland. I own I have scarcely nerves to contemplate the consequences of such a disaster.

There is another matter which has fallen under my observation here, and which gives me serious concern. It is the state of the affair concerning Cattaro. This is, perhaps, a very tender subject to touch upon; all I can say is, that it is one which requires the greatest address in managing, otherwise I foresee a most fatal misunderstanding between the two Courts. The demands of France have been so peremptory that, added to her late successes, and the rupture of Lord Lauderdale's negotiation, they have felt themselves here under the necessity of again issuing orders to attack the place. Let me therefore take the liberty of recommending it to you to prepare the Russian ministry for such an event, and to deprecate its producing any renewal of coldness between the two Courts. I really do not see how Austria can act otherwise than she has done in this unlucky business; and

much as I should regret to see the fortress in the hands of France, far better would it be that it were so than that France should establish herself in Poland through any ill-timed jealousy on such an inferior object. This would be more particularly to be regretted, as, if Cattaro were even surrendered to the French, it is impossible that they could maintain themselves there while we are masters of the sea, and friends with the Montenegrins. Indeed, it is the opinion of the best officers here, who know every inch of the ground, that every man the French sent to Dalmatia is sure of falling into our hands, if our affairs are but commonly well managed in that quarter.

It does not occur to me to add more at this moment ; satisfied as I am that the imminent perils which threaten this country when Bonaparte shall be in possession of Dresden, Königstein, and all the military positions in Saxony, will, with the aid of your representations, produce their due effect upon the Russian Cabinet.

I will not, however, conclude my letter without recommending another point to your management, should Lord Douglas not already be arrived at St. Petersburg. I wish, therefore, as no time ought to be lost in it, that you would open the letter I inclosed for him when I wrote to you on the 30th September ; and that, after considering it, you would make such use of its contents as you may think prudent, with a view to the success of the matter you will find in it. Separated as I now am from my usual channels of communication with England, this object becomes not only of the greatest importance to me personally, but to the common interests of the allied countries. I must in many instances act entirely from myself, which individually I can venture to do, as I see that the same system governs our councils which prevailed during the life of Mr. Fox ; but although I can act largely on my own view of affairs, I cannot answer that others will co-operate with me who are strangers to me, and ignorant of my long and intimate connection with him. When you read what I have written to Lord Douglas, you will see in a moment the importance of what I allude to.

Believe me,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. Stuart to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, Nov. 26th, 1806.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received yours dated the 2d of November, and General Meerfeldt has communicated to me the substance of letters from Count Stadion, directing him to request my interference with this Cabinet, in the hope of effecting such an arrangement of the affairs of Turkey as may harmonise the interests of the two Courts, and create a good understanding at a period when mutual concert is to be desired against the enemy.

This task has not been easy; for although on the most intimate footing with Meerfeldt, and honoured with the entire confidence of the Russian minister, irritability on the one side and quick feelings on the other have created obstacles which, in my opinion, should never have existed. However, the ambassador's remonstrances upon the declaration respecting Turkey were by these means sufficiently softened to induce the minister to specify in writing that no intentions of aggrandisement influence the conduct of the Court of Petersburg towards the Porte.

The state of affairs in Prussia then compelled me to urge the necessity of reducing the means employed by this government to the South, for the purpose of directing the great mass of their disposable force towards the Vistula. The army in Moldavia has been accordingly diminished to 40,000, and the remainder of Michelson's corps has orders to march to the Prussian frontiers.

Every argument tending to show the important aid which may be rendered to our cause by the Court of Vienna, ought to determine the Russians to fix M. Razamoffsky in his present station, and to delay, or, if possible, to prevent the embassy of Prince Kurakin.

Baron Budberg frankly told me that he condemned the measure, which is the consequence of a Court intrigue before he came into office, and which it is not in his power to revoke. He will, however, endeavour to parry the mischief by sending to Vienna Count Pozzo di Borgo, the person who will deliver this letter, and who has ample secret instructions to treat on every subject which can, in the present

moment, interest the two Courts. It is the great object of this government to persuade Austria to arm, and if a favourable opportunity shall offer to take a part in the war. Cattaro and every minor consideration will be sacrificed to obtain that end. The number of troops to be employed on either side will, if possible, be determined by a convention. A mutual declaration, it is hoped, will bind both parties not to conclude a separate peace, and to disregard the probable future neutrality of Prussia.

Stadion, Razamoffsky, Meerfeldt, and Budberg are equally intimate with M. Pozzo di Borgo. His selection is therefore likely to conciliate all parties; it remains only for me to request that you will treat him with confidence, and assist his exertions by all the influence the nature of his employment deserves.

His journey will remain a secret to every one except those with whom he is immediately charged to negotiate. I am aware that in this transaction we must both act in a great measure without positive instructions from home; but where the means of communicating with the office are cut off, it must depend upon our judgment to do whatever we may deem most beneficial to the interests of government. On these grounds I therefore suppose you will not hesitate to support an undertaking, upon which the feasibility of the measures suggested in your last letter must in a great degree depend.

As your letters from England must pass through Petersburg or Trieste whenever the present state of the Continent shall be known in London, I deem it expedient that a frequent communication shall be maintained in future between the two missions.

I inclose extracts of my despatches respecting Turkey and a copy of the Russian declaration on that subject, which I have likewise forwarded to Mr. Arbuthnot.

I am with great truth and regard,

My dear Sir,

Your faithful obedient Servant,

CHARLES STUART.

Mr. A. to Mr. Stuart.

Vienna, Dec. 6th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

THE departure of a courier for St. Petersburg gives me an opportunity of writing to you, and of informing you of the present state of affairs at this Court.

On the 3d instant I received a letter from Mr. G. Jackson, dated at the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, informing me that his Majesty had rejected the proposed armistice *in toto*, and had put himself entirely into the hands of the Emperor of Russia. He added that it was most anxiously hoped by his Majesty that the intervention of Russia through the medium of her minister here, and that my zealous co-operation with both him and Count Finkenstein, would be used in order to engage this Court to come forward. His letter contained further a request from Count Woronzow that I should make the above communication to Count Razamoffsky.

At no time since my arrival here have I omitted an opportunity of laying before the Austrian government the imminent peril of its situation under the ascendancy of France. I have added to these representations assurances of the strongest support, and the most vigorous co-operation on the part of the British government. My discussions with Count Stadion on this, and I may say on all subjects of a common interest, have been minute and confidential, and it has rarely happened to us to differ except on points comparatively trivial. Matters were coming to an understanding from which the most beneficial consequences to Europe might have resulted, when the precipitation of Prussia in rushing into this war before any concerted plan had been settled, before even the first elements of a concert had been formed (for I must observe that Baron Jacobi himself appears to have returned to England without proper powers), spoiled all our operations. With the best wishes for Prussia, the extent and suddenness of the disasters which befel her arms in the first days of the campaign, rendered, as you must acknowledge, the choice of the moment for interference the most difficult of all questions for this Court. It was a question very unpromising with a view to success, if she decided in favour of interference, and decisive of her own destiny upon the least failure.

These points premised, I come to the immediate circumstances of the present moment.

Since the 23d of October, negotiations for peace as well as for an armistice have been going on between Prussia and France. It is only three days ago that I received the advice which I have already alluded to as contained in Mr. Jackson's letter.

During these negotiations Count Finkenstein, by orders from his Court, has repeatedly urged Austria to come forward. The answer has been in the negative, founded on these three following reasons: — 1st, the possibility of a peace between Prussia and France; 2d, ignorance of the intentions of Russia; 3d, the distance of the Russian succours.

Of these reasons, the first is without further force; but the two others, and more especially the last, appear, and I must confess justly, to weigh most decisively against any immediate effort on the part of Austria.

In answer to all I can say, and I have said much on former occasions as well as on the present, it is replied to me, and the same to Razamoffsky, "Tell us what Russia will do. Where are her forces? What is their effective number? Where are they stationed?" and, unfortunately, at the moment I am writing, I have no satisfactory information to give them on this important head. By all I can learn, there are of Russian troops at General Beningsen's head-quarters at Pultusk little more than 15,000 men; at Praga, there are no more than 6,000. At Grodno, indeed, we hear of Buxhowden with an army of 70,000; but, putting all these together and with the remains of the Prussian army, what is it in comparison with the immense force collected, and still collecting from all parts of Germany, as well as France, to oppose them? It is really dreadful to think of this. Depend upon it, my dear Sir, that unless Russia puts forward the whole forces of her empire immediately, and without the loss of an hour, she is gone as an European Power. Next spring she will be attacked by 400,000 men, and when she asks why Austria does not assist her, it will be replied that Austria is surrounded, and cannot.

It was the strong and deep sense of these stupendous dangers that prompted me to write to you as I did on the 25th of October last. This danger I should think must now be

evident to Russia herself. For God's sake, let me request you again and again to press these points upon those in his Imperial Majesty's councils who may not yet be thoroughly aware of its extent, or of the celerity with which it is advancing upon them. Indeed, we have but a few moments left in which to make our choice, not merely whether we shall resist or not, but whether we shall enjoy the last consolation to the great and brave, — that of perishing as we have lived, with honour.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

Mr. A. to Mr. Jackson.

Vienna, Dec. 6th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your letter of the 23d November by the courier, Large, and am greatly obliged to you for it. I am fully rewarded for his detention by the service which the communication he has brought me may enable me to render His Majesty's government.

His Prussian Majesty may rely upon my utmost zeal and assiduity in doing every thing for his service, which my duty will allow me.

His Majesty will, before this, have received a proof of it in my having requested Mr. Wynne to convey to him some very important communications. I did not, of course, know of your being at head-quarters.

Nothing effectual is to be done here unless Russia will come forward with her whole force. I have frequently urged Russia to do this, to set all considerations of Turkish politics aside for the present, and bear down with all her powers to the Polish frontier. I have written by a special courier to Mr. Stuart again to-day, in the strongest terms to this effect. Count Razamoffsky has done the same, and I have reason to think that Count Meerfeldt's orders are to press this point equally.

Have the goodness to answer my letter as soon as possible,

that I may know how to direct to you, and whether it reaches you in safety.

I am, dear Sir, &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

The same to the same.

Vienna, Dec. 12th, 1806.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE again to return you my thanks for your attention in writing to me. I received very safely your letter of November 27th.

It gives me great pleasure to hear of Sir Harford Jones' safe arrival so far on his journey. I have not yet received the letter you mention his having written to me from Pul-tusk.

By the time you will receive this letter, it is most likely that Mr. Wynne will have arrived. I send you some letters for him which have been received here since his departure.

I have now to request your attention to the inclosed paper, and after communicating it to Mr. Wynne, if he should still be at head-quarters, to cause it to be laid before his Prussian Majesty in such a manner as to obtain an early consideration, and a speedy answer to its contents. You will observe, and of this you will likewise assure his Prussian Majesty, that this paper is strictly confidential, and that until his pleasure shall be made known to me, I shall open myself to no person whatever, not even to his own minister, respecting its contents. A most anxious desire alone to clear away all possible difficulties in the way of procuring him effectual and immediate assistance, has guided me in the step I am now taking, and in proposing such an object for his deliberation. I will only observe that if this matter should appear to be of a nature to require that, in return, any confidential communication be made to me, there can be no harm in sending it through Count Finkenstein.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

P. S. You may give a copy of the inclosed, and likewise the original if it should be wished; otherwise it would be better perhaps only to show it. The proposal is entirely my own, and wholly without the participation of Austria.

R. A.

Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.

(Copy.)

Konigsberg, Jan. 1st, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE bearer of this despatch is Mr. Walpole, with whom I believe you are already acquainted; he will give you the best account of every thing which has passed in this quarter. Should there be any occasion, I have little doubt that you could prevail upon him to return to me; indeed, he has already promised so to do. I opened your last despatches of the 14th of December to Lord Howick, and have written to his Lordship on the subject of the note confidential which was inclosed in your letter.* In the present temper, it would by no means be prudent to deliver it; they have the greatest doubts and suspicions of the Austrian government: I am by no means certain that an absolute promise on the part of that government to come forward with their whole force would induce this Court to put the Silesian fortresses into the hands of their old enemy: some days ago, I mentioned to Count Zastrow that I had reason to believe the Austrians were inclined to offer their mediation for a general peace. I supposed that the Count might have received the proposition with great satisfaction; quite the contrary: he said that no good could be expected from Austria, that he was certain that they did not mean to give any effectual assistance to the Prussian monarchy: that he, for his own part, would not wish to accept of their mediation; that the King of Prussia had connected his interests with Russia and England, on whom he could rely, and with those two Powers he was determined to stand or fall. I have not yet been enabled to

* See Inclosure, p. 160.

sign a treaty of peace with Prussia. They have sent me a project in which they take care to mix the question of subsidies with the affairs of Hanover. They have made very large demands for the future. They have required that the treaty of the Hague in '94 should be taken as the basis; this demand is entirely inadmissible, as by that treaty we promised to give at different payments to the amount of three millions, of which twelve hundred thousand pounds were actually paid, though the Prussians did nothing.

By the second secret article they ask the immediate payment of five hundred thousand pounds: there are a variety of reasons against complying even with this demand; it was refused after much discussion to Jacobi in England, and I do not believe they are in immediate want of money assistance. A great sum of money was brought from Berlin, I believe to the amount of between two and three millions sterling.

* * * * *

Thus circumstanced, it would be highly imprudent to hazard a proposition which would be revolting in the greatest degree to the pride of this Court, and would awaken all their old jealousies against Austria. It is extremely unfortunate that the Russians at this critical moment should have no ambassador or any man of consideration to represent them here; his co-operation with me would be invaluable; they have nobody here but a *chargé des affaires*, certainly a very worthy and a very sensible man, but entirely without weight or power, as he can never act from himself, but always waits for instructions from his Court, who are frequently very remiss in furnishing him with any, and the generals of the army do not think it worth their while to correspond with him at all.

I should deceive you excessively were I not to state to you plainly and directly that I have a very bad opinion of the state and posture of affairs here. The pretended victories of the Russians are great exaggerations, and were probably nothing but affairs of advanced and rear guards, the Russians retiring, and the French following them. The King of Prussia has written a strong letter to request the Russian generals would re-occupy their former positions; otherwise all this line must fall into the hands of the enemy, who will make themselves masters of great magazines of stores and provisions which they have had the imprudence to place here.

Count Zastrow told me yesterday that the Russians were in full retreat towards the Neimen, and their own frontiers, and that the King would be obliged to retire from this place in a few days. A few hours afterwards General Rûchel told me it was no such thing, and that affairs went on tolerably well; I do not, however, believe him. To judge from all appearances, as far as I am able to estimate the consequences of the military events which have lately happened, I do not think that the Russians are willing, or have strength sufficient to re-occupy their former positions. If that be the case, Königsberg, Dantzic, and all the country between these two places, and those with the magazines they contain must fall into the hands of the French.

The greatest misunderstanding prevails among the Russian generals; it is not known exactly who has the command. The Russian chargé des affaires and Count Zastrow both suppose that Marshal Kaminsky has abandoned the command of the army and returned to Petersburg; certain it is that he has never sent any report to the King. I wrote both to him and to Count Woronzow on the day of my arrival here, but have received no answer from either of them. The Marshal refused to allow Colonel Sontag, a British officer, to remain with his army without an express permission from the Emperor of Russia; he was, therefore, obliged to join the Prussian corps. Mr. Walpole will give you the best accounts of what has passed here.

I have the honour to be,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

P.S. Colonel Sontag is this instant arrived from General Lestocq's army; he does not bring any intelligence of importance. We probably shall be obliged to leave this in a few days.

*Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson.**

Vienna, Jan. 14th, 1807.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's arrival at the King of Prussia's headquarters, having been notified to me by Count Finkenstein, and it being essential to the public service that you should be informed of what is transacting both here and in the South of Europe, I take the liberty of requesting your Lordship to point out to me a safe and ready channel of communication with you. I shall continue in the meantime addressing my letters to your Lordship, by such opportunities as may offer themselves.

The first matter that I have to communicate to your Lordship, is that in consequence of a representation made to me by Count Finkenstein, at the earnest request of the Count de Gotzen, of the deplorable state of his Prussian Majesty's affairs in Silesia, and of the imminent danger to which their fortresses there are exposed, by the impossibility of keeping an army together, unless instant pecuniary succours be sent to him; I have, after maturely weighing the nature and urgency of the service, taken upon myself the responsibility of advancing 20,000 ducats, under an agreement signed by him in the name of his Prussian Majesty, that this sum shall be deducted from the first subsidies which it may be his Majesty's pleasure to grant to Prussia.

I trust that your Lordship will approve the application of this money. Count Finkenstein earnestly pressed me for 260,000 dollars, but as I have reason to believe that 20,000 ducats will be enough to meet the most pressing danger, namely, a dissolution of the Silesian army, until such time as your Lordship's sentiments can be known, I have judged it expedient to limit the advance to the sum above mentioned. There are likewise other possible contingencies, for which I must reserve the credit I possess at Vienna.

With regard to what will most chiefly interest your Lordship in my correspondence, namely, the hopes of Austrian co-operation, I will state at once that it depends upon the success of the allies. The best effects have certainly been

* Written previously to the receipt of the previous letter. — R. A.

produced here by the result of the actions of the 25th and 26th of December. Hitherto I have seen but little chance of Austria coming forward at all, but the language is greatly altered within these few days. I am assured that if the allies can maintain themselves without experiencing any further disaster until the spring, Austria will join us. The Russian Minister and myself, who are alone informed of these dispositions, are entreated earnestly to discourage at our respective Courts all propositions tending to peace. This is going far beyond what I could have expected a fortnight ago, at which time I had to send an account to government of the failure of the Emperor Alexander's efforts to engage this Court in a common alliance. I will not, however, be too sanguine even now. Should Bonaparte fall back upon the Oder without its being in the power of the Russians to follow him, I am afraid this government has not energy enough to take the only step which would enable them to follow him, namely, that of marching into Silesia and Saxony. The importance of this step, together with the danger of letting the French get possession of the Silesian fortresses has been demonstrated again and again to the Archduke Charles, but it seems impossible to make the government understand it.

Your Lordship will, therefore, perceive of what infinite use any communications with which you may honour me, must become in the view of determining Austria to declare herself. I allude of course chiefly to such communications as tend to exhibit in a favourable point of view the resources of Prussia, and the stability of her councils. Any advances towards peace in that quarter may be attended with the worst effects. I am not sure whether Major Krusemarck's last mission to St. Petersburg is yet known to the ministers here. Certainly I shall not be the first to tell them of it, and the same reason which determines me not to tell them of his journey, makes me likewise request of your Lordship to send me the earliest information of his return, and of the continued resolution of our allies, of which I will not permit myself to doubt, to prosecute the war to the utmost.

As it is possible that your Lordship may find much difficulty in obtaining any intelligence from the interior of Germany by a nearer way than Vienna, I will send you from time to

time such reports of what is passing as I receive through confidential channels. Generally speaking, great discontent and a disposition to have recourse to arms prevail in Germany. In Hesse a formidable insurrection has actually broken out, but as I do not know accurately the extent of it, I will not risk misleading your Lordship by statements which may prove exaggerated.

Your Lordship may depend upon hearing from me whenever this Court shall agree to join in the common cause. If that event should take place, I mean to suggest the propriety of despatching an intelligent Austrian officer to your Lordship, to concert the necessary measures with you in person. If you should happen to know any one in the service with whom you would more like to confer than another, I have no doubt but that he would be named at your desire.

I have now nothing further to trouble you with, except to mention that it would be of essential benefit to the public service, if Mr. Arbuthnot, our ambassador at Constantinople, could receive early intelligence of events in Poland. It is with the greatest difficulty that the Turks can be prevented from declaring in favour of France, and General Sebastiani's account of Bonaparte's successes, especially in Poland, have almost turned their heads. I do my best to keep Mr. Arbuthnot well informed, but as the French are between the Russians and Vienna, my accounts cannot reach Constantinople so soon as General Andréossy's.

I need scarcely suggest to your Lordship the utility likewise of sending me such intelligence as may be made use of for the common benefit here or in Sicily. I have constant communications with Capt. Campbell, who is off Trieste, and who has a sloop in the Adriatic always ready for my despatches.

I have the honour to be,

With great truth and regard, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. Stuart to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, Jan. 19th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE been favoured with yours by M. Pozzo's messenger; and before I proceed to relate what passed after the arrival of the communications sent by that opportunity, I must state a circumstance which has materially influenced the sentiments of this Court towards Austria.

Positive instructions from Count Stadion had induced General Meerfeldt to bring forward a peremptory representation respecting the non-execution of the orders said to have been sent from hence for the evacuation of Cattaro. This demand being unsupported by the reports which it was natural to expect from Count Razamoffsky, the Court of Petersburg was not prepared to receive with indulgence an unfavourable answer to the proposition transmitted through Colonel Pozzo di Borgo. Count Razamoffsky remained likewise silent as to the probable future dispositions of the Austrian government, and the language conveyed in your former letters held out hopes so contradictory to the assertions of General Meerfeldt, that I must freely confess I had in some degree given into the same mistake.

The evasion of every question on which this Court thought an explanation from that of Vienna indispensable, the refusal of Count Stadion to declare that future aggressions on the neutrality of that Power, which appeared to be meditated by France would be resisted, the general cold reception of the overtures from hence, the silence of the ambassador here, and the reserve maintained towards Razamoffsky, not only damped the expectations of the Russian ministers, but created a suspicion that an inclination to join the enemies of the alliance might possibly exist, and thinking, as you do, from my knowledge of the persons in power at Vienna, such a change to be improbable, I assure you my assertions that the panic created by the late numerous successes of the French was the principal cause from whence the answers lately received are to be traced, were extremely necessary, though perhaps not always entirely credited.

General Budberg in particular has frequently expressed uneasiness concerning the line of conduct which the Austrian government may think proper to adopt ; and has observed, though with much temper, that however their determination may be fatal to their own existence, or contrary to the interests of Russia, reproaches from hence will only irritate or increase the evil, but that no endeavour will be omitted to conciliate and to reclaim a Court suffering from the erroneous line of policy she has chosen ; although at the same time it cannot be expected under such circumstances that much consideration for their interests should bias the proceedings of Russia, whether on the side of Turkey or elsewhere.

The insinuation on your part, that it was possible the Court of Vienna might propose her intervention, to bring about a peace between the belligerent Powers was not followed by any proposition from General Meerfeldt or his government. The arrival, however, of M. Krusemarck, with a similar overture on the part of the Prussian Court, enabled me shortly after to ascertain the real sentiments of the Russian government upon that important subject, and though I am assured that terms incompatible with her own honour or derogatory to the connection with England will not be listened to at St. Petersburg, yet the answer which they experienced when M. Pozzo di Borgo's propositions were submitted to the Austrian ministers, induced his Imperial Majesty not wholly to reject the offer.

The public outcry against Austria is loud and unrestrained : the personal irritation of every one in the employment of that Court must, under such circumstances, be very great ; but whatever may be the reports on this subject which reach Vienna, I am willing to believe that, provided M. Pozzo, Count Razamoffsky, and yourself go hand in hand, no other feelings but good-will towards Russia, as the active enemy of France, will prevail on the spot. The views of the Emperor respecting Turkey have been satisfactorily explained in writing : the objects of the war against France, and the force employed to attain those objects are now well known ; nothing further therefore remains but to hush up the clamour created respecting Cattaro.

Why the Court of Vienna should press this subject so urgently, and why this government hesitate to give it up, are

not easily explained, but at all events the fewer irritating demands brought forward, and the less writing on the subject the better: I have said this to the ambassador, and although he admits the principle, I do not think he entirely acts conformably to his opinion, and I lament it; for these questions being either set aside or satisfactorily answered, there exists no reason why Austria should be suspected of unfavourable intentions towards the allies, because she has refused to take an active part in their support.

I hope, however, every negotiation on this subject will be exclusively arranged at Vienna, matters being there in the best hands, and I anxiously wish to hear from you, as the principal task of an English agent here must now depend upon the details which you transmit.

I beg to be remembered to Pozzo; and as the Marquis of Douglas is expected daily, I close my correspondence with many thanks for the interesting communications I have received.

Prince Kurakin has the gout, which I hope will continue long enough to prevent his departure for some months.

I remain, with the greatest truth,

My dear Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

CHARLES STUART.

P.S. May I beg you to forward the inclosed letter to its destination.

Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.

Memel, Jan. 26th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED your despatch of the 14th of January, the day before yesterday. I think that under the circumstances of the case, you did perfectly right to advance the 20,000 ducats to Count Finkenstein. My powers of granting subsidies are limited indeed; I shall mention the sum which I am at liberty

to give in cypher, and I was even told not to make use of these limited powers unless the occasion was urgent.

* * * * *

I came here with full powers accredited to a king, whom I expected to find at the head of his army. In this expectation I am disappointed, and nothing remains for me to do, but to perform the duty of a negotiator without any communication with my own government, and without being able to know what are their opinions on the present existing circumstances of affairs; however, I should be unworthy their confidence were I unwilling to take upon myself every degree of responsibility, when I see that the public service absolutely requires it. I therefore have thought it right to promise Count Zastrow that I would advance 500,000 dollars for the payment of the Silesian army; and I promised to write to you to furnish Count Finkenstein with money to the amount of that sum, in different payments as he may require. You will understand me that it is entirely my act, and not yours; that I am responsible to the English government, and not you; it is impossible that I could think of suffering fortresses to be surrendered, and an army to be disbanded for such a paltry consideration as seventy or eighty thousand pounds, particularly as this government has agreed to sign the treaty which relates to Hanoverian affairs, and to give up all pretensions to the future possession of that Electorate. There is also an article relating to the guaranty of Russia, by which Prussia pledges herself to ask for that guaranty. I fear it will be unavailing, as Russia is unwilling to consent; however, I can do no more, nor can I require any thing further on the part of this government. I am extremely happy that they have agreed to sign, otherwise I should have furnished with difficulty the sum of money which I now authorise you to pay. Though I suppose you are already informed of the result of Krusemarck's mission directly from Petersburg, I still think it right to acquaint you that a negociation for peace is on the tapis, that Krusemarck brought the consent of the Emperor of Russia, and that Zastrow has written a letter to Talleyrand, inclosing one from General Budberg to himself, which states that Russia had no objec-

tion to enter into a joint negotiation with Prussia and England, and names Lublin in Gallicia, where the intended Congress is to meet. I thought it right to mention to Zastrow, that I had that moment received a despatch from Petersburg, dated the 19th of January, which stated that the Emperor of Russia never would have agreed to the proposed negotiation had he not been influenced by the absolute refusal of Austria to enter into the war. I added that as I knew from you that the disposition of the latter Court was changed, and that Austria might be induced to co-operate with the allies, I did hope that the negotiation which had been entered into from mistaking the views of that Power, might not be persevered in. In answer, he read me the despatch of Count Finkenstein, which is at least as strong as yours, and states as forcibly the determination of Austria to come forward in the spring. In short, every thing is contained in it which I find in yours, except the declaration which you and the Russian ambassador received, expressing a wish that neither England nor Russia should enter into any negotiation. When I told it to Zastrow, whom I believe to be a very direct and honest man, it did not make any impression on his mind. I know him so well, that I am sure he was not acting, but that he really felt that it was, and is the intention of Austria to do nothing; and to be candid with you, I have the same apprehension. I cannot be persuaded that the situation of Bonaparte and his army is so desperate as is represented; I do not at all say that he may not be baffled in his designs against Poland, provided the Russian army is conducted with any ability. The seasons and the nature of the country may throw obstacles insurmountable in his way, and set limits to his ambition. As a military man, I am very much inclined to believe that France will never succeed against Russia in a contest on Russian ground, always with a proviso that the Russian generals are not blunderers, and have sense enough to avoid great general actions. At the same time that I make this acknowledgment in favour of Russia, I am convinced that in countries abounding in provisions with great chaussées and towns, the French have a real superiority over them.

The intelligence I get here is so bad, that nothing can

be relied on: they never have been able to give me an exact statement of the position of the French army, nor do they appear at all to have penetrated into the military views of Bonaparte, or into the probable plan of the campaign. I dare say there are many sick in his army, but there is nothing which ought to lead me to imagine that there is not an equal proportion in that of the Russians. They appear to have moved a great deal more than the French: they have been constantly advancing and retreating, and moving from right to left; when, on the contrary, I do not understand that the French, with the exception of Ney's corps, have been much in motion. The French hospitals are better taken care of than those of any other nation, with the exception of England. The Russians, I have always understood, are miserable in the extreme. I have entered into this part of the subject in order to let you into an opinion, or rather a conjecture of my own, which may not be at all founded, that it is not at all impossible that Bonaparte does not mean to persevere in his designs against Poland, and might be glad of an excuse to abandon them. In the present position of the French army, nothing would be so easy for him as to make an attack on the Austrian hereditary states, and by that means extricate himself out of the difficulties, or rather the embarrassments of his present situation. He might draw prodigious resources from Galicia, and march an army through Silesia into Bohemia; these are all military reasons which ought, and will induce Austria to be cautious, and not to act till the army of Bonaparte is thoroughly committed in the Polish war. The Archduke Charles is certainly a great officer, and they have many men of merit in their army; let nobody persuade you that there does not exist more military talent in the Austrian than in any other service in Europe, with the exception of the French; their soldiers are excellent, at least as good, perhaps better than those of any other nation. I wish most anxiously that they would act; I should have the greatest hope and reliance on them, but I am sure that the observations which I have just stated to you cannot have escaped their generals, and that they are perfectly alive to the dangers of their position.

I think it right to communicate to you, but in the utmost

confidence, that when I told the Russian *chargé des affaires* that I meant to send my brother and Sir Robert Wilson to the Russian army, he objected in the strongest manner. When I asked him for an explanation, he said that he must tell me in confidence that the greatest disorder had prevailed in that army, which had been represented to the Emperor by General Tolstoy, and that he knew it would be very disagreeable to General Beningsen and the chiefs of the Russian army, that English officers should see them in their present state. I told him that it was a duty which I owed to my own country, and that as probably we were to pay them, we must see them; that we came to act as soldiers, and not as spies; that the character of British officers was well known all over the Continent; that there were no men more anxious to acquire reputation than they were; that we came for the purpose of risking our lives with our allies; and if the gentlemen whom I sent were not received with the respect and attention which they so justly merited, I should make the strongest complaints to my government, who would undoubtedly remonstrate, and insist that their officers should be countenanced and respected in the allied army. I was obliged to use this language, because Marshal Kaminsky would not allow Colonel Sontag to remain at the Russian head-quarters; he was obliged to go to General Lestocq who commands the Prussian corps. I am sure that the King and government here are highly pleased with the determination which I have taken; it was absolutely necessary, as I shall now be enabled to know something of the real condition of that army: as yet I have been in a state of most perfect ignorance. I shall direct those gentlemen, if they find it necessary for the public service, to communicate immediately with you, as that will save a great deal of time, which may be of importance in case any very extraordinary event should take place.

I take the liberty of a friend, and write to you in the utmost confidence, without any disguise. I beg you will do the same, and that the freest communications may pass between us. I hear nothing from Germany but through your medium. I should therefore be very anxious to hear everything which is passing there. Zastrow tells me that

the intended negotiations will not paralyse the military operations. I should doubt it; but perhaps the season has done it most effectually already.

Lord Douglas arrived at Petersburg the 23d.

I have the honour to be,

My dear Sir,

With much regard,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson.

(Copy.)

Vienna, Feb. 3d, 807.

MY DEAR LORD,

THIS letter will be presented to you by Lieutenant Schepelar, an officer of great merit in the Austrian service, who has been recommended to me so strongly, and from so many quarters, that I make no scruple of complying with his request for a letter to you. Of his talents, and of the degree of service to be obtained from them, you will be the best judge. Of his zeal his journey will be a proof, as he undertakes it entirely from his own feelings, and with his own means.

I have now to thank you for your letter of the 30th Dec. by Mr. Walpole.* He did not arrive here until Thursday the 29th of January. He is quite disposed to return to you, and as soon as I have anything of importance to communicate I will undoubtedly send him.

I am happy to think you were already arrived at Konigsberg time enough to act as you did, respecting my despatch and the inclosure. My proposal was certainly not imagined in concert with the Austrian government, nor was it even known to them, but there is no saying how far this would have been believed by that of Prussia.

My hopes, I confess, were grounded upon the existence of

* The present Lord Orford. — R. A.

more liberal dispositions on the part of Prussia, dispositions of which I cannot even yet entirely renounce the hope without supposing the Count de Gotzen to have acted not only without authority, but intentionally, with a view of deceiving both Austria and myself. The fact is, that in the course of my correspondence with the Count de Gotzen, I have received from him direct authority to offer the occupation of Silesia to Austria. I am sorry to say that as yet Austria has discovered no disposition to listen to the proposal.

* * * * *

I perceive by the tenor of your letter that I have ventured a very hazardous step in advancing the 20,000 ducats, but I still hope you will not condemn it under the circumstances, especially when you hear that it has been of infinite service to the King's affairs in Silesia.

The Turks have declared war against Russia, but they have suffered M. d'Italinsky to leave Constantinople quietly. Mr. Arbuthnot is yet there. I expect his despatches every hour, and will contrive some means of forwarding them to England when they reach me.

Believe me, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P. S. I will send Mr. Walpole to you as soon as I receive some despatches which I am daily expecting from St. Petersburg.

Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.

(Copy.)

Memel, Feb. 8th, 1807.

MY DEAR ADAIR,

I AVAIL myself of this opportunity by an English messenger to inform you of what is passing here. Things have taken an unexpected, and certainly an unfavourable turn. On the 3d of February Bonaparte put himself at the head of his

whole army, and marched to attack the Russians near Allenstein: about 3 o'clock on that day there was some cannonading, and an affair, in which only a few battalions and squadrons were engaged on each side, took place, in which the Russians claim the advantage; however, General Beningsen, finding that the French were endeavouring to turn his left, he retired to Guttstad, from thence to Landsberg, and he has now taken a position between Allenberg and Welau, which threatens to take in flank any corps of the French that may move on to Königsberg. I know it is not General Beningsen's intention to risk a general action if he can avoid it, but if he remains where he is I think one must take place. Bonaparte will endeavour in the first instance to turn his left flank, and if the Russians are beaten, their retreat is a miserable one indeed. The armies of Essen and Beningsen are entirely separated; the consequences of these unfortunate events have been that some cannon, baggage, and magazines have been lost, particularly that of Seeburg, which was lately formed by the King of Prussia at a great expence by the particular desire of Beningsen. It was supposed here that Beningsen would have made a most obstinate stand at Allenstein; he wrote to that effect to Count Zastrow, and said that as he had taken an aide-de-camp of Bernadotte's with the whole of the disposition on the night before the intended action, he was then sure "*de son fait*," but with all this anticipated certainty of success he retired as soon as he was attacked. I rather hope that he will not make a stand in his present position. I always remonstrated strongly against the Russian army's making the movement which they did to cover Königsberg. I was persuaded of the danger of placing the whole force in such a *trouée*, where, if any misfortune happened, half their army would be obliged to lay down their arms. They are now convinced themselves of the imprudence of these movements. If they should receive no other punishment for them but the loss of military reputation, it will be fortunate indeed both for the Russians themselves, and the common cause.

I have received your despatch of the 23d of January, and will forward the inclosure to Lord Howick by the first opportunity.

I send you inclosed a letter from her Majesty the Queen

of Prussia to her sister, which you will have the goodness to forward to Ratisbon.

I have the honour to be, my dear Adair,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

Le Comte de Gotzen to Mr. A.

(Copy.)

Glatz, ce 7 Février 1807.

MONSIEUR,

JE ne puis me refuser la satisfaction de vous témoigner ma grande reconnaissance de ce que vous avez bien voulu nous procurer la somme de 20,000 ducats* sans laquelle nous n'aurions pas été en état ni de pourvoir pour le moment au besoin des troupes réglées, et de l'approvisionnement des forteresses encore dans notre pouvoir, qui sont d'une importance si évidente pour le succès des opérations des armées alliées, ni à la levée de troupes en forme de corps francs destinées à des diversions absolument nécessaires pour notre existence. Retranchés par l'ennemi à un petit coin de la Silesie, le reste absolument dévasté par ses troupes de brigands, nous ne manquons pas d'hommes, qui nous accourent en masse, mais bien d'armes et d'habillement que nous ne nous pouvons procurer qu'à grands frais, et l'épée à la main. Le manquement de canons disponibles contre un ennemi qui ne fait point de patrouille sans une batterie nous réduit à des surprises, sans pourtant oser trop nous exposer, pour ne pas intimider notre troupe qui commence à devenir très brave.

Mais quel dommage pour la suite des opérations si ces forteresses si formidables, bien garnies de troupes et de canons, qui ne manquaient pas à l'ennemi mais bien à nous, tomberaient encore dans son pouvoir par manque de nécessaires, comme aussi cette cavallerie de deux mille chevaux, et ce corps de Chasseurs de mille hommes que nous avons levé depuis peu, qui s'augmenteront tous les jours, et que l'on pourroit facilement augmenter à l'incroyable, s'il ne falloit pas tant ménager l'ar-

* See Despatch of Jan. 23. 1807, with the two Inclosures, p. 176.

gent que nous ne pouvons plus tirer de la partie envahie par l'ennemi ? Et pourtant ce n'est que par là que nous sommes probablement en état de sauver le Comté de Glatz, qui par les montagnes qui l'entourent doit être notre dernier asile, si l'ennemi dans sa retraite inondoit ces contrées, ce qui est très vraisemblable.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur, par ce petit tableau de l'état dans lequel nous nous trouvons, combien je vous dois être obligé, et combien il est nécessaire qu'il ne nous manque pas d'argent.

Je désire que l'occasion se présente bientôt où je vous pourrais témoigner en personne l'estime avec laquelle

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signé) LE COMTE DE GOTZEN.

Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.

(Copy.)

Memel, Feb. 27th, 1807.

MY DEAR ADAIR,

YOUR despatch of the 3d of February by Lieut. Schepelar arrived here on the 17th. That officer appears to be a man of merit. I will do every thing in my power to serve him. I doubt, however, whether my exertions can be useful to him or not. Apropos, on the subject of couriers, you ought to take some measures that those passing between you and me should not be stopped on the Austrian territories; the delay may be of the worst possible consequences: it is so easy to distinguish an Englishman, particularly an English gentleman, from any other man, that I wonder they do it; if no other means can be devised, you must send me two or three blank Austrian passports, which I will fill up as occasions may require. By some mistake in the Foreign Office I am only in possession of cypher *, so that what you have written at the conclusion of your letter is to me unintelligible; have the goodness therefore in future to use that cypher. Having discovered that this government had made an offer to Austria to put the remaining Silesian fortresses into their hands, I took the opportunity of saying that you had long since, in your zeal for the service of Prussia, suggested that idea to me, but

that I, from delicacy to them, had not thought it expedient at the moment to lay your communication before them. I then repeated to them again how much they were obliged to you for all your conduct on the subject of the troops and fortresses in Silesia. It is a very extraordinary thing that, notwithstanding all our united efforts to preserve so valuable a part of the Prussian dominions, I never was told that any such offer had been made to Austria, and I only discovered it by accident. Zastrow tells me that the offer was not only rejected, but they would not listen to it even for a moment. It appears to me to be clear that if Austria does not declare now, she never can think of doing it after the remaining Silesian fortresses shall have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

I send you an account of the battle of Preuss Eylau, written by my brother, who was present. The Russians certainly repulsed the French in every attack; they say they were victorious. The loss of men on both sides has been immense. There are 800 wounded Russian officers in Königsberg, and from 8,000 to 10,000 privates; what has happened is a proof that though the Russians may repulse the French, they cannot gain a victory, or at least profit by one. Jealousies, faction, and insubordination prevail in their army beyond all imagination. Beningsen has requested leave from the Emperor to resign. There is now every appearance that the French are going to retire behind the Vistula; whether it is from want of provisions or because Bonaparte means to give up his designs on Poland, it is difficult to ascertain. I am apprehensive that he means to leave this part of the world, and to concentrate himself behind the Oder. The Silesian fortresses once in his hands, I think the army of Russia alone, with the now feeble assistance of Prussia, will probably never be strong enough to force the enemy to abandon it; with Mecklenburg and Pomerania on one flank, and Silesia on the other, with Saxony in their rear, they may subsist for ever. Everything, therefore, now depends on Austria; if ever she means to engage with France again, certainly now is the time to recover her glory and possessions. The Turkish war is certainly a most unfortunate event, and the policy of Russia on this occasion is undoubtedly a reasonable cause of jealousy to the Court at which you reside.

General Bertrand, an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, brought to the King a letter from the French Emperor on the 15th. The letter was only in the usual style of compliment, but Bertrand made a verbal declaration, both to Zastrow and the King, that his master was willing to enter into a separate negociation with Prussia, and to restore his Majesty to his dominions. The offer I believe was only in general terms; it has been rejected. I saw the letter of the King of Prussia to the Emperor of Russia, in which he leaves the decision entirely to him in this negociation. There never has been any question as to England; indeed, we are not even in alliance with Prussia: I signed a treaty of peace, but nothing more. I have now only to repeat to you again that every thing depends upon Austria. It is unfortunate that they have no minister here: probably it would not be advisable that they should send one; it might give cause of suspicion, but you may therefore, in my name, assure the Austrian government, and particularly the Archduke Charles, that I never will deceive them as to the situation of military affairs in this country and the probable designs of this Court. If you should find any disposition in the Austrian government to act, and they should desire further information on the state of things here, I will send my brother to you to Vienna, who is at present with the Russian army; though not an officer, he is a man of great military talents and experience, has constantly served with me, and is as capable of giving military opinions or making military arrangements as I am. If you should wish him to come, only take care that no time should be lost, and that he should not be stopped on the frontiers. Let me know whether you can make out my cypher.

I am, my dear Adair,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

* * * * *

Inclosure referred to in the preceding letter.

Mr. Hutchinson to Lord Hutchinson.

Konigsberg, Monday Feb. 9th, 1807.

MY DEAR JOHN,

THE different marches of the Russian army from Morungen, which we left on the 3d instant, to Preuss Eylau, where we arrived on the 7th, having taken the direction of Jankova, Wolsdorf, Frauensdorf, and Landsberg, you are already acquainted with. The first movement to Jankova, in the neighbourhood of Allenstein, which the enemy had approached, you cannot but have censured, the more so as General Beningsen had declared that it was his object to avoid a general action; at the same moment placing himself in a situation where it was evident he must fight should the enemy wish it, or dispirit and weary his troops by night marches, and through a sea of sand, in order to avoid as long as possible the evil moment which was to decide the fate and interests of all the Powers of Europe. On the 4th the enemy failed in his attempt to dislodge us from two different parts of our very extended position at Jankova; but on the evening of that day he pushed forward a corps, and made rather an obstinate reconnoissance. The defence of the rear-guard of the Russian army during the four following days, against a much superior force, was vigorous and able. On the evening of the 6th at Landsberg, the enemy having driven in the rear-guard, showed himself for the first time in force on the opposite hills to our camp, when night prevented his attempting any thing. On the following evening at Preuss Eylau, he took possession of that village which lay at the front of our position in a valley separating us from a range of sand hills, over which he had to pass in approaching from Landsberg. We had taken up our position on the morning of the 7th, and had originally occupied this village, and two others in the same valley, towards our right; but all of which were on the approach of evening abandoned by our troops, owing to some mistake. The enemy, who had advanced a corps along the range of hills in our front, immediately pushed for

these villages, particularly that of Preuss Eylau, from which he was at length driven with considerable loss on both sides, but of which he again took possession during the night, this village having been a second time abandoned by the Russians, though not attacked, I believe, owing to the general who commanded there being wounded, and who had retired behind the camp to head-quarters to be dressed, having, however, left another general to fill his place. The position of the Russians from right to left extended about one English mile, and from front to rear nearly as much; to the right the country was open for a considerable way, but on the left at some little distance, there were woods and ravines. The front was strong, in consequence of the valley I have mentioned; and from the nature of the hills opposite, from which the enemy had to descend, he could not approach with an extended front; besides, in his ascent from the valley to the Russian position, he had to encounter a very formidable range of batteries, consisting on the whole along the front line of nearly one hundred pieces. The whole of the Russian and Prussian artillery amounted (as they inform us) to seven hundred pieces! Several guns were placed during the night at that point of our position which overlooked the town of Preuss Eylau, and at daybreak yesterday morning this battery was opened against the town; after a little time a strong column of infantry issued from the town, and advanced nearly to the battery, from which they were driven with considerable loss, when they fell back on a strong corps of troops, posted at some distance opposite in one of the ravines which ran nearly parallel to our front, therefore not commanded by it, and consequently could not be enfiladed by our cannon. At the same time the enemy appeared in several lines on the opposite hills further back than this first corps, extending along our front, and particularly annoyed us from the villages by their tirailleurs; they had brought up also on different points some guns, which, however, had little effect, whilst our batteries were making a tremendous noise to little purpose. After some time the enemy annoyed us much by the fire from several heavy pieces of ordnance, which he had most judiciously, and with great quickness, placed on the commanding points of the opposite hills: and at length availing himself of the smoke and a snow storm, he attempted to

reach our first line with two strong columns of infantry, which were literally cut to pieces by the Russian cavalry, notwithstanding the ocean of snow through which they had to wade, and that down hill. The enemy again had recourse to his batteries, from which we suffered much, when at last his cavalry had the boldness to advance, and did actually reach our lines, where it suffered much, and from whence it was, in a short time, driven by our cavalry, whose conduct then, during the whole of the day, and in all the affairs of rear guards, has been most heroic. The sharp-shooting and discharges from the batteries still continued to do us some mischief; but by the hour of twelve, that is, about five hours and a half from the commencement of the action, the advantages were all on the side of the Russians, who had certainly lost many men by the intrepidity, perhaps inconsiderate rashness of their cavalry, in charging through ground where they were exposed to great disadvantage, but where, notwithstanding, they were always successful, and gloriously so. Still I say, notwithstanding their losses from this and other attacks from batteries, &c., all the advantages were to the Russians, and hitherto the enemy had completely failed: he had, I supposed, very early experienced how impossible it was to attack us with success in front; on our right, the country was open for a considerable distance, so that we could have been apprised immediately of any advance from that quarter. Not so the left, where, as I informed you, there were sand hills and wood. There had been repeated requests made to the Russian chiefs to be most active in watching the enemy's movements in this direction, and I was assured that every necessary precaution had been observed; the distance from the extreme left to where the serious attacks in front were made did not admit of personal observation. At about one o'clock, however, notwithstanding our success, some of the Russian corps of infantry fell back from the left, where at the moment they were not attacked, as also some corps of cavalry, though covered with glory. At this instant the enemy (who had been, I doubt not, for several hours getting his troops through the different defiles and woods on our left) appeared in the rear of the left, where he had already succeeded in bringing up, with certainly vast difficulty, some pieces of artillery,

which he placed on the summit of the ridges, and from whence he succeeded by his fire to convert the heroes of the morning into the very cowards of the evening! for neither cavalry nor infantry, which I said was without cause falling back, could now, when attacked in the rear of the left of its camp, be prevailed upon to advance to the point of the left which was thus threatened, or in part to re-occupy his former position in front, which the enemy from the opposite hills soon perceived to be deserted, and in consequence again attacked, but fortunately without success, from the exertion of the troops, which were brought up from other quarters. In this most extraordinary revolution—in this most unlooked for and cruelly mortifying reverse of fortune, where troops which should

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found necessary to request of General Lestocq, who was supposed and reported to General Beningsen to be actually in the rear of his camp, to advance towards the front to impose by the appearance of his infantry upon the enemy. But Lestocq was at this critical moment three British miles from us, and did not arrive before three o'clock: by this time the enemy had taken up a strong and formidable position on our left flank, in the rear of it; and when a panic once seizes troops your experience informs you how sadly distressing is the situation of the general commanding. The enemy could at first, without much loss, have been compelled to abandon his new position; but by the time Lestocq arrived he had made it a very strong one. It extended beyond the extremity of our left flank, occupying two small woods, which were about equal distances from his centre; the whole of this space was filled with tirailleurs, artillery, and other corps in line. The enemy did not, however, advance; he only cleared that part of our position, particularly the rear of it, by his guns, having placed himself in a most formidable and menacing position, in accomplishing which I cannot but think he displayed great military proficiency, by which he deprived us almost entirely of the hitherto commanding advantage of our situation in front, and which he could not have accomplished but by the best organized troops. He never ceased occupying our attention in the front with his light corps, having also pushed some troops towards the right of our front who threatened us

occasionally. Lestocq came into our camp by our right, with I suppose about thirteen thousand men; they say much more, but I don't give entire credit to camp accounts: however, he immediately directed himself by our rear to the left, and advanced in two lines upon the right of the new position of the enemy, while the Russians advanced against him at the other extremity, and also towards his centre. The enemy appeared inclined to advance through our camp from left to right, but there was no light for this, and the thing terminated in an affair of sharp-shooting from and against the woods, as also in a mutual exchange of great guns, by which some valuable lives were lost. I should mention that, during all this time, the front of the line was engaged, as I have before stated. The day closed, leaving the enemy in his new position, though certainly threatened with a very formidable attack, and most likely to be driven from it in the morning, at the same time in a position very menacing to us. At night the enemy opened a battery upon us rather on our right, which we were informed was done by the corps of Bernadotte. The artillery ammunition had been suffered to be most unnecessarily and uselessly expended. The Russian chiefs were early cautioned not to permit this. The army had not been well fed for some days; I cannot say, however, that provisions were wanting to the whole of the army, though many of the men had been a long time without food. They had fought well for some days, during which they had sustained great fatigue and privations of every kind, and during the greater part of this day they had displayed the most undaunted courage, and had in every instance foiled the enemy in his attacks, and gained the superiority over him, except in manœuvring, in which I think he showed most signal talent. I allude to his new position, which he conceived as a great general, and executed with the greatest precision and ability. We were still in possession of the field of battle, yet notwithstanding it was resolved to fall back, which we did during the night, leaving Lestocq, who had taken up a position as I have stated, to cover the retreat. The Russians are at about nine miles from hence and ten from where they fought. I don't hear that Lestocq has been attacked, or that the French advance in any direction. Lestocq's affair of last night was very trifling, though they say (Wilson of the number!) that

he had his horse shot—*mais supposons cela!* Though the French may not have lost in the long fight of yesterday a great number of men, still their loss must have been considerable, and the dismay of the troops great indeed, for undoubtedly the Russians have not the smallest dread of them, and that they know. The Russian army, on the other hand, are for the moment nearly disorganized—at least in a most astonishing state of confusion! Not unlike that which one sees occasionally in a Turkish army; still I believe and doubt not that a sufficient number can be collected, to enable the superior officers, who are really a very fine set of fellows, and possessed of the most indignant feeling against the French power, to make another very formidable resistance to M. Bonaparte, should he wish to persevere. He certainly ought to feel greatly mortified by the frequent and decisive repulses he experienced yesterday, and the resistance which a very superior number of his troops met for several days from a very small rear-guard of the Russians. As I said before, I still am of opinion that the real Russian gentleman, and soldier from his native strength and undaunted disposition, when well led on by this said gentleman, who appears naturally proud and brave, are capable with a little assistance in the way of military heads, &c., of opposing effectually the further progress of Napoleon in these parts at least. The loss on both sides yesterday must have been very considerable, though not as much as it should have been, considering the number of hours we were engaged, from half past six till half past five. I don't take any account of a few bloody night scenes which followed. I fear the wounded are sadly off; what we witnessed in that way was dreadfully affecting indeed. Our (Wilson and mine) obligations to Beningsen and his officers are great. A very good horse of his, which I rode yesterday, was badly wounded in two places. I don't think I can offer to pay for it; but should the black mare be in good condition, and that you have no objection, I think I may at least present her Ladyship to him as a return for his horse, which, I fear, will never be perfectly well. All the villages we passed through have been ruined, as might have been expected. The action of yesterday destroyed several. Kind regards to all the party.

Monday night, $\frac{1}{4}$ past 5.

I have been most tedious, and I fear, dull and tiresome, from a wish to put you in possession of our position and the nature of our attack. I believe the Russian strength, from what I saw yesterday, to exceed what I stated it before. I have come into Königsberg for the night, but shall return to camp in the morning.

I think in a few days we shall see you.

General Fox to Mr. A.

Messina, Mar. 6th, 1807.

DEAR SIR,

I AM to thank you for your letter of the 17th January, which has given us all here the greatest satisfaction, and I trust and hope the effects of the considerable check the French have met with will give a general turn to their affairs, and that the Powers on the Continent will not lose this opportunity of re-establishing their independence. I have only to say how thankful I shall be for any communication you are so good as to make to me, as we are always a long time hearing from England, and the Continental Gazettes that we are likely to receive here, you must well know, cannot be in the least depended upon, being entirely under the direction of the French.

According to a secret letter from England, I have sent 5,000 men under the command of General Fraser to occupy Alexandria in Egypt. They sailed this day under the convoy of the Tigre.

I hope you received my letter of the 21st January.

I have the honour to be,

With great truth and regard,

Your most faithful and obedient Servant,

J. R. C. Fox.

*Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.**(Copy.)*

Memel, April 1st, 1807.

MY DEAR ADAIR,

I HAVE waited a long time for some intelligence worthy of communication to give you. I have at length received despatches from England, but as the messenger, unluckily for me, was both a gentleman and an officer * * *

he passed six weeks on his journey, and amused himself for a fortnight at Copenhagen. I see by the English papers that another messenger left London on the 7th of March. I can entertain but little doubt that he has been taken, as there is a privateer known to be out from Stettin, and merchant ships, which left Yarmouth roads on the 27th, arrived here several days ago. I requested them to send out my despatches by a cutter, but, alas! those who are at a distance always imagine themselves to be better informed than those on the spot. My last accounts from England were only of the 20th of February; the treaty which I signed on the 28th of January had not then been received; so there is nothing new or interesting. The Emperor arrives here to-morrow; he is accompanied by Novosilzow and Budberg: I cannot tell you whether Lord Douglas comes or not; as I have not heard that he does, I should rather suppose the contrary. The first division of the Russian guards arrive on the Memel to-morrow; as soon as the whole line have joined General Beningsen, he purposes to make an attack on the French position. Bonaparte has still his head-quarters at Osterode, where they say he has constructed a magnificent house for himself. The Emperor does not mean to take the command of the army, though he probably will go to the neighbourhood of it, and continue some time there: the King of Prussia will accompany him, and I shall follow his Majesty; so that you may depend on having from me the earliest information of military events. I think it right to acquaint you that I have proposed to the government of England, that a large body, or rather an army of British and Swedish troops should assemble in Pomerania, act on the left bank of the Oder, besiege Stettin, which is a very bad place with a small garrison, and perhaps Custrin,

and by that means open the communication with Berlin, the Elbe, and the rest of Germany. I think we can send thirty thousand men, including the German Legion, but at least twenty-five thousand. The Swedes can give ten thousand men at least, and if pressed and paid, fifteen thousand; so that the whole might compose an army of forty thousand men, placed in a situation where they might render the most essential services, and with a most excellent retreat in case of misfortune behind the river Peene and Stralsund, which is, as you know, a most excellent place in summer.

I have read Count Gotzen's paper over and over again; I have neither power, authority, nor inclination to enter into such schemes. *Entre nous*, there appears to me to be in England a very laudable design of sparing the public purse: I enter into it most heartily; I am glad I have done so. They have got it into their heads here, founded on accounts from Troppau and Cracow, that the Austrians are at length determined to take a part in the war, and to act with the allies. I do not give any countenance to this idea; it would be neither right nor honest to act in that manner, till I have assurances from you that something is likely to be done in your quarter. I satisfy myself with saying that they may be better informed than you are, as to the intentions of the Austrian government; but I am without any authority from you to assure them that it is in the contemplation of the Court of Vienna to give that assistance, which, in the present crisis, would undoubtedly be decisive. Till so desirable an event happens, it is better to rely on our own strength, which is very great, and not to follow false illusions, which must lead to misconceived plans of military operations, and end in ultimate disappointment.

I send you a private letter which I opened by mistake, but which I closed again immediately; it came alone, and was put into my hands by an ignorant master of a vessel, so that of course I conceived it was for myself. Nothing new from the army. The Cossack war still continues, and they have taken a number of prisoners from the enemy. I have forwarded all your letters and papers to Garlike.

Believe me ever,

My dear Adair,

Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

*Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.**(Copy)*

Memel, April 5th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AVAIL myself of the opportunity of Mr. Baker, to write you a few lines. The Emperor remained here only two or three days, and then went, accompanied by the King of Prussia, to visit the Russian guards at Georgenburg, where they will remain two or three days, and then I rather think they will both proceed to the army. What is to be done there is the doubt: whether we are to enter into a negociation for peace or continue the war, I defy any man alive to predict.

I take it for granted that you have got from England a copy of the instructions sent to Lord Douglas on the 6th of March; you see that we consent to enter into a negociation, a joint one, with Prussia and Russia, but we are determined to make no sacrifices to purchase a peace for Prussia. There has been nothing doing of any consequence with the army for a great while; Bonaparte is still in his old position, nor does he appear willing to quit it. General Beningsen talks of attacking the French when his reinforcements arrive; I believe it is only talk. The position of the French is a strong one, in a country full of lakes, marshes, and defiles, where they would have every advantage. The frost is now entirely breaking up: the country will be one sea of water; the roads almost impassable for cannon, and difficult for cavalry. I see amongst the Russians a great hesitation whether they shall attack or not.

If Bonaparte offered any basis which could be accepted, I am sure they would negotiate; there can be no doubt that it is in their contemplation so to do, as Baron Budberg is to be here in six or eight days. Novosilzoff came with the Emperor. Strogonow got here yesterday, and I am told Czar-toriski is expected.

Nothing can be more uncertain than the posture of our affairs; every thing depends upon events, and particularly upon the favourable intelligence which you may send us from your quarter. I had nearly forgotten to mention to you that Baron Hardenberg is, or is likely to be, minister for foreign affairs. This was chiefly brought about by the efforts

of the Emperor, but I gave my assistance, as I was ordered by my instructions so to do. This change has rather a warlike appearance, but you may depend on it things are just as I stated them to be, and that if the French are reasonable, they may possibly negotiate. Prussia will urge Russia, and there are many reasons which ought to have the tendency to make Russia herself wish for negotiation.

I think I shall not stay many days longer here, but go to the head-quarters, where there must be discussions on several important questions. You shall hear from me as soon as I am in possession of any thing worthy of communication, which I dare say will be soon, as things cannot remain long in their present state. I should not imagine there was any serious danger for Dantzic.

Believe me ever,

My dear Sir,

Yours most truly,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson.

(Copy.)

Vienna, April 6th, 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I SHOULD have informed you before this, if I had found an opportunity, of my having advanced a further sum of 240,000 dollars to the Count de Gotzen, on his Prussian Majesty's account just previous to his departure from Vienna. This makes in all 500,000 dollars, which, according to the rate of exchange at Vienna, amounts to 87,719*l.*, 5*s.*, 9*d.*; for which I drew bills on the Treasury at three different periods.

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Since writing to you last, we have had but bad accounts from Constantinople. I have nothing direct from Arbuthnot; but it appears that on March 4th, until which period the negotiations continued, Duckworth repassed the Dardanelles without having effected any thing. We have now therefore

a Turkish war to carry on, which, if not speedily finished, may produce fatal consequences to the common cause.

I have great satisfaction in adding, however, that orders have just been received here from Petersburg by M. Pozzo, to proceed instantly to Constantinople to make peace. The perfect integrity of the Turkish Empire is the basis on which he is to negotiate.

You will know by this time that Bonaparte has acceded to the offer of Austria, to mediate for a general peace. I should be astonished at his having done so, considering that the pretensions of Austria are nothing less than a thorough revision and re-settlement of the affairs both of Germany and Italy, were it not evident that he calculates upon the advantage of at least a month's delay before Austria can declare against him, and that in the mean time he hopes to strike some important blow against the Russian army, which, I fear, the reinforcements he has received will but too surely enable him to accomplish.

I send you, by Walpole, the official copy of the Emperor of Austria's invitation to his Majesty to accept his good offices for the restoration of peace; and, having scarcely a moment to write, I refer you to him for other matters of a confidential nature, of which I have made him master.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. A. to the Marquis of Douglas.

Vienna, April 3d, 1807.

MY LORD,

IT is with infinite concern that I have now to inform your Lordship, that his Majesty's fleet repassed the Dardanelles on the 4th of March, without having attempted any thing against the city of Constantinople.

As I am for the present utterly unacquainted with the motives which occasioned this determination on the part either of Mr. Arbuthnot, or of the admiral commanding the squadron, I can only simply state the fact, together with

the effects which have attended it both at Constantinople and at Vienna.

At Constantinople all British property has been seized, and all British subjects declared prisoners of war: General Sebastiani is completely master of the Turkish Empire.

At Vienna all the original alarms upon the subject of a Turkish war protracted to an indefinite time, have been renewed, and the approaches to a good understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg have been retarded.

I cannot find words sufficiently strong to express to your Lordship the mischief which all this has occasioned to the general system of our foreign relations. It happens most unfortunately, likewise, that much about the time of the arrival of this intelligence, representations were received from the Count de Meerfeldt, tending to impress this Court with an opinion that the British government had adopted a totally new system with regard to those relations. I think it right to state that these representations of Count de Meerfeldt were grounded upon a conference with your Lordship soon after your arrival at St. Petersburg, in which you are supposed to have declared that Great Britain had now very little to do with foreign affairs, and that her plan of policy would henceforward be regulated more according to the principle of separation from the Continent than of union with it.

When this was told me by Count Stadion, to whom it had been represented by Count Meerfeldt, I could not help answering that this statement differed so widely from the whole tenor of the instructions I had received both from Mr. Fox and from Lord Howick, that I could not but conclude Count Meerfeldt had misunderstood you.

Not only were his Majesty's intentions to support the King of Prussia to the utmost distinctly communicated to me by government, but I have been authorised from the very first to promise the most liberal assistance to Austria herself in case of necessity.

His Majesty's ministers have also been regularly apprised of the support I have given to the negotiation for a general concert now carrying on by M. Pozzo di Borgo, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that my conduct has hitherto met with their approbation.

If your Lordship will take the trouble of reading my correspondence with Mr. Stuart, you will see what have been the principles and the views on which that conduct has been regulated; you will find them to have been strictly conformable to the principles and views of Mr. Fox, and consequently to those which I have no doubt your Lordship under similar circumstances would have yourself adopted.

I dwell particularly upon this topic, thinking it of the deepest importance to the cause in which we are so closely united with the Court of St. Petersburg, that no misapprehension whatever should subsist with regard to the fundamental principles of policy which actuate his Majesty's present advisers in regard to foreign affairs, and in order that the earliest opportunity should be afforded to Count Meerfeldt of correcting the intelligence he has transmitted to his Court upon this subject.

It has this day been officially communicated to me that Bonaparte had accepted the Emperor of Austria's mediation for a general peace.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c. &c.

R. A.

The Marquis of Douglas to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, April 11th, 1807.

MY GOOD SIR,

I DO not know whether I was more hurt or surprised by the receipt of your letter of the 3d of April; feeling, however, that the opinion Count Stadion has imbibed may place you in a very awkward situation, and impede the progress of public business, I have resolved upon sending off a person immediately, with a view of correcting an error, that, from whatever mistake it may have arisen, ought to be corrected with the utmost promptitude.

I had no sooner received your letter than I repaired to General Meerfeldt; and as we are upon the most friendly terms, I thought I could not do better than show him that part of it wherein you state that, in consequence of an official communi-

cation from him, grounded upon a conference with me, Count Stadion had expressed himself as being impressed with an opinion that the British government was disposed to adopt a new system with regard to her foreign relations; that England had little to do with foreign affairs, and that her plan of policy would henceforward be regulated more according to the principle of separation from the Continent, than of union with it. Nothing can be more contrary to the system of Great Britain, nothing more adverse to the disposition of government, nothing more in contradiction to the policy evidently manifesting itself through all Europe, and nothing more diametrically opposite to every feeling and opinion of my own.

General Meerfeldt, not feeling that his despatches had given any ground to Count Stadion for similar conclusions, appeared not a little surprised at the contents of your letter, and in reply to satisfy me showed me the two despatches that he supposed were alluded to, and wherein he has reported some conversations we have had together upon general subjects. I find there *some hypothetical remarks and conditional inferences of mine*, but I can discover nothing, according to my opinion, that leads even to a suspicion that Great Britain has altered, or intended to alter, the system of policy she has so long and so strenuously espoused; and I am persuaded Count Meerfeldt will be ready to do me the justice to acknowledge that, far from appearing to alienate the British government from Continental concerns, I have more than once expressed her extreme anxiety upon the subject, and reasoned the point of co-operation with the General, insinuating that if the satisfying peculiar views, or the acquiring lost territory, would induce Austria to take a decided step, it was more than probable that England would lend her assistance in support of these pretensions. It is unnecessary that I should say any thing more upon this business. It is altogether erroneous. General Meerfeldt is to write by this courier to Count Stadion, to correct a misunderstanding, that I hope has not yet been able to do any mischief, and I send this *éclaircissement* to you, wishing you to read it to the minister at Vienna, assuring him how much he is mistaken as to the views of the English government, their conduct, and mine; moreover, I have communicated to Lord Howick this strange misconception, at the

same time adding that I am persuaded no evil consequences can ensue, having immediately myself contradicted it in the most unequivocal terms, and assured the Austrian government through your means that Great Britain felt the same unabated interest towards the Continent that has characterised her whole proceedings.

Having said thus much, I trust I may expect to hear shortly that Count Stadion's erroneous conception of British policy is done away: I should be glad were I to hear likewise that Austria was so firmly persuaded of the loyal and honourable proceedings of Great Britain and Russia, that she was resolved to make common cause with them, and assist in restoring to Europe some relative equilibrium, without which no pacification can be either satisfactory, secure, or permanent. I should have rejoiced to have heard the mediation of Austria announced in another style. With such a document there ought to be an accompanying clause to serve as guaranty of her intentions and her consequence.

This subject naturally leads me to the co-operation of Austria, at this moment so desirable; and I cannot refrain from observing that it appears to me that could personal animosities be laid aside, and personal views be fully understood, an union might be brought about. The jealousy and pride of Austria will never permit her to avow her views or admit her mortification to Russia; she nevertheless must be awake to these sentiments, and perhaps would be candid enough to confess them to you, in which case I would convey them to this Court, on my part using every delicacy towards feelings that must be wounded.

Would Austria suggest a general view of future and conditional arrangements in Germany? It is evident that the present system of things has not only destroyed the relative situation of individual possession, but Empire itself has assumed a novel character with these various changes of limitation.

I have expressed to the government here, in consequence of a letter from Lord Howick, a wish that Razamoffsky should use every argument in his power to persuade Austria that his Imperial Majesty has no views of aggrandisement upon the frontiers of Turkey; this has been suggested with a hope of destroying that jealousy which you must discover at Vienna

upon many occasions. Be so good as to find out if the Russian ambassador has exerted himself upon this subject; for although I despair of seeing Austria in the field of battle, yet it is a satisfaction to remove every plausible pretext that is brought forward to justify their inactivity at this critical moment.

If you should not have heard from home upon the subject of a congress, should one ever be in agitation, perhaps it may be satisfactory to you to know that Lord Howick has desired me to object to Lublin, as a place too distant from the seat of the British government. Copenhagen would be preferred, or even Hamburg. I send you this information, as, should it first fall to your lot (as it is most probable) to hear that such a thing is in agitation, you will be enabled to state with certainty the wishes of Great Britain upon the occasion.

You will have heard of the discussions with Count Bernstorff upon the subject of Husum. He wished to exclude the English from that port; however, M. Garlike has persuaded, or rather alarmed the Danes into an acquiescence. There is a probability of some agreement with Sweden, by which an additional force will be on foot to distract the attention of Bonaparte; and it is not impossible that some British cavalry may appear upon the Continent. This probably is not new to you.

I send you herewith a letter I have received from England for Mr. Arbuthnot. As you will probably have an opportunity of conveying it to him sooner than I shall, I have resolved upon forwarding it to Vienna.

The courier that brings this letter is a man of Mr. Arbuthnot's (who was forwarded here with despatches and whom I was requested by him to take care of). As he wishes to get away from here, and as he will be nearer his master at Vienna than at St. Petersburg, I have made use of him as my messenger, and must request in Mr. Arbuthnot's name that you will take him under your protection.

I am, with the greatest truth,

My good Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

DOUGLAS AND CLYDESDALE.

Mr. A. to the Marquis of Douglas.

Vienna, April 8th, 1807.

MY LORD,

I RECEIVED several packets and your Lordship's three private letters, by the last Russian courier: I am greatly obliged to you for them, and likewise for your expressions of personal civility towards myself.

I beg your Lordship in return will command my services here in all things.

Herewith I inclose the extract of a despatch I have just received from England of the 7th of March. May I request that you would have the goodness to communicate it to Baron Budberg; and I should also think it would not be amiss to read it to Count Meerfeldt. The despatch is in answer to one from me, in which I expressed a wish that some distinct manifestation of the opinion of his Majesty's government should be sent out to me respecting the entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia and Wallachia; I desired this, in order to make use of the authority of the British Cabinet at this Court, for the purpose of allaying those jealousies on the part of Austria, which at one time wore a very formidable aspect. As I have reason to think that this despatch, which contains so explicit a declaration of the sentiments of government respecting Turkish affairs, may prove of the utmost consequence to the success of the negociation which Colonel Pozzo di Borgo is instructed to open with the Ottoman Porte for the restoration of peace, it is my intention to furnish him with a copy of this part of it, together with the strongest recommendation to Mr. Arbuthnot to concert with M. Pozzo the best means of assisting the generous views of the Emperor of Russia.

Your Lordship's ideas respecting the importance of bringing about a thorough good understanding between the Courts at which we respectively reside, are most correct. Every thing, both now and hereafter, depends upon it—the present safety of the world, and the existence of anything like a federative system for the future. In this point of view I have never ceased presenting the question to the Austrian government since my arrival here, and I have taken upon myself in

more instances than one to give a wide interpretation to my instructions. The jealousy concerning Turkey is now, I trust, completely at an end, and matters are fast verging to a point at which we shall either force Bonaparte to a general peace, or have the assistance of Austria in a general war.

There still exists here a doubt, however, concerning the views of our government in regard to its Continental relations, which I find some difficulty in combating. In returning a second time to explanations with Count Stadion upon this point, I find that the Count de Meerfeldt has represented your Lordship's conversation with him (which I dwelt so much upon in my last letter) in a point of view still more likely to discourage the formation of a general alliance than I had at first thought; for he not only represents England as generally wishing to avoid the renewal of her connections with the Continent, but so indifferent to its fate as not to be willing at a peace to surrender any of her acquisitions, or to make any sacrifices, in order to obtain better terms for the Powers that may be at war with France.

I am confident that your Lordship can never have said this, without such qualifications as the circumstances of Europe naturally suggest; but these, or any qualifications whatever of a declaration so discouraging, it appears that Count Meerfeldt has entirely omitted to state.

Believe me, my Lord,
With the greatest esteem and regard,
Your most obedient Servant,
(Signed) R. A.

The Marquis of Douglas to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, May 14th, 1807.

MY GOOD SIR,

I CANNOT allow an instant to escape me in acknowledging your letter of the 8th of April. It has revived with additional pain the subject upon which I last addressed you; because it appears to convey an idea that the opinions erroneously attributed to me by the Austrian ambassador here, continue to have some weight at the Court of Vienna. That you may be fully aware of every thing I have done in consequence of

this misunderstanding, I herewith inclose an abstract from my despatch to Lord Howick upon the subject; and although it is little different from what I wrote to you upon a former occasion, it may yet possibly act upon Count Stadion's mind as a corroborating proof of the opinions of his Britannic Majesty, and his Britannic Majesty's ambassador.

With respect to what are the views of England, and what her policy upon the Continent of Europe, Count Stadion, if he doubts her words, will hardly question her actions. Let him examine the line of conduct she is pursuing, and ask himself if it is possible to suppose under such circumstances she can feel indifferent, or can intend to relax from those principles of co-operation, which, whilst they establish her glory and equity, are tending to maintain the honour and independence of Europe. But I will not enter into discussions of this nature. General Meerfeldt has been totally in an error, and I again aver that every instruction I have received from England, and every inference I have been able to draw from those instructions received, so far from appearing to carry with them the appearance of alienation, most decidedly bear the character of union and co-operation.

I must add one word more: his Britannic Majesty, so far from not being willing to make sacrifices, I have always declared (although the observation is hypothetical), would be disposed at a peace to make every sacrifice in favour of his friends and allies, that was consistent with the dignity of his crown and the interests of his people. General Meerfeldt, with whom I am personally upon terms of intimate friendship, I am persuaded could never have intended to have given an erroneous interpretation of any conversation we have had together. Of the character and leaning of his political opinions it is not for me to say any thing. If his prepossessions (as you say) are considered at Vienna to be very strong, of a particular tendency, and that tendency inimical to any connection between Russia and Austria, I am to suppose that the policy of that Court prefers at this moment an ambassador with such prepossessions. Should such sentiments be congenial to the feelings of Austria, they are neither analogous to those of his Britannic Majesty, nor to the protestations of his representative here. Of this General Meerfeldt can bear witness, for I have frequently attacked him upon the subject

of Austria's inactivity, and encouraged a different system, maintaining the impolicy of the one they had of late adopted. Nay, I have gone further by suggesting that if Austria wished to be indemnified for what she had lost, she might look with greater confidence and security to that indemnification through the medium of the coalesced Powers than through any other channel; if she only desires the permanent tranquillity of Europe, the surest means of obtaining it would be by establishing a relative equipoise upon the Continent.

I do not know why I have added so much to what I wrote to you upon a former occasion. I hope it was not necessary, and yet I am aware that too much cannot be done to correct an error that, if persisted in, would prejudice all the operations of the allied Powers.

The extract of the despatch you have inclosed shall be communicated to this government and to the Austrian ambassador without delay. His Imperial Majesty will, I am persuaded, find the sentiments contained in the same similar to those honourable ones that animate his conduct, and therefore will be satisfied; and Austria, whether active or passive, at this present crisis ought to be made fully aware of these loyal proceedings on the part of Russia, that neither suspicion nor surmise may yield a pretext for inactivity.

I am glad to find that you feel in full force the great advantages to be derived from a more cordial understanding between the two Imperial Courts. I fear that we have to combat against personal as well as public impressions; but Great Britain, by softening unpleasant recollections, and mitigating all recrimination, may do much. To do more, she must communicate that conviction she feels and manifests herself of the essential benefits naturally resulting from a friendly and confidential intercourse. What are the feelings in Austria I cannot tell; but I really do not see any thing like rancour on the banks of the Neva.

Your *reports* from the Mediterranean are a subject of concern: I feel quite grieved that there should be so considerable a depôt of military force in a part of the world where there is so little use made of them. What the expedition you allude to anticipates I cannot tell; but some accounts that lately arrived from Sicily I am sorry to say do not forebode any thing there very favourable for the future.

As you are now probably better informed at Vienna of all that is going on upon the Continent than we are at St. Petersburg, I shall not attempt to send you any news. You will probably have heard of the check that the Swedes have met with: this is a subject of particular grief to me, as I repose the greatest possible confidence both in the Sovereign and the soldiers of that country. It appears that they extended their line too far for the small number of troops they had to defend it. The loss is however not very great, although 500 or 600 men is an object of importance to a Power limited as to finance and population.

I have only received a few lines from Mr. Canning since his appointment to the situation of Secretary of State. He has desired that I should notify to this Court that the change in the administration would make no change in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty, but that the same line of friendship, candour, and policy, would be maintained in full vigour.

I am happy to have an opportunity of assuring you of those sentiments of regard with which I am,

My good Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

DOUGLAS AND CLYDESDALE

P. S. Before I seal this letter, I should inform you that I have just learnt that Lord G. L. Gower will shortly be here to conduct public business instead of

Yours,

D. AND C.

Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson.

(Copy.)

Vienna, April 13th, 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I RECEIVED yesterday your letter of the 1st instant. I am extremely sorry to hear of the delay in the messenger's arrival from England, as I have reason to believe that he accompanies a young gentleman who was sent out to me in the capacity of private secretary, and by whom I expected letters of all sorts from England. Mr. Thornton wrote to me on

the 23d ultimo to tell me that this gentleman had landed from one of the packets at Husum, and that by the advice of the agent, Hart, he had proceeded to Flensburg in order to embark there for Königsberg or Memel. I have heard nothing about him since.

I thank you sincerely for your communication respecting the military measures recommended by you to government. They are exactly what would most suit this Court, if ever it should embark in the alliance. But I am afraid that moment, although certain to come at last (barring treachery and gross blunders), is not so near as his Prussian Majesty suffers himself to believe. I suspect some bad views in encouraging expectations of an opposite nature, which, I must say, Austria has never given either to Count Finkenstein or to any person in his Prussian Majesty's service. Count Finkenstein has this very day assured me that he has given no cause for such sanguine hopes. Whence then can they come? Are there in the Prussian councils still such determined advocates for the system which has destroyed the monarchy, as to seek to raise the hopes of his Majesty to the highest pitch in order to take advantage of the moment of disappointment? And do these advocates await the Emperor Alexander's arrival to gain him to their side by artfully urging the necessity of forcing the Cabinet of Vienna to an immediate declaration, and, consequently, to separation if it should be much longer delayed? I am afraid, my dear Lord, that there is much of the old leaven still existing, and that you will find occasion before long for the exertion of all your powers, both of mind and character. Thank God, however, that Count Hardenberg is near his Majesty's person, and that he appears to possess the confidence, or at least the good opinion of his master. I am made very happy too by your information that Baron Budberg accompanies the Emperor Alexander. He is a strictly honest man, and you will suit each other admirably. As to M. de Novosilzoff, if he be the same who was in England, he is very strongly inclined to the pacific party. The Cabinet *here* wait with much anxiety for the result of the meeting at Memel, and will I think be very much guided by the complexion of the first despatches from thence after it takes place. If the pacific party appears to have obtained any ascendancy, the whole faction

of separatists here will immediately go to work to destroy even the small approaches that have been made towards a better system. If, on the contrary, you all remain stout and resolute, I have no doubt that we shall arrive *through the mediation* at that most desirable of all results—joint peace or joint war.

It is here that I expect the Austrian declaration; but not one moment before, unless circumstances foreign to this view of the subject should force it on. I learn for instance that some message is gone from Bonaparte to the senate, calling for next year's conscription, and telling his faithful people that he can manage the Russians and Prussians very well, but that "on s'arme autour de moi," or some such expression. These preliminary indications may lead to a quicker result than would follow from a negociation entered into and broken off. They may lead to the demand of explanations as to what is going on in Hungary, where I understand that a proposal has been made to the Hungarian nation to render the insurrection *permanent and disposable*. A passage may also be demanded through the Austrian territories for an army into Dalmatia. This is sure of being refused, and war of course must follow; but, except in the above cases, and the consequences resulting from them, I see nothing to make me depart from my opinion, namely, that Austria will not be led into active measures except through the failure of her mediation.

Now as this is all we are likely to get from Austria, do you not agree with me that it will be much better to take it, and avoid any appearance of forcing her hand? I am sure Baron Budberg thinks so, because I have seen a great part of his correspondence with M. Pozzo di Borgo on this subject, all of which has been most temperate and judicious. But I should not be surprised if the Emperor were accompanied by persons of a more eager character who may conceive a little *brusquerie* towards Austria would bring us nearer to our point. Let me recommend such counsellors to your particular vigilance. Be assured they know nothing of the Cabinet of Vienna, nor of the means of convincing the Archduke Charles, whose influence on the great question of war or peace is decisive. I have not the

least doubt that on comparing notes with Baron Budberg, you will find him of the same opinion.

I am extremely glad to find that you are to accompany his Majesty to the army or its neighbourhood. You shall hear regularly from me on all matters that occur at this place.

My instructions from England are of the same nature as yours with regard to subsidies, and a due tenderness of the public purse. I feel it possible, however, that I may be under the necessity of risking much, and pushing responsibility to its utmost verge. It is not that I am embarrassed by any promises, for I have always abstained from making any, and latterly would not suffer the word subsidy to be named *previous to an actual commencement of hostilities*, but if hostilities do actually commence, and combined operations be thought of and proposed, I cannot let them fail for want of sufficient assurances of support. This, of course, must always be decided by the circumstances of the moment, which very often prescribe of themselves the readiest way out of the difficulties they appear to create.

I am truly sorry to inform you of the death of the Empress at 7 o'clock yesterday morning. She was taken ill in consequence of a premature delivery, and died after a short illness. The Emperor is most deeply afflicted by her loss. He returned from Buda the day preceding her decease, and attended her with the most affecting solicitude during the whole of the night. He introduced all his children to her bedside, to take their leave, with the utmost composure and fortitude. After the last sad moment he gave way to the sensations natural on so severe a loss; but I am happy to say that he has recovered sufficient possession of himself to return to the Diet at Buda, where he is to go to-morrow. I understand that matters are going on there much better than was at first expected.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Lord Hutchinson to Mr. A.

Bartenstein, May 6th, 1807.

MY DEAR ADAIR,

THE bearer of this letter is Prince Radzivill, who is married to the Princess Louisa of Prussia; he is a particular friend of mine, and I have a great regard for him. He is a very agreeable, sensible man, and perfectly in the confidence both of the Russian and Prussian governments, so you may open yourself to him in the fullest manner. I am at present with the army, so that it would be impossible at the present for me to resign my situation, which I consider as entirely a military one; but should any serious negociation for peace be entered into, or when the campaign is drawing to a conclusion, I shall think myself entirely at liberty, and desire leave to retire. As for anything which has passed or is likely to pass in England, I have no information, as I have few correspondents; those few never write to me but on subjects of private business: but there appears to have been a division amongst the ministers themselves. The Russians, who have no idea of religious persecution, cannot believe that such a cause could have created such a ferment at such a moment.

Believe me to be,

My dear Adair,

With great regard truly yours,

(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

The same to the same.

(Copy.)

Bartenstein, May 19th, 1807.

MY DEAR ADAIR,

I HOPE you have received the letter which I sent to you by Prince Radzivill about a fortnight ago. I have been with the army for about three weeks: we have been very inactive; and such is our want of provisions that we are likely to remain so for a long time. Dantzic is, I fear, likely to be soon taken. On the 15th of this month an attempt was made to throw a body of troops into the place, and to

open the communication with the sea. The Russians on one side, the Prussians on the other, were repulsed with the loss of about 2000 men, killed and wounded. Both attacks were made on the right bank of the Vistula along the []* which is a long narrow neck of land between the Vistula and the sea. This letter will be presented to you by Major Baron Tuyll of the Russian service, formerly in ours; he is an officer of great merit, and a man of considerable reading and understanding.

Believe me to be,
My dear Adair,
With great regard truly and sincerely yours,
(Signed) HUTCHINSON.

Mr. A. to Lord Hutchinson.

Vienna, May 19th, 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I HAVE nothing at this moment to say more than you will find in my two short letters of the 5th and 16th instant. I do not like the Prussian answer to the Austrian mediation. It ought to have been a simple acceptance of the proposal. The good of the proposal was that it might prove a means of uniting the three powers in *some* common object. I fear now that no such object will be found, as we are not ripe here for what you propose, namely, an accession to your Convention of the 26th of April. The consequence may be that Austria *retirera son épingle du jeu*, and will leave us to carry on the war or settle the peace by ourselves.

That if the Continental peace be settled without the concurrence of Austria as a party to it, she will be eventually the sacrifice, no man in his senses can doubt. But I have told them all this till I am hoarse, and till they are deaf.

I am now, however, reduced to silence myself from another cause. Before this can reach you it is most probable that Lord Pembroke will be at Vienna. I most sincerely hope he may be more successful than I have been in conciliating

* MS. here illegible.

this Court to the views of the present ministers. Ever since the change, I have repeated the most positive assurances of support, and endeavoured to persuade them that the political events in England had nothing in common with our Continental system. I have not been successful.

Believe me, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. I inclose you three packets. There are two from the Bishop of Nancy of great importance, as he tells me.

The same to Mr. Canning.

(Copy—Private.)

Vienna, May 29th, 1807.

DEAR SIR,

I WROTE a few lines to you the other day to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28th. I have now only to add that you may rely on me, until Lord Pembroke's arrival at Vienna, for a continuance of the same endeavours to promote his Majesty's service which you have been so good as to notice and to approve.

On public affairs my despatch will tell you every thing I know. There is one subject, however, which I have thought it most prudent to reserve for private communication. I inclose what I have to say upon it in a separate paper.

I am, dear Sir,

(Signed) R. A.

Inclosure referred to.

THE letter to Monsieur de Vaudreuil, which accompanies my despatches, relates to the unfortunate Marquis de Rivière, speedily about to be sent to Cayenne, or perhaps put to death, unless means can be found of helping him to escape from his prison. If you should deem this an object worthy the generosity, or perhaps the justice of the British government, let me entreat you to send out orders without delay to Lord Pembroke to furnish the means of effecting it. — R. A.

The same to M. Pozzo di Borgo.

Vienna, June 29th, 1807.

DEAR SIR,

THE importance of the moment in which you will most probably have to open your negotiations at Constantinople, makes me judge it expedient to forward to you without loss of time an extract from a despatch, dated the 9th of this month, which I have just received from England.

You will remember the despatch I wrote home as soon as you received at Vienna the Emperor's orders to proceed on your present mission. You will recollect how strongly I recommended it to the English ministers, in order to give additional weight to your efforts, to send you out such recommendations to Mr. Arbuthnot as would ensure his co-operating with you; and also that in my private letter to Lord Howick I used these strong expressions among others: "M. Pozzo di Borgo is now thoroughly master of all the views of his own Court, as well as of ours, and likewise of those of the Court of Vienna—a most material point among his means of negotiation at the place to which he is going."

That despatch was sent to England the 5th of April, and must have been received there by the 20th of the same month. As events have turned out, it is greatly to be lamented that the new ministers (into whose hands it came officially) did not send me out the necessary authority for you to act upon, without losing a moment's time; as you might then have been able, as soon as you heard of the revolution at Constantinople, and of the amicable dispositions of the Porte towards Great Britain, to offer peace in our name upon the same terms as you were authorised by your instructions to propose for Russia.

The instant I heard of the taking of Alexandria by our troops, I renewed my applications to Government in a despatch dated the 29th of April, and written expressly for the purpose of obtaining full powers *for you** to assure the Turks they might have it again, together with all the conquests we might make upon them, as the price of peace with Russia. I hope

* Mr. Arbuthnot had left Constantinople.

and believe that Sir Arthur Paget's voyage has been accelerated in consequence of what I wrote, but it is still to be regretted that he did not set sail before the beginning of June.

I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

M. Pozzo di Borgo to Mr. A.

à bord du vaisseau Amiral le Tverdoy près Tenedos,
le ^{31 Juillet}_{6 Août} 1807.

MONSIEUR,

LA lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 29 Juin avec l'extrait de la dépêche de S. E. Mr. Canning, secrétaire d'état au département des affaires étrangères, aurait beaucoup contribué à accélérer la conclusion des affaires ici, si les événemens militaires arrivés dans le Nord, n'avaient tout-à-fait changé et les dispositions des Turcs et, je crois, le plan même de la pacification qui devait être traitée par moi.

Je n'ai encore reçu aucun ordre de ma Cour, ni aucun renseignement sur les déterminations qui ont été prises en conséquence de ces événemens; mais les communications même imparfaites, que j'ai pu me ménager à Constantinople, ne me laissent aucun doute que la nature de ma mission doit avoir entièrement changé. J'attends avec anxiété de savoir à quoi m'en tenir.

Le zèle avec lequel votre Excellence s'est employé pour le succès des ordres et des intentions de ma Cour, et l'effet qu'il avait produit sur le Cabinet Britannique, sont si remarquables que j'ai crû de mon devoir de soumettre à sa Majesté Impériale la dépêche de votre Excellence, et je ne doute que cette démarche, de la part de votre Excellence, n'ajoute à la considération que l'on a déjà à ma Cour des principes qui la distinguent.

M. le Chevalier Paget est arrivé ici le ¹⁷₂₉ Juillet. Il s'est annoncé au Divan en sa qualité de plénipotentiaire. Sans les malheurs arrivés en Pologne, son intervention aurait beaucoup contribué au succès de la négociation.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la considération la plus distinguée,

Monsieur,
De votre Excellence
Très humble et très obéissant Serviteur,
POZZO DI BORGO.

Commodore Campbell to Mr. A.

H. M. S. Unité, Sept. 5th, 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE great satisfaction in congratulating your Excellency on your re-appointment at the Court of Vienna.

Your Excellency will perceive by the accompanying letter the unpleasant situation I am placed in with respect to the Russian troops landing at Venice.

I trust you will be able to arrange with their minister a mode of debarkation that will be satisfactory to all parties, as however necessary or proper it might be to prevent their being landed at Venice, with the force I have resistance would be vain; there are three more line-of-battle ships and four frigates coming from Cattaro with troops, and are daily expected.

There was a strong report of several Russian ships being given up to the French: Mr. Foresti mentions it in a letter I had from him; but I can scarce suppose a thing of the kind can happen, although one is hourly seeing the most extraordinary occurrences: should such a thing take place, I shall immediately be obliged to quit these seas.

A report has just reached me that one of our frigates has taken General Bertham's staff and military chest on their way to Corfu, also a transport with clothing, and drove several others on shore.

A frigate will be going to Malta in a few days with Lord Pembroke; should you have any thing to send that way, I shall be careful to have it forwarded.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your Excellency's very humble Servant,

PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Mr. Foresti to Commodore Campbell.

Corfu, Aug. 12th, 1807.

DEAR SIR,

As it is of great importance to his Majesty's interest that you should be informed with the utmost despatch of the new political arrangements, which are now under execution in virtue of the peace just concluded between Russia and France, the articles of which I have reason to believe may not reach you so directly by way of Trieste, I have thought it expedient to freight and despatch a vessel from this port, in order to acquaint you with the actual state of affairs in the Adriatic and in these Islands. For this purpose I cannot do better than refer you to the inclosed copy of my despatch to General Fox and Lord Collingwood, to whom they were yesterday forwarded.

The Bocche di Cattaro is already evacuated by the Russians, and occupied by the enemy. There is every reason to believe that the Russian ships there and at Curzola have been ceded to the enemy, in addition to the greater part of the Russian squadron now in the Mediterranean.

The French troops destined to occupy *Corfu* are expected here hourly, and perhaps in Russian ships. The ceded Russian ships, it is said, are to proceed to Chioggia, where the Russian crews will be debarked in order to return to Russia overland.

Such reports as these would be wholly undeserving of notice, were not the probability of their reality amply supported by the realisation of events almost incredible.

The Russian garrison here is in the deepest consternation, and can scarcely conceal its indignation at the peremptory terms prescribed to them for evacuating these Islands, which amount almost to a surrender at discretion.

Every arrangement has been made for the reception of the new protectors; and should they not be arrested on their passage to their new possession, which after their arrival will, it is said, be declared as French Departments, any subsequent attempt for dislodging them will be almost impracticable. The inhabitants who will know by experience what French protection is, anticipate with terror and disgust the change that awaits them.

The appearance of the slightest effectual support might rouse them to the most successful resistance, nor can it be supposed that the Russian government would see without exultation every foreign impediment to retard the execution of the harsh stipulations it has agreed to respecting Corfu. To prevent the enemy obtaining the quiet uncontrolled possession of this island so important to their views at this moment, is of the utmost consequence to his Majesty's government. To prevent this operation might produce a diversion not less favourable to his Majesty's interest, than the possession of Cattaro produced to the common cause. Whatever may be the present relations between his Majesty and the French government, the possession of the islands by the latter would greatly enhance their pretensions and claims. And in the event of the war being protracted, the situation of his Majesty's ships on the Adriatic station in the winter season, particularly without a port in the Adriatic or Ionian seas, would be often rendered most critical.

I must refer you to the inclosed letter for further arguments in support of the absolute expediency of preventing, by the promptest and most vigorous measures, and with whatever means can be collected, the occupation of Corfu by the enemy. For this purpose I have to recommend to you to detach immediately a frigate, or any disposable part of the force under your command, to cruize in the channel of Corfu.

I am now awaiting the answer from the Senate to my demand respecting the new system they seem to have adopted. The violence of the French party so long coerced here reappears again in all its force. Nor is it to be expected they will show any kind of regard for those who are publicly known as their enemies. But every personal sacrifice will be light to me, if it be the means of promoting the interests of his Majesty in this island, at this most momentous crisis. The rapidity of the enemy's movements for accomplishing the design of occupying Corfu cannot be exceeded, and to frustrate it nothing but an equal celerity on the opposite party can avail.

No longer wishing to delay the measures that you may be enabled to take for the public service on this occasion, I hasten to conclude with assuring you, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) SPIRIDION FORESTI.

Commodore Campbell to Mr. A.

H. M. S. Unité, Sept. 5th, 1807

SIR,

I YESTERDAY fell in with a squadron of Russian men-of-war, of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 troops on board from Cattaro; they are now anchored in Pirano Bay, on the coast of Istria.

The Commodore, who I waited on this morning, informed me he is ordered to land them at Venice: as that port is in a state of blockade, I do not know how far it is consistent their entering it, as I cannot permit them, otherwise than their going with a force superior to mine, as I find the Commodore only means to send a frigate to escort the transports there, but he waits from my representation for instructions from Vienna, and this letter goes by the courier he sends.

I have pointed out to him, that by landing them at Grado, which is immediately opposite Pirano and about twelve miles distant, they could be sent in Trabacolos by the inland navigation, or they might be marched opposite to Venice, the main road passing within a few miles of Grado, which would prevent any unpleasant circumstances happening.

As it is quite a novel case, may I request your Excellency would have the goodness to favour me with your opinion on the subject, as I imagine it would not be the wish of his Majesty's ministers to give any offence to the Russians at this moment.

I have the honour to be

With great respect,

Your Excellency's most humble Servant,

PATRICK CAMPBELL.

*Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. A.**(Secret and confidential.)*

St. Petersburg, Sept. 14th, 1807.

SIR,

YOU have already been informed that the mediation of this Court had only been conditionally accepted by his Majesty's

government. I was instructed to demand, as a preliminary to our acceptance of it, the communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. I have received a direct refusal, but accompanied by a sort of assurance that the secret articles contain no stipulation hostile to England: I am disposed to give so far credit to this assurance as to believe that the Emperor is not bound by any article to shut the Russian ports against British ships; but at the same time I have reason to think, though the Emperor may not be bound by any engagement to adopt measures of decided hostility, that he has promised to connive at and favour the establishment of a maritime league against Great Britain.

I have heard, and from pretty good authority, that the Islands composing the Septinsular Republic are to be delivered to France, and that the Russian ships of war are to convey the French troops to Cattaro and Corfu: it appears to me to be of importance that this intelligence should be conveyed as speedily as possible to the commander of his Majesty's naval force in the Adriatic, and from Vienna you will probably find no difficulty in forwarding to him this information.

Count Romanzoff is appointed minister for foreign affairs: his feelings are certainly not Anglican. * * *

* * * * *

I am with great truth, &c. &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

Le Comte Nicolas de Romanzow to Lord L. Gower (inclosed to Mr. A.).

Sept. ¹¹/₂₃ 1807.

LE Soussigné a eu l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur la note et la copie de la capitulation de Copenhague que lui a fait parvenir S. E. le Lord G. L. Gower.

S. M. I. a vu avec une peine infinie tous les malheurs qui viennent d'accabler un monarque auquel elle est attachée, et par les liens du sang et par ceux d'une longue amitié.

Lorsque le ministère Britannique a conçu le dessein de ravir au Danemarc toute sa flotte, lorsque pour cet effet il a envoyé dans la Baltique des troupes nombreuses et une

flotte considérable, il l'a fait sans en prévenir S. M. L. Ce silence, cette extrême réserve peut servir de preuve que le Cabinet de St. James jugeoit lui-même que ce qu'il entreprenoit étoit directement contraire aux intérêts de la Russie.

Tout ce qui vient de s'exécuter l'est en effet, et l'Empereur se doit à lui-même comme aux intérêts de son empire de ne s'y pas montrer insensible.

S. M. se regarde comme garant de la sûreté et de la tranquillité de la mer Baltique; à quelle époque la tranquillité et la sûreté de cette mer a-t-elle été troublée comme elle vient de l'être aujourd'hui?

Le Soussigné, après avoir instruit M. l'ambassadeur de S. M. B. des sentiments de l'Empereur son maître, prie S. E. &c. &c.

(Signé) LE COMPTE NICOLAS DE ROMANZOW.

Mr. A. to Lord Granville Leveson Gower.

Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1807.

MY LORD,

I RECEIVED some days ago a letter from Commodore Campbell, who commands a squadron of frigates in the Adriatic, by which he informs me that a Russian force of three sail of the line and three frigates, having under convoy a number of transports, with 5000 troops on board, from Cattaro, had anchored off Pirano, on the coast of Istria; and that the Russian commander had acquainted him that his orders were to land them at Venice.

The Russian commander also signified to Commodore Campbell his intention of sending on the transports under the escort of a frigate.

The Commodore, entertaining doubts how far their being suffered to enter Venice would be consistent with the blockade of that port, represented to the Russian commander that it could not be permitted unless he went with a superior force. It was agreed, accordingly, that nothing should be done until he could receive instructions from Prince Kurakin at Vienna.

By the Commodore's desire, I had yesterday an interview

with Prince Kurakin on the subject, the result of which I think it highly necessary to communicate to your Lordship.

Having stated the object of my calling upon him, I mentioned that, in order to avoid the appearance of any misunderstanding with a Power so long and so cordially connected with us, a middle course had been proposed by the Commodore, viz. that of landing the troops at Garda, which is immediately opposite to Pirano, and only at twelve miles distance from it, and thence either to get them conveyed by inland navigation, or marched by the high road to Venice. To this proposal I requested Prince Kurakin's assent, and also that he would issue the necessary instructions to the Russian commander.

It was not my good fortune to succeed in persuading Prince Kurakin to adopt this suggestion. I could only obtain from him a declaration upon his honour, that the landing of the troops at Venice was with no hostile intention, but merely a measure of convenience and arrangement.

An answer so little satisfactory occasioned my writing immediately to Commodore Campbell (who had solicited my advice how to proceed in a case so new and so difficult) a despatch, of which the following is an extract:—

“All I can recommend you to do is this:—If the Russian commander should persist in sending these troops by sea, and under the escort of a frigate only, to resist it by force. If he should come with his whole squadron, then to deliver him a strong protest in writing, drawn up as closely as possible to the spirit of your instructions, against a proceeding so contrary to every principle of neutrality, and so directly prejudicial to the interest of his Majesty, and of his ally the King of Naples.”

It appears to me to be necessary that your Lordship should without loss of time be made acquainted with a transaction which may lead to very serious discussions between the two countries. More Russian ships are expected every day with the troops from Corfu, which important station has, in virtue of the secret engagements at Tilsit, been put into the possession of France. All these troops, it appears, are destined for Venice. I am absolutely without instructions for my guidance on an occasion so novel and so unexpected; but under the present apparent relations between

Russia and France, and considering the many just causes of alarm from what has already transpired of the secret articles of their peace, the term of one month assigned for our acceptance or rejection of their mediation, the recent surrender of Corfu and the known determination of Bonaparte to attempt everything to get possession of Sicily, I cannot help looking upon the assemblage of a large Russian force in the north of Italy as a measure extremely suspicious, to say the least of it; and one which the British government would on no account allow to be carried into effect through the abandonment of the blockade of the port of Venice.

I have the honour to be,
&c. &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

The same to the same.

Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1807.

MY LORD,

I INCLOSE you the copy of a letter which Lord Pembroke received a few days ago from M. Foresti, giving an account of the surrender of Corfu to the French. I am afraid they are already in full possession. This effect of the treaty, more perhaps than any other part of it, proves the existence of a general plan of partition between Russia and France, of which the Ottoman Empire will be the first victim in point of order. The rest will follow in their turn.

In my conversation with Prince Kurakin on the business contained in my public letter to you, I endeavoured to discover, as much as possible, what was at the bottom of this fatal treaty; and I am much afraid, by what fell from him, that all your prognostics (as they were communicated to me by Lord Pembroke) are on the point of being verified.

His conversation, it is true, is so desultory, that I may be wrong in drawing any distinct conclusion from his silence and embarrassment on points where I pressed him; but, unhappily, the conduct of his master corroborates every suspicion his own language is calculated to inspire. I cannot attempt to give a regular report of this strange conference, as he carried me about from south to north and from west to east at almost

every question I put to him. In short, it was the clumsiest attempt to *battre la campagne* I ever witnessed.

Three points, however, I should judge to be certain, from his way of receiving and noticing what I said to him:—

When he gave me his word of honour that the troops were not to be landed at Venice with any hostile intention, he objected to me the injustice of entertaining suspicions against an old friend and ally; and asked what harm Russian troops could do to us in the north of Italy?

He asked also whether the Emperor Alexander had not even given new proofs of his friendly disposition towards us by the offer of his mediation to bring about a peace? I answered to this latter question that what he affirmed respecting the mediation, was perfectly true; but that the Emperor had given us only a month to consider of it. I then asked him in my turn, what Russia meant to do after the expiration of that term? Was it not true that she meant to force us to make peace? At this he was visibly embarrassed, and made me no answer.

I pressed this point still further. In reply to what he had objected concerning our suspicions of an old and faithful ally, I said (taking it for granted by his silence that Russia did actually entertain the designs I have mentioned) that I would accept the pledge of his word of honour for the absence of all present hostile intention in landing Russian troops at Venice; but that if the mediation should come to nothing, their presence there would be very convenient for whatever operations the allied Courts of France and Russia might think necessary to give effect to their engagements.

I then said that I would not conceal from him my opinion that *no* Continental Power would be free from the influence of those engagements; and I begged him to recollect that we had not abandoned the King of Naples, and that Bonaparte was determined to get Sicily if he could.

He was quite silent to all this except what regarded an attack on Sicily by Russian troops; and to this he replied that the Emperor would never attempt anything against King Ferdinand. He then began talking of the conduct of Great Britain in the Baltic, and twenty other matters totally foreign to the object of our interview. Among other things which escaped him, was a kind of renewal of the principle respecting

blockaded ports contended for by the neutrals. He would have had me to understand that as Commodore Campbell's force before Venice was inferior to that of the Russian commander, the entry of the latter with his fleet could not be considered as disturbing the blockade. I contented myself with saying that we had not yet received this law into our naval code.

From what I have here detailed, I should collect (if I had been conversing with a man at all informed of the views of his Court) three things as certain:—1st, that if we don't make peace, Russia will declare against us ;—2d, that attempts will be made to force Austria to join the continental confederacy;—and 3d, that the troops landed at Venice will either be employed in rendering disposable a larger French force for the reduction of Sicily, or in some hostile manner against Austria. * * * *

I intend either despatching another courier to you, or profiting by one Count Stadion will probably send off to Count Meerfeldt as soon as we know the issue of this business.

Believe me, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. Lord Pembroke, Mr. A'Court, &c., left Vienna on the 14th, to proceed to England by Trieste.

The same to the same.

Vienna, Sept. 30th, 1807

MY DEAR LORD,

I RECEIVED, on the 24th inst., your despatch and inclosures of the 14th, and am extremely obliged to you for the information you have sent me.

By what I wrote to you on the 15th, and by Mr. Foresti's letter, you will have seen that the cession of Corfu to France was already known to me; but I confess that I could not have believed that Russia would have pushed her hostile inclinations against us so far as to lend her ships and her flag to put our enemy in possession, *during the war*, of a military post of such importance. I am still incredulous respecting the cession of a part of the Russian navy to France; but

whether it be so or not, we must exert ourselves to send a fleet into the Adriatic, and obtain the superiority there at any price.

Soon after I had despatched my messenger to you with the account of my conversation with Prince Kurakin, I received some information respecting the internal state of the Seven Islands, which gives me hopes that with a little exertion we may render ourselves masters of them. I have accordingly transmitted my information to Commodore Campbell and Sir Alexander Ball, and have desired the latter to forward a copy of it to General Moore, or whoever commands in Sicily. I have of course written home to government; but time is too precious to wait their answer, if our commanders in the Mediterranean can spare a force sufficient to make the attack.

The difficulty of communication will delay this enterprise, and indeed may possibly prevent its taking place; otherwise, its success is certainly on the cards. If Sir Arthur Paget, for instance, could make peace with the Turks, which he has orders to do without Russia, the troops from Alexandria would be more than sufficient to reduce all the Islands before the French could fortify themselves in them and settle their government. They cannot attack us for some time in Sicily; perhaps not this whole winter, if we could get possession of Cephalonia, and the vessels there and at Zante. With the aid of a Turkish peace, too, we could raise a considerable number of Albanians, and employ them to great advantage against the enemy in the South of Italy.

The state of affairs in this quarter just now is as follows: the Russian commander who convoys the troops from Cattaro to Venice, has sailed for that port with his whole fleet; consequently Commodore Campbell has quitted his station. I trust he will protest in the strongest terms against this proceeding.

With regard to Corfu, about 1200 French under General Miolis are arrived there. A second division from Otranto appears to have been prevented from landing by two of our frigates which blockade the harbour; consequently, the rest of the Russian garrison, which was to have been relieved by the French, are obliged to remain where they are. But if the Russian squadron employed in conveying the troops from Cattaro to Venice should return from executing that service

before we can establish our superiority in the Adriatic, I am afraid the frigates will be obliged to quit their station too.

With regard to general politics, I shall in a few days be able to say something more distinct than I can at present. Braunau is not restored, nor likely to be; but otherwise the communications between Austria and France since the peace of Tilsit have been, and continue to be civil, and even amicable. No cession of the sea-coast of the Adriatic has yet been exacted, nor any requisition been made to Austria to assent to the principles of maritime law attempted to be revived at the present moment. Count Stadion, however, gives me no assurance that these demands will not be made some time hence; indeed by his manner I am sure he expects them. What they will do in consequence of such demands is more than they know themselves. I am afraid you can give me no hopes that Russia will support them in a refusal to comply with these or any other conditions.

I shall be most happy in communicating regularly to you everything of importance which may occur during my residence here, and I shall of course be very anxious to hear from you, as according to the dispositions which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg may manifest, I should be disposed to be more or less tractable on the subject of their proceedings in the Adriatic.

I am, my dear Lord,
&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. I have this moment received a letter from Lord Pembroke, dated the 2d, on board the Melpomene off Trieste. He incloses me one for you, but desires me not to send it, except by a messenger or other safe conveyance.

The same to Sir Alexander Ball.

Vienna, Sept. 25th, 1807.

SIR,

THE Island of Corfu, having in consequence of the Peace of Tilsit been ceded to the French, who appear to have already been put in possession of it by Russia, and the importance to Great Britain of wresting it from their hands being manifest, I conclude you would wish to receive every information concerning the internal situation of that island, and of its dependencies, which might facilitate an enterprise for such a purpose.

It is with this view that I take the liberty of writing to you upon the present occasion, and of transmitting to you the inclosed memoir, which at my request has been drawn up, and intrusted to me by a person on whose accuracy, intelligence, and good faith I can depend.

The name of this gentleman I am not yet at liberty to reveal, as he would suffer too much from the unsuccessful issue of any enterprise for the liberation of his country, to justify his being exposed to the least risk of discovery.

I have already despatched a messenger to England in order to learn the sentiments of his Majesty's government with regard to the expediency of a regular expedition for the reduction of these islands. In the mean time it may perhaps be possible to get possession of some of them by a *coup de main* before the French government can be settled. It would be most useful if we could carry and keep Cephalonia, where there is no fortress at present able to make any resistance. At Cephalonia my informant assures me there are at this moment between 300 and 400 vessels, and 5,000 or 6,000 excellent seamen, all disposed to serve us with zeal and fidelity against France. Could we prevent the enemy from availing himself of this resource, the service would be worth almost any effort. It will be for your prudence to determine whether you can spare the necessary force for it, or whether all things considered, it be advisable to undertake it.

As far as my opinion on this last point may be of any value, I do not hesitate under the present mysterious rela-

tions between Prussia and France, to declare decidedly in the affirmative.

Should any other method strike you by which such an enterprise might be rendered successful, or should you wish any further information from hence, or to set on foot any secret correspondence within the islands, you will always find me most happy to contribute every assistance in my power.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. If the Earl of Pembroke should be still at Malta when this letter arrives there, it would be expedient to lay it before his Lordship, and take his opinion upon the matter of it.

R. A.

The same to the same.

(Private.)

Same date.

SIR,

MR. SUMMERERS, who will have the honour of delivering to you my accompanying despatch, was his Majesty's Resident at Bucharest, which place he has been compelled to quit in consequence of the war in Wallachia and Moldavia. His object is to join Sir Arthur Paget, under whose authority his situation places him, and for this purpose I take the liberty of recommending him to your protection.

After having read and considered the despatch of which he is the bearer, together with the memoir it contains, may I request of you to forward the latter to General Moore, or whoever commands in Sicily, and to add to it such observations as you may think the project deserves?

I am, Sir, &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Commodore Campbell to Mr. A.

H. M. S. Unité, Lussin, Oct. 2d, 1807.

SIR,

I LAST night received your Excellency's despatches for Sir Alexander Ball by Mr. Summerers, who shall be forwarded to Malta by a transport that sails in a few days.

I perfectly concur with your Excellency in the importance these islands would be of to Great Britain, particularly Corfu, as it is the key to the Adriatic; and if once in our possession, while we had the superiority at sea, it would be easily kept. The other islands would at present be easily wrested from the enemy; Corfu would require a blockade and siege. By a Russian man-of-war brig that arrived at Trieste from Corfu two days before I sailed, the Captain informed me the French had not above two thousand men on the island, but they were in daily expectation of reinforcements. They will find it now a difficult matter to get any over, as we have several cruisers thereabouts.

I am fearful Sir Alexander Ball, however much inclined he may be, will not have it in his power to make any attempt until he receives instructions from home, and by that time the enemy will have well established himself. As there are now cruisers to be constantly kept off there, it will greatly facilitate any attempt that may be made on it. I sail with the transport in a few days, and will cruise off there for near three months.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your Excellency's very humble Servant,

P. CAMPBELL.

Mr. A. to Count Starhemberg.

Vienna, Oct. 10th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I CANNOT suffer an opportunity which I know to be safe, and which I have reason to fear will be the last I shall possess for a long time, to pass by without troubling you with a few lines, and communicating to you my views on the present singular posture of affairs, as far as I can form any that are distinct. And first, as to your situation with regard to France. It is supposed here, but on what the hope is founded I know not, that Austria will be left quiet some time longer; that the business of the North of Europe, and that the disposition to concede to the utmost, will avert the impending calamity, and that the winter may *yet* be passed at Vienna. As there is no use in my expressing a contrary opinion, especially having no power to prevent the evil, my duties are now reduced to the task of watching the course of events, and of being ready with the feeble succour I can afford whenever the opportunity for offering it shall arrive. The errors of the last winter have been so great, and the defection of Russia from the common cause so destructive of all prospect of union, that (I grieve to say it) you have *now* no other course to pursue except that of submission.

With regard to the Court of St. Petersburg and its wretched politics, no man can be more thoroughly disgusted with them than I am. I cannot help, however, being still of opinion that your Court ought to show less aversion towards Russia than appears to me (and with some justice) to be felt. Russia, to say the truth, has far less to answer for towards you than she has towards us. She was bound to you by no alliance, you having yourselves over and over again refused coming to an explanation with her last winter. Nay more, Russia gave you fair notice through M. Pozzo di Borgo, that she and Prussia by themselves, reduced as Prussia was by the first events of the campaign, *could* do nothing for the general cause of Europe, and *would* not continue the war unless you gave your assistance. On the other hand, you ought to consider that not only the aggrandizement of France since last autumn, but that the peculiar relation in

which you are made to stand towards Russia by those articles of the peace * which concern Poland, almost obliges you to choose between her friendship and her enmity. There never, in short, was a situation in which two Powers, supposing them even to have been separated by centuries of hostility, ought to come to an understanding with each other more quickly and more unreservedly than your Court and that of St. Petersburg ought to do, notwithstanding the many motives for jealousy and mistrust which subsist between you both.

This situation of your affairs with regard to Poland was, I confess, one of the grounds on which I speculated for a chance of gathering together the fragments of Europe, and of once more (at what period events alone could determine) attempting to give them a consistency, and to mould them into some resemblance to that system under which Europe enjoyed so many years of prosperity. In aid of this chance I was sanguine enough to hope that two other events might come, on each of which I will now take the liberty of offering you my opinion.

The first was our peace with the Turks. I was in hopes that Sir A. Paget might before this have been able to make that sort of arrangement with them which the change of circumstances between his quitting England and his arrival at Constantinople rendered it expedient for him to attempt. I have no doubt, indeed I may say that I know, that Sir Arthur Paget's instructions were the most judicious that could be devised; but the immense difference of being sent to negotiate in concert with Russia, and of finding himself on his arrival obliged (in a manner) to negotiate against her, was such as no instructions could meet, and became a case in which a minister must make instructions for himself. I have no hesitation in saying that my conduct, as far as at this distance I can judge, would have been as follows: knowing the extreme jealousy which Russia feels with respect to a British establishment in Egypt, I should have insisted that she should evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia, before I consented that the British troops should evacuate Alexandria; and this I should do *for your sake*, and to take away one of

* Of Tillsit.

the causes which contributed last year to prevent your uniting with Russia.

Another chance of recovering our lost ground appeared to arise so naturally out of the circumstances which preceded the peace of Tilsit, and the good will testified by the Emperor Alexander towards Austria in all the communications made by Baron Budberg last winter, that I confess I did entertain hopes that it would have been seized by your Court and turned to some advantage. Previously to the treaty of Tilsit, as you know, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia had in substance accepted your mediation for the restoration of a general peace. This acceptance was grounded, first, on a necessity which appeared to be recognised even by France herself, of including England in any peace which it was intended to render permanent; and secondly, on a truth equally admitted by France, namely, that Austria since the federation of the Rhine and the other arrangements made by the peace of Presburg, required some further security for her frontiers on the side of Germany and Italy than she now possessed. After the treaty of Tilsit Russia, by the consent of France, offered her mediation to Great Britain, and her guaranty for the preservation of the *maritime* peace to be concluded under her auspices. Observe that I am no advocate for this mediation; but being offered and not rejected by us *, what could be more obviously your policy than to endeavour to engage Russia to extend her guaranty to the *Continental* peace, and to consolidate the treaties of Presburg and Tilsit (bad as they both are) with that which she hoped might be concluded between us and France through her intervention? If Bonaparte had consented to any proposal from Russia to this effect, I will not say you would have been safe, but as safe as you can be under any treaty made with him. If he had rejected it, then at least he must have completely developed his views to the Emperor Alexander, and given us a foundation to work upon, and to build some reasonable project upon hereafter.

It is only through these means, I confess, that I can see the most distant chance of getting round to our old habits, and detaching Russia from her present monstrous association;

* See Lord G. Leveson's letter next following, November 8th.

for I cannot suffer myself to entertain a moment's hope that either the ill-humour of Russia at the continuance of French troops in the Prussian territories will be carried further than remonstrance, or that her own non-evacuation of Wallachia will be more seriously resented by Bonaparte. If any thing, I should apprehend still further schemes of partition between them both.

Were it possible, indeed, to draw any conclusion from the conduct of Russia in the Adriatic, I should say that she appears determined not only to favour France to the utmost, but to provoke Great Britain to some act of hostility. The manner of the Russian admiral's putting the French in possession of Cattaro and the Seven Islands is to the highest degree offensive. I do what I can to prevent open quarrelling, but there are some things to which it is impossible to submit.

With regard to what is intended to be done in Germany or Italy, you will hear more from others than you can expect from me. Whatever is settled, you must acquiesce for the present.

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

The same to Lord G. L. Gower.

Vienna, Oct. 20th, 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I HAVE nothing particular to send to you by this opportunity, but only to recommend the accompanying packet to your care, which contains vouchers for the payment of pensions.

We have various reports of Sir A. Paget's success at Constantinople, but none on which I can depend. I am, however, pretty sure that he is actually at Constantinople, which is a great point. We should have had peace long ago with the Turks had not Sebastiani declared to them that his Master would consider such a step as a declaration of war against himself; and the menace I fear be carried into effect if Sir Arthur's negotiation succeeds.

I have great reason to believe that a demand will speedily

be made here for the passage of a French army through Croatia. This Court, abandoned as she is by Russia, cannot refuse it, and then let Russia look to herself! She will find the French very different neighbours from the Turks.

M. Pozzo di Borgo is returned. I regret that I cannot have the same intercourse with him which was so serviceable to the common cause in better days, as it might be the means of preventing much mischief between us and Russia in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. Lord Collingwood is returning to those seas, and certainly will not permit quietly the establishment of the French in the Seven Islands by the assistance of a Russian naval force. Having already said all I could to Prince Kurakin upon this subject in my last conversation (of which I gave you an account in my despatch of the 15th September), and having no intercourse with him except that of mere civility, I must leave events to take their course if any of our cruisers should fall in with Russian vessels convoying French troops.

I am ever, my dear Lord,

&c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

The same to the same.

Vienna, Oct. 28th, 1807.

MY DEAR LORD,

I HAVE nothing very particular to say by this post, except that the passage of French troops through the Austrian territories towards Dalmatia is becoming very serious. They are marching in corps from 800 to 1200 men. Is Russia so infatuated with her new system as not to see to what this leads? How will she like the French in Bosnia, and possibly at Belgrade? and can she expect that Austria, in the present situation of Europe, can stir a step to prevent these evils?

In this quarter I am sorry to add that appearances are most discouraging. The distance between the Austrian and the Russian Cabinets seems to increase every day.

* * * * *

My poor friend Pozzo is ready to break his heart at all this. I contrive to see him sometimes, but with great circumspection and secrecy.

Believe me,
&c. &c. &c.
(Signed) R. A.

Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. A.

St. Petersburg, Nov. 8th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE been daily deferring the return of your messenger for the last three weeks, from the expectation of having something more decisive to communicate to you of the intentions of this Court. I have this morning received a note from Count Romanzow, of which I inclose a copy. I will not allow myself to make any comment upon its contents, unless it be to observe that the question of the mediation of Russia is completely misrepresented. We did not reject the mediation of this Court; we required only previous to our acceptance of it the communication of the secret articles, which was distinctly refused. The paragraph respecting Denmark contains a curious construction of an assurance I was charged to give to this Court of the readiness of the English government to come to an understanding with Russia upon the question of the restoration of peace with the Court of Copenhagen, and the re-establishment of the tranquillity of the North of Europe.

There is no doubt that this note is the consequence of an imperative demand brought by Talleyrand from Paris, requiring the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit.

I inclose copies of the notes which passed between Count Romanzow and myself, to which allusion is made in that which I received this morning; and also a paper containing materials I have picked up here, which it may perhaps be useful for you to possess.

I shall leave Petersburg in the course of a few days, and

am extremely sorry that circumstances have rendered our correspondence of so little duration.

I am, my dear Sir,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

Inclosure in Lord G. L. Gower's letter to Mr. Adair of Nov. 8. 1807.

Count Romanzow to Lord G. L. Gower.

St. Petersburg, ce ^{27 Octobre.} 8 Novembre. 1807.

L'EMPEREUR, qui dans le cours de la guerre qu'il vient d'achever, avait à se plaindre de la conduite de l'Angleterre à son égard, subordonnait ses justes ressentimens à la pensée consolante que la paix qu'il venait de conclure devait amener la paix générale.

Il s'était constitué médiateur. Il avait ensuite offert sa médiation en prévenant sa Majesté Britannique que son désir était de lui procurer une paix honorable. L'Angleterre rejeta ses offices.

Il semblait qu'il entraînât dans ses vues de ne pas laisser éteindre les feux de la guerre, mais de la rallumer dans le Nord par un événement subit et nouveau.

Les flottes de sa Majesté Britannique, ses armées vinrent commettre sur le Dannemarc un acte dont l'histoire n'offre aucun exemple.

L'Empereur, qui du sçu de l'Angleterre était un des garans de la tranquillité de la Baltique qui est une mer fermée, l'Empereur qui n'avait été prévenu de rien, ne dissimula pas son ressentiment, et dans une seconde note remise au Lord Gower prévint l'Angleterre qu'il ne se proposoit pas de rester tranquille spectateur de ce qui venait d'arriver à un roi son parent et son ami.

L'Empereur ne prévint pas, il le confesse, qu'après cette déclaration l'Angleterre lui ferait l'offre de se charger de faire entendre au Dannemarc qu'il était de son intérêt de supporter ce qui venait de lui arriver, et de rendre la Russie garante que la Grande Bretagne pouvait en toute sûreté posséder ce qu'elle venait de ravir.

Le Prince Royal de Dannemarc n'avoit pas ratifié la convention de Copenhague; aux secondes propositions qui viennent de lui être faites il a encore exposé à sa Majesté Impériale, combien il était irrité par ce nouveau procédé du ministère Britannique à son égard.

L'Empereur, touché de la confiance que le Prince Royal plaçait en son amitié, ayant considéré ses propres griefs contre l'Angleterre, ayant mûrement examiné les engagements qu'il avoit avec les Puissances du Nord, engagements pris par l'Impératrice Catherine, et feu sa Majesté l'Empereur, tous deux de glorieuse mémoire, s'est décidé à les remplir.

Aussi sa Majesté charge-t-elle le Soussigné de déclarer à son Excellence le Lord Gower, ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique, que l'Empereur rompt toute communication avec l'Angleterre. Sa Majesté Impériale rappelle toute la mission qu'elle y avoit, et ne veut pas conserver près d'elle celle de sa Majesté Britannique. Il n'y aura dorenavant entre les deux pays aucun rapport.

L'Empereur déclare qu'il annule et pour toujours tout acte conclu précédemment entre la Grande Bretagne et la Russie, et nommément la convention fait en 1801 le $\frac{5}{17}$ du mois de Juin. Il proclame de nouveau les principes de la neutralité armée, ce monument de la sagesse de l'Impératrice Catherine, et s'engage à ne jamais déroger de ce système.

Il demande à l'Angleterre de satisfaire complètement ses sujets sur toutes les justes réclamations de vaisseaux et de marchandises, saisies ou retenues contre la teneur expresse des traités conclus sous son propre règne.

L'Empereur prévient que rien ne sera rétabli entre la Russie et l'Angleterre que celle-ci n'ait satisfait le Danne-marc.

L'Empereur s'attend à ce que sa Majesté Britannique, au lieu de permettre à ses ministres, comme elle vient de le faire, de répandre de nouveaux germes de la guerre, n'écoutant que sa propre sensibilité, se prêtera à conclure la paix avec sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, ce qui étendrait, pour ainsi dire, à toute la terre les bienfaits inappréciable de la paix.

Lorsque l'Empereur sera satisfait sur tous les points qui précédent, et nommément sur celui de la paix entre la France et l'Angleterre, sans laquelle aucune partie de l'Europe ne peut pas se promettre une véritable tranquillité, sa Majesté

Impériale reprendra alors volontiers avec la Grande Bretagne les relations d'amitié que dans l'état de juste mécontentement où l'Empereur devait être, il a peut être conservé trop longtemps.

Le Soussigné s'étant acquitté des ordres de l'Empereur son maître, prie son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur, de faire parvenir sans délai à la connoissance du Roi, son souverain, le contenu de cette note.

(Signé)

LE COMTE NICOLAS DE ROMANZOW.

Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Count Romanzow.

(Copie.)

Nov. 9th, 1807.

LE Soussigné, ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique, a l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la note que S. E. le Comte de Romanzow lui a adressé en date de hier. Il ne tardera pas à la transmettre à sa Cour, mais les inculpations qui y sont contenues contre le gouvernement Britannique imposent au Soussigné le devoir de prier S. E. de vouloir bien porter sans délai à la connoissance de S. M. I. quelques observations qui puissent mettre dans leur jour véritable les démarches réciproques des deux Puissances.

Quoique la célérité indispensable à l'exécution des projets de précautions adoptés vis-à-vis le Dannemarc ne permettoit pas des communications antérieures, la note du Soussigné en date du 2^{de} Septembre, bien loin de cacher les raisons qui avoient motivées cette expédition, les divulgoit avec franchise, et l'explication en fut réitérée et accompagnée de détails plus que satisfaisans à l'occasion de la première conférence du Soussigné avec le ministère du jour.

Les articles secrets du traité de Tilsit sont d'ailleurs inconnus à la Cour de Londres, et le Soussigné a vainement réclamé la communication des arrangemens dont l'accomplissement développe chaque jour des objets peu conformes à l'esprit des anciennes alliances, et absolument préjudiciables aux intérêts dont le maintien fut jadis une partie essentielle du système Russe. Est-ce donc à la Russie de se plaindre du secret, lorsque cette Cour refuse nettement la seule explication

qu'auroit pû rassurer celle de Londres sur les intentions et les projets médités à son égard? Ce silence, cette extrême réserve peut servir de preuve que le Cabinet de Petersbourg jugea lui-même que ses arrangemens secrets étoient directement contraires aux intérêts de la Grande Bretagne.

Quant à la tranquillité de la Baltique, l'Angleterre n'a jamais reconnu des droits exclusifs, et qu'elles que fussent les prétentions de la Russie au titre de garant de la sûreté de cette mer, son silence lors de la clôture des ports au Pavillon Britannique de Lubeck jusqu'à Mémel paroissoit en être l'abandon ouvert.

Le Soussigné saisit cette occasion,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signé) G. L. GOWER.

Mr. Garlike to Mr. A.

Memel, Nov. 14th, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

ADMIRAL Gambier did send two cutters to Liebau to keep up a communication with England, but he gave orders at the same time that they should not remain longer than the first east wind beyond the 10th of November. I had just time to charge one of them with despatches, and found by the answer from Liebau that they meant to keep company, so that I fear they are both gone. They have shown great unwillingness to remain, although I have little doubt if Russia did not shut her ports that it would be practicable to ply between Liebau and Ystadt at least till Christmas, if not during the whole winter. It was impossible to inform you of it in time, for I understand from this government that the letters, *vid* a road of security, are three weeks on their way to Vienna.

You know that this country has 112,000,000 of livres to pay to France. It is proposed to pay one half in five years, and to mortgage certain crown lands as a security (France had required the sale of crown lands near Berlin to be à la disposition des généraux Français) and the other half in a given time by "obligations royales." For the security of this paper France requires five fortresses, Glogau, Custrin, Stettin, Graudenz, Colberg, and that Prussia shall maintain

in each of them 8,000 French soldiers, or, rather, pay France for their maintenance on a calculation given in for that purpose, amounting to 11,000,000 thalers, that is to say, 11,000,000 thalers for 40,000 men, while Prussia formerly maintained 250,000 men for 17,000,000. Then you must add about 4,000,000 to pay off the contribution, and 2,000,000 for other demands; that is to say, 17,000,000 of a revenue amounting in the whole to about 20,000,000.

Prince William is gone to Paris to endeavour to soften the French government; while the agreement, or negotiation to agree, was already so far advanced as to induce this government to believe that a definitive answer will arrive here about the 19th instant. Which way the dilemma will turn it is impossible to foresee, for if Prussia agrees to do what is evidently not within her means the favourable condition of that agreement will be to keep the French in the country. The alternative is evident. I have written to Count Goltz against the cession of the fortresses on English grounds.

This government wish me in the gentlest, friendliest, most managed terms possible to go away. It may be as well every way to accept an intimation before it grows to an order, but I must be sure it comes from the king; I mean to say I can justify my departure in no other way. The king's name must appear; as many civilities may follow as may be thought proper: I sometimes think the notion of its necessity is suspended, but so much has already been said upon it, that I shall not wonder if the first time I see Count Goltz something more passes on the subject; I say the first time, for while I write, a mercantile estafette brings word from St. Petersburg, that an embargo has been laid on all vessels whatever in the Russian ports; but that ninety-six hours will be allowed to them to get away if they will; or, at the farthest, till the 14th instant, that is to say, this day. I do not understand the news, but enough of it is intelligible to justify the belief that an unfriendly step has been taken against England at St. Petersburg.

Count Goltz has been informed from Vienna that France had desired Austria to shut her ports also, and to induce you to retire. The Franchise frigate came off this place the other day to look for Lord Pembroke and take him home.

If you have occasion to send this way inclose it to *Mr. Griffin*, who will always find means of furthering the letters to London.

I have the honour to be,
My dear Sir,
Most faithfully,
Your obedient Servant,
W. GARLIKE.

Sir Alexander Ball to Mr. A.

Malta, Nov. 17th, 1807.

SIR,

I HOPE soon to hear that his Majesty's ministers intend to pursue vigorous measures in the Mediterranean, to counteract the enemy's operations, and to open new channels for our commerce, which they may effect, if we act with energy and wisdom.

Lord Pembroke arrived here in his Majesty's ship *Melpomene*, the 2d of last month, and proceeded immediately to Gibraltar, and Sir A. Paget called here the 2d ult. in his way to England, having failed in his mission.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect and esteem,
Sir,
Your most faithful and obedient,
ALEX. M. BALL.

The same to the same.

Malta, Nov. 17th, 1807.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Mr. Summerers arrived the 15th inst. and delivered to me your despatch containing a project, which I communicated to Major-General Sir Charles Green, the senior officer in the Mediterranean, commanding the troops in this garrison.

You will hear before this reaches you that Lieut.-General

Sir John Moore sailed from Sicily last October with a large British force on a secret expedition, which must for the present impede our attempt to put into execution your project.

I have this day received intelligence that his Majesty's ship *Unité* has been chased off Corfu by three large French frigates, which are supposed to have put into that port. As I have been directed (in addition to my civil employment here) to hoist my flag and carry on the duty of port admiral, I have (in the absence of Lord Collingwood, the commander-in-chief,) ordered a very efficient squadron under the command of Captain Mowbray, of his Majesty's ship *Active*, to proceed up the Adriatic to counteract the enemy's operations. I have directed Captain Mowbray to correspond with you by every safe conveyance.

I have the honour to be

With great respect and esteem,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most faithful

And very obedient,

ALEX. M. BALL.

Mr. A. to Lord Collingwood.

(Copy.)

Vienna, Nov. 23d, 1807.

MY LORD,

I TAKE the liberty of recommending to your Lordship the bearer of this letter. He is the gentleman from whom I received the information respecting the state and condition of the Seven Islands, which I transmitted to Sir Alexander Ball in a despatch of the 25th of September, of which Mr. Summerers was the bearer.

I trust that your Lordship will find his information to correspond with what you will have yourself received from those inhabitants of the Seven Islands who are attached to the British cause, and who wish to co-operate with your Lordship for the deliverance of their country from the oppression with which it is threatened by the French.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Inclosure in the above.

*Proclamation of George Moncenigo, Minister Plenipotentiary
of the Emperor of Russia, to the Inhabitants of the Republic
of the Seven Islands.*

L'ÉTABLISSEMENT d'un gouvernement provisoire, soutenu par les invincibles troupes de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, a pour objet de vous mettre en état de mériter de plus en plus le bienfait de cette libre et durable constitution à laquelle vous êtes appelés.

Ainsi au nom de mon auguste Souverain je vous exhorte à vous soumettre, &c. &c.

Je me propose de soutenir avec fermeté, et tout l'appui de la force, l'installation du gouvernement, afin qu'une administration suprême, juste, mais sévère, active et forte — telle que vous n'en avez point joui encore — vous fasse sentir les précieux avantages d'une existence civile.

Vous devez, habitans des Sept Isles, recueillir par l'effet de ses mesures paternelles et prévoyantes, les premiers fruits des soins affectueux que prend de vous mon auguste Souverain.

Que celui, qui pourroit ne pas y répondre par la conduite la plus pacifique, sache qu'il sera considéré comme ennemi.

Que dans toute l'étendue de la République *Septinsulaire*, dans les plus ténébreuses retraites de toutes les parties de l'Isle, je saurai par des moyens dont je me suis assuré, voir pénétrer, entendre.

Je vous invite donc à m'obéir.

Retournez à vos demeures, appliquez vous à vos occupations domestiques, et, quant à la chose publique, laissez en absolument toute pensée à ceux-là seuls qui y sont autorisés !

C'est ainsi que vous vous préparerez à devenir les enfans légitimes d'un état libre !

The same to the same.

Same date.

MY LORD,

WERE it in my power to send your Lordship any further information from this place, than that which will be communicated to you by * * * * * it would give me inexpressible satisfaction. All I have now to say (and of this your Lordship may possibly be apprised already) is, that by the secret articles of the peace of Tilsit, it is agreed that both the Morea and Candia shall be possessed by France in the eventual partition of the Ottoman dominions.

I have the satisfaction, however, to observe that this new and monstrous connection between Russia and France begins already to wear the appearance of mutual distrust. How can it be otherwise when not one single article of the treaty of Tilsit has been executed by the latter Power? The Prussian territories are occupied as they were during the war. Upwards of 40,000 French troops, besides a Polish army, still remain at Warsaw, and in the neighbourhood of the Vistula; an equal number occupy Silesia, and there is a large division of their army at Berlin, and in its neighbourhood. All these districts, as your Lordship may well imagine, exhibit scenes of plunder and oppression without end. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, under such circumstances, Russia should now refuse to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, which were to constitute her share of the Turkish spoils whenever France should proceed to put herself in possession of the Morea. But whatever may be the motives of Russia, your Lordship may depend upon the fact, that not only she has not evacuated these provinces, but that the interior administration of them is organised on a footing of permanent possession. Of these tardy proceedings France complains, and calls upon Russia first to execute the treaty by which her armies, as well as those of the Turks, were to retire to their respective frontiers, until the definitive treaty of peace. I scarcely need acquaint your Lordship, that Sebastiani has transferred the negotiations for the Turkish peace to Paris, in order (no doubt) to give time for the occupation of the Seven Islands by France, and the assembling an army in Dalmatia, so that both parties may start fair in the

race of spoliation. This plan, as your Lordship will instantly perceive, would be materially counteracted, and perhaps totally destroyed, should Corfu and its dependent islands be wrested from France, and placed under his Majesty's protection, of which event, among its many and incalculable advantages, one of the most immediate must be, that France, disappointed in the execution of what is to her advantage in the secret articles of the treaty, will insist with more firmness upon the execution of its ostensible stipulations, and that by a peremptory demand to that effect, she may break at once the bonds of this unnatural confederacy.

It has just come to my knowledge, that the Turkish minister who passed through Vienna last winter in his way to the head-quarters of Bonaparte, and who has repassed a few days ago on his return home, informed the Turkish chargé d'affaires at this place that he had obtained thorough information at Paris of the treachery of France towards Turkey in the late treaty of Tilsit, and that he was hastening to Constantinople to lay the whole before the Divan.

To what I have here the honour of stating to your Lordship, I have nothing to add, except that the ports of Trieste and Fiume continue shut to the British flag, and that in consequence of a new convention with France, they will probably continue so during the war.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

The same to Sir Alexander Ball.

Vienna, Nov. 27th, 1807.

SIR,

IN the extraordinary situation of affairs produced by the avowed alliance of Russia with France, it has appeared to me expedient that Lord Minto, governor-general of Bengal, should be informed as speedily as possible of an event likely to affect in so material a degree the British interests in India.

I take the liberty, therefore, of inclosing to your Excellency a despatch for his Lordship, which I request you to forward to him, if possible, overland by Alexandria.

I send this dispatch to your Excellency under a flying

seal (requesting you to close it up when you shall have perused and taken a copy of any part of its contents which you may think useful), in order to your understanding exactly, which you will do by a perusal of Lord Granville Leveson Gower's correspondence, the state of the question between Great Britain and Russia.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

P.S. I despatched a messenger to Trieste on the 24th instant with orders to hire a vessel there and endeavour to fall in with Lord Collingwood, to whom I wrote an account on that day of Lord Granville Leveson Gower's having been ordered to quit St. Petersburg.

R. A.

The same to Lord Minto.

Vienna, Nov. 26th, 1807.

MY LORD,

IT is with the utmost concern that I inform your Lordship that on the 8th instant, Lord Granville Leveson Gower, his Majesty's ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, received the Emperor of Russia's orders to quit St. Petersburg with the whole of the British Embassy.

The motives which are alleged by the Emperor's new advisers for thus breaking off all connection with Great Britain, and making common cause with France to exclude us from the Continent of Europe, your Lordship will find partly detailed in the inclosed note to Lord Granville Leveson Gower signed by Count Romanzow. For your Lordship's information I subjoin Lord Granville Leveson's answer to it.

At so great a distance from the scene of transactions whose effects and influence are now approaching even the countries committed to your Lordship's administration, you will naturally be anxious to learn through what variety of events, and through what succession of calamity the natural and, as it appeared at the time of your Lordship's departure from England, the fixed policy of Russia, has undergone so entire and so fatal a revolution.

Your Lordship will observe in the beginning of Count Romanzow's note that he alludes to some grounds of complaint against the British government. What may be the nature of those grounds is totally unknown to me. During the whole of the confidential intercourse which subsisted between the Russian ambassador at Vienna and myself, and which never varied for one moment while that post was filled by Count Razamoffsky, I heard no syllable of complaint, nor perceived the slightest symptom of dissatisfaction.

On the 10th or 11th of the month of June indeed, the Earl of Pembroke, who had been sent from England on a special mission to this Court, and who arrived at Memel in company with Lord G. L. Gower (reappointed to the Russian embassy on the recal of the Marquis of Douglas), had an interview with the Emperor Alexander who had come to visit his army. His Imperial Majesty expressed undoubtedly much dissatisfaction at that time, and with considerable vehemence of manner, with respect to a supposed want of activity on the part of England in producing a diversion in the North of Germany; but his Imperial Majesty likewise assured Lord Pembroke in terms equally energetic, that he had no thoughts of entering into negotiation with France, much less of accepting such terms of peace as the treaty of Tilsit has unfortunately revealed to Europe.

Eight days after these assurances, confirmed by every asseveration which could add weight to the promise of a sovereign, without the occurrence of any new event except the trifling disadvantage of the battle of Friedland where the Russians scarcely lost 8000 men, an armistice was solicited by the Russian general. Then followed the interview at Tilsit between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte, the unseemly familiarities of their prolonged intercourse, and those fatal conferences which under pretended views of universal peace, have banished even the name of peace from Europe, and will carry the war, probably, from the Vistula to the Ganges.

Of the treaty of Tilsit your Lordship has no doubt a copy, but it is in the secret articles of the treaty that the essential part of it is contained, and of these little transpires, except through their execution. It was by the occupation of

Corfu alone that we knew of its cession, together with its dependent islands, to France.

Three of the most important stipulations, however, of these articles may be collected from circumstances already known.

1. By the ostensible treaty, the Emperor Alexander engaged to offer his mediation to bring about a peace between Great Britain and France. By the secret article, one month was agreed upon as the period for our acceptance of this offer, after which if we rejected it, Russia was to make common cause with France to force us to make peace.

2. Another secret article relates to what in the cant phrase of the day is called the "liberty of the seas," which was to be the basis of any peace to be concluded between Great Britain and France under the auspices of this mediation.

3. The third is the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire. I am ignorant whether any proposals of co-operating, and sharing in the spoil, have been made to the Court of Vienna, but I am confident that to this moment none have been accepted. Russia and France are agreed, however, as far as this, that Russia shall have Wallachia and Moldavia, and France the Morea and the island of Candia. It is through the Morea that Bonaparte looks forward to Constantinople.

A mediation offered to England under the existence of secret articles of such a tenor, was sure to be ineffectual, and indeed could scarcely have been sincere on the part of the Court which proposed it. It was at all events necessary before entering into negotiation under circumstances so ambiguous in their appearance, to require an explicit communication of the further engagements subsisting between the mediator and the enemy. This was flatly refused by the Russian ministry to Lord G. Leveson.

The attack on Copenhagen, and the surrender of the Danish fleet, followed soon after this refusal of Russia to communicate the secret articles. Of this expedition, and of the circumstances attending it, as I have no knowledge except from the newspapers, I can relate nothing but the fact.

I am equally without any documents from Lord Granville Leveson respecting the discussions which passed between

his Lordship and the Russian, ministers upon this event. Your Lordship, therefore, unless better informed, will collect the matter of these discussions, as I am obliged to do, from the correspondence inclosed. I think it but fair, however, to observe that Russia has no great right to complain of the attack on Copenhagen by us, to whom her secret engagements with our enemy gave the indisputable right, and might perhaps have justified the policy, of attacking St. Petersburg, or any other part of her own dominions.

It is also to be collected from this correspondence that Russia had promised her assistance to Denmark on the Prince Royal's refusal to ratify the convention of Copenhagen.

Things appear to have remained in this situation at St. Petersburg until the arrival (as Lord Granville informs me) of M. de Talleyrand, a nephew of the minister, from Paris. This gentleman is supposed to have brought with him a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles. In consequence of this summons Count Romanzow's note appears to have been delivered to our ambassador, who informs me in his private letter that he was to quit Petersburg in a few days.

By the style of the note, and the topics of accusation and reproach addressed in it to Great Britain, it was evidently written at Paris.

Russia and France, therefore, must, I fear, be now considered as leagued for the destruction and slavery of the world. That an alliance so monstrous, and so opposite to all the old notions of policy entertained by the founders of the Russian Empire, should last, would be incredible in any other times; but in the state to which Europe is now reduced I see little to shorten its duration, and nothing, certainly, to resist its effects.

One of these effects (and which has made me think it my duty to send off this despatch to your Lordship) is the renewal of the vast project, remote I trust in its execution, but dear and ever present to our enemy, of attacking the British possessions in India through Persia. That such a project has long existed in the mind of Bonaparte there can be no doubt. I saw the details of it myself before I left England (and I make no doubt your Lordship has seen them) in the

possession of Sir John Hippealey. Information, general indeed in its nature, but which I think may nevertheless be trusted, has reached me that the plan is again in contemplation. I received this intelligence before the breach between Great Britain and Russia,—an event alarmingly calculated to accelerate the attempt, and to facilitate its execution. For, visionary as the project seemed even last year, circumstances have so favoured Bonaparte, that even prudence seems now on the side of enterprise with him, and what is regarded as impossible on one day becomes only improbable on the morrow. At the date of this letter, some of the great obstacles to an attack on India have disappeared: others are much diminished. The Turkish empire in Europe seems approaching to its fall. France has been gaining ground rapidly in Persia, where her negotiations have been pushed during these last two years with extraordinary activity; and all she now wants to be in a condition to execute the most gigantic schemes, is to consolidate her connections with Russia.

Having stated these matters, which are of a more immediate import, for your Lordship's consideration, I will conclude with a few words on the present state of Europe.

Of this renowned monarchy * I can say nothing consolatory to your Lordship who has seen it in some of its best days. I followed last year, to the best of my power, the traces you had left behind you, and endeavoured to animate it to those exertions by which alone it could again become illustrious, or continue to be safe. It was my good fortune at that period to co-operate with one whose zeal and abilities no man can appreciate more justly than your Lordship, I mean M. Pozzo di Borgo. I have found in him everything that is valuable in man,—ardour and prudence in great affairs, sincerity and affection in the intercourse of private life. If, before leaving England, your Lordship took the trouble to read the despatches from Vienna, you would have seen how earnestly M. Pozzo di Borgo and myself laboured to bring Austria to a just sense of her situation, and to convince her that as she could have no hope but in resistance, so she never would have such an opportunity of resisting with effect. That opportunity she lost, and she is now bitterly suffering

* Austria.

for her indecision. Not only is she obliged to submit to the humiliating condition of allowing French troops to pass freely through her territory, but she is obliged to resign her independence in the most essential article of sovereignty, namely, the free intercourse with foreign and friendly Powers. She has been compelled, under a threat of immediate war, to exclude the British flag from her ports, and I am in daily expectation of receiving a notice that my diplomatic character is at an end.

Every other part of Europe presents an aspect to the full as gloomy and discouraging. Germany and Italy are absolutely provinces of France. Prussia, notwithstanding the peace of Tilsit, is still occupied by French troops, and likely, for some time, to remain so. In Spain, the Prince of the Asturias has been arrested. The Prince Regent of Portugal, perpetually fluctuating between opposite resolutions, and once half in earnest to emigrate with the Court to the Brazils, seems at the moment of execution to have relapsed into the natural indolence of his character and to have resigned himself totally to the mercy of Bonaparte. In the hopes of securing some part of his former existence, he was induced on the 20th of October to shut his ports against the British flag: he has been rewarded for it by seeing his capital occupied ten days afterwards by the French, and by being told that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign!

Of all the states of once independent Europe, therefore, Sweden may be considered as the only one which has preserved her dignity and her faith. How long the generous monarch who reigns there may be able to hold out, especially if Russia should determine upon forcing him to abandon the cause, is more than I can say. Russia and Denmark together, or rather Russia and France acting through Denmark (for we have abandoned the island of Sealand), must prove too strong for him in the end.

You will see, my Lord, by this statement, which the shortness of the time to the departure of my messenger will prevent my rendering so full as I could wish, that on the Continent of Europe nothing is beyond the reach of this man's power. You will, therefore, be pleased to hear that Louis XVIII. and the Duc d'Angoulême left Mittau in September last, and that after passing through Sweden and receiving there the treat-

ment due to his royalty and his misfortunes, he embarked for England at Gottenburg on the 20th of last month. At Mittau, certainly, he could no longer be safe.

I will now conclude, my Lord, with sincerely hoping that this letter may reach you in India; and that you may find its contents not wholly unworthy of your attention.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

Mr. A. to Sir Alexander Ball.

Vienna, Dec. 22d, 1807.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH I have not yet received any official intimation that my mission at this Court is at an end, my last conversation with Count Stadion gives me every reason to believe that he will soon be under the necessity of sending me a declaration to that effect in writing. It will depend of course upon the terms and the manner of such a declaration, and a variety of other circumstances connected with it, whether I quit Vienna forthwith on receiving it, or whether I may think his Majesty's service will be best promoted by delaying, under some pretence or other, my departure. From present appearances I confess that it is most likely that the option of remaining at Vienna beyond a period reasonably necessary for my private arrangements, will not be left me, and that on every account I shall best consult the good of his Majesty's service by quitting Vienna with the whole of the mission, immediately on receiving the notification I allude to. Under such circumstances, and being wholly without instructions or any other guide to direct my conduct, my present determination is to come straight to Malta with my cyphers and the official correspondence; but as I cannot consistently with my duty expose them to the risk of a conveyance by an Austrian or American vessel, I feel the greatest embarrassment with regard to the means of executing this intention. If no British ship of war should be in these seas, I am afraid I must be under the necessity of destroying them all; on the other hand, I have no authority to require the services of any

of his Majesty's vessels, nor do I know to whom I ought to apply to solicit as a personal favour the convenience of a conveyance to Malta or Sicily. If it were in Commodore Campbell's power, indeed, I have every reason which a frequent and confidential correspondence with him can give me to believe that he would assist me; but then the nature of the service he is employed upon, added to my ignorance of the station assigned to him, leaves me in uncertainty with regard to the effect of any application I may make in that quarter. I am equally ignorant where Lord Collingwood is at this moment, otherwise I should take the liberty of applying directly to his Lordship for his assistance. It is under these considerations that I am induced to address this letter to your Excellency, with a view of making known my situation, and in hopes that your Excellency may be able to suggest some measure by which I may bring away in safety the cypher, and other matters committed to my custody.

I am, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. A.

WHEN the following paper was drawn up, the French Revolution had assumed a decided character of foreign conquest and aggrandisement. In the minds of many, the hope of peace and liberty to mankind, which had accompanied the first great changes, had long been extinguished; while even the more sanguine felt themselves obliged to gird up their loins against Napoleon, wielding, as he did, the prodigious energies of the revolutionary system, and refusing to make peace with us, even on the most moderate conditions. The writer, therefore, can accuse himself of no inconsistency if, notwithstanding his dislike to the original war with France, which he had proved by his votes in Parliament and by various publications, and his sincere good wishes for the success of her endeavour in 1791 to establish a free constitution, he now gave his feeble, but honest help to resist her aggression to the death. This was a case which, in his mind, admitted of no middle course: in fact, the Government which sent him to Vienna were so convinced of the necessity of a prolonged resistance, that, as may be seen by Lord Henry Petty's budget, they made it the foundation of their whole financial administration.

As to his opinions in regard to the probable condition of the world under the final establishment of such a domination, with Napoleon at its head, the

author thinks it right to declare that he alone is responsible for giving expression to them. The paper was drawn up without communication with any of his friends in England or elsewhere, and solely at the request of the distinguished Minister to whom it is addressed. The occasion of writing it was as follows : —


Austria, after the peace of Tilsit, soon found herself under the necessity of breaking off her intercourse with England. Now, there was at Vienna, and had existed for a long while, a strong feeling of impatience under the sacrifices and calamities which the country had endured by war ever since 1792. It was thought by not a few, and those by no means inconsiderable persons, that now that they had obtained a peace, such as it was, their best chance for keeping it, especially since the cession of the Netherlands, would be through a permanent alliance with France. Fear of Russia, also, was another motive for favouring such a connection. This party, of course, on the interruption of our diplomatic relations was very little desirous of renewing them in their former intimacy. Count Stadion saw the true policy of his country in a different light. Fully aware of the mischief likely to result from ill-advised projects growing out of the recent treaty, he nevertheless preferred friendship with Russia to falling in with the French system. Neither would he lose sight of a cordial and perfect reconciliation with England, although he thought himself compelled to give way to the ascendancy of events, and recal his embassy from London.

It was the object of this memorial, therefore, to

counteract the impression — more or less common to all — under which our intercourse was about to close, by presenting a view of the condition in which Austria would find herself under the workings of an effective alliance between Russia and France; to show that the consolidation of so fatal an union might yet be kept off, and that there was yet room for a confidential understanding with Russia, leading hereafter, perhaps, to better things, bottomed on their common interests in Poland.

Reasoning on these topics, it was necessary to point to the nature of a war so entirely maritime as Napoleon had prepared for Europe by his pretensions to share with us our “ships, colonies, and commerce,” — benefits which we could not give him even if we were willing, and which he could only acquire through peace, and by pacific courses; as also to show that, to render his subjugation of the Continent of any use towards effecting his purpose, he must erect all its several states, including Austria herself, into a regular permanent confederacy, in a constant state of action, against England.

In treating this delicate subject, especially that part which points to the establishment of an Archduke in Galicia, the author could not venture to give advice. Even to suggest matter for reflection seemed to him an unwarrantable act of presumption, and only to be justified by the flattering manner in which it was asked of him.



TO
HIS EXCELLENCY COUNT STADION,
&c. &c.

Vienna, February 22. 1808.

AT this moment, my dear Sir, when I am preparing to take leave of you perhaps for many years, I cannot suffer our intercourse to close without expressing to you my gratitude for the many marks of attention and regard with which I have been honoured during my residence at Vienna. Accept, therefore, for yourself as well as for your country, my warmest and truest thanks. Believe me, that next to England I love and cherish Austria; that I quit you, not with regret merely, but with sorrow; and that in this fearful hour of our destinies, my most fervent prayers are offered up for your sovereign and his illustrious House, and for the prosperity and preservation of his dominions.

To yourself individually I have to acknowledge an unvaried succession of acts of personal kindness. Above all, I feel obliged to you for the tone of frankness and confidence you established between us from the first, in our conversations upon business. If my mission to this Court under the auspices of Mr. Fox has produced any good, or shall leave behind it the seeds of any remedy to the present evils, I can attribute its success only to this cause. We may owe to it in a great degree, as I am willing to hope, that in this difficult crisis for our respective governments we separate without hostility; that our rupture goes not beyond the suspension of diplomatic communications; that in happier days these may be resumed where they break off; and that the solid interests of the two

empires, so far as they have been treated at Vienna, are left secure and undisturbed. Flattered by this sort of intercourse, I used myself always to blend the sentiments of private esteem with the performance of those duties on which I had to communicate with you; and even now, forgetting almost the shortness of my mission and how little I am authorised by ordinary forms, I presume upon a reciprocity of feeling on your part, to lay before you, with the freedom of a friend, the reflections which oppress my mind on the alarming posture in which I leave your affairs.

It is not that I have the presumption to suppose that I can offer you any new ideas, or present in any new point of view the old topics on which we have so frequently conversed. The dreadful history of the rise and progress of the French power offers but one barren uniformity of thought or action to those who are within its reach. Nothing seems left to them now but to suffer and submit. The reason is plain—the new system has completely subdued the old. That state called Peace, to which France has reduced the Continent, bears nothing upon the face of it which indicates, as in the termination of other wars, some fluctuation of fortune during the struggle, or some apprehension of its future renewal. After seventeen years of war, France has established her dominion whole, and without compromise, over the rest of the European Continent. During that period, she assumed, successively, every shape which she found best suited to the destruction of the enemy immediately opposed to her. When a people was to be inflamed to take up arms against their government, she was the Goddess of Liberty. Where empire was to be gained and consolidated, she became a flaming sword for the extirpation of those who resisted, and for enslaving those who obeyed. At this point she stops. This is the last character she has to play.

I can offer you, therefore, nothing new on a subject which seems to have exhausted all fertility of thought and all faculty of combination. General ideas, indeed, and speculations formed more or less according to our several characters and tempers, we cannot banish. These belong to our habits, and to the constant state of fear in which we live; and will force themselves upon the imagination, how fatigued soever it may be with calculating the chances and adding together in laborious despair all the little items of political safety that yet remain to us. I am myself, for instance, much inclined to think that this mischief may find its end in the principles in which it originated; and that the present system of unfeeling oppression, which offers to the sufferers no resource in the sympathy of their government, may generate a spirit of lawful resistance, as fatal to the new authorities as the spirit of revolution proved to the old. But the cure, if it wait this remedy, will be long and painful.

Tired out with conjecture, and dissatisfied with speculating upon these latent possibilities for our deliverance, we come round at length to the place from whence we set out,—to the old principles on which the states of Europe grew up to civilisation and independence. All on this side is equally barren. The balance of power is lost to the very name. Every possibility of reviving the principle of association among independent states for their mutual safety, seems to be destroyed by the peace of Tilsit. Hopes would yet remain for Europe, if the Austrian Empire singly could recover its strength. That, like the rest, is for the present a dream! Nothing is left for you now but to secure, as well as you are able, your present existence, together with some degree of freedom in your relations with the neighbouring Powers. Here lies the source of all the anxious thoughts I

carry with me to England. This is the subject on which they are employed without intermission ; in revolving your various dangers, and in exploring the whole circle of possible contingencies to find a remedy for them. My reflections, such as they are, I now submit to your judgment, with no other confidence in their value than what may be due to the motives in which they originate.

These dangers are so complicated, and all tend so visibly to one and the same point, namely, the utter destruction and dissolution of your empire, that it is difficult to separate them from each other, or to class them under distinct heads. I set totally aside any direct danger to you from England. Those to which you are exposed from us are purely collateral, and belong rather to the prolongation of our war with France than to any activity we might give to our hostilities—should we unfortunately be involved in hostilities—against you. Here, however, the probable duration of the maritime war becomes to you a point of primary importance. I will shortly call your attention, therefore, to the character and nature of that war, in order that you may have this part of the question before you in its clearest light.

Never was the character of any war more clear and definite, than the war now carrying on between Great Britain and France. All possibility of misrepresenting, or at least all difficulty in comprehending, its objects, are once and for ever cleared away. We are not at war to change the government of France, nor to set up a balance to her power, nor to send her back to her own frontiers, nor even to obtain a frontier for any other state. If there be any continental interest implicated in the contest, it is an interest so little felt by those in whose favour it is asserted, that they are themselves in arms against us for its destruction. The war is now brought to a simple question of in-

dependent existence for the British nation. A war of more pure, unmixed self-defence never yet was sustained by one nation against another since the beginning of the world. It is so clearly so, that France cannot even find a name for her cause. The ruler of the French professes, as usual, his extreme desire for peace; but so little does he know, or so little does he wish that *we* should know, what he wants from us, that he cannot even name the conditions on which he requires that we should make it. It is almost an affront to ask them of him. Talk of a basis—the direst act of offensive war can scarcely raise his indignation to a higher pitch. Ask him what he means by the “liberty of the seas”—instead of vouchsafing to inform us, we are referred to Lord Lauderdale’s negotiation in 1806, to whom neither this foolish phrase, nor any one question belonging to the neutral code was ever mentioned, or in the remotest degree alluded to, during the whole period of his stay at Paris. Pressed a little closer on this point, he imputes to us the absurd intention of making other nations sign and seal some strange instrument, the idea of which never yet entered into the head of man; and then proudly asks whether we mean to proclaim eternal war? Whether our arms are yet in possession of Petersburg, Paris, Madrid, and Vienna? Scarcely has he thundered this in our ears than, becoming all at once reasonable, he declares that England may keep her maritime code; that is (according to him), her maritime superiority—that is, her maritime tyranny (the word is his own)—and that there is nothing to prevent peace in the counter-declarations of the English and Russian governments on this point. Amidst the obscurity and confusion of these opposite pretensions, all he will allow us to understand of his demands, all he suffers to appear of his high will is, that he is much in want of something we have got.

This is plain. Now if the something we have got had ever been his, or if he was in a condition to take it from us by force, or if he had an equivalent to offer for its surrender, or any inducement to hold out for our consent to allow him to participate with us, the point might admit of some discussion. But what is it that he wants? Participation in naval advantages, in colonial establishments, in commercial profits. None of these ever were his, nor can they be his except through peace, and even then they cannot be his except through an assiduous cultivation of the arts of peace; for he can scarcely expect that we should surrender him a fleet by an express article, or that we should give him up the half of Jamaica, or assign him a tributary per centage on our custom-house receipts. Now if these be things he cannot take from us—if he have nothing to offer us in return for them, and if he will not even ask us civilly to be admitted to a share of their benefits, I wish to know how he is to get them from men who possess one grain of the sense or spirit of the country over which they preside? So much for the character of this war as influencing its duration.

With regard to other points, and particularly such as relate to its nature, this, above all other wars in which Great Britain has ever been engaged, possesses the distinctive character of naval. Other wars, whether sustained by her singly, or in concert with allies, had always a mixed interest: this interest was partly naval, partly territorial. If she had to contend single-handed against France, as in the American war, the territorial interest was neutralised, but not abandoned. The continental balance never being disturbed, she was sure, at a peace, to find it again where she had left it. On the other hand, her wars of alliances embraced naval securities and improvements together with the continental balance.

Under the system of the day, all this complication and interchange of political interests has disappeared: the ruler of France has determined to exclude Great Britain totally from her relations with the European Continent. The means he possesses to accomplish this object are great: so are our means of resisting him. In this terrible conflict, now beginning, you see the undisputed superiority of the land striving to reduce the undisputed superiority of the sea. This can only be effected by the conquest of England. I think he will fail both in his means and in his end.

The permanent exclusion of Great Britain from the Continent of Europe must suppose that great calamities, calamities not inferior to those which attend the reduction of mankind from civilisation to barbarism, had visited the nations of which it is composed. In the present division of human society, the separation of the interests of the land from those of the sea is one of those wild projects engendered between the extravagance of hate and the impotence of despair, of which the inventors will soon be taught the folly; and that it is not in them to subdue the elements of nature as they have subverted the principles of public order. They will learn that man is associated to man by his wants; that his wants are in proportion to his civilisation; that his wants cannot be supplied, and, consequently, that his civilisation cannot be continued, except under the free intercourse of state with state, and that, of this intercourse, Great Britain commands all the principal channels. If the ruler of France shall persist in the fruitless attempt to impose the law of conquest upon a nation, her equal in fame and arms, he will learn that the sure effect of this prolonged contest upon the continental states will be to turn back the current of their prosperity to its scarcely perceptible

sources, and to annihilate the industry which made it flow.

He will find how grossly he has been mistaken in his opinion of the value of the Continent to Great Britain under the form in which it is likely for a time to settle. It was as belonging to the same family, as making part of the same commonwealth; it was from the similitude and sympathy which prevailed more or less among the European governments, all deriving their existence from the same feudal origin, and not on the vulgar principle of finding a market for her goods, that England has always felt an interest in the welfare of the surrounding states. Their value will be wholly lost to us as soon as they lose the body of their laws and institutions, and the real independence of their respective sovereignties. In proportion, therefore, as they fall under the dependance of one all-absorbing empire, England, whose great interest was a balance among the separate states, must feel a diminished interest in their prosperity. With a diminished interest in their prosperity, she ceases altogether to have an interest in their peace, which was chiefly useful to her as it constituted the true security of a balance. Those who would exclude Great Britain from the Continent under the pretence that her interference is calculated to promote wars, will soon find that they are occasioning the very evils against which their short-sighted policy would guard. They would deprive her of all common feeling by which to counteract the temptation of an immediate advantage. Observe the dilemma to which these exclusionists are reduced by their own argument. If continental wars are useful to England, they give us an interest in exciting them; if they do not, the accusation is a mere calumny.

In a war of the nature I have above endeavoured

to describe, whatever may be its final issue, this at least is certain, that each of the parties concerned in it possesses the means of inflicting the most lasting calamities on the human species. In proportion as France, as a means of reducing Great Britain to a state of vassalage, shall succeed in separating her from the rest of Europe, in that proportion must Great Britain, for her own absolute preservation, and not to be so reduced, separate Europe from its means of maritime communication, and thus strike a palsy into the limbs of the confederacy by which she is about to be assailed. She must do this at the risk of reducing the Continent by degrees to the barbarism of the tenth century; *but she must do it*. There is no help for it — no choice but this; or the certain abandonment of our country to France.

But it is not so much in the mode of carrying on this war, as in the impossibility (almost) of putting an end to it, that its duration must prove calamitous to Europe. A war on the principles above declared, and for the purpose above announced, is scarcely within the reach of peace; the objects to be reciprocally abandoned by the belligerent Powers for the sake of peace being totally unsuited to the condition and state of existence of the adverse parties. No territorial concessions made to *Great Britain* can balance the maritime advantages to be acquired by France. Even if such concessions could be desirable for us, where is the protecting continental Power to guaranty their security? On the other hand, what are the naval advantages we could grant to France in her present formidable condition which would be short of an act of suicide? Peace, on these principles, would be nothing but the voluntary, uncompensated, gift to her of a navy.

You see from the nature of this struggle that there can be no hope of its end so long as France shall

persist in declaring that our refusal to sign her *carte blanche* is a declaration on our parts of eternal war. Here, then, begins your chief danger. Bonaparte, in separating England from every sort of continental interest, has affected to make the tranquillity of the Continent depend absolutely on the maritime peace. This is the pretext for his continued infractions of treaty, and for his invasion of neutral and unoffending states. Prussia is to be retained by French troops, and robbed of her last ducat, in spite of his most sacred engagements, until England signs the maritime peace. The Ottoman empire is parcelled out because Constantinople is the way to the Ganges, and because the loss of India may force England to a maritime peace. All the exchanges of territory which he forces upon other Powers, he refers to the principle of increasing the energy of those means by which the maritime peace is to be obtained. You will be the first to feel the effects of this system, as yours is the only country where France can look for the means of keeping off for some years longer from her own subjects the pressure caused by her insatiable thirst of dominion. You possess almost the only virgin territory of Europe which has yet escaped his grasp, and depend upon it, that while a ducat is to be found in other countries, *the armed people* of France will not fail to exact it rather than contribute themselves to a war where they have not the shadow of an interest. *Your* wish certainly is to remain as you are, preserving things as near as you can to your last agreement. But the convention of the Isonzo would be precious indeed if it contained the fixed line of demarcation between you and France. This war is proclaimed — and who shall deny it? — for neutral rights: neutrals, therefore, must pay the charge of it. It is time, we are told, for France to breathe a little, after having for seventeen years

fought and bled in this just and sacred cause! Shall Austria pretend to remain inactive in the struggle, now become a war of resources? If so, she must expect that other Powers, whose meritorious efforts are exerted in destroying the maritime tyranny of Great Britain, will not remain indifferent to the advantages she proposes to herself by this system, or patient sufferers under their own losses. If we take Corfu and the Seven Islands, you must cede your littorale to France. If Russia, as the reward of her efforts against us, or by way of compensation for the annihilation of her commerce and credit, until she can realise in her coffers the fabled treasures of Hindostan, requires some *douceur* in hand, more than Moldavia and Wallachia, which is her already allotted share, she can look to it only in Poland; and you will hardly doubt that any further unsettlement in that quarter must be paid ultimately by Galicia.

This is the danger to which you will, in all probability, be exposed by a situation, such as I have described it, of imperfect peace with France. But let us now suppose that the necessities of your situation force you into a temporary union with her. This case may happen before long. Having once gained his great point of establishing what he calls a continental cause, his next natural object will be a combination of measures to render that cause prevalent. As a foundation for these measures, the continental Powers will be told that all the calamities he compels them to endure, from the interruption of maritime communication, arise from the obstinacy of England; and, as a necessary consequence, that if England will not yield to his promulgated will, she must be made to yield to your joint efforts. When, therefore, the grand confederacy is once consolidated, when the common object is declared, when the *manifesto* against England is signed by the French,

Spanish, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian plenipotentiaries, and by the representatives of the vassal kings of Germany, Holland, and Italy, you will be called upon in your turn to furnish your contingent to the grand continental army, which is to carry fire and sword to our devoted shores, and dictate the maritime peace in London. You must pay your *quota* of subsidy. Your proportion of men and money will be assessed by a French commissioner, and calculated in savage derision, on the subsidies received by you from England in the days of our common fellowship. You start at this. Tell me how you can avoid it? Are you strong enough to resist the demand? Is Bonaparte too kind to make it? Can you do more than hesitate — than temporise — than represent; and, amidst the stern menaces of vengeance and robbery, obtest earth and heaven against his injustice?

These are the measures to which you must become actively a party. Let us now look to those of which you will be the passive agents. I say nothing of Germany and Italy. Leave it also to us to crush her rising naval dominion in the Adriatic. I look only to what France is doing in Poland *, and to what she is meditating in Turkey: these dangers grow upon you with the growth of the year; every day narrows the circle which France has drawn around your empire, and by a fatality which the world has never before witnessed, you are destined not only to be the spectators of this work, but the first instruments of its execution, and the forgers yourselves of the chains you are doomed to wear. But even supposing Bonaparte were to leave you quiet for the present, and to require from you nothing but manifestoes and decla-

* A treaty was then negotiating, and soon after signed, with the Elector of Saxony, for the keeping up an army of 60,000 men in Poland, of which 15,000 to be French.

rations against England, and your perfect neutrality during his Turkish expedition; admitting that it be his system to end with you, and not to begin with you, there remains still that fatal alliance of Tilsit, that union between France and Russia, which while it subsists, no intervening state can be certain of an hour's repose. It is not for me to point out to one so well informed as you are, the extent and variety of evils of all kinds which the consolidation of this alliance must inevitably produce. There is not a measure it accomplishes which will not be necessarily destructive to you; not a step it advances which is not over your prostrate bodies. This alliance will not be less fatal to your existence, whether it devote your empire to immediate partition, or whether it confer upon you the poisoned gift of a share in the spoils of Turkey*, and of a frontier which brings you into immediate contact with the most litigious of all dominations. I may err, but I confess that the union of these two Powers appears to me more dangerous to you under its present form, than even if France had annexed Russia as a conquest to her own territories.

It were a mere waste of words to say more on this part of the subject. I have before considered the chance of your failure, should you be forced to make common cause with France, in a war essentially of resources. But what if you succeed? you are still worse off than if you fail. I leave out of the question what you will have to suffer generally from the humiliation of Great Britain, and from your being at the mercy of France by the sort of peace forced upon us by the success of these measures. Do you think these measures will stop at a peace? Do you hope to be then left at liberty, or that you will be freed from the obligations of supporting France by similar efforts whenever the

* Proposed the ensuing year to Austria by Bonaparte.

chief of its government shall think proper to renew the quarrel with us? Would not such a peace confirm Russia in his alliance? Would it not for ever unite, and bind up the destinies of Europe with the fortunes, the grandeur, the solidity, the high triumphant and uncontrolled ascendancy of France and her revolution? Could you stand this long? Could you remain a state? Could you even govern your interior? Could you invest your capital? Could you transfer your estates? Could you marry your children? Could you, in short, act, or live, or breathe, except by the *Code Napoleon*? In such a state do you hope for safety? In such a *peace* do you hope for *rest*? or that your independent dominion, your internal authority, your commerce, or even that literature and the fine arts among you could long survive this forced and perverted state from which all social comfort will have disappeared, and in which the sole business of human life will be to supply the wants, and administer to the passions of a ruthless and unhearing despotism?

To all these dangers, and to many more less immediately in sight, but not less certain and imminent, I leave you exposed, without seeing, I must confess, any means of averting them, whether by force, by compromise, or even by submission. I leave you employed on the sole consideration of the comparative remoteness or proximity of your destruction. But even in this situation it is not permitted us to neglect the examination of every possible means of escape. Under the operation of the monstrous principles which for so many years have been employed in unsettling the world, and which are now moulding it into all sorts of fantastic shapes, you are so placed that you must have recourse to your very danger for your protection. Your choice does not lie between good and evil, but between evil and evil. But still it is much if you may choose.

In examining with painful solicitude these different questions of danger, precaution, and defence, and turning round this dark body on every side in order to discover some crack or chasm through which a ray of light may penetrate, I cannot help resting with most anxiety on the situation in which the peace of Tilsit has placed you with relation to Russia.

This situation is, no doubt, highly critical and dangerous, but comparing it with all others, it has this in its favour, that the danger is less pressing, less imminent, and even less positive according to rational calculation. The principal bad effects of the treaty of Tilsit to you individually, will arise, as I have before remarked, from the eventual consolidation of the alliance between Russia and France. Something, therefore, will always be gained while you can keep this consolidation at a distance. But the interest of your position with regard to Russia does not stop here. If it be on this side that you can retard your fall, it is on this side that you must work out your deliverance. I know well the unpopularity at Vienna (and in many points of view I acknowledge its justice) of anything that bears the semblance of a Russian connection; but remember that you have no variety in your choice; remember that all hateful and all shameful as is this Russian connection with France, it is the weakest side of the line of circumvallation which is drawn around you. After what Russia has done against England, it is not from me undoubtedly that she can expect defence or exculpation; but in the services she may render to you, I am ready to forget her levity towards us. Be assured that I speak the language of all the men of any lead in the councils of my country, when I declare that if your present rupture with us could produce a *real* defensive concert between you and Russia, founded on the necessity of preserving to you your German dominions, of guaranteeing the tranquil-

lity of Poland, and of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, all her wrongs towards us would be forgiven and forgotten for ever. In effect the really offensive part of the conduct of Russia even towards us, is her having leagued with France against the rest of the Continent. England is of all Powers the least affected by her capricious freaks. Remark also that the nature of her complaints against us speaks rather in her favour than otherwise. The alleged cause of rupture was not that we persisted too pertinaciously in the plan of delivering Germany from the French arms, but that we did not assist her with sufficient energy. This is the complaint. Whether seriously urged by Russia, or fairly urged against Great Britain, are questions wholly foreign to the present discussion.

But it is with your affairs, and not with ours, as connected with this powerful neighbour, that my business lies at present. England has the elements for her resource, and throws a wilderness of waters between her and every possible danger with which she may be threatened by a foreign enemy. Your case is different. Russia is a neighbour against whom you have no defence but that of your armies; and by her engagements with France, if once they settle into system, she becomes an enemy from whom you can expect no mercy. Indifferent to you she can never be; and the choice between her enmity and her friendship, is, I am afraid, all that is left you now.

The question, therefore, seems to be, whether in the subversion of the old system, there yet remain any points of contact or of common interest, by which you may approach Russia. If any such points remain, the next inquiry will be whether you can trust Russia enough to have *any* dealings with her. Both these questions seem to meet their solution in the necessity of the case. You cannot well avoid entering into

some relations with Russia, if she is to extend her frontier to the Danube ; and the situation of Poland seems to require that they should be those of amity and good understanding.

I admit, it is true, that you cannot just now make any treaty with Russia which shall contain the most distant overture towards a future union with her for the recovery of what you both have lost in territory or in influence on this side of the Vistula. You can make none to disturb the new settlement of the House of Saxony in Poland. You must not look for the present further than your own Galicia. But Russia cannot wish to see this province dismembered from your empire ; much less that it should be erected into a French principality, and become the *nucleus* of a future confederation of the Vistula. Russia must see this danger in the moment of her returning reason, and must acknowledge no less the necessity of uniting with you for mutual security in that quarter.

Is it for your respective interests that Poland should again become a nation ? Is there in the laws, and institutions, and habits, by which your own share of Poland is governed, sufficient stuff out of which a nation might be composed ? Would you, or would you not, be better enabled to avail yourselves of the martial spirit of its population by sending an archduke to hold his Court at Cracow, with the state and title suited to a people thus re-embodied ? Would Russia join you in any future projected settlement of the Polish state ? or if not, would she object to any settlement you might find it convenient for yourselves ? These are important considerations, and well worth weighing. Unfortunately they contain nothing extravagant. Adversity has so familiarised men's minds with change, that speculations, which in other times would have passed for wild and chimerical fancies, present themselves now as rational results from what is passing every day before our eyes.

I am aware of the many objections which may be urged, and which, in fact, subsist against any proposal of engagement of what nature soever, with such a Cabinet as that of St. Petersburg, composed as it now is. I feel—no man more—the justice of all that can be said against the advisers of the peace of Tilsit. Suffer me, however, to point out to you an evident distinction between the grounds of accusation which Austria and Great Britain have respectively to enforce against the Russian ministers. On our side we have to complain of positive and unjust hostility. You have to complain of the levity with which a sovereign, pointed out as it were by the hand of Providence to be the great stay and support of any alliance for the protection of Europe, was, in one disgraceful day, changed from its defender into its destroyer, and into the instrument and accomplice of some of the worst acts of Bonaparte. But let us be just. *Austria* of all Powers has the least right to complain that Russia made her peace at Tilsit. *Austria* during the preceding winter (for reasons of which I will not inquire into the soundness) had been a tranquil spectator of the most bloody and the most eventful campaign ever known in modern history. She was warned in the month of December of the certain and inevitable consequences of her indecision. The event has answered the prediction, but has not exceeded it. But notwithstanding this marked difference between the two cases, and notwithstanding the many reasons there are to wish for union upon its true and proper principles, I should be the last person to recommend that with a puerile oblivion of the past, and a rash confidence in the future, you should throw open at once your arms to Russia. Such an act would be the consummation of imprudence. The proposition I hazard is strictly limited to what it professes. It goes to nothing further than the in-

ternal situation of Poland under the new settlement; an object scarcely visible as yet above the political horizon, interfering with no declared object of French ambition, and at such a distance from English interests that you may even render your separation from us subservient to the arrangements necessary to give it effect. Nor do I suppose, as a motive for its adoption, any thing far short of a positive necessity. Your will I must reckon for nothing. You have no freedom, except in the choice between an understanding of this nature with Russia, and a direct connection with France.*

Here, in my opinion, lies the great question. In the long storms which are preparing for the world, you will find it difficult to stand alone; and if you once entangle yourselves with France, you are gone past remedy or redemption. From that Stygian shore there is no return: —

“ *Fata obstant, tristisque palus inamabilis undâ
Alligat.*”

When you have made one step with her in this vale of death it will be useless to look back — it will be impossible to stop — you must go on to the journey's end. You must participate with her in the plunder of other states. You must exchange your own territories at her will. You must follow and assist her in that which she prizes above conquest, in that which is the real motive of all these exchanges of dominion, the disorganisation of the social state, and the blotting out from the memory of mankind all the old relations by which they were once governed. Even this would avail you but little as a safeguard against Russia, or any neighbouring state. What signify to France the petty disputes among the Kings

* Napoleon's marriage with the Archduchess took place in the next year.

she still suffers to wear their crowns? Why should she prevent Russia from vexing you by her intrigues in Servia and Hungary? You are not her allies. France *can* have no allies, constituted as her empire now is, except such as are essentially French; and Austria, to deserve her effectual protection, must pay the same hard price for it which has brought Spain and Holland to the condition of tributary provinces.

What, then, is the result of this speculation? If I can strike out no new and distinct course; if this be no time to talk of union with Russia; if all the considerations I have ventured in this long letter to lay before you, lead to nothing more than to the adoption of measures of general caution, and to act for the best as circumstances arise, the conclusion is too little precise and positive to be worth the pains taken to arrive at it. This would, perhaps, be true if there were not some hopes that a case may soon arise when the reflections I have presented to you may find their application. In Russia there are still many men who see and feel as statesmen; many more who, without pretending to the qualifications belonging to that order, love their country with true hearts, and deprecate the certain and countless mischiefs which threaten it from a perseverance in the system of French fraternity. Before many months are elapsed, the pressure of these mischiefs will be seriously felt. It will be asked why Russia is at war with England? This question cannot long be kept out of the palace of the Emperor himself; to whose ears it must come at last, and who must and will be told that to have peace with England (I mean anything which deserves the name of a peace between two such Powers) he must resume the station and the character which belong to him in the distribution of the sovereignties of the world. Of such a peace *you* are the natural mediators — not the formal mediators — that cannot

be while France is so near you ; but the mediators in substance ; the power to whom *in fact* Russia would owe the peace ; the state for whose sake England would bury all her anger in eternal oblivion.

It is with a view to this possible turn of affairs that I have troubled you so much at length. You will ask what part I assign to Great Britain under such circumstances. When, and in what form, it may be prudent *for you* that Great Britain should appear by the side of her old allies, must be determined by the prudence of those who may be at the head of your councils and of hers at the moment. It is enough that you be assured that our accession to any new system of continental union will be quite independent of the changes which may happen in our internal administration. Pursuing, in the mean time, with firmness and with frankness the principles of her unalterable policy, Great Britain cannot fail of essentially serving your cause and that of Europe, even while she is defending herself against your united arms. Every mischief she succeeds in preventing is so much saved for the common stock. Every year she continues to keep down the marine of her enemy will reckon for ten in the account of your salvation, by the distance to which she throws the final establishment of the French empire, one, universal, and indivisible ! In the mean time, the sort of war we may have to carry on is not likely to embitter our quarrel. There is scarcely an enterprise we can undertake to which you may not fairly wish success. We want no concert, no private understanding with you to confirm you in these sentiments. Concert and a good understanding will produce themselves. We shall find them as we go on. You will understand us in our actions. You will read the whole secret of the British state in our deportment towards the real enemy ; in the station

we confer upon ourselves, and in the proud elevation of our mind above our difficulties. You will know that while we oppose France, the mainspring of our country is sound and whole. As to peace with us, for you it is the affair of an hour. You declare it by the very act of your separation from France. From that happy hour all things will fall back into their original order, and begin for you a new era of life and happiness.

Here I close my subject. Much more remains to be said, but we have enough for the day. Time presses, and I must bid you farewell. Receive therefore, my dear Sir, once more the assurances of my durable esteem, of the high consideration with which I am impressed for your abilities and your virtues, and of my true good wishes for your success and happiness.

(Signed) ROBERT ADAIR.

THE papers which follow were written in consequence of the appearance of a work, entitled “ *Mémoires et Lettres inédits du Chevalier de Gentz* ;” printed at Stutgard in the year 1841. Two of these memoirs, especially the latter, concern too nearly the author’s account of the same transactions not to require some notice on his part.

REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S NARRATIVE OF WHAT PASSED
AT THE PRUSSIAN HEAD-QUARTERS IN OCTOBER, 1806,
PREVIOUSLY TO THE BATTLE OF JENA.

It will be observed by the reader of the despatches which form the ground-work of the preceding historical memoir, that a fuller exposition of the condition of Prussia, and particularly of the system of its government under the administration of Count Haugwitz, is necessary for a full knowledge of the state of Europe at the time they were written ; and of the reason why no general confederacy could then be formed against Napoleon. He may collect, indeed, the nature of the obstacles to such a confederacy by the measures suggested for their removal ; but it will require a more extended detail of facts, with many of which the writer was then unacquainted, to establish in his mind the conviction of its utter impossibility. Evidence decisive of this fact has been produced recently to the world in a posthumous publication of memoirs by the well-known Chevalier Gentz. It was printed at Stuttgard, in 1841.

This gentleman had been invited to the Prussian head-quarters to write proclamations and manifestoes. He arrived at Erfurt on the 3d of October, a few days before the great battle, and during his stay there drew up a narrative in the form of a journal, of his daily conversations with Messrs. Haugwitz, Lucchesini, and Lombard — the three great directors of the Prussian councils.

His narrative, therefore, becomes an important historical document. M. Gentz was a man steadily attached to the old governments, an acute observer of public transactions, and a writer, as we all know,

of very considerable eloquence and ability. His journal was drawn up with a regard to truth which seems evident, under the clearest conviction of his judgment, and in the full bitterness also of his despair for the public cause. To that cause he certainly was devoted ; and although I shall have to remark not very favourably on some passages in another paper contained in this posthumous collection, consisting of comments and criticisms on the negotiations for peace in 1806, between England and France, of which he could know nothing, I will not refuse my testimony to his patriotism and his zeal, of which he gave me many proofs in his letters while I was at Vienna.

The document is further valuable as exhibiting, by actual experiment of its working, the faults of the system adopted by the Prussian government in the early days of the French Revolution ; that is to say, by persisting in their French connection after the nature and the reason of their original alliance with that Power, and consequently of all that was German in its objects, had become fundamentally altered : I speak of the time when on the failure of the Duke of Brunswick's expedition in 1792, Prussia separated herself from Austria, and concluded shortly afterwards the peace of Basle. From the web of that treaty she never could extricate herself. In fact, the breaking up of the German union began with that act, and prepared the way consequently for the dissolution of the empire. It brought Prussia into a vicious system of relation towards the smaller states, whose union, grounded originally on resistance to the too great pretensions and preponderance of Austria, was nevertheless German in purpose, and German in its means. At the head of this national league, Prussia had long taken her place, and she had no right to desert it, or to change its character into that of an armed protectorship, grounded on a neutrality too necessary to France

to be fair towards Austria and its other members. By so doing Prussia became substantially the ally of France from 1795 forwards.

The practical evils of this state of things, and the point which they had reached, are brought out into full day in the conferences here recorded by M. Gentz. They disclose a series of the most disreputable transactions: but upon these it will be needless to enter further than as they affect the question of re-uniting in 1806 the Powers of Europe against France. To this point they are conclusive; and on many other matters of deep interest they open a mine of gold to the historian.

What we are first led to remark on reading these papers is the singular temerity of Prussia in making war, which, as to the time of beginning it, was purely a voluntary act on her part, not only without the knowledge of Austria, but when by no moral possibility she could obtain the co-operation of that Power; and when in the false calculations of her diplomacy, and, as it would seem, in the hope of making her arrangements without him, she had kept back part of her secret from her best friend, the Emperor of Russia. But the great folly of all was the entering upon a war against England and France at the same time:—against the King of England, to retain possession of his hereditary dominions, of which at the instigation of Napoleon she had deprived him; and against Napoleon, who, for his own convenience, now wanted to get them back for their right owner. By what mischievous ingenuity she contrived to get herself into this predicament, puzzled at the time all the old politicians of Europe. It is brought to light in the present publication, which exhibits a picture full of instruction of the consequences of that scheming policy to which Prussia had in a manner delivered

herself up from her first deviation into French revolutionary connection.

Her case shortly was this : — Tired of the long and oppressive domination of her ally, towards the end of 1805, when Mr. Pitt on his return to power again endeavoured to bring together something of a confederacy against Napoleon, Prussia, although rejecting the specific proposals carried out by Lord Harrowby, saw nevertheless that the time was fast approaching when she would have not only to redeem her mistakes, but to defend the independence of her monarchy. Just cause for action had been afforded to her by the violation of her territory in October, when Bernadotte marched his army through Anspach to the rear of the Austrians. The Emperor Alexander, who arrived at Berlin soon after that event, encouraged of course the King in his views of emancipation, offered him all his forces, and succeeded in drawing him into a measure, from which there could be no retreat ; namely, a convention for restoring the affairs of Europe to the footing on which they had been placed by the treaty of Luneville. A treaty to this effect was signed at Potsdam on the 3d of November ; and Count Haugwitz was despatched to Vienna with orders to communicate it to Napoleon, to offer the King's mediation with the other Powers in the event of his accepting its conditions, and to denounce immediate hostilities if he should reject them. Haugwitz arrived there some days before the battle of Austerlitz. Why he delayed entering immediately on his business has never yet been satisfactorily explained. It is stated in the "*Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*," with what truth I know not, that "*le négociateur Prussien antécédemment au grand événement militaire, dont il attendait l'issue, ne voulut ou n'osa point communiquer au Quartier Général Français le principal objet de son importante mission :*" and yet he had his audience of

Napoleon on the 28th of November! Be this as it may, Napoleon finding him still at Vienna after the battle, addressed him one day thus: — "*Eh bien, vous savez que les jours se suivent, et ne se ressemblent pas. J'ai voulu vous faire la guerre; aujourd'hui je vous offre le Hanovre.*"* The choice was Hanover, therefore, or war. Haugwitz chose Hanover, and a treaty for its occupation was drawn up on the instant. The king, his master, than whom a more virtuous monarch or man never lived, and who never dreamt of such a transaction, indignant at the whole proceeding, but circumvented in every way, and inclosed in the net of long standing and inextricable difficulties in which his servants had involved him, added nevertheless conditions to his compulsory ratification of this treaty; stipulating for delay in its execution until a general peace, and for the consent of the King of England to it. These in the spring of 1806 were taken to Paris by Haugwitz. Rage and scorn awaited that minister on their reception. The modifications were rejected: a new treaty was framed, compelling Prussia to occupy the electorate forthwith, and to put herself instantly into a state of hostility with England by excluding the king's flag from his own ports.

About this period negotiations for peace with England and Russia were opened by Napoleon, and at the very first step towards a treaty, the retrocession of Hanover was offered by him unconditionally to the King of England. Thus stood the matter between Prussia and France. It was this act it seems which determined the cabinet of Berlin to go to war. So much at least is now established by the testimony of the Marquis of Lucchesini, then their ambassador

* See Narrative, p. 275.

at Paris. Let us see the account which he gives of it.

" Cette première conversation," says M. Gentz, " fut entièrement consacrée à l'histoire de ce qui s'était passé à Paris *pour amener la rupture avec la Prusse.* * * * Il (Lucchesini) savait, à ne

pas pouvoir en douter, que dès la première ouverture des négociations avec l'Angleterre, la restitution du pays de Hanovre avait été formellement proposée au gouvernement Anglais. On ne voulut pas le croire à Berlin ; cette démarche faite à la même époque où M. Laforêt avait ordre de presser le Cabinet de Berlin à compléter et à renforcer les mesures par lesquelles il s'était approprié ce pays, parut d'une perfidie si noire, que ceux mêmes qui connaissaient le gouvernement Français avaient de la peine à y ajouter foi." *

* * " Napoléon se flattait à cette époque que *de concert avec l'Empereur de Russie*, il engagerait le Roi de Prusse sans difficulté à sortir du pays de Hanovre ; on ne pensait pas même à la restitution de ses provinces cédées ; quelque dédommagement chétif, quelque Bernbourg, Coethen, &c. (disait le Marquis) voilà tout ce qu'on avait imaginé pour lui ; et chaque jour développa davantage le projet de le sacrifier absolument, et de préparer la chute de la monarchie."

" Ce fut là la substance des avis qu'il avait donnés depuis quelques mois à sa Cour, mais principalement de deux rapports qu'il fit le 22. et le 29. de Juillet, et lesquels joints aux propositions faites à l'Electeur de Hesse, et aux démarches hostiles contre le Prince d'Orange, déterminèrent le roi à la guerre."

Determined thus upon war with France, not for Hanover only, but for the preservation of the monarchy, any but the infatuated men who then directed the councils of Prussia would have begun by diminishing the number of their enemies, and by calling their friends to their assistance. They did neither.

And, first, as to Great Britain. With us the door was always open for reconciliation. The King, in his message of April 21st to the House of Commons, on the seizure of his territories, and the closing of the northern ports against his flag, declares that "he will look with anxious expectation to that moment when a more dignified and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia shall remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a Power with whom his Majesty *has no other cause of difference.*"

Assuredly that moment was now arrived; and Prussia had it once more in her power to occupy the post offered to her through Lord Harrowby's negotiation of the preceding year. Yet it was not until the 18th of September, and at the very time at which Krusemarck was sent to Petersburg to claim the Russian succours, that any overture whatever was made to Great Britain; and even then what was its nature? A desire was expressed through Mr. Thornton, our resident minister at Hamburgh, that we should send a plenipotentiary to open negotiations for a reconciliation; but not one word was said to authorise a belief that there was any disposition to remove the cause — the *only* cause — of difference declared by his Majesty's message. The English government, nevertheless, complied instantly with the request, and named Lord Morpeth. He was appointed the 1st of October; on the 6th he was at Hamburgh, and at Weimar (the head-quarters of the Prussian army) on the 12th, two days before the great battle.

Will it be believed? Yes, any thing may be believed, when it is remembered that the same ministers who had thus brought their country to the brink of destruction were still in office — Lord Morpeth could not get an audience! Haugwitz avoided seeing him; and *after* the battle, but *before* the result of it was

known at head-quarters, his Lordship having asked Lucchesini whether Prussia was ready to enter into a negociation, received for answer, "that it would depend on the result of the battle which had just been fought."

M. Gentz's narrative is silent on this point. On the 11th, he tells us, the head-quarters had been removed to Weimar; and as he had signified his intention of returning to Dresden, Haugwitz invited him to remain with them some days longer. "Restez avec nous encore quelques jours; nous serons à Weimar en même tems, tranquilles et instruits; et nous touchons, comme vous voyez, aux grands événemens." Gentz, however, wisely resolved to set off on the next day. On the 12th, accordingly, he paid his valedictory visits, and dined with Haugwitz. There he again meets Lucchesini, who promises him that "*si quelque chose d'essentiel se faisait jusqu'au lendemain matin il aurait soin de m'en faire avertir à l'endroit où je passerais la nuit, pour que je partisssse en possession des nouvelles les plus fraîches. Ni Lord Morpeth, ni aucune personne de la Russie n'était arrivé jusqu'à mon départ;*" — and afterwards — "*Je suis parti de Weimar à cinq heures.*"

There is no reason to suppose that M. Gentz was aware at this time that Lord Morpeth was actually in the town of Weimar. Yet such is the fact; and Lucchesini's neglecting to communicate to him this important circumstance, as he had promised to do, at the place where he was to pass the night, is another proof of the dishonest after-thought which lurked under every one of their proceedings about Hanover.

So much for the conduct of the Prussian Government as regards England at this perilous crisis. Let us now see how they acted towards Russia.

They had an alliance with Russia which entitled them to call for assistance in a war with France. War

had been determined upon immediately (as we have seen) after Lucchesini's despatch of the 29th of July, received the 7th of August; and yet it was not until the 18th of September that General Krusemarck was despatched to Petersburg to claim the Russian succours.

But in the interval what was going on in the Prussian councils? This is a matter highly necessary to ascertain, with a view to the main object of our inquiry, viz. the possibility of effectuating a general alliance in 1806.

It appears by M. Gentz's account of his first conversation with Haugwitz, that on the very day on which it was determined to go to war, namely, on the 7th of August, that determination was communicated to the Emperor Alexander, in a confidential letter by the King, and that by the end of August the Emperor's answer was received. This answer, according to Haugwitz, "ne laissait rien à désirer." Now it is of importance to truth that we should know the precise meaning of these words. M. Gentz's narrative furnishes no explanation of them. Lombard's statement is as follows: "En réponse au premier avis que le Roi lui avait donné de ses intentions, l'Empereur lui avait écrit une lettre qui serait un monument éternel de sa grandeur d'âme; il avait déclaré dans cette lettre qu'il ne s'agissait entre lui et la Prusse ni de négociations ni de stipulations; qu'il ne lui demandait pas même ce qu'il comptait faire en cas de succès; qu'il se remettrait absolument à lui: que la seule chose qui l'intéressait était de voir les Français bien et dûment battus; que pour cet effet il offrait au Roi la totalité de ses forces, et de l'argent * même, s'il en avait besoin," &c. &c. But there is no promise here of *immediate* succour.

* It could not be for want of English subsidies, therefore, that Russia was driven into a French alliance the next year.

No Russian troops were put in motion until the end of November, and General Krusemarck, who was sent to ask for them, did not set out on his mission (as we have seen) until the 18th of September. Why this delay in sending him? It now appears that a hope was entertained, that notwithstanding Lucchesini's departure from Paris, his successor, Knobelsdorf might obtain some explanations which would change the whole face of affairs, and render the demand of succours from Russia unnecessary.

And this presents another point of view in which the exact knowledge of the communication in question becomes highly desirable. As Hanover was the cause of the impending war, the expected explanations or proposals from France could only regard that territory. Now the King of Prussia in his letter to the Emperor, either stated the cause of his recourse to hostilities, or he did not. If he did, and if he received an answer which, according to Haugwitz, "*ne laissait rien à désirer*," it must have been an approbation of, and concurrence in, that cause, — not very consistent, certainly, with good faith towards his ally, the King of England. If his Majesty did not state that cause, he was unwisely concealing a purpose which, when the discovery should be made that it was supported by Russia, must have broken up the alliance between that Power and Great Britain. Such a supposition, therefore, is inadmissible from the common sense of the thing itself; since it argued very little knowledge of the Emperor Alexander not to be sure that whatever communication favourable to the retention of Hanover might come from France in the interval, it would be in the same degree offensive to his Imperial Majesty; inasmuch as it must not only force him, as already observed, to break with England, but divest him of the high character and station in which he stood towards

Germany, and render him, instead of a protector, an accomplice in her spoliation. On the other hand, and under the supposition of an unfavourable answer from Napoleon, it will be difficult to believe that his Imperial Majesty would have been sparing of his exhortations to his ally; that he would not have reprobated the principle of a war for such a purpose even against France; that he would not have shown him the necessity of standing well with Europe, of being *rectus in curiâ* on all points of justice as well as prudence before he drew the sword; or that, with the knowledge that nothing could be done against France without a confederacy, nor any confederacy be effectual without England, he would not have advised the removal of every cause which rendered confederacy impossible, especially one which had already disgusted Austria, and confirmed the statesmen at Vienna in the belief that the cession of a village or two would disperse the impending storm, and send all the Prussian troops into cantonments.*

Yet against this interpretation of the correspondence, we have the following words of Haugwitz, supposing M. Gentz to have correctly reported them:—

“L'Empereur de Russie fut d'abord le seul dépositaire de notre projet; le Roi lui écrivit le jour même que l'ordre fut donné” — (to put two-thirds of his army on a war footing); “*en lui exposant toute sa situation, il lui faisoit voir la totalité de ses plans.*”

If M. Gentz had been conversant with the business of diplomacy as much as he was with the art of drawing up proclamations and state documents, he would have required to see these papers,—the King's letter and the answer to it. As the matter now stands, namely that the answer was one “qui ne

* Baron Thugut's words to me very shortly before the battle.—*R.A.*

laissait rien à désirer," there is a shadow of ambiguity on this point of Hanover to be dispelled only by our confidence in the high character of both the one and the other Sovereign.

The truth may very well be this. On the 20th of July, and consequently before Lucchesini's final despatch, M. d'Oubril, the Russian plenipotentiary at Paris, sent thither, as I have already given my reasons for believing, with orders not to return without a treaty, had signed one with the French ministers; and of this document the Russian ministers, who had given him all their confidence, were in daily expectation. Connected with this event was the possibility likewise of a treaty with England, and consequently of the retrocession of Hanover to his Majesty. In such a case, it never could enter into the contemplation of the Emperor that Prussia would hold out against all Europe by retaining it. There was the less necessity, therefore, in a personal correspondence between the two monarchs, for more particular explanations on this head.

But it is with councils and ministers that we must examine these matters, and not with their masters. What advice did Lombard and Haugwitz give to their Sovereign on the receipt of the Emperor's letter? Evidently not to give up Hanover *without some equivalent*. Again, we must lament that the letter was not produced to M. Gentz. According to Lucchesini, "Napoléon se flattait que de concert avec l'Empereur de Russie, il engagerait le Roi de Prusse sans difficulté à sortir du pays de Hanovre." No ground is assigned for Napoleon's confidence on this point. There was reason certainly to believe in the efficacy of the joint representations of Russia and France, after peace should have been concluded between those great Powers, added to the severe pressure of an English blockade: but general belief will scarcely

be admitted as a safe ground of action with such a man as Napoleon, and, coupled with other words from the above text, namely, "que si l'Empereur de Russie désirait *s'étendre en Pologne*, on y consenterait sans difficulté," the passage above cited makes one anxious to discover—that which the production of the papers alluded to would enable us to do—what effect, or whether any effect, the offer of extending his dominions in Poland had produced on the Emperor's mind, considered with reference to the evacuation of Hanover. This is the true point; and without the production of the whole of his Imperial Majesty's answer, the communication, "qui ne laissait rien à désirer," might be taken to mean, as in the mind of Haugwitz and Lucchesini it did mean, that some opening was left in it for the retention of Hanover, or that some possible compromise was hinted at on which England had never been consulted. Thus much is certain. Whatever good advice the King may have received from the Emperor of Russia, that of his ministers was the reverse of it. If, as is probable, the Emperor privately remonstrated against the retention of Hanover, it was certainly without effect. During the whole progress of her disasters, Prussia held on to her prey with something like the convulsive grasp of death, and it was not until Lord Hutchinson's arrival at Memel that she relaxed her hold. The ministers were ever looking out for equivalents, and it is in this fatal word that we shall speedily see developed the extent of the false principles by which they were governed.

But before coming to this point, it may be asked, why such obstinacy on our part about Hanover? Why insist upon an object of such trifling interest to England when the safety of Europe was at stake? It is answered, *because* the safety of Europe was at stake; *because* that safety depended on a clear, un-

compromising, systematic resistance to those principles under the practical operation of which Hanover had been seized by Prussia, and Sicily had been demanded by France. Much clamour was raised against Mr. Fox when, in his sound view and prospective calculation of the public interests in all their bearings, he compared Hanover with Hampshire. The objectors were but sorry statesmen. Placing Hanover as low as we may please in the scale of territorial importance, although that is by no means inconsiderable in its relation to other and higher interests, its value at that moment was of the first order: it involved the national honour in a question where honour was all.

This policy of Mr. Fox, followed up as it was by his colleagues and successor, and making part of the system of their foreign administration, sets in its true light of party cavil the hundred times repeated and refuted accusation against them of having abandoned the Continent. Never was there a charge so utterly devoid of truth. M. Gentz, with all his dislike of an administration in which Mr. Fox bore so great a part, repudiates it with indignation. Hear what he says in his instructive conference with Lombard, whom he describes as being "*encore plus ministre que Haugwitz.*"

After informing M. Gentz that the King was perfectly satisfied with the good disposition of the Court of Vienna, Lombard goes on, "*Je ne sais pas si nous devons également bien espérer de celle de la Cour de Londres. Je ne suis pas sans inquiétude à cet égard.*" To this Gentz replies naturally that the appointment of a plenipotentiary to negotiate with them on their application for one, ought to quiet his alarms. Lombard, however, persists. He is afraid "*que l'Angleterre leur ferait de bien dures conditions,*" and then goes on "*quoiqu'il en soit, les ministres Anglais se rendraient bien responsables s'ils pouvaient*

sacrifier à *un point d'honneur outré*, ou à un ressentiment particulier, la plus belle occasion qu'ils aient encore eue pour co-opérer à l'affranchissement de l'Europe. Ils feraient un mauvais calcul dans tous les cas ; vainqueur ou vaincu le Roi de Prusse trouverait toujours le moyen de leur faire regretter un jour une *indifférence cruelle*, ou une opiniâtreté déplacée."

Gentz's indignation at this effrontery — for that is the word for it — can hold out no longer. "Ce langage," he says, "que je ne pouvais attribuer qu'à des préventions invétérées contre l'Angleterre, ou au trouble d'une mauvaise conscience se roidissant de loin contre des obstacles dont elle ne se sentait que trop responsable, me parut tout-à-fait extraordinaire." And he censures it without mercy. "Je lui dis que je trouvais ces plaintes, non seulement prématurées, mais encore arbitraires et injustes ; que selon moi le gouvernement Anglais avait fait preuve d'une magnanimité peu commune en se prêtant sur-le-champ à des négociations avec une Puissance qui l'avait si cruellement offensé ; que le soupçon d'un *ressentiment particulier* ne pouvait pas même atteindre les hommes publics de l'Angleterre ; que celui d'une *indifférence cruelle* sur le sort du Continent serait exclu par leur intérêt évident, s'il ne l'était pas par la libéralité de leurs principes ; et que, quant à ce qu'il craignait de leur *opiniâtreté*, je ne voyais pas même sur quoi pouvait porter cette crainte," &c. &c. "J'ai ajouté, que loin d'être surpris de l'accueil froid qu'il disait avoir été fait à Londres à leurs premières propositions, je ne revenais pas de mon étonnement *de ce que l'Angleterre y était entrée si tôt.*"

Disdaining to narrow the question to one of mere persons, the English government took the high ground that became their station and their names. Whether Hanover should be governed by a King of England

or a King of Prussia, was a question to be sure that could stand in no comparison with the interests of European independence ; but of those interests good faith and honour were with them the first. Here also, independently of general justice, was the special good faith of England pledged to the sovereigns of the House of Brunswick, and which no ministry, least of all a Whig ministry, could abandon ; and here was the fate of the world about to be committed, in a last appeal to arms, to this very honour and good faith, and to a combined defence, if such a benefit could be brought about, in which one false principle, one hesitating friend, would be sure to bring ruin upon all.

Of its effect in this sense, the Prussian advisers took no note ; and Haugwitz, it is fair to own, does not stand single in his shame. Many distinguished persons at Berlin, although disapproving the original seizure, and hostile themselves to a French alliance, still were disposed to regard it as a thing done, as "*un fait accompli*" (in modern diplomatic parlance), and were disposed consequently to resist any proposal for its retrocession. Even the celebrated M. Stein was of this number.* If, however, they yielded to considerations of what they denominated national convenience on this point, and even thought that the question of good faith might be slurred over by finding out and proposing something in the shape of indemnity to the King of England, never could it enter into their heads or hearts to countenance the nefarious project with the

* "Que des personnes de poids et des personnes mêmes qui avaient hautement désapprouvé la manière dont on avait acquis ce pays, m'avaient dit que la chose une fois faite, on ne pouvait plus retourner sur ses pas, et que cette possession était d'une nécessité indispensable pour la Prusse. (Voilà ce que par exemple M. de Stein, opposé autant que possible au principe de la première occupation, m'avait déclaré sans détour au mois de Juillet à Dresde.)" See Narrative, p. 322.

account of which M. Gentz closes the catalogue of his discoveries.

Hear the relation of his last conversation with Lucchesini, in which the agony of despair, and it is hoped of remorse, seems to have eviscerated from that minister the last of his portentous revelations:—

“Ce soir,” the 10th of October, “j’ai eu la dernière conversation suivie avec M. Lucchesini.” * * *

“Pour épuiser la question sous tous les rapports, je l’ai abordée encore sous celui des avantages particuliers que la Prusse pouvait se promettre de cette guerre.” Then, after much fencing on one side, and much pertinacity on the other—M. Gentz not choosing to be satisfied without a full confession of all their schemes, “d’autant moins,” he says, “que l’occasion me parut favorable pour m’instruire de leurs véritables intentions,”—“Il s’est expliqué,” he continues, “avec franchise. Il m’a dit que tout dépendait de la tournure qu’on donnerait aux négociations avec l’Angleterre; que si cette Puissance insistait sur la restitution, et s’il ne se présentait aucun moyen pour l’y faire renoncer, plutôt que de garder le pays de Hanovre malgré elle, on le rendrait *sauf à chercher quelque bon équivalent dans les résultats d’une guerre heureuse*; mais que pour peu qu’il seroit possible de convaincre l’Angleterre de l’insuffisance des raisons par lesquelles elle pourrait s’opiniâtrer sur ce pays, ce seroit à elle que l’on proposerait des équivalens, *jusqu’à concurrence même de la Hollande* si elle vouloir contribuer à la conquérir. Maintenant, a-t-il ajouté, *vous connaissez le dernier de nos secrets.*”

It is sad to reflect how rarely, when a course of dishonest measures has once been entered upon, the virtues of a sovereign can avail against the vices of a ministry. Here was an act of pillage,—and that of the very worst character,—meditated against the two Houses of Hanover and Orange; against the

latter, too, when, by Lucchesini's account, to redress the wrongs of that House was one of the motives of the rupture with France. Observe the circumstances, too, under which this project was to be executed. It was to take effect "*dans les résultats d'une guerre heureuse.*" The common depredator pleads want as his excuse for robbing his neighbour ; here robbery was to follow gain and success.

And under such auspices, forsooth, the English government was to set on foot a new confederacy for the preservation of the liberties of Europe !

We come now to the speculations of those ministers on the co-operation of Austria ; and on this subject, with an exception soon to be noticed, nothing passes that is not highly creditable to M. Gentz, as well for the soundness of his general views, as for his discouraging what would appear from his statement to have been meditated by both Prussia and Russia, to draw, or rather to force, the Court of Vienna into their measures. With some extracts on this point we shall finish our remarks. His conversation upon it with Count Haugwitz was on the 6th of October.

" Il avait reçu un dépêche du Comte Finkenstein. L'Empereur ayant été absent de Vienne lorsque les dernières communications de la Prusse y étaient arrivées, le Comte Finkenstein n'avait pas encore reçu une réponse positive. Le Comte Haugwitz me parla de nouveau du projet de la mission militaire. Je me trouvais dans un singulier embarras toutes les fois qu'il entamait ce sujet. Car d'un côté je frémissais à l'idée de voir la Prusse embarquée toute seule dans cette vaste et terrible entreprise ; j'en calculais les suites possibles pour elle et pour les autres Puissances ; j'étais sûr que sans l'appui de l'Autriche elle ne pouvait pas la conduire à bon port. D'un autre côté, loin d'avoir le droit de proposer ou de prôner des mesures par lesquelles la Cour de Vienne

pouvait être alarmée ou compromise, présumant déjà par plusieurs indices que l'Empereur ne jugerait pas convenable de prendre part à la guerre, j'avais plutôt le devoir de détourner autant que possible tout ce qui pouvait le contrarier ou le gêner dans sa résolution. Heureusement (je veux dire pour *moi*, puisque ce fut bien autre chose pour la *Prusse*) le Comte Haugwitz, dès la première conversation, s'était montré si fort satisfait des dispositions qu'il supposait à l'Autriche, et si complètement tranquille et résigné sur les déterminations futures de cette Puissance, que je n'avais qu'à prendre le ton auquel il m'invitait lui-même; et rien ne m'annonçant de sa part qu'il regardait comme particulièrement pressant cet envoi d'un officier négociateur, j'étais autorisé à en penser de même, quelle que fut ma vraie opinion à cet égard."

It was a serious fault on the part of M. Gentz, who in many parts of his narrative gives us to understand that he was admitted to these conversations in the character of an adviser, to have concurred in the reliance thus exhibited by the Prussian minister on the reports favourable to co-operation which he had received from Count Finkenstein. He might have doubted whether that envoy, however deservedly entitled to esteem, was, under the existing relations of the two Cabinets towards each other, sufficiently in the confidence of Count Stadion, to justify that prudent man in communicating to him so much of his intentions as to render the Cabinet of Berlin "complètement tranquille et résigné sur les déterminations futures de cette Puissance." M. Gentz's discretion on this occasion would have shown itself, one would think, in meeting rather than in avoiding an opportunity to express the doubt, which, as he tells us himself, he entertained of the soundness of Count Haugwitz's conclusions. But at all events he adds his

testimony to that of every man of sense, not only to the practical inefficiency of all confederacies without Austria, but to the inevitable mischief which would result to Europe, as well as to Prussia herself, from her rushing single-handed into this war.

Very different was the good sense he showed when Haugwitz imparted to him the intentions of the Emperor Alexander. Very different his appeal to past misunderstandings and errors which had reduced Europe to its actual condition of helplessness.

“ Il me parla ensuite de la Russie. Il dit que je pouvais être bien persuadé que jamais l'Empereur n'avait été plus prononcé pour la guerre ; qu'il y mettait plus d'ardeur encore que la Prusse ; que sans se borner aux négociations amicales *il tiendrait un langage très énergique à ses voisins* * * * et qu'il déclarerait sans beaucoup de détours *qu'il ne souffrirait aucune neutralité.*”

Gentz exclaims justly against the mischievous folly of such an intention. “ Je lui dis que je voyais se reproduire un système qui déjà dans une occasion précédente avait entraîné les plus grands malheurs ; que j'osais lui rappeler l'année dernière ; que j'avais toujours été persuadé que le projet de forcer la Prusse à la guerre était une des causes principales du triste résultat de la campagne de 1805 ; que je frémissais en pensant que l'on pût s'aviser de renouveler ce projet contre l'Autriche ; qu'il en résulterait certainement les mêmes désastres ; que s'il existait un moyen de jeter l'Autriche malgré elle entre les bras de la France, il se trouverait dans une entreprise pareille ; que je ne concevais pas comment un homme aussi éclairé que lui pouvait parler avec satisfaction de ce projet ; qu'il me paroissait plutôt, que si un Prince aussi juste et aussi magnanime que l'Empereur de Russie avait pu le former réellement, il faudrait tout faire pour lui en montrer les dangers, puisque rien ne serait plus

propre à détruire jusqu'à la possibilité d'une union entre les grandes Puissances, sans laquelle cependant je n'hésiterois pas à le dire, je regardois une guerre heureuse contre Bonaparte comme la plus désespérée des chimères."

Such was the infatuation of the Prussian Minister that he heard these opinions with astonishment; but he made haste to disavow all share in advising Russia to this course, and to quiet M. Gentz's alarms by expressing his conviction that the Emperor would execute his intention, "avec toute la modération possible!"

Any thing so desperately imprudent as the intention on the part of Russia of forcing Austria at this juncture to declare for or against France, I must be slow to believe, and I notice it only for the purpose of declaring that no symptom of such a measure was visible at Vienna. There was an angry correspondence indeed concerning Cattaro about this time, but nothing more; and so far from a threat of hostility *from Russia* on this point, the threat, if any, was the other way, Austria being resolved to execute honourably the treaty she had concluded at Presburg. Russia, to be sure, in sending the best part of her army to attack the Turks in Moldavia, instead of to defend the Prussian monarchy on the Oder, was guilty of the greatest fault both in war and politics that had been committed during the whole course of her hostilities against France; but of anything so wild as the project here imputed to her by Count Haugwitz, I am convinced that she was quite innocent.

After what we have now read, can we wonder at General Kalkreuth's prediction uttered in his first interview with M. Gentz on the 3d of October, the day before that gentleman's arrival at head-quarters?

"Voyant que j'étois suffisamment instruit sur beaucoup de points intéressans, il se livra avec plus

de franchise, et à la fin entraîné par la mienne, il s'ouvrit à moi sans réserve. Il me dit que personne n'avoit plus désiré que lui une guerre avec la France; que personne n'en avoit plus reconnu la nécessité; mais qu'aujourd'hui personne ne seroit plus enchanté qu'il se trouvât un moyen honorable pour en prévenir l'explosion; que de la manière dont les choses étoient préparées, cette guerre ne pouvoit pas réussir, et que sans un bonheur presque fabuleux, elle conduiroit aux plus tristes résultats."

But enough from this memoir for the purpose for which I have noticed it. In another sense, the whole deserves to be read and studied by every man who wishes to make himself master of the history of the eventful times to which it refers.

REMARKS ON M. GENTZ'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1806, FOR PEACE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

M. GENTZ's animadversions on the Paris negotiations of 1806, are expressly pointed against the manner in which they were conducted by Mr. Fox. They were written to prove that he was no statesman. To have followed the professor's precepts, or to have acted as it seems he would have advised, was certainly not the way to become one. The work may be read without injury to Mr. Fox's fame. Our observations upon it will therefore be few.

The author is evidently misinformed concerning the most important part of that transaction ; namely, the honest intention, not of Mr. Fox alone, but of the whole government in whose name he acted, to make peace on safe and honourable terms, if such could be agreed upon between the parties.

When M. Gentz composed his remarks, the ideas which prevailed very generally at the time of our former negotiations with the French republic, particularly those of 1794 and 1795, appear to have been still fresh in his mind. It was the belief of many that on those occasions Mr. Pitt gave way — not reluctantly perhaps — to a strong pressure from without, headed by Mr. Wilberforce and the popular supporters of that gentleman ; but that he had himself very little hope of success in the experiment, and that he had agreed to make it, in order to produce a general conviction of its impracticability, as well from the exorbitant demands of the enemy as from the nature of the government with whom he consented to treat. This misgiving of the minister was taken by many persons on both sides of the question for a want of

sincerity. It was the source of hope and of fear to them both; with the difference that the fear was openly expressed in accusatory speeches by the opposition, and the hope was silently nourished in the breasts of those, who believed in their conscience that no peace was possible with a government born of the Revolution. To this class M. Gentz was proud to belong, and he proclaims it in every one of his writings. Consistently with those opinions, therefore, and with the set of hopes and fears associated with them, he must have rejoiced in the two failures of Lord Malmesbury. He must have reprobated the peace of Amiens, and rejoiced in its non-execution; and (combined with other reasons not worth our while to examine) he must have looked with perfect abhorrence to a negotiation with Napoleon, conducted by Mr. Fox. All this is in order.

Strong in these opinions, he sets himself to examine the documents relating to that negotiation which were laid before parliament at their close; helping himself in his condemnation of Mr. Fox and the government, by adopting occasionally the reasoning of the French negociators, and that of the speakers of the then Opposition in the two Houses.

To the whole of his remarks therefore, on what he considers the faults in this transaction, there lies this fundamental objection of purpose; for it was *really* a negotiation for peace. M. Gentz of course saw this purpose with no favourable eye. In many respects also he seems to consider it in the same light with M. Bignon, namely, a contest of diplomatic cleverness; and in his conception of what is meant by skill in such affairs, he states some points which he thinks ought to have been pressed, the mode and the time of pressing them, and the proper language to be used in the discussions with the French plenipotentiaries. He tells us, in short, what he would have done himself,

had the conduct of the business been confided to him. It would have been more to the purpose, especially as his erudition rendered him fully competent to the task, had he laid down the principles of public law and state policy on which the negotiation ought to have been conducted, with a view of demonstrating a deviation from them on the part of Mr. Fox. Not having done this, his remarks can reach a no higher character than that of criticism. Many of them indeed are ingenious and true; and for the sake of their truth, we may forgive their pretensions to novelty. With these, however, we have nothing to do, except to observe that in the way in which he would have enforced them, we never could have advanced one step towards peace.

The true, and indeed the only object for inquiry therefore in this case—all general considerations with regard to the cause, origin, and various fortunes of the war, having been long previously disposed of—will be simply, whether the proposals of France were fit to be listened to? Whether they were adequate to the just claims of the country? M. Gentz acknowledges their sufficiency, and there this matter may rest.

But if our demands were just and reasonable, and not below what the country had a right to require, the next question will be, first, whether we could have obtained them by treaty? and secondly, failing in such an endeavour, whether our negotiation could have ended more satisfactorily than it did to prove that no peace was at that time possible with Napoleon?

On all these points the English government of 1806 have no reason to be dissatisfied with the public opinion either of their country or of Europe, or even of M. Gentz himself in his essential admissions.

All that remains to be considered, therefore, is the

question whether in setting on foot, or in conducting this negotiation, there was, or was not, any imprudent concession, not to say criminal leaning towards France, on the part of Mr. Fox? And as it seems to be M. Gentz's chief object in drawing up his notes to maintain the affirmative of this proposition, we shall examine shortly how he tries to make it out.

He begins with a letter from Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, written a few days after he was in office, to inform that minister that a proposal had been made to him to assassinate Napoleon.

The act of writing this letter, according to M. Gentz, was in every sense to be condemned. First, it betrayed an undue partiality towards Napoleon; secondly, it recognised the legitimacy of his government; and thirdly, it was taking the first step in the negotiation which ensued, and thereby humiliating the country.

In examining these grounds of accusation, we are obliged to enter upon a question which the publication before us raises again from the unhonoured grave to which the common feelings of mankind seemed to have consigned it for ever. That question is, whether, England being at war with Napoleon, it was lawful for an English minister to connive at his assassination?

The reader of M. Gentz's work is invited, therefore, carefully to consider this article of his attack on Mr. Fox, and then to determine for himself, whether his mode of stating and arguing the subject be open or not to the observations which follow.

In the first place, the right and the duty of putting tyrants to death is not here contemplated by him as an abstract question. He has argued it as one on the practical merits of which a very important part of Mr. Fox's conduct on this occasion, indeed the whole of it in one sense, is to be judged. He states his prin-

ciple also without exception or limit as to its application, other than that the man to be killed must be an usurper *in the opinion of the man who intends to kill him*.

“La question,” he says, “si c’est un crime de tuer un homme tel que Bonaparte tient *exclusivement* à celle de la légitimité de son pouvoir. Celui qui le croit un souverain légitime fait bien de prononcer pour l’affirmative; mais celui qui ne voit en lui qu’un usurpateur doit en juger autrement. Si Bonaparte étoit aux yeux de M. Fox un usurpateur et un tyran, il seroit le plus inconséquent des hommes, s’il n’approuverait pas le projet de le punir. Son horreur pour le projet n’est fondée que sur ce que, pour lui, Bonaparte est un souverain légitime.”

And then he goes on to argue that the individual who proposed the matter to Mr. Fox *being of opinion* that he was not a legitimate sovereign, and having himself probably suffered from his tyranny, he had a right to put him to death; and, further, that having such right, there was no harm in his proposing the exercise of it to Mr. Fox, but much harm on the part of Mr. Fox in dismissing him from his presence discourteously, in sending him out of the kingdom, and acquainting Talleyrand with what he had done.

This is pretty well for a professor of public law and ethics. Let us hope they were not his deliberate opinions — that in asserting them he was but playing off a little casuistry to suit the purpose of his memoir. For he must have known, as well as other men, that there is no mysterious boundary between right and wrong; that our notions on extreme cases are never so general as not to be reducible to some rule of moral definition. But to define is to limit; and what is to limit individual opinion? There is no excuse for him, therefore, for giving the semblance of a sanction to principles so full of mischief. If, as he says in another place, “chaque genre d’attaque” on

an usurper be "*juste et permis*"—*permis*, we may ask, by whom? and to whom? *By* every body, he must answer, and *to* every body. And where is the usurper who would not hail an admission offering to his "dark suspicions and tyrannous mistrust" a wider scope of action than can be found even in the code of the old man of the mountain—who would not thank him for giving the excuse of self-defence to his seizing and executing every body *in whose opinion* he was not a legitimate sovereign?—since, under this dictum, every such person must *of necessity* wish and approve all means to procure his death.

Following up the singular opinion that Mr. Fox, *from the nature of his principles*, must have been a fool not to wish that usurpers of all sorts ought to be put to death, he proceeds to argue that *by necessary consequence*, the act of rejecting the assassin's proposal, and sending him out of the country, was itself a declaration in favour of the legitimacy of Bonaparte. He is too wise, indeed, to argue this point, so we may leave it to its own intuitive worth. Others may therefore be permitted to judge from their own impressions on a view of the known facts. To such it will be rather more clear, that when Mr. Fox first heard the proposal, not a thought of legitimacy or legitimates, of tyrants or patriots, ever crossed his thoughts; that his whole mind was fixed on the proposal; that the intention was to murder a man, and that he deemed it his duty to warn that man of his danger. But to pursue this thread of sophistry any further were a task equally useless and ungrateful. It is enough to place the author's words under the reader's eye, leaving him to judge of their import.

He will then, if an Englishman, and a friend to the present establishment, and notwithstanding his just horror of the French Revolution, have to decide whether, under this justification of the principle of

killing such kings as the killer may believe to be illegitimate, it was not perfectly lawful in Louis XIV. (supposing the historical fact to be well authenticated) to connive at the murder of King William; nay more, whether it was not murder in King William's advisers to execute the persons convicted in his courts of justice of attempts to assassinate him.

One more observation, and we have done. When he censures Mr. Fox for expressing his regret that he had suffered the assassin to escape, M. Gentz, in taking the man's part, affirms that he was not responsible to Mr. Fox for his opinions. Certainly not for his opinions; but he was responsible for his proposal. When the intention, therefore, was disclosed to him, Mr. Fox, had he taken no steps to prevent its execution, would have had a *guilty knowledge* of what he believed to be a crime, and consequently have been a participator in it. He may be pardoned, therefore, for not trusting for his peace of mind to M. Gentz's absolution.

The professor, however, I lament to say, does not stand alone in his judgment of this transaction. To the shame of our age, I have myself heard Mr. Fox called "un imbécille," for his conduct in it. "Pourquoi ne pas laisser faire?" it has been asked me by politicians of that sect, although happily by no person who has since arrived to eminence in public employments. Such, thank God! was not the way of thinking of the gentlemen of England; no, nor of France. Among them, great as were their sufferings from Napoleon, I never heard of an apologist for his murder; of any who would have accepted M. Gentz's defence of the criminal, and have joined consequently in his inculpation of Mr. Fox for preventing the deed. What would Chateaubriand and Polignac say? how would La Ferronaye have looked, if it were told them in the trashy metaphysics of this school, that their

loyalty and misfortunes made them *of necessity* parties to such principles as the following? — “ Il a le droit de ne voir en lui (Napoléon) qu'un ennemi déclaré, perpétuel, et implacable, contre lequel, placé au dessus de toutes les loix et de toutes les punitions ordinaires, chaque genre d'attaque est juste, légitime, *et permis*.” It would not be easy to figure the contempt and scorn of their noble hearts, on finding themselves incorporated into such a partnership.

M. Gentz has discovered, however, that there was a deep secret in this business; that the letter to Talleyrand, giving him notice of danger to the life of Napoleon, “ n'a été évidemment écrite que pour amener une correspondance pacifique.” He even goes so far as to affirm in another place that it was the first step, the actual commencement of the negotiation. On the question of who made the first overture, it is needless to multiply words. Were it even as he states, there was nothing disgraceful either in the thing or in the manner of doing it. The English government, as it has already been said, was sufficiently strong, and the resources of the country sufficiently at their command, either to offer or to accept negotiation; and the fact is simply, that it arose out of the general state of affairs both in France and in England. This, however, is not enough to repel M. Gentz's insinuations directed personally against Mr. Fox for undue favour towards Napoleon. We ask, therefore, where does he find the connection between the letter in question and an overture towards peace? His proposition must be as follows:— Mr. Fox's partiality produced the warning sent to Napoleon to beware of an assassin. This produced from Napoleon the expression of a wish for peace: ergo, the warning was the first step in the negotiation for it. The logic of this is not very clear. It is something like the demonstration familiar to

our early years, of the birth of prosperity out of war. War begets poverty, which begets peace, and "peace causeth riches to flow; ergo, war is a cause of prosperity." If M. Gentz was serious in imputing such consequences to this act, he ought to have shown why Napoleon's answer to Mr. Fox's letter could not be one merely of civil thanks, why it could not stop at the simple acknowledgment of an honourable proceeding on his part, but that it necessarily required a notice of the state of hostility between the two countries, and a declaration either of regret that we were at war, or of a disposition to treat for putting an end to it. M. Gentz has not a word to justify such an interpretation of the bearing of Mr. Fox's letter; he takes care, on the contrary, to avoid any manifestation of opinion upon it, except — such is the perverseness of party hatred — a sense of his own difficulty to comprehend, or of his reluctance to admit, the possibility of a noble action on the part of Mr. Fox.

But this letter, says M. Gentz, was the first step in the negociation. The notion is original, and all his own. No man of sense, except himself, ever took it for such, or doubted that the first advance came from Napoleon. No school-boy reading his Plutarch ever dreamt that when the Roman consul wrote to Pyrrhus, apprising him that his physician had offered to poison him for a reward, he was in fact becoming a suppliant to him for peace; none who, if a similar event should show him a Fabricius of his own acting in the same way, would not blush that "his father had become his foe" for it; none who does not see that the real overture was made by Pyrrhus himself, when, in emulation of his adversary's magnanimity, he sent back his Roman captives without ransom. So will youth judge — and they are the best to judge — this generous strife of a distant age! But in those

days men's virtues were their habits ; now, they are exceptions. M. Gentz and those of his class may be excused, therefore, for considering this proceeding as a mere contrivance of Mr. Fox, a "tour de métier," as they would call it, all in the day's work of a heartless and calculating diplomacy. And there let it rest with them.

Let us hear the gentleman, however, to the last:—

"Cette lettre," he says, "sera un texte inépuisable pour ceux qui, dans les tems futurs, voudront étudier ou peindre le caractère de M. Fox. Rapprochée de plusieurs autres circonstances malheureusement trop connues, de ses opinions sur la Révolution de France, de ses liaisons intimes et suspectes avec les plus cruels ennemis de l'heureuse constitution de son pays, de son admiration pour Bonaparte, de la visite qu'il lui a faite en 1802, de ses rapports et correspondances continuelles (continuées même pendant son ministère) avec Talleyrand et d'autres de cette trempe, — elle fera naître les plus sérieuses réflexions sur la conduite de cet homme célèbre, qui a été l'idole d'un grand nombre de ses contemporains, mais que la postérité saura mettre à sa place."

This is mere libel. What does this writer know of the acts which he here imputes to Mr. Fox ? what of his opinions ? Quite at his ease about the facts, M. Gentz takes them at once from Mr. Fox's enemies ; posterity, more likely, will take them from himself and his public conduct. That age will not fail to ask, where are to be found in any of Mr. Fox's speeches, or writings, or actions, opinions at variance with those on which the English constitution was built, and on which it must rest ? Where too, we ask, in this day, did he ever discover even a leaning towards any of the wild theories of France ? Which of their constitutions did he ever hold up to the imitation of England ? He never read

one of them in his life ! Indeed, all paper constitutions were equally the subject of his mistrust and dislike. Often have I heard him declare to eager partisans who still continued to value his advice, that if Solon and Lycurgus, and all the renowned legislators of antiquity were assembled together to make a constitution for the smallest state, they would not be able to effect their purpose. These were the known, settled opinions of Mr. Fox. Many thought him too vehement, even culpably so, in defending the French revolution : his opposition to the war also was as unpopular as his adversaries could wish ; but his opinions were English. At the first outbreak in France, he had none which were not held by nine-tenths of his countrymen, even by Mr. Windham ; in after days he retained none that were not retained (and where shall we look for higher sanction ?) by Romilly and Horner* ; but hating the Jacobin mis-

* With the truest respect for Mr. Horner, I must offer some remarks, in a sense differing from his, on the following passage of his *Journal* for 1804 :—

“ An error of inferior appearance, but of fatal influence upon the Opposition party, was the countenance given to the Jacobin party in England by Mr. Fox. He was misled in this by some people about him, and by the persuasion, no doubt, that that powerful party might easily be restrained from excess, and in the mean time give effectual aid to the prevalence of popular sentiments. Mr. Fox was led in this business by such an unworthy agent as Dennis O’Brien, who must have been, as Mackintosh remarked to me, the original of Burke’s picture of the *go-between* in the ‘ Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs.’ ”

The justice of this censure of countenancing English Jacobins, will depend very much on the sense we give to the word “ countenance.” Mr. Horner, when he entered upon public life, found such an opinion (the cause and origin of which have been noticed in the introductory part of this memoir) very prevalent against Mr. Fox ; and as Mr. F. did not give himself much trouble to remove it, no wonder that such should continue to have been the impression on his mind. This, however, makes no difference as to the fact, quite new in the history of *countenancing* mischievous factions, namely, that Mr. Fox had neither intercourse nor even acquaintance with any of their leaders. In this, as in all similar cases, men will judge from mixed considerations. Some will condemn the *tendency* of certain opinions : others will see danger in the

chief as much as they did, he thought with them that war was not the way to cure, or even to conquer it. As to intercourse or correspondence with the enemies of our institutions, he had none; unless, indeed, a literary discussion on a Greek particle with Mr. Gilbert Wakefield shall be made to pass for such. The very reverse of this imputation is the truth. That faction who, in their clamour for extreme changes, were ready to risk, if they were not desirous to destroy, the ancient constitution of their country as it exists in the balance of its powers, were his bitterest enemies. They hated him to the full as much as he was hated by the Court for his endeavours to maintain that balance by rendering the House of Commons an efficient control over the servants of the Crown. This, in truth, was Mr. Fox's political creed—in two words, parliamentary government. For this he joined with Lord North; for this in 1784 he stood up for the Commons against the prerogative.

assertion of even the best principles at particular times, and under circumstances of great peril and alarm; but many, and those not the least reflecting nor the least honest part of the community, in answer to a charge against the leader of a party, essentially popular and consisting wholly of volunteers, for tolerating extreme courses in others, will oppose the discountenance of them by the uniform tenor of his own life. These also may think the habit a bad one which confers character by exceptions and not by rules—that it tends to destroy all generous consistency in public men. Happily for Mr. Fox's fame it was not exposed to this trial by the conduct of the admirable man whose words we are now considering. Cato never could have become the colleague of Catiline, and Mr. Horner was to the last the political friend of Mr. Fox.

As to Dennis O'Brien, and his supposed credit with Mr. F., Mr. Horner was totally mistaken. This was a busy electioneering agent, full of zeal, and very wrong-headed, who had rendered some services to Mr. Fox which were not unrewarded; but he never was admitted to his councils. He was indeed, as I also learned from Dr. Lawrence, the *go-between* of the "Appeal to the Old Whigs;" but if Mr. Horner had attended to Burke's delineation of that character, he would have recollected that the salient point in it is the man's erecting *himself* into a negotiator, carrying his own ideas to the opposite party, and passing them off for those of his pretended principal. This was precisely the case with Mr. Dennis O'Brien.

For this he sacrificed his power and popularity—his power for twenty-two years, his popularity for ever. As for his admiration of Bonaparte, he had none but for his abilities; his visit to Paris was not to *him*.* He had no intercourse of any kind, nor any correspondence beyond the business of his office, with Tal-

* *Mr. Fox's visit to Paris in 1802.*

When I first undertook to comment on the work of M. Bignon, though I had still fresh in my memory every circumstance of Mr. Fox's visit to Paris, I determined to secure the best testimony then living, that would enable me to repel the many falsehoods which had been spread about in England and every where else, on the subject of his private interviews with Napoleon. No day passed during that visit without my spending many hours in his company, yet I never knew nor heard of one such interview. The First Consul and Mr. Fox met three times and no more in that period, and never once were alone. Unwilling, however, to trust to my own recollection, in the year 1829 I wrote to his widow, Mrs. Fox, to whom it was the delight of his life to communicate every thought or act in it, with a view of confirming or correcting my impressions. The following was her answer, accompanied by extracts both from his own journal and General Fitzpatrick's.

" St. Anne's Hill, August 29. 1829.

" My dear Mr. Adair,

" The above (see the end of this letter) is an extract from General Fitzpatrick's papers, which I think a more detailed account than any I can give you. Mr. Fox saw Napoleon but three times, and certainly never in private. But as it may be more satisfactory to you to have his own statement, I copy the only mention he made of Bonaparte in his journal.

" " Sept. 2. Presented to the first Consul. Bonaparte very civil to me—dined there, near 200 people—very magnificent—long talk—Bony talked almost all—was presented to Madame—liked her very much.—22d. Went to the exhibition of new manufactures—saw Bonaparte—(He took no notice of Mr. Fox).—23d. Went to Court.—October 10. Wife presented. Madame Bonaparte very civil—we were offered a calèche to go about the park, which we were sorry we did not accept.'

" I perfectly recollect it was in the conversation where the English newspapers were mentioned, that Wyndham was spoken of, and that appears to me the only time in which there was any conversation—at the exhibition he certainly took no notice. I am truly glad you got in time to your sister, &c. &c.

" Ever, my dear Adair,

" Yours, &c.

" (Signed) ELIZABETH FOX."

leyrand or any other persons "de cette trempe." The whole of this passage, where it is not an invidious perversion of the truth, is a direct breach of it. But it is valuable in one sense; it gives the key to the work.

"*Mettre M. Fox à sa place,*" therefore, will not be given to Professor Gentz. He seems to be sensible of this himself, and so calls upon posterity to do it. That, however, is a tribunal which his appeal may never reach. The process in the mean time is going on without him. There is no quarter of the globe in

Extract referred to in Mrs. Fox's Letter.

"*Mr. Fox's first Interview with the First Consul, copied from General Fitzpatrick's Papers.*

"Sept. 2. 1802. The First Consul was very polite to all the Englishmen presented, but most especially so to Mr. Fox. The Consul addressed him in a speech evidently prepared, which he was some time in delivering, and apparently anxious not to forget any part of it. The speech was highly complimentary to him on his distinguished talents, which was all I could very exactly hear; he then talked to him in a more familiar strain. He returned a second time and renewed the conversation. As we were leaving the palace, General Duroc brought an invitation to Mr. Fox to dine there, a departure in compliment to him from the usual rule, which is to invite foreigners only on the court day subsequent to their presentation. He seemed desirous of marking to every person presented that he had some knowledge of them. To me he said, "Vous avez fait la guerre de l'Amérique: vous êtes aussi membre du Parlement. Je suis bien aise de vous voir."

"The speech of Bonaparte to Mr. Fox was very different from what those who stood near them had supposed it to be. It was very flattering to him personally on the score of his distinguished talents. The chief feature of this speech was an idea he expressed of the world's being divided into two nations, the Eastern and the Western—that the laws, manners, customs, and religion of each should be held sacred and respected, and supported by all governments; and whoever attempted to disturb any of them should be considered as an instigator of civil war. After the dinner he conversed, or rather talked to him upon all subjects—complained bitterly of the license and scurrility of our newspapers, which he said however harmless their effect might be in England, might in France occasion sedition and civil wars, by making it necessary, in case of tumults, to have recourse to military interference. He stated that the situation and policy of France made it necessary to maintain large armies."

which the course of action pursued by Mr. Fox during his arduous life is not felt and judged at this hour. America never can forget the man, who while he fought the battle of our English liberties in the House of Commons, and, with the help of the foremost men of the age, achieved the hitherto impracticable union of popular and aristocratical interests,—giving thus a new and national character to our party struggles,—engrafted her cause upon our own, stipulated with the Crown on his coming into office for the unconditional recognition of her independence*, and put an end to the war that was destroying us both. Ireland tunes her harp to his name when she sits down and weeps over the short happy hour of her freedom†; her liberated religion confesses that his was the first voice‡ raised in the British Parliament against the penal laws;—that his was the hand which wrote EMANCIPATION on the banners and in the code of the Whig party. His efforts to relieve all Christian sects from civil disabilities for conscience sake, although unavailing in his own lifetime, secure to him an enviable share in the repeal of the Test Act. The juryman now looks a judge in the face, when, in determining the limits of a free press, the law is no longer dictated to him but ex-

* The terms on which Lord Rockingham, in 1782, consented to form an administration were—

1st. The Independence of America unconditionally, and not as the price of peace.

2d. The consent of the Crown to Mr. Burke's bill for economical reform.

3d. The consent of the Crown to two bills, the one excluding contractors from the House of Commons, the other disqualifying revenue officers from voting at elections.

† The independence of the Irish parliament was one of the measures of Lord Rockingham's administration in 1782.

‡ Specifically against the Catholics of Scotland; but all penal laws on account of religion came equally within the purview of his speech on that occasion. See the Debate on the Scotch Roman Catholic Petition in 1779.—*Cobbett's Parl. Register*, vol. xx. p. 322.

pounded. The poor negro comforts himself in his hovel that he can no more be made an article in our tariffs; while, in the glowing language of Burke, who fell with him in the endeavour to rescue our fellow-subjects in India from the most grinding oppression, eighty millions of human beings will ever remember him in their prayers to the Divine goodness, "in whatever language and with whatever rites pardon is asked for sin, or reward for those who imitate the Godhead in his universal bounty to his creatures."* Here is Mr. Fox's place,—in the midst of works such as these! There is no blood upon them to be sure, but true glory writes on his tomb—

" Only the actions of THE JUST
Smell sweet, and blossom in the dust." †

The little that now remains to show the worth of this publication shall be done by the author himself. Writing to me from Prague in January, 1808 (for he was not allowed to come to Vienna), on the sad prospect of our affairs, and the hopelessness of retrieving them through the public men of the day, he expresses himself thus:—

" Je vous ferai même ici un aveu que peut-être vous ne désapprouverez pas. Les ministres actuels ‡ ne sont pas, comme nous savons très bien, de la première force, et de ce que vous appelez 'first-rate talents.' Cependant tout ce qu'ils ont fait, tout ce

* Speech on Mr. Fox's India Bill.

† " The garlands wither on your brow,
Then boast no more your mighty deeds,
Upon death's purple altar now
See where the victor victim bleeds!
Only the actions of the just
Smell sweet, and blossom in the dust."

The above lines of Shirley point to the *acting* principle in Mr. Fox's mind—the love of Justice. A greater poet has sung the qualities, the "*animus et mores*," which gave it that direction.—See *Human Life*, p. 91. Dodsley's edition, 1836.

‡ Mr. Perceval's administration.

qu'ils ont publié depuis deux mois (et principalement les différentes pièces par lesquelles ils ont répondu aux mesures et aux décrets de Bonaparte), portent le cachet d'une très grande sagesse, jointe à une très grande énergie. A qui donc en toute justice attribuer des démarches aussi méritoires? — à l'excellent esprit qui anime le pays. Sous ce point de vue là ces démarches m'inspirent *plus* de confiance, en venant de la part d'où elles viennent, que si elles auroient été l'ouvrage de quelque génie du premier rang. Les grands hommes ne sont pas immortels; une seule funeste année a moissonné un PITT et un FOX, mais l'esprit public est impérissable; et avec celui dont les ministres actuels n'ont été que les interprètes et les instrumens, une grande nation ne succombera jamais."

The reader will add this passage to the former, and take them both for what they are worth.*

* I am much gratified by Lord Brougham's permission to copy into this work the following extracts from a letter which I have recently received from him. The first refers to some of Mr. Fox's opinions most pertinaciously misrepresented, and from incessant repetition really misunderstood by many persons, both with regard to Napoleon and to the character of the French Revolution. The second decisively confirms the fact stated in the Memoir, namely, that the negociation was considered by him to be hopeless before he died.

Mr. Brougham and Lord Rosslyn, assisted by a fleet and army, were sent to Lisbon in 1806, on a special mission, which had for its object the removal of the government to the Brazils, should the defence of Portugal prove impossible. — R. A.

* * * * *

"I know, too, that he had but very slender hopes of any good to the people or to the cause of freedom in general, from the measures of that great man¹, of whose inordinate ambition he was to the full as sensible as of his great capacity; and he regarded France as for a long while likely to be laid under a military despotism, quite strong enough to repress all attempts at renewing the bad scenes of the Jacobin times, but also quite powerful enough to overmatch all efforts of national freedom. I can have no doubt whatever that the treatment of the Swiss confirmed his distrust of Bonaparte; but at least this is certain, that when in 1803 hostilities again began, although he exerted his utmost

¹ Napoleon.

This exposition of M. Gentz's purpose, and of his unscrupulous pursuit of it, will greatly abridge our comments on the rest of his work. Nor indeed is there much in it to interest the general reader : it consists almost entirely of criticisms on the notes of the respective ministers, and on the conferences of the negociators. By these criticisms we may learn indeed how M. Gentz would have conducted the business himself; but it may be doubtful whether that information would much advance the science he is so ready to teach. Mr. Fox ought to have answered

efforts to obtain a renewal of the negociation, and avert if possible the scourge of war, not one of his arguments could be traced to the least trust in the First Consul, nor did any word escape him which could indicate any abatement of jealousy towards the grasping views of France.

" At length, after the ill-concerted and ill-fated coalition of 1805 (the fourth) had laid all Europe at Napoleon's feet, the death of Mr. Pitt opened the Cabinet to Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville. Now I can confidently assert, that upon the subject of France and of the negociation, which began as soon as the new government was formed, not a shade of difference existed between Lord Grenville, then at the head of the Treasury, and Mr. Fox, then in the office which Lord Grenville had held at the beginning of the war in 1793, and at the rejection of Bonaparte's offer of treaty in *April*¹, 1800. Whoever had the happiness of knowing Lord Grenville will bear me out in the assertion that his opinions remained unaltered, and that his distrust of the Emperor fully equalled his distrust of the First Consul. But not a shade of difference existed between Lord Grenville and his successor in the Foreign Office, to whom he gave his confidence as entirely as the rest of his colleagues, who all, as Lord Ellenborough once said to me, left Mr. Fox's department entirely in his hands, asking no questions, and feeling quite satisfied with the striking ability which he showed in the conduct of it," &c. &c.

" Some months after, he fell ill; and when Lord Lauderdale was gone to Paris, or about to go, I remember Lord Holland told me one day he had just seen his uncle, who asked him ' how he thought it would end?' meaning his malady. But Lord Holland thought he meant the mission, and said, ' Oh! I have but a bad opinion of it.' Mr. Fox was extremely hurt, and said, ' it was an unpleasant hearing; *but that he himself did not feel so ill as that,*' which brought on an explanation. He was then proportionally pleased, and said, ' Oh, as to the negociation, that is past praying for,' &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) B."

¹ Qu. March?

thus, he tells us — Lord Lauderdale ought to have done *this*, — and so he proceeds, but without once venturing to controvert either the expediency of negotiating at this time, or the justice and sufficiency of our demands, or the principles on which we rested the whole measure. One thing is clear, however; M. Gentz would have begun a fresh quarrel on *principles* long before arriving at a discussion on *terms*. Mark the judgment of the following passage, in which he comments on Mr. Fox's answer to the first step proposed by the French government to set the negotiation on foot.

“ La proposition de la paix d'Amiens, comme base de la négociation, est repoussée avec *beaucoup trop* de ménagement, de politesse, et de détours.” (What he means by “détours,” when the rejection was simple and instantaneous, does not appear.) “ On n'auroit pas dû se contenter de dire que cette proposition admettoit *plus qu'une interpretation*, et qu'il y avoit encore *d'autres objections*. Il auroit fallu articuler ces objections sans voile et sans ménagemens, et déclarer une fois pour toutes, que parler encore de la paix d'Amiens, c'étoit déclarer qu'on ne vouloit pas la paix, et offenser gratuitement l'Angleterre.” And again: “ Puisque l'Empereur ne pensoit pas que tel ou tel article du Traité d'Amiens avoit été la cause de la guerre, il auroit dû lui faire entendre au moins que cette cause se trouvoit *dans l'ensemble de ce malheureux traité*.”

If Talleyrand's proposal, or Napoleon's remark, called for any hostile reply, surely the best would have been to tell them that the cause of the war was not in the treaty, but in the breach of it. M. Gentz's reply gives up the point of breach of treaty by France, and consequently the justice of our cause. But laying that out of the question, what could with more certainty have put an end to the whole business at

once, than an answer which, if listened to patiently by France, would have rendered the first step she should afterwards take in it an admission that such was in effect the true character of the peace of Amiens? And here we may be permitted to observe, that it is never right to break off a negociation for the sake of a sarcasm ; nor even for that of successfully establishing a principle when its assertion leads to nothing. Eloquence is a very useless guest at the diplomatic council-board, where the whole matter is to render what is demanded on either side intelligible and clear. M. Gentz seems desirous of showing that he could write better than Mr. Fox. There was no harm in his thinking so, if it pleased him ; but there would have been much and serious harm in his forgetting, had he been entrusted with the conduct of such a business, that the best penman in these cases is he who distinguishes what is forcible in his argument from what is offensive in putting it. M. Gentz, indeed, who viewed the whole purpose of these negociations in a light diametrically opposite to the purpose for which they were undertaken, might very properly prefer giving that sort of epigrammatical turn to a sentence, which would be sure of being taken according to his wishes ; but this was not the way to peace. Many passages, no doubt, in the French minister's notes were open, and provokingly open, to retort. It was thought better to answer them with temper. But when Mr. Fox is arraigned for missing so fair an opportunity to censure the Treaty of Amiens, does the author overlook the immense advantage he would have given to his antagonist by setting out in his negotiation with condemning and disavowing, as it were, the national compacts ? Was he aware — a secondary consideration, it is true, but yet a considerable one, — by whom that “ *malheureux Traité* ” was made ? That it was

in a great measure the work of Mr. Pitt? That Mr. Addington, his successor in office, consulted him on most of the details of that measure? That he defended it in Parliament? That, on the question of approving it, he separated himself from his earliest political connection, Lord Grenville, as well as from those of Mr. Fox's friends who had co-operated honestly and zealously with him to carry on the war? The side-blow, therefore, aimed at Mr. Fox, would seem to strike harder at the celebrated man whose policy was ever the object of M. Gentz's special admiration.

At this distance of time it is easy to give a hard word to the Treaty of Amiens, and to say that it was a great mistake. So be it: but whose mistake was it? Rigorously abstaining from party retrospections, all we shall say is, that it was not Mr. Fox's. The Treaty was the necessary consequence of ill success. What caused that ill success is another matter.

The Treaty of Amiens may truly be said to have been a following up of the policy which dictated the two negotiations with the French Republic, in 1795 and 1796. The difference was that, at those periods, we should have made a peace — if any could have been made — while the main-springs of European strength remained still unbroken and afforded a resource for future alliances, while, in 1802, that strength, if not destroyed, was almost exhausted.

It is far from the intention of these remarks, grounded as they are on a combination of facts which are now fixed and grafted on our English annals, to derogate from the reputation of the illustrious man, who directed during those changeful times the public councils of his country. But let us be just to every one. Without imputing inconsistency of conduct to any of our great leaders, which of them has not been mistaken at one period or another, in his estimate of

this greatest of all events in modern history ? Read Mr. Pitt's honest avowal in the debate of March 2. 1800, on the rejection of Bonaparte's overture for peace ; when alluding to his own former negotiations, he confessed, that he had not then " rightly calculated the character of the French Revolution." And of Mr. Burke himself, who had rightly enough calculated its character, moral and social as well as political, what also shall we say but that even he, with all his penetration and profound philosophy, totally mistook the way to deal with it ? Mr. Fox was in error also when in his generous ardour for the establishment of human liberty and happiness, he too eagerly anticipated from the expulsion of the Bourbons a change in the disposition to war and aggrandizement on the part of the people whom they had governed ; and he lived to see the ambition of that House a mere dream in comparison with that of the man with whom he was afterwards to treat.*

Of Mr. Burke indeed, it is true, that neither in form nor substance would he ever compromise with the French revolution ; but he died before a necessity could be presented to him, which should leave no choice between compromising under wise direction, and pushing his principles beyond the means of action. It was otherwise with Mr. Pitt. He saw, and earlier than many who acted with him, that this " armed doctrine," his own splendid expression, although in its immediate mischief to be combated, was in its essence not to be conquered by force of arms. But the world came later into these opinions : and so, from year to year, we went on in fruitless experiments, until, left alone to struggle against the new principle,

* Four years even before this, and when we were together at Paris during the short interval of the peace of Amiens, I well remember his exclamation on the arrival of an account of some fresh usurpation. " Where is all this to end ? In the sands of Russia, perhaps ! "

we also came to a compromise with it in 1802, under the name of a treaty of peace. On this grave question, public opinion in England, after our first ill successes, varied indeed from day to day, but did not range itself on the side of Mr. Fox; who, looking forward with a surer and a steadier eye, deemed it wise to do that which, after all, must be done, before we should be forced to it. The example of such a struggle crowned with success, and presented to the people of England and Europe in all the fascination of a victory over the combined resistance of the monarchical governments, seemed to him a consequence, infinitely more to be dreaded than any which might arise from the recognition of a provisional power in France to treat on the subjects of difference between the two countries.

It is under allowances such as these, which History will be sure to make, that the character of the negotiations of 1806, the way to which had been already prepared by the Treaty of Amiens, will claim hereafter to be considered.

To return to M. Gentz and his Notes. According to him there were many faults in Mr. Fox's language, which, by its supposed admissions, gave up material points in the discussion, and betrayed his criminal partiality towards France. In his criticism on No. 7. of the "Parliamentary Papers," for instance, he is much offended with the word *égalité*. "Il est vrai," he quotes from Mr. Fox's despatch to Talleyrand, "que nous nous sommes mutuellement accusés; mais il ne sert à rien de discuter les argumens sur lesquels ces accusations ont été fondées. Nous désirons comme vous *l'égalité*." — "Par cette réponse," he says, "M. Fox paroissoit admettre dans toute son étendue cette '*égalité*,' très peu honorable, que Talleyrand avoit mise en avant."

It so happens that this frightful word "*égalité*,"

which he quotes *as translated from the English despatch*, is not to be found in it from first to last ! No, nor the meaning of it in the sense here insinuated. Mr. Fox's words are these, "Like you we desire to treat *on equal terms* ;" and adverting to Talleyrand's expressions, "*We shall never require an account of what you do at home, provided that on your side you never require an account of what we do at home*" — Mr. Fox adds, "Assuredly we are not accountable to each other for what we do at home, and the principle of reciprocity which your Excellency has proposed *on this point* appears just and reasonable." M. Gentz continues, "Pour l'article des accusations, il a l'air de placer sur la même ligne la France et l'Angleterre; complaisance extrêmement dangereuse, &c. &c. ; et quant à l'avenir, il entre dans les insinuations scandaleuses de Talleyrand. Cette proposition qu'il lui plait d'appeler 'juste et raisonnable' étoit, ou une niaiserie (si elle ne s'appliquoit qu'aux affaires domestiques) ou un véritable attentat contre le droit public, si, comme rien ne nous permet d'en douter, elle ne tendoit qu'à une réciprocité d'injustice." Now considering how much the war to which both parties were seeking to put an end, had either been caused or influenced by what France "did at home," it does not seem to be quite a "niaiserie," to begin by clearing away *in limine* all pretensions to interference in her concerns, and of course to exact reciprocally that she should not interfere in ours ; and to this point we see that Mr. Fox's reply is limited. What other answer he could have made is not easily imagined. That which M. Gentz suggests is an evasion, and a mischievous one. "Quant à l'avenir," he would have said, "nous n'hésiterons pas à reconnoître le principe de réciprocité." But he admits himself that "*la discussion des événemens passés ne seroit pas à sa place dans ce moment.*" So he proposes an answer which

was sure to bring on a dispute, first by the act of limiting *to the future* our non-interference in the internal affairs of France, and next by fixing upon her by implication the charge of having *falsely* accused England of such interference; while under the terms "*la discussion des événemens passés ne seroit pas à sa place,*" she would be precluded from clearing herself from it if she could do so. This may seem dexterous, but could not have been very wise.

To return: the proposition of reciprocity, says M. Gentz, if it were not a "*niaiserie,*" was an outrage on the rights of nations. *How* an outrage, he does not tell us, but he explains himself by adding "*si elle ne tendoit qu'à une réciprocité d'injustice.*" This may safely enough be granted; but it does not render his argument the clearer. We are still in the dark as to any way in which two independent states can meet to talk of peace except on "*equal terms,*" for that is the *reciprocity* intended as well as expressed in the despatch of Mr. Fox. Conditions of peace indeed may be unequal and unfair; but to exact such seems an offence rather against justice and generosity than against public law.

The true cause of all this perversion of fact and reasoning is plain. M. Gentz attaches to the word "*égalité*" the sense in which it was used by the Marats and Robespierres in their domestic government, and by the Directory in their foreign transactions; and through the disingenuous artifice of a false translation, sure to impose on his continental readers from their confidence in his knowledge of our language, he seeks to stamp on Mr. Fox those crimes, to charge him with which is the sole purpose of this laboured composition. In this view "*égalité,*" with its train of precious associations, was a word too tempting to be rejected; while the words "*equal*"

terms," employed by Mr. Fox, and recognised as the basis of all negociations between independent states, were too clear to admit of grafting upon them the imputation that he entered "*avec facilité dans les insinuations scandaleuses de M. Talleyrand.*"

Again: "It can no longer be concealed," says Mr. Fox, "that the project of combining the whole of Europe against France is to the last degree chimerical." Here M. Gentz exclaims, "*malheur à l'homme d'état qui pourroit admettre et prêcher une doctrine pareille!*" "De quel droit érigeoit-il en principe générale ce qui n'étoit que son opinion particulière?" One would think that M. Gentz was writing on some other subject than Mr. Fox's despatch. Where does he preach the doctrine, or establish as a general principle, that Europe cannot be united against France? The power of forming such an union when it is wanted is a question of fact; and the only way in which any doctrines or principles can be applied to that question, is by showing that Mr. Fox had maintained the proposition that there *ought* to be no such union. Let us see, therefore, how the fact stands.

The sentence quoted from his letter was in answer to an objection of Talleyrand to the admission of Russia into the negociation as the ally of England. The objection was in substance that England possessing the undisputed sovereignty of the sea, and allied to a Power which possessed an army of 300,000 men, would obtain also the sovereignty of the land. Now the fallacy of this proposition consists in taking for granted that France could look no where for the means of counterbalancing such an alliance. Mr. Fox meets this fallacy, by observing, that the notion of uniting all Europe against France had been proved to be chimerical. And had he not reason for this, both in recent and in former history? When *was* Europe

ever united against France? Carrying our views no farther than to the beginning of the federative system which prevailed among its states until the breaking out of the revolution, France in all her wars had some great Power always on her side. Spain might be said to belong to her. If she was at war with Austria, she had Prussia, and great part of independent Germany. If at war with Prussia, she had Austria and Russia. In fact, the old European system never sought to effect more than a balance. An universal confederacy against her was never thought of, until 1793, after the avowed project of the French republicans to arm all people against all governments. But the confederacy then entered into was so ill-constructed as to have neither a basis nor an object that could keep an alliance together. See what Mr. Burke says of it in his "Thoughts on a Regicide Peace." Mr. Fox's words, as above cited, go no further than to the case before him. It was a practical answer to a theoretical assumption, which had been used dexterously enough for the *practical* purpose of excluding an ally from the negotiation. So far from giving up the point of future union against France, the argument was expressly urged by Mr. Fox, as it is proved by the context of this very despatch, on the principle of keeping the ground clear for such an union; the extent of which, of course, would depend on the state of Europe, at the breaking out of a new quarrel. Something like one took place in 1813, after Napoleon had lost his army—and his army was France,—in the snows of Russia; and yet even then his defeat was not brought about by a general league on the old ground of balanced interests. It was a popular European movement, caused by his having disgusted the *population* of all the countries he had overrun.

M. Gentz pathetically laments that the expression

of the impracticability of uniting all Europe against France, took away the hopes of those unhappy countries that were groaning under her yoke. He ought, therefore, to have stated the value of hopes founded on delusion. But as he is wrong in his whole perception of the case at the time of opening these conferences, he is equally unjust in expanding and stretching out a proposition of fact, into a general doctrine and principle of political conduct.

It is needless to pursue any further this part of M. Gentz's remarks, and the rest of them may easily be disposed of. Little anxious of course for the success of a negotiation for peace with Napoleon, he is inclined to think that it would have been better to break it off on the affairs of Germany, than on the claim for the surrender of Sicily—the value of which to England could easily have been compensated, he says, by other advantages to be secured to her by the peace. The question of giving up Sicily has been argued enough already; and no doubt that of the breaking up of the German empire stands in the very first rank of importance; but it is difficult to understand how a comparison can be instituted between the two cases. The point of honour for England was out of the question with regard to Germany; so were those of direct interest, and of the practicability of securing the object contended for. Germany, lost for a time, might be recovered; Sicily and English honour, never. But to insist on the first would have been decisive of the fate of the negotiation, and that was all M. Gentz wanted.

For, pursuing this line of argument, he says, that Lord Lauderdale ought immediately on his arrival at Paris to have declared that the “*état de possession*” proposed in February and March, could no longer be admitted in August, and that he ought to have demanded of France “*de remplacer l'Allemagne dans l'état*

où elle se trouvoit avant le 17 Juillet * ;” he adds, “ Je sais qu’on lui auroit répondu qu’on ne pouvoit pas revenir sur le passé, et qu’alors la négociation auroit été finie.”

This observation, which applies not to any imputed misconduct in the negotiation itself, but to the propriety of continuing to negotiate at all, might be passed by as inapplicable to the only parts of the author’s purpose which call forth our comments. Indeed it will be the less necessary to remark upon it, as Mr. Fox’s illness had incapacitated him for business long before Lord Lauderdale’s departure from London. The sole question will be then, — would it have been wise to demand as a *sine quâ non* what it was sure would be refused ? As he gives no reason in support of this opinion, it is useless to examine it.

But returning soon to his main point, M. Gentz renews his personal charges with more than usual acerbity, and on one point with an audacity of assertion scarcely credible in a writer whose task obliged him, however reluctantly, to deal with facts. In continuation of the passage already quoted, these are his words : — “ Mais à qui donc la faute de cette situation funeste et désespérée ? Si M. Fox avoit bien su lui-même ce qu’il vouloit, et ce qu’il devoit vouloir, *en entamant cette négociation*, il auroit dû demander avant tout que pendant le cours des négociations, le Continent resteroit tel qu’il étoit au moment que Lord Yarmouth fut envoyé.”

A, qui la faute ? This is tender ground. It is opening the whole question of the disasters of Europe from 1793 to 1806 ; and not only those disasters but

* For the value as a political body of the German Empire, such as it existed on this 17th of July, consult the various German writers on the Congress of Radstadt in 1797 ; consult also a work published at Brunswick in 1842, entitled *Memoiren von Karl Heinrich, Ritter von Lang*, in the Edinburgh Review, No. 158.

the cause of them. We decline the invitation, tempting though it be to those who venerate the memory of Mr. Fox. Indeed, on this subject, we are not on the same terms with M. Gentz. Apart from all party resentments, our business is wholly with historical evidence. We have to repel party charges brought against one of the greatest statesmen of his time in utter contempt of the most palpable and recorded facts. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, as in the case of the Treaty of Amiens, to replying simply to his question, "*à qui la faute de cette situation funeste et désespérée ?*" — that it was not Mr. Fox's. Whether his opposition to the war was right or wrong, it is tolerably clear that he planned none of the confederacies or expeditions which drew down upon them from Mr. Burke the irreversible sentence that "the whole war was but one error" from beginning to end.* It was not his fault that Prussia deserted Europe in the beginning of the struggle, and thus broke up and cast away for years the elements of a confederacy, which, resting as it ought to have been made to do upon a common cause, and guided by the powerful hand of Mr. Pitt, might have opposed an effectual resistance to the coming mischief. It was not the fault of Mr. Fox, that Austria was forced into the treaty of Luneville, and the surrender of the Netherlands to France; nor that she lost Italy, and was nearly annihilated at Ulm and Austerlitz. M. Gentz talks of this matter as if, when the negociation was first opened, there had been no such thing as the Treaty of Presburg in existence: as if there had been no treaty of alliance, entered into in positive hostility to England, and on the very eve of execution, between Prussia and France; and as if the confederate princes of the Rhine, for whose sake, according to his advice,

* Regicide Peace.

we ought to have broken off the negotiation, were not themselves by their unseemly scramble for indemnities and compensations, the willing instruments of the destruction of the whole system which held together the Germanic Empire. This is sad trifling; all for the sake of a dull sarcasm against Mr. Fox, and to say of such a man that he "neither knew what he meant himself, nor what he ought to mean!"

Most assuredly a stipulation that during the progress of the treaty no change should take place in the relative state of Europe, was one which ought to have been insisted upon, if we had been negotiating *for* Europe, with a confederacy at our back that could bring into the field an army of half a million of men; but in this case, as we have seen, Europe, with the exception of Russia, was in fact either against us, or so circumstanced as not to be able to help either us or herself. Even Russia, although by name and title the protector of German liberty and independence, offered us no means of sustaining such a stipulation, had it been agreed to. In fact, Russia had begun negotiating on her own account long before Lord Yarmouth returned to Paris. England was no party to M. d'Oubril's instructions, and all we could hope for from our ally was, that she would adhere to her direct engagements with Naples and Sweden, as well as with ourselves and the Ottoman Porte, in the discussions which were about to take place.

The state of the case as far as it regards the means possessed by England of enforcing such a fundamental condition,—for surely unless we were resolved to enforce, it would have been both senseless and disgraceful to put it forward, — will be seen by attending to Mr. Fox's despatch of the 26th of March in reply to Talleyrand's communication of the basis on which peace might be discussed. Mr. Fox rejects the basis proposed, namely, the Treaty of Amiens, and without

specifying any on his own part — why, we shall soon see — answers that the true principle of any basis between two great Powers is mutual honour for themselves and their allies, and the security as far as possible of the future tranquillity of Europe. He then goes on to show the intimacy of our connection with Russia, and his determination to do nothing but in concert with her ; and he concludes in the following words : —

“ It might seem that Russia, on account of her remote situation, should have fewer immediate interests to discuss with France than other Powers ; but that Court, so respectable in every point of view, interests herself, like England, warmly in every thing that concerns the greater or less degree of independence enjoyed by the different princes and states of Europe.”

Mr. Fox could go no farther. He was not authorised either by his correspondence or by his knowledge of the intentions of his ally, to ground upon these general dispositions a *status quo* for Europe during any negotiations which they might eventually agree to enter upon. And certainly in the instructions given to M. d'Oubril, if we collect his instructions from his treaty, there is not a word that could justify the hope of co-operation on the part of the Emperor Alexander in any endeavour to break up the Confederation of the Rhine. What could be done by England alone towards this object, was in fact done by the special explanatory stipulation, contained in Mr. Fox's letter of the 14th of June to M. Talleyrand, in which he accepts the proposal for opening the conferences under the *proviso* already noticed.

When M. Gentz therefore, in explanation of what is meant by the term “ *uti possidetis*,” tells us that it infers that the state of actual possession shall remain undisturbed during a negotiation, he tells us nothing

that we did not know before ; but it is a mere fallacy to apply to any general state of European relations the principle of an agreement between England and France for the settlement of their respective claims upon each other.

But the least comprehensible part of his charge is that Mr. Fox could have obtained the above stipulation if he had pleased, " or if he had known how to set about it." M. Gentz affirms that nothing would have been more easy, but " depuis que Lord Yarmouth étoit resté spectateur tranquille de l'opération qui achevoit l'Allemagne, depuis que M. d'Oubril avoit signé la paix, le moment étoit passé sans retour."

The moment, then, to have gained this great point, was, according to him, during the conferences with D'Oubril. Now we know that that plenipotentiary negociated separately from us both in form and substance ; that he communicated nothing of his acts or purposes to Lord Yarmouth (who could not even get sight of him during his latter interviews with Talleyrand), and that he had no commission to talk, even, on the subject of the Rhenish confederation ; but that he *had* instructions to insist on the evacuation of Germany by the French army, *and that they were limited to that object*. To this point the treaty which he signed is decisive. We now ask, therefore, with M. Gentz, "à qui la faute de cette situation désespérée ?"

The stipulation, however, in M. Gentz's view (as we shall speedily see), would have carried him much further than he meant himself ; and in any other view of it, his censure of Mr. Fox is harmless. The distinction once established (and none is more clear) between the *uti possidetis*, in its large and general sense, carrying with it all the vast consequences of recognition and even guaranty, and the same principle in its more restricted meaning, as it could alone

be applicable in a negotiation confined at first to England and France,—all his elaborate argumentation upon it falls at once to the ground ; and the fact of this distinction appears on the face of the correspondence. Russia, it is known, was already in amicable intercourse with France. The date of D'Oubril's commission, as well as the tenor of it, proves that it was a separate transaction. Now, between Russia and France, there could be no question of an *uti possidetis* as a basis for treating. It would have been nonsense on the face of it. But when an overture was made to us, an *uti possidetis* basis (with the exception of Hanover, which was a case by itself), although utterly inapplicable to the situation of our ally, was precisely the one most suitable to our individual honour and interest. For what other was there? The *status ante bellum* was out of the question ; and for that of reciprocal restitutions, what had France to offer to England? If, as he observes, we might have allowed part of our conquests to go in mitigation of continental losses, the losses ought at least to have been those of our allies. But who were they? His principle supposes a state of things totally different from that which existed in the beginning of March when Talleyrand wrote his first letter, as well as a knowledge, which we had not at that time, of the views and intentions of Russia. But, practically speaking, even this advantage might have been reserved for our allies ; for in accepting the *uti possidetis* as a basis, there was nothing to exclude reciprocal concession, if the course of the negotiations should happily present an opportunity for acting on that principle. If Napoleon, for instance, would have restored Naples to its lawful sovereign, there was nothing to prevent us from compensating France with as many West Indian Islands as Naples was worth.

It is most true that the *uti possidetis*, in the sense annexed to it by M. Gentz, would have been of immense advantage to France. He cannot overstate the value of our sanctioning and confirming to her the possession of the vast conquests she had made upon Europe. But it was precisely for this reason that we restricted it to its limited meaning, namely, the state of actual possession between us and her; and that Lord Lauderdale, in his answer to Clarke and Champagny of August 11th, insisted on the re-establishment, *sans phrase*, of the principle as we had understood it. In his eagerness to condemn the first step on the part of Lord Lauderdale, M. Gentz pretends that in requiring a specification of our demands under the *uti possidetis*, the French negociators were right *as against us*. He exclaims against the insufficiency of Lord Lauderdale's answer. "Il falloit d'abord," he says, "mettre au grand jour que la proposition de l'*uti possidetis* loin d'être injurieuse aux François étoit une preuve de la modération de l'Angleterre; puisque de toutes les bases possibles, elle étoit dans les circonstances du moment la plus avantageuse pour la France; que si tel avoit été le cas à l'époque des premières correspondances, et des premières conférences avec Lord Yarmouth, les changemens politiques qui avoient eu lieu depuis cette époque, renforçoient encore singulièrement les avantages primitifs de cette base. Qu'en admettant encore l'état des possessions après tout ce que le gouvernement François venait d'opérer de revolutions puissantes dans la situation de l'Empire Allemagne, c'étoit y comprendre ces revolutions, et se désister du droit incontestable d'intervenir dans ces grandes opérations qui assuroient à la France la souveraineté de la moitié de l'Allemagne."

All this is perfectly true with reference to the benefit which would have accrued to France, from our

admission of the principle laid down in this manner; but in the desperate condition of the Continent at this period, the way and the only way to avoid it was to take care in negotiating with her to guard against any act from which concessions and recognitions such as M. Gentz enumerates, and which his argument seems almost to recommend, must have resulted.

A word more on the *uti possidetis*, and we have done with it.

In the dispute which arose between the adverse negociators on the question whether this basis, even in its limited sense, had ever been admitted, M. Gentz takes part with those of France. He denies that it ever entered into the contemplation either of France to grant, or of England even to demand it. He says, "Il est faux et de toute fausseté que le gouvernement François ait proposé la base de l'*uti possidetis*." If, as contended for by the French negociators, and after them by M. Gentz and M. Bignon, there had been nothing to warrant our English interpretation on this point, except a loose word to Lord Yarmouth, thrown out in the hurry of sending him off to England, there might be some pretence for denying that they had offered it. But the reverse is the fact. The subject of peace had been considered and discussed between the two Powers long before Lord Yarmouth had been thought of by France to be the bearer of a distinct overture. On the 5th of March Talleyrand *had proposed* "a basis upon which peace, he said, might be discussed," namely, the peace of Amiens; Mr. Fox had rejected that basis, explaining, at the same time, the general principle which ought to be the foundation of treaties between independent states. Nothing further was said upon this point until Lord Yarmouth undertook to be the bearer of an official overture. On that occasion a deliberate discussion of terms, without a full understanding of which he would not

consent to be the bearer of any overture, took place between his Lordship and M. Talleyrand. Lord Yarmouth insisted upon the absolute unconditional retrocession of Hanover. Talleyrand took three days to consider, and agreed to it. Lord Yarmouth then asked about Sicily. "Vous l'avez," says Talleyrand, "nous ne vous la demandons pas." The same declaration was made in writing during the interchange of despatches between the two ministers, in which were mutually discussed the leading principles and objects of the contract they were about to enter upon. "We ask *nothing* from you," says Talleyrand, after three months of contentious wrangling. These were not idle words, used in the common reciprocations of civility; they were terms belonging to the subject-matter in debate, and to nothing else; they were terms strictly called for to denote the conditions on which the whole business was to turn.

In the face of this declaration M. Gentz, like M. Bignon, boldly tells us that except in Talleyrand's words to Lord Yarmouth, "il n'en existe aucune autre origine, aucune autre reconnaissance ou sanction." He may have meant that the above was only in a private letter. So are all communications between governments before the appointment of plenipotentiaries: but private or not, it was official. Letters of this kind are called "private," in contradistinction only to the regular despatches of ministers written after the exchange of their full powers, but are not less binding on the good faith of governments. As to the invidious sense attached to them by M. Gentz, in the whole course of his comments, it is utterly unworthy of notice.

Mr. Fox is next assailed for not having distinctly proposed the *uti possidetis* when he answered Talleyrand's letter on the 26th of March, instead of stating

what is termed a loose general principle. Had his accuser read Mr. Fox's despatch with any other purpose than that of abusing him, he would scarcely have recommended a proceeding so singularly hasty and imprudent. It is evident that Talleyrand in this first motion towards peace with England, was dexterously laying his ground for a separate one. This is clear from Mr. Fox's answer, telling him that he will do nothing without his allies. Was this then a time to talk of an *uti possidetis*, or of a *status quo*, or of any other basis, when he was in doubt whether his *principle* would be agreed to? His accuser, wilfully confounding the ideas of "basis" and "principle," demands "Pourquoi ne l'avoit-il pas articulé à sa place, ou du moins comme supplément à ces autres bases si vagues et si pitoyables que la paix, 'doit être honorable,' aux deux gouvernemens?" Why simply because his principle, instead of "vague et pitoyable," was distinct and fundamental: it was that of joint negociation. Mr. Fox, therefore, avoiding the trap into which this over-dexterous adviser would probably not have been sorry to see him fall, wisely abstained from proposing any basis; much less one that would have committed him to enter upon a treaty, not only before he could know on what basis Russia would be disposed to treat, but before he could determine whether he himself would consent to negociate at all.

What more is wanting? Will it be contended that for the purpose of establishing a basis for the negociation they were about to proceed upon, the plenipotentiaries ought to have drawn up an express protocol? When was such a proceeding ever heard of? But if this be disclaimed, how could any basis whatsoever be settled except by preliminary explanation between the negotiating governments?

In conclusion of all, comes the fact itself. Little

progress to be sure was ever made in this negotiation, Mr. Fox regarding it as hopeless almost from the first ; but that little was effected on the principle of *uti possidetis*, and on no other. Every thing was given up by France: nothing by England. It was only after the signature of D'Oubril's treaty that the French negociator interrupted ours by putting forward another principle, namely, that of reciprocal concession, in the shape of a proposal for an equivalent for Sicily: and there, in fact, the whole business ended.

To pursue these remarks any further were needless; but we are not ungrateful to M. Gentz for the conclusion which he enables us to put to them.

"Ajoutons quelques mots," he says, "sur les causes qui ont fait rompre cette négociation. Elle n'étoit point un chef d'œuvre de sagesse de la part de ceux qui l'ont dirigée. Elle n'étoit point un chef d'œuvre de dextérité de la part de ceux qui l'ont conduite, mais la loyauté qui la caractérise d'un bout à l'autre est digne de l'admiration générale.

"On offroit à l'Angleterre jusqu'aux derniers momens des conférences, la restitution du Hanovre, Malte, le Cap, Pondicherry, &c. (ce qui vouloit dire la domination exclusive de l'Inde), enfin Tobago. Pouvoit-elle en demander davantage pour ses intérêts particuliers? Et auroit-elle balancé de signer pour conserver encore quelques objets subalternes, tels que S^e Lucie, Surinam et Demérari? Non certainement pas. Pourquoi donc a-t-elle rompu la négociation? Pour ne pas dépouiller de la Sicile un roi à qui elle avoit promis son appui."

We accept, in part for what is due to it, this just testimony to the character of the transaction, adding one simple remark. A negotiation "commencée sous des auspices funestes," and when "le Continent étoit à moitié subjugué," — a negotiation so con-

ducted as to have commanded from its commencement to its close the terms enumerated in the passage we now cite,—a negotiation which established and preserved untouched, and in opposition to the master of the Continent, all the rights of Great Britain as to her relations with that Continent to their very utmost extent, can hardly be said to have failed either of wisdom in its plan, or of efficient vigour in its conduct.

THE END.

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